



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

HISTORY OF
6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON
1 JULY THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1971
RCS: USS-D3



1 April 1972



6994th Security Squadron, APO San Francisco 96307





HISTORY OF THE 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

01 July 1971 through 31 December 1971

RCS: USS-D3



Approved:

Grover S. McMakin

GROVER S McMAKIN, Lt Col, USAF
Commander



F R O N T I S P I E C E

As time evolves - hour by hour - day by day - week by week and month by month, history is in the making. To the unindoctrinated/uninterested individual, passage of time and the resultant historical developments are of little consequence. To those who see and record the passage of time as history, time becomes one of man's most valued possessions. Without the passage of time, there would be no history. So, as the year of 1971 comes to an end, we who are purported to be historians, again attempt to record for antiquity that which has passed before us. Our efforts will successfully capture a great share of those bygone events for posterity. Others will evade us as we struggle to recognize and isolate the significant and eliminate the commonplace. To reduce those instances where important events are lost in the web of time will be our goal. Since no historian has a crystal ball with which to view the future, it is impossible to know all that will be significant in years to come. Consequently, that which is herein written takes cognizance of historical events the writer recognizes as having rippled the surface of the sea of time. If through recording the past we will have shed light upon some of the problems of the future, we can feel satisfaction and pride in the accomplishment.

(Msgt Kyle L. Emerson, Unit Historian, 6994th Security Squadron.)

[REDACTED]

FOREWORD

This historical report covers the period 1 July 1971 through 31 December 1971 for those operations performed by the 6994th Security Squadron and staged from Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Republic of Vietnam.

The report concerns itself with the overall operational concepts of the 6994th Security Squadron in day-to-day performance of a direct support mission for Tactical Field Commanders. This record has been compiled in an effort to provide a continuous documentation of the Airborne Radio Direction Finding program in support of an armed conflict.

Historical accounts of three subordinate detachments of the squadron have been documented individually by these units.

This history is subject to revision. Additional information or suggested corrections will be welcome.

This report was written by Master Sergeant Kyle L. Emerson as additional duty Unit Historian, with valuable research assistance from Master Sergeant John T. Koraska and typing assistance from Master Sergeant John H. Ragsdale.

[REDACTED]

Listing of Key Personnel

Commander - Lt Col Grover S. McMakin
First Sergeant - MSgt John R. Herridge
Operations Officer - Major David H. Eddy
Assistant Operations Officer - Captain George F. Logan, Jr.
NCOIC Operations - CMSgt Luther M. David, Jr.
NCOIC Operations Requirements - SMSgt Ronald J. Faile
NCOIC Standardization Evaluation - TSgt Michael D. Preslar
OIC ACC - Captain William K. Skaer, Jr.
NCOIC ACC - SMSgt James A. Jones
OIC Mission Management - 1st Lt Henry X. Mioduski
NCOIC Mission Management - MSgt Thomas N McChesney
NCOIC Plans & Programs - MSgt John T. Koraska
OIC Operational VIM Training - Captain Thomas L. Collins
OIC VIM Maintenance Training - 1st Lt Owen T. Costello
OIC Local Operations - Major John V. Thompson
NCOIC Local Operations - MSgt William D. Baucom
NCOIC Local Analysis and Reporting - SMSgt David A. Mangum
OIC Communications Security - 1st Lt Jay G. Cowan
NCOIC Communications Security - SMSgt J. P. Regan
OIC Material/Maintenance - Captain Matthew R. Morrone
NCOIC Material/Maintenance - CMSgt Donald F. Connell
NCOIC Supply - MSgt J. L. Morris
NCOIC Communications - MSgt J. J. DiSabatino
NCOIC Administration - MSgt Andrew J. Brooks, Jr.
NCOIC Security Police - TSgt Leon A. Beverly
NCOIC Personnel - MSgt Ronald A. Grayum



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
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
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CHRONOLOGY

2 July COMUSMACV informed 7AF/6994SS of plans to transfer ALR-38s to NKP.

6-8 July Test flights flown by Det 2 in ALR-38s to determine volume of VHF in northern Laos.

10 July Flight training for VIM Class II begun.

13 July 6994SS proposed changes in mission duration to provide more time over target. (Variable Tasking).

16-20 July Coordination on replacement of 460TRW as command and control of TEWS begun.

24 July AFSSO PACAF advised all concerned of a need for 6 daily ALR-38 sorties from Danang (DNG).

27 July MACV concurred in variable tasking and announced intentions for implementation of a test period from 7-13 August.

28 July Blue Beetle program updated by 7AF.

30 July 7AF suggested transfer of two ALR-38s and three ALR-35s with R-2000 engines to NKP to replace the R-1830 powered ALR-35s being fraged from that base.

30 July MACV concurred with transfer of R-2000 powered (7 hour sortie capability) aircraft to Nakhon Phanom (NKP).

30 July PACAF recommended that action be taken to eventually establish a squadron of EC-47s at NKP.

02 August 7AF execution order for FIX/FAC operation in Danang area originated.

02 August 6994SS concurred in 15 October target date for transfer of ALR-38s to NKP.

03 August 7AF announced plans to transfer command and control of TEWS to 483 TAW at Cam Ranh Bay on 31 August.

03 August DIRNSA evaluation of ALR-38 test at NKP received, verifying the need for VHF fix capability (ALR-38) at that location.

[REDACTED]

05 August MACV concurred with tasking of CCZ for multi-channel collection, not to interfere with primary ARDF requirements.

06 August 6994SS reported a meeting to discuss transfer of Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq and 361 TEWS to Cam Ranh Bay.

11 August Meeting held at 7AF to discuss development of PAD covering movement of Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq and 361 TEWS to Cam Ranh Bay.

13 August Possibility of deactivation of Det 1, 361 TEWS and transfer of assets to Danang/Continental U.S. (CONUS) raised.

16 August 7AF recommended that deactivation vice relocation of Det 1, 361 TEWS, with transfer of certain resources to Danang and possibly deploying certain assets to CONUS.

17-18 August Quarterly 6994th Security Squadron Operations Officer conference held.

18 August Conference held at 7AF to discuss Black Bear communications problems.

26 August 6994th informed PSR of a number of options originated by 7AF for transfer of Det 1, 361 TEWS.

26 August 6994SS advised Pac Scty Rgn that sufficient manpower for manning 7 hour sorties from NKP were available within squadron resources.

31 August 460 TRW deactivated and command and control of TEWS transferred to 483 TAW, Cam Ranh Bay.

07 September 6994th Scty Sq advised Pac Scty Rgn of in-country actions to discuss phase-down of USAF ARDF assets.

07 September USAFSS concurred with 6994SS working with MACV/7AF as USAFSS representative in ARDF drawdown discussions.

10 September 6994th SS advised PSR that MACV had assumed the 'no reduction of assets' posture.

11 September Det 2, 6994SS announced system of relaying Black Bear fixes via AUTOSEVOCOM to 20th TASS.

15 September 7AF requested CINCPACAF approval for transfer of 15 EC-47s from Phu Cat UE to Danang vice movement of Det 1 to Cam Ranh Bay.

[REDACTED]

16 September 6994SS provided local operations and detachments with up-to-date status of SEA reductions.

16 September 6994SS advised of CAS Vientiane concern over lack of ARDF support.

17 September 6994SS advised Pac Scty Rgn of failure of CAS Vientiane to state requirements in tasking requests.

18 September ACC announced necessity to re-frag certain missions to cover enemy build-up in Cambodian/Vietnamese border area.

24 September NSA implemented study to determine quality of ARDF technical support.

30 September 6994SS advised of plan to resume Project Cumbersome tasking in near future.

01 October MACV expressed appreciation for outstanding support given in cover of Cambodian/Vietnamese border targets.

02 October Pac Scty Rgn expressed concern over the effect of Direct Support Unit closures on FIX pass timeliness.

02 October 7AF directed implementation of Brown Beaver FIX/FAC program for northern Laos.

06 October COMSEC submitted request for reduction of DHOC to Pac Scty Rgn.

09 October DIRNSA message concerning possible multichannel operations in Cambodia received.

10 October MACV directed special ALR-38 mission for cover of possible VHF multichannel.

11 October ALR-38/R2000 ALR-35s began regular sorties from NKP.

11 October Ground school for Class IV of VIM training begun.

12 October COMSEC received special Igloo White tasking.

13 October 903G mission established for ALR-38 sorties in Cambodia.

14 October 6994SS provided MACV with summary of favorable impact of variable tasking on ARDF results.

20 October MACV opposition of tentative plan for transfer of EC-47 assets to CONUS announced.

[REDACTED]

21-23 October Typhoon Hester forced evacuation of Phu Cat/
Danang aircraft to Tan Son Nhut/Nakhon Phanom
respectively, and hampered construction of Danang
facilities to accommodate influx of Phu Cat
resources.

22 October COMSEC tasked with participation in tri-service
COMSEC survey of MACSOG operations.

23 October Advised by USM-7 that Project Cumbersome test would
resume on 25 October.

24 October Phu Cat aircraft departed Saigon safe haven follow-
ing typhoon evacuation.

25 October 30 day test of Project Cumbersome resumed.

25 October Danang/Phu Cat aircraft departed Nakhon Phanom safe
haven following typhoon evacuation.

25 October 7AF directed that plans for transfer of Phu Cat
aircraft be held in abeyance until further notice.

27 October Plans for SSTB personnel to begin scheduling for
VIM back-end crews announced by ACC.

31 October 7AF advised that transfer of Phu Cat aircraft would
begin on 6 November.

01 November 366TFW (Danang) advised of minimum required items
to support influx of Phu Cat aircraft and crews.

03 November Det 1 issued plan for personnel movement in con-
junction with deactivation.

06 November Det 1 began standing down: Two aircraft transferred
to Danang (DNG), six to Tan Son Nhut (TSN).

06 November Complaint received from [REDACTED] concerning number
of ALR-38 missions being fraggged into Plainne des
Jarres (PDJ) area of Northern Laos.

07 November Six TSN ALR-35s transferred to DNG and five ALR-34s
arrived TSN from PHC.

08 November Movement of complex aircraft completed, with three
aircraft being moved from DNG to TSN.

08 November All Det 1 supply assets at Phu Cat turned in to the
host base.

[REDACTED]

11 November Material functions terminated at Phu Cat.

11 November CSAF message providing for turn-over of 23 EC-47s to VNAF on 31 December 1971 received.

12 November Detachment 1, 6994SS officially deactivated.

19 November Need for additional CCZ assets at TSN aired by 509 RRG.

22 November All AGE equipment for turn over to VIM on hand at TSN.

22 November Plan for closure of Cam Ranh Bay and deactivation of 483TAW announced.

22 November Plan for resubordination of TEWS to 377ABW at TSN and 366TFW at DNG announced.

25 November Project Cumbersome test terminated.

26 November Target date of 15 December set for trade-off of three TSN ALR-34CC for three DNG ALR-34CCZ.

08 December Meeting held at MACV to discuss ARDF/AGI support to Laotian intelligence requirements.

10 December Rehabilitation of building to house VIM maintenance completed.

12 December 7AF intent for resolution of TEWS command and control problem announced.

15 December Meeting held at 7AF to discuss TEWS subordination.

15 December Det 2 suggested cancellation of Black Bear FIX/FAC tip-off program.

21 December Guidelines established for aviation units to request tasking changes.

27 December 7AF stated need for more voice collection emphasis in Steel Tiger.

31 December VIM maintenance training began.

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

[REDACTED] The organization of the 6994th Security Squadron was comparable to that of the majority of USAF Security Service units. Directly subordinate to the Pacific Security Region at Wheeler Air Force Base, Hawaii, this was the only intermediate between the squadron and Headquarters, USAF Security Service. The one difference in organization was the subordination of three (two after 12 November 1971) ⁽¹⁾ operational detachments to the squadron. The mission of the 6994th and subordinate detachments was unique. Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) in support of tactical units (both Army and Air Force) within the Republic of Vietnam placed the 6994th in the distinctive position of being the only USAF unit of its kind.

Mission

[REDACTED] The 6994th Security Squadron (Scty Sq) was located at Tan Son Nhut Airfield (Afld), Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The operational mission of the 6994th Scty Sq was to conduct Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and specified Airborne Communications Intelligence (ACI) collection against enemy targets in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ), and Cambodia in direct support of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Another mission of the 6994th Scty Sq was providing direct Communications Security (COMSEC) support to Tactical Commanders and 7th Air Force (7AF). ⁽²⁾

(U) In addition to the mission performed in III and IV CTZs, the 6994th Scty Sq provided command, operational, and administrative control for the three subordinate units located at Phu Cat Air Base (AB), RVN,

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Danang AB, RVN, and Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB),
 Thailand. (3)

[REDACTED] The Command, Administration, Personnel, Communications, and Operations functions were located in the Air Force Special Security Office (AFSSO) 7AF compound within the Headquarters 7AF compound at Tan Son Nhut Afd, RVN. The squadron logistics function was located on the flight line adjacent to the 360th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS). The 360th TEWS directly supported the 6994th Scty Sq by providing the necessary aircraft and front-end crews. The 360th TEWS was subordinate to the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) from 1 July until 31 August 1971, at which time command and control of the 360th TEWS, Detachment 1, 360th TEWS Nakhon, 361st TEWS at Phu Cat AB, and 362d TEWS at Danang came under the purview of the 483d Tactical Airlift Wing at Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN. The 361st, 362d, and Detachment 1, 360th TEWS directly supported Detachments 1, 2, and 3 of 6994th Scty Sq respectively, in the same relationship as that of the 360th TEWS and 6994th Scty Sq. (4)

[REDACTED] The 6994th Scty Sq performed the ARDF mission in South Vietnam and Cambodia aboard EC-47 platforms throughout the entire reporting period and were tasked with the completion of any of three types of missions: ARDF, ARDF/ACI, and when ARDF capability was lost, ACI only. In accomplishing these missions, two separate position equipment configurations, COMBAT CROSS (CC) and COMBAT CROSS ZULU (CCZ) were utilized. In subsequent portions of this historical document, the specific tasking for each of these positions and configurations is outlined in detail. (5)

*See Chapter IV for additional information.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Organizational Structure

(U) The 6994th Scty Sq was subordinate to Pacific Security Region (Pac Scty Rgn), located at Wheeler Air Force Base (AFB), Hawaii.

[REDACTED] In view of the daily inter-service involvement throughout the entire ARDF program in Southeast Asia (SEA) (i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force, Australian, and Vietnamese), the general operational control of the entire ARDF effort was exercised by the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV).⁽⁶⁾

Internal Organizational Structure

(U) The 6994th Scty Sq integral support functions consisted of Administration, Personnel, Airborne Equipment Maintenance*, Operations Supply*, Communications, and Security.⁽⁷⁾

(U) The operations functions consisted of Local Operations, Squadron Mission Management, COMSEC, and Airborne Coordination Center (ACC).⁽⁸⁾

[REDACTED] Local Operations was responsible for the management of airborne mission resources located at Tan Son Nhut Afd. This function directed, coordinated, and controlled personnel and mission equipment toward achieving maximum mission effectiveness. They provided for all operational missions and were responsible for scheduling and training newly assigned airborne personnel. They coordinated with ACC and 360th TEWS on all changes to mission tasking and published daily flying schedules all fraged mission areas. Additionally, coordination with the TEWS command and control element and 7AF was conducted on special occasions. They performed analysis and reporting on all ARDF and COMINT *Specific functions and appropriate historical data is outlined in detail in Chapter VI of this history.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

intercept collected, prepared daily/weekly evaluations and reports on
(9)
the squadron's ARDF/Collection accomplishments.

Scheduling Section Re-Organized:

(U) Local scheduling was the focal point of all duties performed by airborne personnel assigned to 6994th Scty Sq. From 1 July until mid-August, the scheduling section was made up of 3 Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) (one E-6 and two E-5s), working on a semi-rotational schedule. A review of the workload and the Job Continuity folders for the section revealed several extraneous tasks, and a lack of continuity. In mid-August, the section was reorganized, with the assignment of one E-6 and one E-4. The former semi-rotational schedule was replaced with a 7 day per week operation, with both assigned individuals working days only.

(U) To accomplish the reorganization, considerable changes were necessary. Tasks unrelated to scheduling were either eliminated or transferred to more appropriate sections. This allowed the scheduling section to concentrate solely on airborne problems, or areas directly associated with the airborne mission. Prior to this time, an overage of 202s within the Local Operations Branch had allowed assignment of one individual per shift to the additional duty of driver for the crew van. When 202XO slots were reduced, it became necessary to schedule drivers for this particular duty. Initially, random selection of persons to fill this position was employed. The problem was later resolved by the establishment of a fixed driving crew, selected from the unit's most qualified drivers. Through this action, the scheduling section's duties were simplified and more efficient vehicle control was realized.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 15 November 1971, 360th TEWS implemented a program to have a ground check performed on all aircraft prior to launch time, thereby greatly reducing late Initial Time Over Target (ITOT) incidents. On 19 November, following close coordination with 360th TEWS, 6994th Scty Sq established a pre-flight detail, whereby one A292X1 was assigned to pre-flight back-end equipment on a daily basis. Expanding upon this duty, the Scheduling Section in cooperation with the Ground Training Section, made this duty a part of the ground training indoctrination program. This allowed a student and the Instructor Radio Operator (IRO) to whom the student was assigned to be scheduled for this pre-flight duty, making it possible for the student to become familiar with the back-end equipment and pre-flight procedures prior to his initial flight. This program was enthusiastically endorsed by the IROs, as it greatly enhanced the student's familiarity with both the aircraft and equipment prior to his assuming responsibility for a position under actual combat sortie conditions.

(U) The Scheduling Section also became responsible for assigning students to individual IROs. This facet ranged from critical to negligible in its degree of impact upon the squadron's mission. At the peak of the permanent change of station (PCS) turnover during September and October, up to 16 individuals were in training status at a given time, resulting in IROs being assigned two trainees simultaneously. This situation led to IROs exceeding their authorized flight time in given months and necessitated immediate action to upgrade the more proficient Class III operators to IRO status. By the end of 1971, the

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IRO/student imbalance had been resolved, with adequate certified IROs available to handle any student influx.

[REDACTED] An imbalance between authorized and required A203s presented a constant scheduling problem during the early part of this historical period. A203s had been programmed into the unit, based upon a specific number of CCZ aircraft assigned. MACV requirements being fluid, required a change in CCZ assignment/utilization, placing five CCZ configured EC-47s on temporary duty status (TDY) to Detachment 3, 6994th Scty Sq, and retaining CC platforms at the 6994th. Additionally, the impetus of the Vietnamization program added to these complications, in that more and more CCZ sorties were manned by Vietnamese linguists, leaving the U.S. A203s virtually without a job. Lacking slots/requirements to place these individuals on regular flying duties, they were placed in various duties throughout the organization, ranging from Duty NCO to analytical assistants. While this satisfied the requirement for day to day utilization of manpower resources, it became the responsibility of the scheduling section to insure equitable distribution of the few flying requirements that were available to prevent aggravation of an already potentially explosive morale problem. Turnovers and PCS movements ultimately brought the number of assigned personnel down to a more realistic level, and through coordination with the Vietnamese Improvement and Modernization (VIM) Section, arrangements were made to allow A203s to fly as linguists aboard VIM CCZ missions. This served to insure adequate airborne duties to alleviate the situation and insure proper use of assigned airborne linguists.

[REDACTED] During the past historical period, certain contingencies

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

were experienced which further taxed the Scheduling Section to meet daily requirements. For nearly 60 days (October-December) one member of the Scheduling Section was TDY for manning assistance, leaving only one individual to perform all scheduling duties. It was during this period that two separate aircraft movements transpired: Typhoon Hester forced the evacuation of Detachment 2 aircraft resources and Detachment 1 closure brought an influx of aircraft into Tan Son Nhut. In both instances, local scheduling was tasked with the assignment of crews to both the local missions and those of visiting aircraft as well. Close coordination between 6994th Scty Sq, Airborne Radio Direction Finding Coordination Center (ACC), and 360th TEWS greatly facilitated this task and all missions were launched as scheduled.

[REDACTED] The increased integration of the Vietnamese into the ARDF program had a significant impact upon the scheduling section. During the 3 October Vietnamese national elections, it was necessary to provide 15 additional U.S. stand-by crew members to insure that all fragged missions were fully manned in the event election poll times conflicted with the ARVN operator's mission schedule. As the VIM program progressed, constant rearrangement of crew structures was necessary to meet mission requirements. All VIM missions were flown with one USAFSS operator aboard, due to the lack of language expertise which prevented Vietnamese operators from working with English speaking ground operators. Scheduling of these VIM mission augmentees became an integral part of the Scheduling Section's responsibility and required constant coordination between the two sections. In addition, a stand-by crew was scheduled daily to replace any VIM operator who failed to show for a fragged mission.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Increased participation in personnel management was a major factor in the success of the scheduling function. All correspondence involving aircrew members (including leaves, Rest and Relaxation (R&R) absences, TDYs, etc.) were cleared through the Scheduling Section prior to final approval. Copies of the unit manning report were delivered to the section on a daily basis, as were all matters emanating from the local personnel office, such as port calls, tour unavailments, tour extensions, etc. A line of communications was established between the Scheduling Section and the base Flight Surgeon's office for the purpose of monitoring the status of personnel who were unable to fly due to medical reasons.

(U) As a result of this reorganization, crew schedules were prepared daily, two days in advance of the effective date. This arrangement was well received by all aircrew members. Changes to any day's schedule were held to a minimum, limited to conditions of an emergency nature.

Mission Management:

[REDACTED] The Mission Management function for the 6994th Scty Sq was accomplished by two separate offices, one coming under Local Operations and one a Squadron function, subordinate to the Squadron Operations Officer. The local operations function prepared and forwarded the Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS), prepared and forwarded all changes to the USA-561 distribution lists, and prepared a weekly evaluation of the local operations mission accomplishments.

[REDACTED] The Squadron Mission Management function was responsible for the staff supervision of all ARDF and COMINT collection missions at the 6994th (Local Operations subordinated) and subordinate detachments. (10)

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

The section evaluated management summaries and position status reports submitted by subordinate elements and maintained weekly and monthly statistics which were used to identify trends/problems in all areas of productivity. The statistical management data base maintained by the section was used not only at the 6994th Soty Sq but also at staff level by both 7AF and MACV. Additionally, the Mission Management Section participated in the development of plans, programs, Joint Operating Agreements (JOAs), and other directives governing all aspects of squadron operational functions. Mission Management was responsible for monitoring/ updating the Master Program, the submission of Change Requests generated thereby, and assisted in the preparation of Manpower Change Requests which were generated as a result of Master Program action. Periodic Master Program Review Boards were convened under the guidance of Mission Management to insure current/future alignment of documented resources with constantly changing mission requirements. Preparation of various weekly and monthly Programmed Actions Directives (PADs) progress reports was also a function of Mission Management. (11)

Training:

The training function of the 6994th Soty Sq was concerned with two distinct phases; ARDF Proficiency Training, and normal upgrade training. The ARDF Proficiency Training involved the conducting of a familiarization "ground training" course prior to a newly arrived individual being placed on airborne orders, monitoring upgrade actions as the newly assigned individual progressed, and maintaining Air Force Forms 623 in accordance with existing directives. AFSC upgrade training was limited to seven level upgrade, since five level is a prerequisite for

operators being assigned to the ARDF program. There was an average of 10 persons on seven level training throughout this historical period, with no end of course tests being given.

Standardization Evaluation Flight Examination (SEFE):

The Standardization Evaluation Flight Examination (SEFE) function was composed of a Chief Examiner (SEFE), (a member of the squadron operations staff), and the Local Operations SEFE section. The Chief SEFE was responsible for monitoring the flight examination/evaluation procedures employed by the SEFE sections of Local Operations and subordinate detachments. He also acted as an advisor to the Operations Officer on matters involving standardization evaluation examinations. Additionally, as a means of insuring that current material was utilized by 6940 Technical Training Group (TTG), Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas for the schooling of operators destined for assignment to the 6994th complex, the Chief SEFE provided quarterly update information on all changes in techniques generated at a squadron level. The Local Operations SEFE section, composed of A202, A203, and A292 personnel, worked in close coordination with the ARDF Proficiency Training Section to insure timely action to upgrade newly assigned personnel. Cognizance of the Scheduling Section's activities was also an important requirement of the SEFE Section, thereby insuring that IRO upgrade actions were taken in a sufficiently timely manner to provide adequate IROs to guarantee ease of scheduling and constant upgrade capability.

Communications Security (COMSEC):*

The COMSEC function of the 6994th Scty Sq continued to

*See Chapter V for complete resume of COMSEC activities.

[REDACTED]

operate in direct support of 7AF, a unique position for any United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) COMSEC unit. This support consisted of providing timely information concerning probable or possible intelligence losses and COMSEC weaknesses on which the tactical commander could base operational decisions. This was accomplished by continual monitoring of telephone/radio communications, conducting analysis, and reporting the results thereof directly to 7AF. (11)

ARDF Coordination Center (ACC):

[REDACTED] The ARDF Coordination Center (ACC) function was manned and operated jointly by members of the 509th Radio Research Group (RRG) and the 6994th Scty Sq in accordance with MACV Directive 381-23. Located in the Headquarters, 509th RRG at Whitebirch Station within the Vietnamese Joint General Staff Compound, the ACC was the organization through which MACV coordinated ARDF/ACI operations throughout SEA. The mission of this unique center was to provide for the coordination, control, and evaluation of all functions connected with the ARDF/ACI program. This included the coordinated scheduling and evaluation of ARDF and ACI missions as directed by MACV. (12)

Administrative Support:

[REDACTED] The 6994th Security Squadron also provided administrative support to the Security Service Liaison Officer (SSLO), Electronic Warfare Liaison Officer (EWLO) to 7AF, and USAFSS personnel assigned to Operating Location Delta-Delta (OL-DD), 6970th Support Group. Tasked with separate missions, these activities functioned independently of the 6994th Scty Sq. (13)

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Chapter II

SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION

[REDACTED] The Commander, MACV exercised operational control of the ARDF/ACI activities performed by the 6994th Scty Sq. Technical control of assigned ARDF/ACI activities was exercised by the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA).⁽¹⁾

[REDACTED] The 6994th Scty Sq was tasked with ARDF collection, processing, and reporting of Southeast Asia Communist High Frequency (HF) tactical morse and voice communications. In addition, ACI tasking was levied against both HF and Very High Frequency (VHF) SEA Communist morse and single-channel voice communications. Applicable authorities held the prerogative for tasking against all other entities deemed necessary.⁽²⁾

[REDACTED] Collection was accomplished through the use of EC-47 aircraft, manned by Manual Morse and Voice Systems Specialists.

Basic Missions

[REDACTED] For the period of this report, the 6994th Scty Sq, staging from Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN, was tasked with flying missions in SEA Areas 01,02,03, 04 (RVN), and 20 (Cambodia).* The primary objective of these missions was to obtain accurate locations through ARDF of Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces operating in South Vietnam and Cambodia. In addition, the secondary mission was to collect target communications data in order to derive exploitable intelligence. The 6994th Scty Sq utilized two basic methods

*For outline of SEA ARDF areas see Appendix II.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (3)
of operation in accomplishing this assigned mission.

COMBAT CROSS (CC)

([REDACTED]) The primary objective of CC missions was to fix enemy target transmitters deemed priority targets by MACV. CC aircraft were configured with two individual Signal Intelligence positions; ARDF and ARDF acquisition. The ARDF and ARDF acquisition positions were designated "X" and "Y" consoles, respectively. The "X" position was capable of fixing targets within a frequency range of 2 to 16 megahertz (MEZ). During fix operation, the "Y" console provided supporting intercept copy of ARDF targets and when time permitted, performed a Communications Intelligence (COMINT) collection mission, directed toward maximum continuity and development of all hostile target transmitters. The "Y" console operated within a frequency range of .2 to 30 MEZ. (4)

COMBAT CROSS ZULU (GCZ)

([REDACTED]) This platform possessed two positions in addition to those found on the CC aircraft. The additional positions provided voice and manual morse intelligence collection capabilities and were designated "Z1" and "Z2" respectively. The "Z1" and "Z2" consoles were wired for flexible systems capability and could be configured for HF/HF, VHF/VHF, or HF/VHF reception. Selection of HF/VHF receivers and VHF tuners was more in consonance with the target environment to be exploited and in consideration of other systems component characteristics, (i.e., Antenna/Pre-amplification capability of .2 to 300 MEZ). To accomplish 6994th Scty Sq mission requirements, the two collection positions were configured in accordance with tasking/collection requirement of the

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TRW/483 TAW* provided ACC with an aircraft availability forecast for the tasking week in question. ACC then assigned individual missions to fulfill the tasking requirement originally generated by the Field Force Commanders to each Collection Management Authority (CMA) and the 6994th Scty Sq on Thursday of each week. At the same time, ACC provided a "sanitized" version of the tasking to 7AF for issuance of the required Fragmentary Order (FRAG ORDER) for each mission to be flown. On Friday morning of each week, the 6994th Scty Sq received position tasking from the appropriate CMA having the SIGINT collection, processing, and reporting responsibility for the specific target area of operations concerned. Prior to each day's series of missions, the applicable CMA provided the majority of technical data. Once airborne, CC/CCZ crews, through Air/Ground/Air contact with Direct Support Units (DSUs) and the 6994th Scty Sq local operations, had access to additional technical data for individual FRAG areas. In addition, DSUs accepted all fixes from the airborne platform, passed tip-offs to the aircraft, and accepted messages which were deemed exploitable by the airborne crew. The 6994th Scty Sq also accepted fixes and exploitable messages for relay to CMAs when air-
(7)
crew contact with the SDU could not be made.

Tasking Revisions/Improvement Actions

Basing of ALR-38 Aircraft at Nakhon Phanom

Early in 1971, DIRNSA expressed a desire for VHF coverage in Northern Laos. Between April and June, numerous messages of coordination involving MACV, USAFSS, 7AF, DIRNSA, and the 6994th Scty Sq were exchanged concerning basing of VHF equipped ALR-38s at Nakhon Phanom to cover
*460TRW from 1 July-31 August, 483 TAW from 1 Sep-31 December.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

this growing demand. An estimated target date of late September/early
(8)
October was generally agreed upon.

[REDACTED] Several different problems prevailed. Initially, the uniqueness of the ALR-38 ARDF system as opposed to the ALR-34 and ALR-35 made maintenance and operation a somewhat different problem. Maintenance technicians with ALR-38 experience were not available to allow for division of the ALR-38 fleet between two bases within the 6994th Scty Sq complex. Avionics Ground Equipment (AGE) to support ALR-38 was not available to allow for dispersing of facilities. The fact that all ALR-38 equipped EC-47s were powered by the more sophisticated R-2000 vice the standard R-1830 engine had to be considered from the aircraft maintenance standpoint. Finally, action to divert VHF equipment to Nakhon Phanom for Laotian targeting could not be taken until such a time as activity in the mission area of Detachment 2, 6994th Scty Sq at Danang would allow
(9)
the loss of VHF capability at that site.

[REDACTED] To determine the volume of VHF intercept available in the Barrell Roll area (Northern Laos), three missions were flown by Danang personnel (staging from Nakhon Phanom) on 6, 7, and 8 July. To accomplish this test, Detachment 2 maintenance personnel, with a supply of ALR-38 unique parts, were sent to Nakhon Phanom to accomplish the launch,
(10)
recovery, and maintenance responsibility for the ALR-38 systems. Since Detachment 1, 6990th Scty Sq, Cam Ranh Bay, RVN (among operational USAFSS units) possessed the only pertinent data base on North Laotian VHF targets, Pac Scty Rgn requested that all technical data available be provided to Detachment 3. Of specific importance was the multi-channel VHF
(11)
known to be emanating from the Plaine Des Jarres area.

[REDACTED] In response to this request, Detachment 1, 6990th Scty Sq

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

advised that Bench Lance* intercept in the Plaine des Jarre Area (SEA ARDF Area 15) had been rather sparse during the latter part of June 1971. Available technical data was passed on, with a recommendation that assistance be requested from analyst at USM-7 and USA-29 (Udorn, Thailand ground intercept sites. (12)

[REDACTED] Firm planning steps were taken on 2 July 1971, when COMUSMACV informed 7AF and 6994th Scty Sq of plans to transfer 3 ALR-38s and 2 ALR-35Qs** to Nakhon Phanom (NKP) to replace the ALR-35 N/P (R-1830 powered) that were being fraged from NKP at the time. (13)

[REDACTED] In a 22 July message, Pac Scty Rgn apprised AFSSO Pacific Air Forces with a resume of ALR-38 activities, stressing what appeared to be mis-tasking by MACV, in that ALR-38s were being fraged into predominately HF environmental areas, thereby depleting the effectiveness of the VHF capability. This message stressed that VHF activity in the Southern Laotian panhandle (Steel Tiger) could be covered better by selective targeting of Danang based ALR-38s. Pac Scty Rgn suggested that 7AF insistence upon Steel Tiger targeting by VHF capable platforms was essential. (14)

[REDACTED] This situation was iterated by AFSSO PACAF on 24 July along with other pertinent information primarily concerning SEA ARDF utilization and particularly the VHF resources. They expounded upon the fact that VHF 1.5 watt single-channel (R1XX) and 2.5 watt multi-channel (R401) General Directorate of Rear Services (GDRS) had long been recognized

*Bench Lance - Det 1, 6990th/PACAF C-130 ACRP staging from Cam Ranh Bay.

** Aircraft equipped with R-2000 vice R-1830 engines.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

as a lucrative source of valuable intelligence concerning the movement of troops and supplies, both in the Steel Tiger and Barrell Roll areas of Laos. To adequately cover the Steel Tiger area, PACAF stressed the need for 6 daily sorties by ALR-38 aircraft staging from Danang, with no foreseen possibility for that requirement to diminish. Past practices had been for MACV to task the majority of the ALR-38s with missions in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between RVN and North Vietnam and in the tri-border (Laos/North Vietnam/RVN) areas. Linked with the requirement to support 7AF Steel Tiger commitments was the necessity to effect Barrell Roll coverage in support of [REDACTED]. As a result, PACAF/USAFSS planners had recognized the fact that coverage of both Steel Tiger and Barrell Roll requirements could be effected from NKP. While this would have been the ideal arrangement, the cryptologic headroom ceiling for Thailand prohibited the increase of EC-47 staging from NKP. As an alternative, PACAF tentatively suggested the immediate transfer of five ALR-38s to NKP to replace the ALR-35s then in use. As an added point, PACAF suggested that immediate action be taken to obtain the necessary ceiling increase to allow for retention of an EC-47 squadron consisting of 9 ALR-38s and 3 ALR-35s at NKP after all U.S. forces had been removed from RVN.

(15)

[REDACTED] In response to this PACAF action, 7AF coordinated with MACV and obtained tentative agreement for the transfer of two ALR-38s and three ALR-35s (all R-2000 engines with 7 hour mission capability) from Danang to NKP and in turn relocate the 5 R-1830 powered ALR-35s at NKP to Danang. At that time (30 July 1971), MACV still considered

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) and GDRS transmitters in the DMZ and A Shau Valley areas as first priority VHF ARDF targets. MACV stressed a need for retaining at least 7 of the 9 ALR-38 systems at Danang. (16)

[REDACTED] MACV took formal action to request transfer action on 30 July. In a message of that date, they announced the need for both Barrell Roll and Steel Tiger VHF coverage by VHF equipped ARDF platforms. The proposal outlined by MACV included the tasking of 10 weekly ALR-38 and 16 additional 7 hour (either ALR-35 or ALR-38) for a total of 26 seven hour sorties from NKP. At the same time, 36 ALR-38 (7 hour sorties) and 26 five hour ALR-35 CGZ sorties would be staged from Danang. Target date for transfer of aircraft to allow for formal tasking was set for 15 October 1971. (17)

[REDACTED] This information was provided Pac Scty Rgn on 2 August 1971. At that time, 6994th Scty Sq envisioned the transfer of 2 ALR-38s and three ALR-35Q (R-2000) aircraft to NKP. 6994th Scty Sq was concerned as to the availability of a satisfactory maintenance cadre to allow for splitting of ALR-38 resources. However, the 15 October target date was accepted as feasible. (18)

[REDACTED] Evaluation of the ALR-38 test flown in early July was received from DIRNSA on 4 August. During the test, four missions were flown with 8 fixes and 7 VHF cuts being obtained. Seven of the 8 targets fixed had been previously carried as unlocated and unidentified. In view of the test results, DIRNSA stated their belief that the test had proven the value of the ALR-38 system in Northern Laos, and supported the proposed MACV alignment. (19)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As the friendly offensive commenced in the Plaine des Jarres, [REDACTED] became concerned about the lack of enemy communications activity. In an 18 August message this concern was announced, and the possibility of the transfer of at least one ALR-38 trained maintenance personnel prohibited the permanent transfer of an aircraft. As an alternative, 6994th Scty Sq suggested the TDY of one ALR-38 per week, flying 3 to 5 missions from NKP and subsequently return to Danang for maintenance checks. It was pointed out that it was doubtful if the aircraft/system could be maintained in an operationally ready status for longer periods at NKP. (20)

[REDACTED] Consideration of ALR-38 EC-47 assets for Northern Laos was affected by the plan to replace Nakhom Phanom based Army RU-8s* with RU-21s.** Such action had been proposed, along with an alternative to transfer one U-21 from Army SEA resources to Udorn. DIRNSA indicated that as of 21 August, National Security Agency Liaison Office (NSALO)/Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were staffing a message that would request Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) concurrence, Department of the Army (DA) reaffirmation of aircraft availability, and National Security Agency (NSA) rejustification for this alternative action. Since any aircraft trade-off action was entirely dependent upon Thailand cryptologic ceiling dictates, the ultimate decision had to be kept within manpower limitations. (21)

[REDACTED] In recognition of the fact that replacement of EC-47s

* RU-8 - Army ARDF platform with only HF capability.

** RU-21 - Army ARDF platform with VHF capability.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

with 5 hour capabilities with 7 hour platforms would greatly increase flying time requirements, Pac Scty Rgn requested 6994th Scty Sq to review and provide a resume of the impact this would place on squadron personnel resources. This impact was greatest in the A292X1 area, with 24 being authorized at Detachment 3 and 29 required. All other pertinent fields were adequately provided for by the Unit Detail List (UDL). 6994th Scty Sq stated the belief that augmentees to satisfy the 292X1 deficiency (22) would be available from within squadron complex resources.

[REDACTED] After consultation with 7AF, it was determined that advancement of programmed date for transfer would not be possible. This was due to maintenance training requirements in regards to ALR-38 systems, lack of R-2000 maintenance spare parts, and the lack of maintenance support at NKP. In a joint 7AF/6994th Scty Sq message, the recommendation that "short duration" temporary duty (TDY) of aircraft from Danang would be the only possible solution to effect emergency coverage of Northern Laos (23) by ALR-38 platforms.

[REDACTED] MACV did not press for such emergency action. Consequently, the transfer planning was allowed to progress as scheduled. Final direction from 7AF covered all contingencies and outlined actions to be taken as follows: (1) Transfer five ALR-35 N/P* aircraft assigned to 360 TEWS at Tan Son Nhut and staging from NKP to the 362d TEWS at Danang; (2) Arrange for three ALR-35 EC-47Q** and two ALR-38Qs to be placed on TDY status from the 362d TEWS to KNP; and (3) Implement a programming Document * EC-47 N/P - R-1830 powered, capable of 5 hour missions as CCZ platforms. ** ALR-35 EC-47Q - Powered with R-2000 engine and capable of 7 hour missions in CCZ configuration.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

change to reflect the Unit Equipment (UE) increase of five ALR-35 EC-47 N/P at the 362d TEWS and a simultaneous removal of the same aircraft from the 360th TEWS UE at Tan Son Nhut. Advantages listed for this action included the consolidation of support at one location, elimination of long exchange flights between Tan Son Nhut and Nakhon Phanom for phase maintenance, and allowed the 360th TEWS to isolate its activities and concentrate on programmed Vietnamization responsibilities.*⁽²⁴⁾

[REDACTED] As this planning progressed, simultaneous plans were being formulated for the closure of Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq and the 361st TEWS at Phu Cat Air Base, RVN. This action had a sweeping effect upon aircraft disposition. Relocation of the fleet of 20 ALR-34 EC-47 Combat Cross Configured aircraft from these units, coupled with this ALR-38 basing action dictated a massive re-shuffling of all 6994th Scty Sq platform assets. It was generally agreed that only ALR-34 aircraft would be retained at Tan Son Nhut, and that all ALR-35 N/Ps at Tan Son Nhut would be transferred to Danang, along with several of the Phu Cat based ALR-34s. Since this massive move was to take place in early November, 483d TAW at Cam Ranh Bay (at the time Command and Control authority for the TEWS) stated a desire to make all movements at the same time, thereby eliminating possible confusion. It was generally agreed that this would afford an acceptable solution for all concerned.

(U) This planning went awry in mid October as a result of weather. On 22-23 October, Typhoon Hester struck Danang, forcing the typhoon evacuation of all operational aircraft, many of which were evacuated to Nakhon

*See Chapter VII, Special Interest Items, for complete resume of the Vietnamization Program.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Phanom.

[REDACTED] When the weather allowed for a return to Danang, the five ALR-35s TDY from Tan Son Nhut (360TEWS) that were staging from NKP were returned to Danang, and four ALR-38s and one ALR35Q were retained at NKP, finally giving Detachment 3 the long sought capability for VHF coverage of North Laos. Although the planned arrangement of 3 ALR-35Q and two ALR-38s was not realized due to the non-operational status of two of the three ALR-35Qs assigned to the complex, the primary objective had been realized. It is significant to note that as of 31 December 1971, this planned mix of 35/38 platforms had not been reached, although the Master Program for Detachment 3 was changed to reflect the planned structure. It appeared doubtful if the initial plan would ever be realized, because of the lack of ALR-35Qs to serve as back-up. As of 31 December, five 7 hour platforms were being staged from NKP, with the mix of one ALR-35/four ALR-38s or two ALR-35/three ALR-38s dominating. (25)

EG-47/Forward Air Controller Targeting

[REDACTED] Throughout the period of this report, 6994th Scty Sq, along with subordinate detachments, was tasked with direct working between mission aircraft and Forward Air Controllers (FAC). The Blue Beetle program, as the 6994th Scty Sq (South Vietnam/Cambodia) effort was called, was tested in early 1971 and adopted as standard procedure. The objective of the program was to allow ARDF platforms to pass pertinent fix data to the FAC via secure voice communications. The FAC was subsequently able to provide immediate visual reconnoiter (VR) of the target and if

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

(26)

deemed lucrative, call in immediate strike activity.

[REDACTED] During the six month period (1 July through 31 December), a total of 982 Blue Beetle missions were flown by 6994th Scty Sq. During these missions, 1019 fixes were passed to the FAC, 244 of which were VR'd, resulting in 26 air strikes.

[REDACTED] Operating procedures for the Blue Beetle program were consolidated and updated by 7AF on 28 July 1971. Procedures were set up as follows: (1) EC-47 crews would pass (via secure voice communications) the UTM coordinates, the fix radius, visual description of area if possible, and the priority of the target to the appropriate FAC; (2) All communications would be accomplished by U.S. crewmembers (this stipulation was necessary since some crews were composed of both Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and USAF personnel); (3) 6994th Scty Sq was tasked with providing a weekly summary of targets passed, along with Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for use by 7AF and 360 TEWS; (4) Although assignment of a dedicated FAC was not always possible, a plan to designate one EC-47 as "primary" ARDF platform to work with a dedicated FAC was outlined, while other EC-47s would be selected to pass targets, but would be considered as "secondary" missions; and (5) Specific commu-
(27)
cations procedures were established governing tip-off of target data.

Expansion of FIX/FAC Program to Include Entire 6994th Complex:

[REDACTED] As the execution of the Blue Beetle program continued, daily feedback reports indicated recurring problems. These included (but were not limited to) communications problems, weather limitations, aborts of either the ARDF or FAC aircraft, and terrain/vegetation

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

restrictions placed upon VR activities. Nevertheless, 7AF was convinced that the program was highly successful and remained optimistic. In view of the position taken by 7AF, expansion of the program to include Detachment 2, and Detachment 3, 6994th Scty Sq, with cursory involvement by Detachment 1 was initiated. The targeting trial for Detachment 2 was implemented in mid-August with 7AF Execution Order being forwarded to all concerned on 2 August. (28) Tabbed Black Bear, this program was primarily associated with the South Vietnamese area immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone, in ARDF Area 9.

() As interest developed in the Cambodian/South Vietnam areas, cryptologic authorities in Thailand ()

() began to show concern about the rapid exploitation of ARDF results in Northern Laos. This concern was first addressed in a 3 August 1971 message from () to DIRNSA, in which the "real time" use of ARDF results in the Barrell Roll area was addressed. Basically, the () proposal called for ARDF platforms to relay fixes (initially suggested were those falling below 500 meter radius) to the 7/13AF controlled Airborne Command Control Center (ABCCC). ABCCC would in turn relay the fix to the FAC who would (when operationally able), VR the target/fix area and direct strike sorties to confirmed lucrative targets. (29)

() This message drew immediate USAFSS reaction, in that the () message implied that DIRNSA was the approving authority. USAFSS pointed out that the prerogatives for establishing programs of this nature were totally within the jurisdiction of USAFSS and pertinent operating commands. USAFSS requested that Pac Scty Rgn.

review the development process to ascertain the extent of [REDACTED] involvement and determine the reason for DIRNSA concurrence having been solicited. Although some objection to the initial [REDACTED] message was stated, (30) USAFSS concurred with the proposal. Even though DIRNSA was not directly involved (as was pointed out by USAFSS), that agency agreed with the proposals and suggested use of 1000 meter radius fix criteria rather (31) than the 500 meter radius initially suggested by [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]) Following the above exchange, Pac Scty Rgn and 6994th Scty Sq began close coordination with National Security Agency Office Pacific (NSAPAC) and 7AF respectively. Although it appeared that coordination between [REDACTED] and possibly Laotian FAC operations had indeed been conducted, none of the action agencies had been actively involved in formulation of the plans. Once all concerned became aware of the procedures and objectives, rapid exchanges to finalize plans were made. These exchanges are summarized as follows:

1. Pac Scty Rgn notified NSAPAC of concurrence with the proposal and queried as to what restrictions or constraints would prohibit passing of fixes directly to the FACs via the KAG-275 (wheel) system. (32)

2. [REDACTED] updated their initial proposal by outlining Special Operating Areas in which fixes would be passed to the FAC (in addition to the "Raven Boxes", as the operating area of Laotian "Raven" FACs were called). [REDACTED] further indicated that 7/13AF had initiated a message to 7AF, requesting permission to implement procedures as outlined in the original [REDACTED] proposal, and that an affirmative response was expected. (33)

3. In a resume of coordination actions between 6994th Scty Sq and 7AF, 6994th apprised Pac Scty Rgn of the fact that it appeared that at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the outset, the participating units had been omitted from planning. However, by 6 August, 7AF had a message in the coordination stage that incorporated the FIX/FAC principle in Laos. 6994th Scty Sq further stressed that there had been a communications problem prevalent in the ABCCC/EC-47 relationship during Operation Lam Son 719 (18 February through 31 March 1971),⁽³⁴⁾ due to the location of the UHF antenna on the underside of the EC-47. In view of this past experience, 6994th offered the suggestion that relay of fix information to the ground, thence to the ABCCC⁽³⁵⁾ might provide the greatest reliability.

4. NSAPAC reply to the initial Pac Scty Rgn query agreed that passing information directly from the ARDF platform to FACs would result in faster response than would be realized by relaying through the ABCCC. However, feeling was that 7/13AF might be opposed to the loss of control that would be involved by omitting ABCCC involvement.* NSAPAC further stressed that since all aircraft involved (EC-47s, ABCCC, and FACs) were equipped with Nestor (KY-8 or KY-28) secure transmission devices, use of this system would be far more reliable and secure than the AKAC-275⁽³⁶⁾ (wheel) system.

5. Pac Scty Rgn provided follow-up information to USAFSS, in which they attempted to dispell USAFSS adamancy concerning [REDACTED]/DIRNSA involvement in the Laotian FIX/FAC program. Pac Scty Rgn stress that [REDACTED] had historically been more involved in U.S. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) activities in Laos than NRV(C) exercised in Vietnam, due to the vast amount of authority/control vested in MACV for the RVN area. It was further stated that the [REDACTED] actions appeared to be "within their Charter".

*Raven FACs operating in Laos were not directly subordinate to 7/13AF.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

and suggested that opposition to [REDACTED]/DIRNSA involvement be dropped. In reply to specific USAFSS queries, Pac Scty Rgn advised that they envisioned no change in the level of support being provided [REDACTED] pointing out that implementation of the FIX/FAC program should have an enhancing effect on that support. Region further stated their assumption that all communications between ARDF platforms and ABCCG would be in the secure mode; however, it was request that 6994th Scty Sq confirm this supposition and further insure that [REDACTED] be provided the opportunity to review and comment on the [REDACTED] proposal. (37) These assumptions were subsequently confirmed by 6994th Scty Sq, and 7AF agreed that any proposals (38) originated would include [REDACTED] as an addressee.

[REDACTED] Although initial planning was begun in early August, it was not until 10 September 1971 that the 7/13AF message outlining basic procedures was received at 7AF. Immediately thereafter, 7AF/6994th Scty Sq began coordination and development of the final plan, which was forwarded to all concerned in the form of a 7AF execution order on 2 October. This Execution Order outlined the FIX/FAC background and set forth procedures to be followed. The guidelines for this test (code named Brown Beaver) were generally the same as those implemented for Blue Beetle and Black Bear, with the exception of the involvement of ABCCG as a relay point for Brown Beaver activities. (39)

FIX/FAC Operations Summarized: [REDACTED] The objective of each of the three FIX/FAC programs implemented in SEA was to allow the ARDF platform to provide the Forward Air Controller with potential targets to exploit, strike, and destroy. With an elusive enemy, skilled in the art

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

of hiding from the eyes of visual reconnaissance, it was necessary to employ every potentiality to detect his operations. Since it is well known that every military unit must maintain communications links in order to successfully execute war objectives, ARDF provided the answer to the location of those necessary communications facilities. While hiding from the eyes of visual reconnaissance, soundwaves could not be hidden from the ears of the ARDF crew. Once soundwaves divulged the location of an enemy transmitter within a given area, the FAC could be told WHERE to look - a much easier task than attempting to survey the entire countryside. On the other had, ARDF alone served only to locate a radio transmitter, easily remoted from the main cadre of the enemy. To call in an air strike on the basis of ARDF alone might result in destruction of a transmitter, but would have very little effect upon the ability of the enemy to conduct warfare. It was with these facts in mind that the ears of ARDF and eyes of the FAC were combined as a means of locating the enemy. Basically, the principle was sound. Technically, the program was well planned and gave every indication of being highly advantageous. However, as with virtually every newly developed tactic, there were drawbacks and limitations that only actual execution could divulge.

[REDACTED] Availability of a dedicated FAC (without other responsibility) to work directly with specific EC-47 combat sorties was seldom a reality. This meant that a fix of pinpoint accuracy often failed to have the benefit of visual reconnoitering. While the ARDF results added to the data base concerned with enemy locations and could be used for ground operations, the mobility of the enemy often negated the effect of such delayed action.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Communications difficulties continually hampered FIX/FAC operations. Lack of dependable secure communications often made the passing of valuable fix information impossible. The human element also prevailed, in that there was feeling on occasions, that the FAC was failing to monitor appropriate frequencies, thereby prohibiting tip-off. This led to a feeling of frustration among EC-47 crews who felt that their product was being ignored as a valuable addition to tactical warfare assets.

[REDACTED] Although repeated emphasis was placed upon education of the Forward Air Controllers as to the value and reliability of the ARDF product, there remained an undercurrent of feeling among the EC-47 crews that many were not cognizant of the accuracy of the ARDF fix, resulting in the ignoring of many valid fixes. Whenever this feeling was allowed to become prevalent, the ARDF platform operators began to slacken in their attempts to contact the FAC, leading to a general deterioration of the program.

[REDACTED] Weather conditions often forced the cancellation/diversion of one of the aircraft. Since weather requirements were not identical, dedicated FACs were often in area without the EC-47, or the EC-47 would be working without the benefit of the FAC. Equipment problems, causing the cancellation/abort of the EC-47 mission had the same effect.

[REDACTED] As the Cambodian situation increased in military importance, FACs were more and more involved in directing strikes in support of ground operations. This left very little VR support for the ARDF platforms and the Blue Beetle program seemed to be losing its initial impetus. Again, the human element prevailed, in that the ARDF crews were unable to realize

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

any real or direct results from their efforts. It was a real boost to morale to know that a target fixed by ARDF could be destroyed almost immediately - then the ARDF operator had proof of the worth of his product. Once the ARDF fix had been combined with collateral information, it lost its identity and became just another statistic.

[REDACTED] Cambodian terrain and vegetation provided yet another detriment to the program, in that many of the fixes obtained were centered in triple canopied jungle areas, impossible for the FAC to successfully VR. This led to fewer and fewer of the targets passed being VR'd, since the FAC (from previous experience) knew that visual observance of enemy activity in the area of the fix would be impossible. On the other hand, the terrain and vegetation in the Barrel Roll area did not offer the same protection, and the Brown Beaver program showed much higher VR and strike rates.

[REDACTED] In spite of the problems encountered, 7AF (as the directing/controlling authority) continued to deem the product of the FIX/FAC program as being of high value to the war effort.* Considerable time and effort was expended in the coordination and execution of the programs, and general feeling was that the concept was worthwhile and should be continued. (40)

ARDF Improvement Actions:

[REDACTED] A recurring program at the 6994th Scty Sq was the constant review of tasking and fragging actions to improve the ARDF/ACI mission of the unit. During this historical period, this had become an even more pertinent requirement, due to theater drawdown actions which made it necessary to reassess requirements and capabilities to insure effective

*See Appendix IV for Blue Beetle statistics.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

utilization of available resources. As a result of this constant effort, a number of programs were implemented which had beneficial effects upon the unit's mission.

[REDACTED] Variable Mission Tasking: As the drawdown of American forces continued through mid and late 1971, 699th Scty Sq tended to become more and more aware of actions necessary to insure continued effectiveness of the ARDF program. To this end, 699th outlined a number of facts with associated proposals to enhance the potential of the squadron in maintaining a high level of mission success. To effectively illustrate the point in contention, 699th Scty Sq restated the fact that Combat Cross Zulu (CCZ) EC-47s were ordinarily fragged for 5 hours, while Combat Cross aircraft were scheduled for 7 hour missions. This was due to fuel limitations on missions carrying "X," "Y," "Z-1," and "Z-2" positions and associated operators. 699th further stressed that this concept had been maintained with very little attention being given to the availability/desirability of ACI obtained on the CCZ missions. In order to maximize ARDF and insure effective use of the ACI acquisition positions, certain options for CCZ manning were pointed out as follows: (1) Standard manning with one voice/one Morse ACI position manned, resulting in a five hour mission capability: (2) Manning both "Z" positions on standard 5 hour sortie with two Morse operators in areas where Morse activity was prevalent: (3) Where voice activity formed the bulk of ACI, man 5 hour missions with two voice operators for ACI: (4) Omit either the voice or Morse operator from missions where additional Time over Target for ARDF purposes outweighed the ACI requirement, resulting in 5½ vice 5 hour flight capability: (5) Man for ARDF only in areas

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

where ACI was of little consequence, which would make 6 hour missions possible. (41)

This variable tasking was approved by MACV and implemented for a 28 day test period on 7 August, and subsequently extended. By mid-October, positive results could be noted. Squadron Complex TOT increased from 67 to 70 percent, while local USA-561 TOT rose four percent, an achievement which equaled 30 hours, or five 5 hour missions per tasking week. Since the ratio of one fix per hour had remained constant, there was a concomitant rise in the number of fixes obtained. From the collection standpoint, ACI had not shown a significant volume decrease; on the other hand, exploitable message volumes had risen. (42)

ARDF Coverage of Military Region I: At a 3 November ARDF conference, the stability of the military situation in Military Region (MR) I was an important point of discussion. The implication was that some of the ARDF missions in SEA ARDF Area 9 could be cancelled/diverted. 7AF/6994th Scty Sq, acting on this implication, suggested the downfragging of Da Nang based aircraft from 75% to 50% of available aircraft on a daily basis. A number of advantages in such an arrangement were listed as follows: (1) Aircrews would be allowed more time for transition into the different systems (ALR-34/ALR-35 and ALR-38s) which resulted from the closure of Detachment 1 in November 1971: (43) (2) Allow for more comprehensive phase maintenance: (3) Give Da Nang organizations time to adjust to the influx of assets to the available facilities: and (4) Provide Da Nang organizations time to recover from the destruction caused by Typhoon Hester. (44-45)

The MACV reaction to this suggestion was more or less in the negative vein, since they felt that the implications of the 3 November meeting were misunderstood: However, they did concur with a sortie

[REDACTED]

rate of 50% of assigned aircraft, vice 75% of possessed. 6994th Scty Sq
(46)
concurred in this arrangement and so advised Pac Scty Rgn. Although the
MR-1 activity rate continued to remain static, no positive action was
taken other than the 75 to 50% downfragging action.

[REDACTED] Adjustment of ITOTs: In response to a Detachment 1 re-
(47)
quest of 28 August, 6994th Scty Sq approached SSO MACV and 509 RRG/ACC
concerning a noted drop in Detachment 1 effectiveness during early
morning and late evening hours. The crux of the problem was the low
level of productivity (due to a combination of low target activity and
propagation) prior to 2300 and after 1100 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)
daily. Statistics were presented which revealed a total of 4 targets
being worked during 84 hours on target prior to 2300 and after 1100
GMT. Potential solutions for this problem were offered and comments
(48)
requested. As a result of this action, MACV agreed to adjustment of
ITOTs to allow missions to be on target during more optimum periods.

[REDACTED] This action was only the beginning in development of 6994th
Scty Sq involvement in the adjustment of ITOTs to provide maximum capa-
bility, as all units in the Complex began close scrutiny of ARDF results
in given areas during specific hours, and made repeated recommendations
for changes. The entire problem was given formal recognition in December
when ACC requested that all aviation units and CMAs follow certain guide-
lines for establishing and requesting ITOT changes. These guidelines
included: (1) CMA coordination of ITOT with aviation units prior to
submission of weekly requests: (2) That all aviation unit/CMA coordi-
nation be conducted over formal OPSCOM facilities with ACC as inform-
ation addressee: and (3) Insure that GMT time be used on all requests.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 6994th Scty Sq took action on 29 December to insure that the Complex followed specific guidelines, by forwarding a suggested format for requesting ITOT changes. 6994th further pointed out that all tasking adjustment requests be forwarded to the CMA each Sunday, thereby allowing the information to be included in the statement of requirements for the coming week's tasking. (49) At the close of December, plans were being formulated to implement a 30 day test and if successful, to incorporate procedures into formal directives.

[REDACTED] ARDF Support to [REDACTED] Early in this historical period, 6994th Scty Sq was faced with a problem that has a shocking effect upon any SIGINT unit. With the only objective of ARDF in SEA being to satisfy the daily requirements of the war effort, the entire complex maintained thorough statistical data on all activities and kept abreast of the latest intelligence developments to assist in the performance of the ARDF mission. Thus, when a [REDACTED] representative informed the USAFSS commander that [REDACTED] was dissatisfied with the ARDF support being given, the entire complex/command structure was somewhat taken aback. The information presented by [REDACTED] was statistical in nature, and was primarily concerned with the lack of priority targets being fixed by Detachments 1, 2, and 3 in Military Regions III and IV. Of particular emphasis was the activity in SEA ARDF areas 10 and 11. The content of the paper presented to the USAFSS Staff was passed to Detachments 1 and 2 on 11 August, requesting their immediate review and comments. (50)

[REDACTED] In reply to this initial query, Detachment 1 pointed out that a number of different conditions were prevalent which limited

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

their coverage of SEA Area 10 targets. These were listed as follows:

1. A noted lack of activity on Priority targets.
2. Lack of a data base to identify those targets actually being intercepted.
3. Inadequacy of Target Data Lists (TDLs) provided by the CMA.
4. Weather cancellations/conditions limiting Area 10 missions.
5. Proximity of many priority targets to Anti-aircraft Artillery (AAA) high threat areas.

These same reasons held true in relation to Detachment 2 coverage of SEA Area 11.

[REDACTED] At the request of 6994th Scty Sq, ACC performed a study of SEA Area 10 and 11 ARDF results. Pointing out that a like study had been made in May of 1971 concerning the same areas, ACC went on to discuss problem areas known to hamper ARDF in these areas. Primary detriment was CMA responsibility. Basically, USM-7 (7th Radio Research Field Station (RRFS), Udorn, Thailand) was the Technical Tasking Authority (TTA) for SEA Areas 10 and 11: However, USM-604 (330th RRFS, Pleiku, RVN) and USM-808 (8th RRFS, Phu Bai, RVN) retained TTA responsibility on entities that moved from South Vietnam into those Laotian areas. Although TDLs for Areas 10 and 11 were compiled by USM-7, they had to depend on information provided by USM-604 and 808 on a 48-hour basis. An ACC suggestion that the responsibility for certain of these targets be transferred to USM-7 was rejected by NEV(C) as being impractical. Consequently, when the [REDACTED] concern over lack of support was aired, the less than effective TDL situation still existed. ACC went further to point out certain

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

statistical data pertinent to the problem, and stressed the fact that with one exception (in April 1971) [REDACTED] had not addressed the problem to ACC via their formal weekly request for ARDF support. The fact that [REDACTED] seldom identified specific entities (excepting those upon which they desired special tasking) in their weekly tasking requests was also pointed out. In presenting this summary, ACC brought all concerned up to date on actions that had transpired in relation to [REDACTED] support.

[REDACTED] On 1 September, Pac Scty Rgn officially instructed 6994th Scty Sq to provide a full resume of the outcome of discussions with MACV and NRV(C) as related to the subject. 6994th replied by stating that NRV(C) had been made aware of the situation and was performing a detailed study of the matter. It was further pointed out that the ACC study had revealed that TDLs provided for these areas contained very little useful information, and that [REDACTED] had repeatedly failed to coordinate their requirements with either ACC or the CMA.

[REDACTED] On 25 September, the NRV(C) study was completed and forwarded to all concerned. Some important statistical results of this study which were instrumental in arriving at the major findings were as follows:

1. SEA Area 10: 26.6% of all Radio Designators (RDs) identified as priority one were either inactive or not assigned.
 2. In SEA Area 11, 15.3% of the targets designated as Priority 1 were inactive during the entire seven week period.
 3. Four priority one RDs in SEA Area 10 were active only 28 minutes
- [REDACTED]

collectively during the 49 day period.

4. SEA Area 10 total communications time on RDs in question was 21093 minutes, while ARDF aircraft were scheduled into the area during only 7179 minutes of the activity. As a result, aircraft were present for only 34% of the lucrative time.

5. Communications activity stood at 17581 for SEA Area 11, with ARDF aircraft having been in area only 29.4% of this time.

As a result of this study, NRV(C) arrived at major findings as follows:

1. [REDACTED] observation that ARDF was not satisfying the [REDACTED] requirement was valid.
 2. Aircraft scheduling did not appear to be consistent with optimum periods of activity.
 3. Priority 1 targets were determined to have been inactive during extended lengths of time during the period studied, indicating abuse of the Priority system.
 4. The fix rate for both areas was below acceptable standards. With such findings to substantiate the [REDACTED] complaint, NRV(C) recommended that MACV (J2-1114) convene a conference among representatives of ACC, 509REG, 699LSS, Department of Defense Special Representative (DODSPECREP) (52) MACV, and other interested parties to review and improve the ARDF process.
- [REDACTED] On 30 September, a follow-up study performed by ACC basically supported NRV(C) findings. It became readily apparent that there were fallacies which had indeed resulted in a lack of ARDF support. TDLs were recognized as being inadequate. Over half of the RDs requested by [REDACTED] were omitted from TDLs. This was due in part to the fact that [REDACTED] requirements were received too late to be incorporated into weekly [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

tasking. USM-7 had failed to translate requirements into specific areas for a given airframe, while weekly requests had not even been furnished by the CMA on several occasions. The Priority listing was completely unwieldy and unrealistic, making it impossible for ARDF resources to satisfy tasking requirements.

(53)

[REDACTED] Recognizing these deficiencies, ACC representatives visited [REDACTED], USM-7 and [REDACTED] in late August. After coordination with these agencies, requests were more specific, sorties were requested by frag area and type of platform desired, and TDLs were made more responsive to [REDACTED] requirements.

[REDACTED] It was significant to 6994th personnel that in no instance was the expertise/dedication to duty of the Complex singled out as a potential reason for the alleged lack of support. It was evident that awareness of ARDF capabilities on the part of users and the quality of technical support were of paramount importance in achieving program objectives. At the close of this historical period, all problems seemed to have been resolved and close coordination was being maintained with [REDACTED] to preclude recurrences of this nature.

[REDACTED] Further concern was generated by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in relation to ARDF/ACI support to Laotian requirements at a 8 December meeting held at MACV. Primary concern expressed at this meeting was the lack of VHF fixes being collected by missions flown in the Plaine Des Jarres area of Northern Laos. Once the problem was aired, it became evident that [REDACTED] was still not familiar with ramifications of ARDF and the type of technical support needed if the platform was to satisfy re-

[REDACTED]

requirements. Although [REDACTED] was aware of the fact that at least five enemy regiments in the area were utilizing VHF, the data base was inadequate to allow prediction of callsigns, frequencies, and schedules on these entities. As a result, it was impossible to include the VHF targets on TDLs. After a thorough discussion of all the ramifications/limitations involved, certain problems that demanded resolution or at least awareness of by [REDACTED] were made a matter of record. Primary of these facts were: (1) [REDACTED] must state priorities before ARDF could be expected to satisfy requirements: (2) With only four daily missions scheduled from Nakhon Phanom, certain limitations must be expected: (3) Headroom ceilings of Thailand precluded addition of more daily sorties to support [REDACTED]: (4) ALR-38 resources had to be distributed in such a manner as to cover all lucrative VHF areas (Southern Laos, Demilitarized Zone, and the Tri-border area) as well as Northern Laos: (5) Technical data must be provided on targets requiring priority cover, since random search could not be expected to produce the necessary results: (6) [REDACTED] would have to take a long look at priorities to preclude conflict between HF Morse and VHF voice targets: and (7) [REDACTED] must understand that VHF targets were decidedly more difficult to fix in many instances than the higher powered HF targets.

[REDACTED] At the end of this historical period, it was apparent that the subject of support to [REDACTED] in Thailand would be a recurring matter of discussion, since it was impossible to educate personnel to become cognizant of every aspect of ARDF. To compound this situation, [REDACTED] was out of the normal flow of information concerning the ARDF mission: Although they were users, they were not among the policy makers when decisions on major applications/changes to the program were being made.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To prevent this from ever becoming an insurmountable problem, Detachment 3, 6994th Scty Sq established a channel of coordination between the CMA (USM-7), [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and themselves to insure that requirements were made known and that users were kept informed of the 6994th capability to fulfill those stated requirements.

Multi-Channel Communications:

[REDACTED] Perhaps one of the most important developments of this historical period was the increase in use of low-powered VHF multi-channel communications by the enemy. This sophistication of the enemy's communications facilities necessitated a number of changes in the posture of the Squadron Complex, complicated manning, and brought about a need for altering the capability of ARDF/ACI platforms. Closure of Detachment 1, 6990th Security Group and cessation of that unit's EC-130 Bench Lance collection missions increased the value of the ACI portion of the 6994th Scty Sq mission. This single problem affected the entire complex to some extent, although the greatest impact was felt by Detachment 3. Virtually all aspects of that unit were affected: Tasking, collection, analysis, reporting, processing, master programming, manning, and maintenance all being involved. (54) The 6994th Scty Sq, in its role of Squadron management became actively involved in every aspect of the planning of the multi-channel intercept/processing/reporting capabilities within the complex. The magnitude of this problem was sufficient to involve not only the 6994th, but several other USAFSS and Army Security Agency (ASA) units became actively involved.

[REDACTED] In the coordination of the necessary actions to accomplish necessary multi-channel coverage, 6994th Scty Sq performed certain functions

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

including the following: (1) Coordination with all levels of command to achieve assignment of ALR-38 aircraft at Nakhon Phanom: (2) Monitoring and initiating master program changes to provide adequate processing capabilities for Detachment 2 and 3: (3) Insuring that personnel adjustments were made within the complex to provide necessary manning capabilities: (4) Coordinate mission manning to insure maximum utilization of the Z-1 and Z-2 positions to accomplish the ACI mission: (5) Insure that USAFSS and Pac Scty Rgn were kept apprised of all ramifications and progress made in the processing and reporting of multi-channel communications: (6) Continually monitor manning requirements for the reporting/processing phase and relentlessly pursue the solicitation of assistance: (7) Insure that adequate avenues of coordination/inter-working relationships were maintained between the Complex, 6908th Security Squadron, and USM-7 at Udorn, Thailand: (8) Take necessary steps to set to set up avenues of coordination between in-field users of intelligence and the collection agencies to insure understanding of objectives and limitations: and (9) Establish in-house procedures at all units to provide for rapid recognition of deficiencies in tasking and subsequently recommend adjustments thereto.

[REDACTED] At the close of December, Detachment 3 was firmly entrenched as an important contributor to the multi-channel problem, through copy of activity emanating from the Plaine Des Jarres area of Northern Laos. Close coordination between Detachment 3, 6908th Scty Sq (Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand), [REDACTED], and USM-7 at Udorn provided up to date technical data and insured meaningful ACI tasking of all Detachment 3 missions.

[REDACTED] Multi-Channel Communications in Cambodia: Early in October,

[REDACTED]

Technical Reports received from DIRNSA indicated the possibility of multi-channel communications being used by the enemy in the Krek area of Cambodia. When 6994th Scty Sq was apprised of this fact, immediate coordination was begun to attempt intercept/fixing of the targets. Since such coverage required an ALR-38 configured aircraft, immediate action was taken to transfer one Da Nang based ALR-38 to Tan Son Nhut to conduct research and development flights in the Krek area. On 13 October, ACC established a new mission area and scheduled the first of five ALR-38 sorties, tasked with the express mission of discerning the validity of the reported possibility. The last of these missions was flown on 18 October, with negative results. Due to lack of ALR-38 maintenance facilities at Tan Son Nhut, retention of the platform at Saigon for a longer period of time was not feasible. As of the end of this historical period, no further indications of multi-channel operation in Cambodia have been received.

Tip-off of High Interest Targets to ARDF Aircraft:

Since the inception of ARDF, one of the built-in limitations has been the lack of search capability to insure that each target worked was of high interest to the tactical war effort. Due to the nature of the communications facilities comprising the enemy network(s), there was no possible way that a single ARDF platform could sort out the desirable from the undesirable, and still accomplish any volume of ARDF collection. Consequently, the most logical means of applying a wider capability was to utilize ground facilities targeted against these high interest targets for intercept. By enabling ground stations to tip-off

[REDACTED]

high priority targets as they became active, the capability of the ARDF mission to satisfy requirements was greatly expanded. This system was utilized throughout Vietnam, with a high degree of success. In the early months of 1971, an effort was launched to expand this tip-off capability to include Thailand intercept sites targeted against the Steel Tiger (Southern Laotian panhandle) area. Given the codename of Project Cumbersome, this program involved the installation of communications facilities at USM-7J (Detachment J, 7 RRFS, Ubon, Thailand) to facilitate tip-off actions. Preliminary planning called for the use of Frequency Modulated (FM) KY-8 secure voice communications between Ubon and the aircraft. However, this planning was complicated by the fact that existing facilities established for Air/Ground/Air communications between the EC-47 platforms and [REDACTED] Forward Site at Pakse, Laos, utilized the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) range. Although the EC-47 possessed both UHF and FM VHF capabilities, monitor of both frequencies simultaneously was not possible, since only one KY-8 was available aboard the aircraft. As an alternative, the suggestion was proffered by National Security Office Pacific (NSAPAC) that Very High Frequency (VHF) equipment be installed at both locations, thereby providing a common frequency for both sites. Such action had a built-in advantage of potentially extending the range of communications from the Pakse site, since VHF was known to provide better long range capabilities than UHF. However, the significance of insuring USM-7J/Pakse frequency compatibility was nullified in mid-June when a critical military situation dictated the withdrawal of the Pakse site.

(55)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(56)

[REDACTED] On 5 July, a 30 day test was implemented, utilizing the FM VHF range as had been previously planned. When the KY-8 cypher switch malfunctioned on 31 July, the test was suspended. Unfortunately, contacts had been very sparse during the test. In response to an NSA Office [REDACTED] suggestion, USM-7 concurred with the installation of a discone antenna at Ubon and suggested that a follow-up test be conducted once this antenna was in place and the KY-8 facilities had been returned to operational status. In extending this suggestion, USM-7 pointed out that the July test had not been conclusive for a number of reasons, primary of which were weather (causing cancellation of many of the ARDF sorties), equipment malfunctions, and the lack of experience of personnel manning the ground site. The USM-7 proposal was agreed upon by all concerned, and immediate action was taken by [REDACTED] to supply the necessary antenna. KY-8 spare parts arrived at Ubon on 24 August. In the ensuing days, further expansion of the program received the attention of all concerned. On 23 September, DIRNSA made a point of reminding all units/agencies involved that Detachment 1 and 2, 6994th Scty Sq were to be considered full participants in the program while flying in SEA Areas 10 and 11. Prior to this time, Detachment 3 had been the single USAFSS unit considered as a participant by certain of the non-USAFSS agencies.

(57)

[REDACTED] Antenna installation was completed and the VRC-47/KY-8 equipment successfully tested on 18 October, with the new test being scheduled to commence on 25 October.

(58)

[REDACTED] Initially, this test was also plagued with problems.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

The primary frequency became blocked by an unidentified signal (later determined to be Forward Air Controller communications) forcing a change to the alternate frequency. ⁽⁵⁷⁾ To enhance the test, USM-7 suggested additional procedures, involving "in-the-blind" transmissions by the ground station every 10 minutes. At the same time, they requested ARDF platforms to attempt to contact the ground as often as possible. Additionally, they requested Detachment 1, 2, and 3 to provide certain ⁽⁵⁹⁾ feedback concerning contacts on a daily basis.

[REDACTED]) In a joint 7AF/6994th Scty Sq message of 12 November, it was pointed out that such a procedure would interfere with the primary mission of the aircraft, since such involved logging would keep one operator busy and while transmitting, the FM would interfere with the "X" console, thereby causing a detriment to the ARDF collection capability. As an alternative, it was suggested that a special Detachment 3 mission be scheduled to overfly Ubon and establish contact, then proceed on to Areas 10B, 10C, and 10D, covering as much of these areas as possible. This flight would be entirely dedicated to the communications test and would record specific information concerning each contact, such as aircraft position, altitude, direction of flight, distance from Ubon, weather conditions, hearability, and any other remarks pertinent to the test. Depending upon the success of this special mission, 6994th/7AF were prepared to initiate further flights to augment the test data if necessary.

[REDACTED]) At the close of the test period on 24 November, USM-7 provided all concerned with a resume of the results. Generally, it was felt that the project was worthwhile, and certain refinements were sug-

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

gested. The content of the report as supplied by USM-7 was dedicated to only the communications portion of the test, and did not address the success of the USAFSS platforms in fixing those targets tipped off. Although the tip-off/fix ratio was not overly impressive, all concerned were convinced that the program should be extended.

[REDACTED] To augment the test data, the 7AF/6994th proposed special mission was flown by Detachment 3 on 2 December. During this five hour mission, 28 contacts were made at distances ranging from 10 to 135 miles and at altitudes from 5,500 to 10,000 feet. All contacts were of excellent signal strength and readability. As a result of the proven capability of the communications system, USM-7 strongly suggested that the Ubon site be made a permanent ARDF tip-off station. At the end of the year, action was being taken to make this a reality.

Target Identification:

[REDACTED] Target identification has been a recurring problem throughout this historical period, with fluctuations causing repeated queries from higher headquarters. Each query prompted studies to be generated, with the same two problems being unearthed; quality of Target Data Lists (TDLs) as supplied by CMAs and the completeness of the DIRNSA High Speed call sign list.

[REDACTED] Accuracy of TDLs: Following a USAFSS Staff visit in August during which time the subject of inaccuracy of TDLs was discussed, Pac Scty Rgn that a project officer had been assigned by MACV to visit all CMAs to coordinate the improvement of this identification aid. Additionally, 6994th Scty Sq tasked all subordinate operational echelons with providing inputs to assist in determining specific areas in which improve-

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(62)
ments were needed. The requested input was voluminous and pointed to the fact that a multitude of factors were involved, primary of which were as follows:

1. TDLs often had targets with simultaneous activity schedules that were separated by up to 50 miles, hindering accurate profile preparation for missions.
2. Very little information was included on TDLs regarding targets of opportunity which could be covered while the mission was enroute to and returning from fraggd target areas.
3. Some TDLs were prepared two days in advance of scheduled missions and the ARDF unit was not notified of call sign/frequency changes that occurred in the interim period.
4. TDLs did not always agree with tasking as levied by tasking messages.
5. When missions were re-fraggd (changed from one area to another), on short notice, it was almost impossible to obtain TDLs for the new area prior to launch of the mission.
6. TDLs were stereotyped, with little revision action taken to insure coverage of high priority targets.
7. There was a noted lack of data concerning HF voice targets.
8. Low level targets were generally omitted from the TDL.
9. VHF voice targets (this applied generally to Detachment 2 only) were not covered by TDLs.
10. Many TDLs were received too late to be of any mission value.

[REDACTED] With these discrepancies having been listed and documented,

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6994th Scty Sq (through ACC) approached USM-704 to attempt to resolve the chronic problem. Through stressing the importance of speed in supplying required information and encouraging the use of OPSCOM circuits vice the regular communications channels, USM-704 was able to effect an improvement in the content, accuracy, and timeliness of these valuable aids.

[REDACTED] The 6994th Scty Sq continued to monitor the identification rate of targets throughout the period. Although the TDLs were vastly improved, a gradual decline in identification rates began in July and continued well into November, reaching an all time low of 42% of the fixes/cuts being identified in November. Many factors contributed to the decline, as was addressed to Pac Scty Rgn on 2 December. These factors were listed as follows:

1. Greater communications security awareness on the part of the enemy. Transmitters covered by Tan Son Nhut missions resorted to short transmissions, with a number of targets apparently utilizing the horizontally polarized antennas. Since the ARDF antennas on EC-47 were specifically designed to intercept vertically polarized transmitting antennas, this action reduced the effectiveness of the ARDF platform to fix/identify the target.

2. The drawdown of forces had an adverse effect on the ground station's ability to maintain continuity on many targets, thereby reducing the quality of technical data upon which to base identification. This led to a reduction of the effectiveness of TDLs.

3. A large turnover of operator personnel had nullified the "operator familiarity" advantage to be gained through knowledge of a target

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

weekly ARDF Feedback Report. Although a highly involved and often frustrating duty, this report was considered one of the most useful of all management functions, since it allowed the recording of actual tactical actions taken on the ARDF product. (64)

Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS):

[REDACTED] A new Volume XII to USAFSSM 200-4 was published in mid-1971, which placed management statistics in a highly versatile yet complete machine processing format. At the same time, this vehicle was arranged in such a manner as to provide easy review and posting of statistics manually. During the last six months of 1971, only minor adjustments additions were made to the format. 6994th Scty Sq, in performing quality checks of all incoming DURMIS submissions, was in constant contact with subordinate units to effect accurate DURMIS reporting. Two separate Operational Assistance visits were made to outlying Detachments, specifically aimed at insuring that the reports submitted by all units were as nearly analogous as the difference in missions would allow. Brevity of presentation without sacrificing clarity became a daily point of discussion. By relying on the built-in double checks provided by the ARDF DURMIS format and stressing the necessity of quality control at the production level, DURMIS reporting had become nearly a routine function by the close of the period.

[REDACTED] During this period a system of advising 6940th Technical Training Group of changes in ARDF procedures applicable to the curriculum of the training school was developed. This involved local preparation of all pertinent information covering a three month period into electrical format and inclusion of this course update material in section nine of

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the ARDF DURMIS. This system proved highly successful, and served to insure timely receipt and served to provide adequate update capabilities.

ARDF Productivity:*

[REDACTED]) During the last six months of 1971, ARDF mission results showed a number of fluctuations that were major points of discussion within the Squadron Operations Staff offices. Local operations performed 2070 of 2148 scheduled missions for a completion rate of 96.4%. (This figure represents both U.S. and ARVN manned missions). Monthly deviations ranged from a low of 336 of 360 (93.3%) in July to a high of 337 of 342 or 98.5% in December. Complex statistics were noticeably lower, with the total for the six month period standing at 5509 of 6067 scheduled missions being flown, with a completion rate of 90.8%. Complex deviations ranged from a high of 97.9% (1248 flown - 1275 scheduled) in August to a low of 82.7% in November when only 863 of the 1043 scheduled missions were flown. The reason for these fluctuations can be attributed to two major factors, equipment** and weather. Local statistics for these pertinent areas show 63 of 78 unscheduled missions (80.8%) being attributed to these two causes. During August, 15 of 24 unaccomplished missions were due to equipment problems. In October, 8 equipment malfunctions and 9 weather cancellations accounted for 100% of the unaccomplished missions, while all 15 of the missions not accomplished in November were due to weather aborts. The same is true for the Complex statistics, with 483 of the 565 missions listed as unaccomplished being attributed to these two factors. With 111 equipment problems and 372 weather cancellations, these two items comprised

*See Appendix IV for appropriate charts and graphs.

**Statistics include both Airframe and USAFSS equipment problems.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

85.5% of the Complex unaccomplished missions. When the Complex rate dropped to 82.7% in November, 129 of the 180 unaccomplished missions were due to adverse weather. The ratio of hours flown versus hours fragged naturally shows the same fluctuation. Local operations flew 12262 hours of the 13524 fragged for a percentage of 90.7%. As in the mission accomplishment rate, the highest percentage was realized in December. Of 2270 fragged hours, 2178 or 95.9% were actually flown. This compared to the 86.8% rate realized in July, which was low for the period, due to 105 reduced and 24 unaccomplished missions, representing the highest statistics for the period in both areas.

[REDACTED] During this period, the ratio of Airframe/USAFSS equipment (BRAVO) problems became a point of contention. When possible, it appeared that efforts were being made to show Bravo problems as being a major contributing factor. In response to several 7AF queries, this became an objective of the Weekly Combat Cross Operations report. All malfunctions attributed to equipment were broken down into specifics: E.G., engine, doppler, generators, etc., rather than generalizing and listing as airframe. Likewise, BRAVO discrepancies were listed as printer, scope, erratic bearings, etc., rather than simply "Mission Equipment." In this manner, the report showed developing trends in specific areas and allowed for corrective action to be taken in the maintenance category showing the greatest weakness.

[REDACTED] Since the success of the ARDF program depends largely upon the effective management of mission areas to achieve the greatest ratio between time-over-target (TOT) to actual time flown, this item was given a great deal of critical review by the Mission Management section and the

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

local analyst section. Both local and complex statistics showed fluctuations in this area. Local missions registered 8475 hours over target during the period, which constituted 69.1 percent of the 12262 hours flown. The most effective month in this respect was September, when 73.9% of the hours flown were expended over target. During November, the least effective month locally, 1521 hours or 62.6% of the 2428 hours flown were expended over the assigned target area. Complex performance shows a somewhat lower percentage in this area. During the six month period, 22212 hours were spent over target by the complex, comprising 66.8 percent of the total flying time. The most productive month was September when 3844 hours, or 69.6% of the 5520 hours flown were logged over the mission area. Lowest ratio for the complex occurred in July with 3366 hours being spent over target, which was 61.5% of the 5473 hours flown.

[REDACTED] The ratio of targets fixed versus hours over target remained relatively stable throughout the period. Local operations accomplished 8484 fixes for 8475 hours over target, an average of slightly better than one fix per hour over target. Complex performance showed 22212 hours over target, resulting in 24640 fixes for an average of 1.1 per hour.

[REDACTED] The ratio of fixes to targets worked presents an interesting study in ARDF operations. This facet is important from several standpoints, and provides a great deal of insight into target activity trends, as well as the unit's ability to realize mission objectives. As an example, November shows only 77.7% of tasked hours being flown by the complex, with only 5566 targets being worked, 85.2% of which resulted in fixes/cuts. Both these statistics reflect the lowest percentages for these areas. Generally speaking, this should hold true in all instances: However, such is not necessarily the case. The local statistics show September as having

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

provided the lowest ratio of fixes/cuts in comparison to targets worked: However, September reflects over 90% of the tasked hours being flown. Generally speaking, it would appear that the month of September should have been one of the more productive months for local operations. Since this was not the case, all possible aspects were considered in attempting to explain the situation. In depth examination of each specific area revealed that for the most part, targets were employing stringent communications security procedures. Length of time active was extremely low, as reflected for both ARDF and ACI. Consequently, the "X" operator would barely get a target tuned, when activity would stop, resulting in a single line of position (LOP) rather than the multiple bearings needed for fix/cut data, or on the other hand, providing nothing more than an ACI item, void of any ARDF and not being counted as a target worked for fixing. After all aspects were considered, this seemed to be the only valid reason for this generally perplexing statistic.

() The quality of fixes obtained was generally determined by the fix radius. Basis for VR was a fix of 1000 meters or less. Both Local and Complex statistics show better than two-thirds of total fixes falling within this category, a fact that offered proof of the accuracy of the ARDF system as well as the expertise of the operator/navigator teams.

() In the area of analysis, target identification rates fluctuated greatly. Again dependent upon operator/analyst expertise as well as enemy target activity, this aspect of the mission was under constant surveillance by the Squadron Operations staff.* During the last six months

*This subject covered in another portion of this chapter.

[REDACTED]

of 1971, local operations identification rate stood at 57.7% of fixes/cuts. Forty-two point three percent of those fixes/cuts were identified as priority targets. Complex performance in this area was somewhat lower, due primarily to the difference in call-sign usage employed by a number of Detachment 2 and 3 targets. Complex identification rate for the period stood at 46.0%, while only 32.4% were identified as priority. Due to the rapidly changing structure of the targets lying in and around the demilitarized zone and Northern Laos, identification of targets was a complex problem for both Detachments 2 and 3. In spite of this condition, nearly one third of the targets fixed/cut during this period by the complex were identified as priority.*

[REDACTED] Finally, exploitable message copy for the complex stood at 13615, 6535 of which were obtained through Manual Morse copy, while the remainder were collected by voice positions. This represents an average of 2.5 messages per mission flown. Since the major portion of the voice messages were derived from VHF, this statistic is a realistic representation of a large volume of important intelligence that would not have been intercepted without the EC-47's ACI capability.

*6994th Scty Sq Identification Rates as compared to other ARDF agencies is discussed at length in Chapter III of this history.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Chapter III

SIGINT PROCESSING AND REPORTING

Processing and reporting functions have remained relatively static during the past six month period. Voice processing was directly affected by the paucity of voice activity in the 6994th Scty Sq target areas, and required very little effort on the part of transcription personnel. No changes in local processing procedures were made during this time. Reporting also remained static, with basic reports continuing to be prepared in accordance with existing directives. Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS) continued to be the most time consuming of all reports prepared by the unit. The Airbrone Recovery Report (ARR), Exploitable Message Reports (EMR), Airborne Incident Report (AIR), and of course Critical Intelligence (CRITIC) reporting remained the major reporting vehicles for which the unit was responsible. In view of its direct relation to collection, the Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS) is covered in Chapter II vice Chapter III of this history.

ProcessingVoice Processing:

The voice processing effort at the 6994th Scty Sq continued to be hampered throughout the reporting period by a lack of intercept. The only productive area was centered around portions of Cambodia where active warfare was being conducted. Although there was suspected multi-channel activity in Cambodia, a special search and development mission failed to obtain any intercept of this mode.*

* See Chapter II for resume of this special test.

[REDACTED] There were no changes to local operator processing procedures during the period. Operators continued to record VC/NVA voice communications while airborne. When short messages were intercepted, transcription was performed in the air (when possible), and subsequently passed via secure voice air/ground circuitry to the appropriate Direct Support Unit. After mission recovery, the recorded magnetic tapes were transcribed and those exploitable messages not already forwarded were given immediate handling to insure receipt by users at the earliest possible moment.

Reporting

CRITIC Reporting:

[REDACTED] During the latter portion of 1971, the CRITIC reporting criteria remained static, with no reports being issued by the 6994th Scty Sq. The provision for immediate return to base (RTB) of any platform obtaining critical intelligence remained in effect, but was never utilized.

Airborne Recovery Report:

[REDACTED] Technical Instructions (TECHINS) 2038, the governing directive for preparation of the Airborne Recovery Report (ARR) remained in effect throughout the last six months of 1971. One minor change was made in July that eliminated certain statistical data from the remarks section (Minutes of copy for Radiotelephone, Manual Morse, HF, VHF, etc.) and subsequently incorporated this information into the ARDF Daily Status Report as prepared by ACC. Further proposed changes were proffered by DIRNSA on 13 November. If implemented, these changes will provide much more ease of preparation of the report.

[REDACTED] During this period, 6994th Scty Sq continued to prepare ARRs for both U.S. missions and those manned by Vietnamese operators. However, at the close of the period, plans were underway to turn the ARR

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

responsibility for VIM missions over to the Vietnamese Special Security Technical Branch (SSTB), under auspices of the Vietnamization Improvement and Modernization (VIM) program.*

[REDACTED] During the six month period covered by this report a total of 2228 ARRs were issued by 6994th Scty Sq. One thousand, two hundred, and twenty-seven of these were issued on missions staged from Tan Son Nhut and flown by U.S. crews. VIM missions staged from Tan Son Nhut accounted for 975, while 12 were issued on Detachment 2 missions that terminated at Tan Son Nhut. An additional 11 resulted from tasked missions from Detachment 1 that terminated at Tan Son Nhut during the deactivation and transfer of Detachment 1 resources.**

Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS):

[REDACTED] No significant changes were made to TECHINS 2037, the governing directive for SEATS preparation during the period. The most significant change affecting local reporting work loads occurred on 14 August when DIRNSA began accepting VC Technical Summaries (TECSUM) as produced by the ARVN SSTB. This action deleted nearly 20 percent of the SEATS production responsibility for the 6994th. As Vietnamese crews continued to assume mission responsibilities, SEATS volume underwent a gradual decline. During the six month period, a total of 563 SEATS sections, comprising 394,909 communications groups were issued by the 6994th.**

Exploitable Message Reports (EMR):

[REDACTED] The publication governing issuance of the EMR, TECHINS

*See Chapter VI, this history, for complete resume of VIM actions.

** See Appendix 4 for reporting statistics.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3008, remained unchanged during the last six months of 1971. However, NRV(C) made some minor provisional changes to accommodate reporting of exploitable message activity collected on VIM missions. These changes eliminated certain Communications Intelligence (COMINT) information from the report that was not releasable to the ARVN, allowing 6994th Scty Sq EMRs to be provided to the SSTB. Although unique, these changes did not substantially increase local workloads. A total of 194 EMRs were issued during the six month period.*

Airborne Incident Report (AIR):

[REDACTED] During this period, two AIRs were issued by 6994th Scty Sq. On 5 August, a mission operating in an area just west of Saigon was fired upon by automatic weapons fire while attempting to make a doppler setting on a prominent bridge. Evasive action was taken and no aircraft damage or crew injury sustained. On 14 December, a mission operating over the Delta region south of Saigon detected 6-8 bursts of antiaircraft fire exploding off the left wing. The nearest bursts were estimated to be at least one-half mile distant. The crew stated that fire appeared to have been directed at an O-2 observation aircraft operating in the vicinity at a much lower altitude. There were no injuries to crew members and no aircraft damage occurred.

Target Identification

[REDACTED] A great deal of time was expended by 6994th Scty Sq analysts in the area of identification during this period. Constant efforts to build a data base to augment those aids provided by the CMA and DIRNSA were maintained. As a result, 6994th Scty Sq consistently led

* See Appendix 4 for reporting statistics.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the ARDF community in identification rates. Statistics extracted from a DIRNSA prepared report depicting monthly ARDF management data shows 6994th Scty Sq maintaining from 8 to 15 percent greater identification rates than those shown for the overall SEA ARDF effort.*

[REDACTED] After maintaining over 65% effectiveness during July, August, and September (a high of 74% was realized in July), a drastic drop to 59% occurred in October. This decline was attributed to a VC/NVA communications change affecting major entities within the 6994th area of responsibility. A further decline to 57% (remaining constant in December) occurred in November, concomitant with the deactivation of Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq, and the reduction of USM-607 at Can Tho, RVN. The draw-down of USM-607 denied 6994th missions of valuable timely support data in the form of TDLs and call sign rotas. The deactivation of Detachment 1 further detracted from the effectiveness of local identification, since certain new and unfamiliar areas were added to mission tasking to fill the resulting void.

* See Appendix 4 for statistical comparisons.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

VIETNAMIZATION IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION
PLAN/SOUTHEAST ASIA REDUCTIONS

[REDACTED] During the early portion of 1971, plans were generated to form a Tactical Reconnaissance facility within the framework of the Vietnamese Military Complex. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam, (ARVN), Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), Special Security Technical Branch (SSTB) all cooperated to provide the personnel necessary for formation of two units, the 718th Reconnaissance Squadron of the VNAF and Unit 17 of SSTB. 6994th Scty Sq involvement included the training of ARVN personnel to assume operational duties for all EC-47 positions. The 6994th Maintenance function was responsible for training VNAF personnel for the assumption of back-end maintenance duties. NRV (C), as the DIRNSA representative for Vietnam, was responsible for the training of personnel to prepare and forward applicable reports. Other units (non-cryptologic) were tasked with the training of VNAF personnel to assume front-end flight duties (Pilots, Co-Pilots, and Navigators) and aircraft maintenance. The initial actions in the plan involved the in-country training of operator personnel, and the stateside training of these individuals to take over operation and maintenance of the aircraft.

[REDACTED] The first class of operators, started in April 1971, consisted of ARVN personnel already proficient in code copy and operation of communications equipment. As a result, the rapidity with which they grasped instruction and applied it to operational situations was highly gratifying. Personnel associated with the program were enthused over the speed with which this first class progressed and expressed optimism for the ultimate success of the program.

[REDACTED] Naturally, there were many facets (other than operational)

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

involved. Supply and support for maintenance of classrooms and a necessary level of office supplies and equipment were made available upon request, due to the high priority applied to the overall Vietnamization program. Consequently, by 1 July 1971, the VIM program was well established and progressing on schedule. (1)

[REDACTED] Such actions as those described above were directly related to the drawdown of American forces in SEA. As Vietnamese crews became available, the number of U.S. personnel required to cover the ARDF mission declined. However, problems beyond the capability of the 6994th to rectify tended to persist, which prevented the complete turn over of back-end operation to the ARVN operators. Language problems, which prohibited operation of airborne Air/Ground communications nets by the Vietnamese, made it necessary to retain one U.S. operator to pass pertinent information to the ground base DSU. Since the U.S. Forces drawdown had made no provisions for the simultaneous training of Vietnamese to assume ground duties concomitant with commencement of Vietnamese flight operations, an imbalance between the air/ground Vietnamization programs prevailed throughout 1971.

[REDACTED] The Vietnamization of ARDF was only one of the many problems facing the 6994th Scty Sq as a result of the drawdown of U.S. Forces in SEA. As outlined in Chapter III of this history, reduction of cryptologic spaces forced the closing of many ground intercept positions, thereby reducing the available data-base upon which to derive target identification information. This drawdown action likewise brought about the closure of several ground based Direct Support Units (DSUs), making the real-time objective for passing of fix data to the ground a virtual impossibility.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Support for the ARDF program also faced many and varied problems. Throughout the last six months of 1971, the command and control responsibility for the Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons (TEWS) was in a constant state of fluctuation. As the period began, the TEWS were subordinated to the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Tan Son Nhut. From the 6994th Scty Sq point of view, this was the ideal situation, providing the means for rapid coordination between the 6994th, 7AF, MACV, ACC, and the TEWS Command and Control function. Many potential problems were expeditiously solved/alleviated through this proximity of responsible elements. As the period progressed and the deactivation of 460TRW became a reality, 6994th stressed the fact that command and control should be retained at Tan Son Nhut. In spite of this contention and exhaustive actions to make the USAFSS position/desires known, the responsibility was transferred to the 483d Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW), Cam Ranh Bay, RVN. This decision was predicated on the possibility/probability that the closure of Phu Cat Air Base, RVN would force the transfer of Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq and the 361st TEWS to Cam Ranh Bay, even though USAFSS had continually been against such an arrangement. (2) At the close of 1971, the drawdown of Cam Ranh Bay and the planned deactivation of 483d TAW had again posed a major problem in relation to TEWS Command and Control.

[REDACTED] Finally, as the SEA reduction subject became more and more prevalent, there were high level opinions that ARDF would be reduced on a graduated basis commensurate with the drawdown of other forces. MACV, 7AF, and all in-country users of the ARDF product were strong in their opposition to such actions. Statistical evidence was presented that pointed out the fact that ARDF/ACI had provided the bulk of the intelli-

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

gence upon which the war activities had been based. With general support of this opinion prevailing, it became more and more difficult to support the war effort, since a drawdown of cryptologic spaces was likewise planned. As a result, 6994th Scty Sq was forced to assume the attitude of doing the best possible job with the manpower/equipment authorized. It is significant to note that in spite of the deactivation of Detachment 1, the constant reduction of manpower resources, the forced reduction of airborne analyst slots, and certain delays in the Vietnamization program, the 6994th was able to maintain a respectable mission posture and make continued contributions to the war effort.

[REDACTED] The following represents a chronological summary of events evolving from the Vietnamization Improvement and Modernization Plan (VIMP) and the SEA reduction actions that directly impacted upon the 6994th Scty Sq. Both subjects are covered in monograph style, thereby providing a smooth flow of pertinent information as each subject unfolded and demanded more and more attention on the part of the 6994th staff.

Vietnamization Improvement and Modernization Plan (VIMP):

[REDACTED] In July 1971, a VNAF plan (71-62) was published which took action and outlined steps for the activation of the VNAF 718th Reconnaissance Squadron (EC-47) on 1 December 1972. Stated purpose of the plan was to program tasks and assign responsibilities to activate, man, train, and equip the 718th Reconnaissance Squadron. Basically, this plan was involved with the operation (front-end), maintenance (both airframe and mission equipment), and the establishment of material channels to support the maintenance function. Primary 6994th/USAFSS involvement lay in the training of maintenance personnel to perform necessary maintenance and

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

upkeep of the installed mission equipment. To a lesser degree, 6994th was involved in the establishment of bench stock of pertinent parts, providing the necessary Avionics Ground Equipment (AGE), and coordinating the procurement of support for the maintenance function. Points of contention which were raised were primarily in the areas of the source of maintenance trainees, and the establishment of supply channels. On the subject of source of trainees, 6994th insisted that those personnel destined to receive initial training as maintenance technicians and to subsequently assume the role of instructors for later classes, should be graduates of the USAF Air Training Command school at Keesler AFB, Mississippi, with later inputs to be derived from the VNAF Air Training Center school at Nha Trang AB, RVN. Pac Scty Rgn points of contention were primarily in the support/logistic area.

[REDACTED] After review by all pertinent offices, a revised plan, dated 1 October 1971 was published, which incorporated the majority of the suggested amendments. In accordance with this plan, 6994th responsibilities were listed as follows:

1. Provide formal training on the AN/ALR-34 equipment, with three VNAF personnel scheduled to commence training on 1 August 1971 and the follow-up training of 26 additional individuals to begin on 31 December 1971. Seventeen trainees were to be derived from Keesler AFB inputs, while the remaining 9 were to be inputs from the in-country school.
 2. Transfer peculiar mission support equipment for maintenance of ALR-34 system.
 3. Provide bench-stock listings on ALR-34 "Y" and "Z" positions.
 4. Provide Air Force Advisory Group (AFAG) a listing of end items,
- [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AGE, special tools, and test equipment to be transferred concomitant with the transfer of aircraft. Also, a listing of shortages in each category were to be provided.

5. Assist VNAF/AFGP in USAFSS areas of responsibility to ensure an orderly transfer of facilities and support activation of the 718th.

6. Train 80 ARDF operator personnel in accordance with Joint Program Actions Directive (PAD) 71-7-12. (This PAD was supplemented by USAFSS (6-7) PAD 71-3.

[REDACTED] The operator training was well under way by the first of July 1971, governed by the joint VNAF/SSTB/AFGP/7AF/USAFSS PAD dated 1 March 1971 and supplemented by USAFSS PAD 71-3. The USAFSS PAD, dated 26 February 1971, combined both the operator and maintenance training phase.

[REDACTED] In summarizing the status of the program as of 30 June 1971, reference to the PAD Progress Report for that date is made. The following actions had been completed.

1. A UDL for 699 $\frac{1}{4}$ th Scty Sq reflecting an increase of 1 officer and 23 airmen for FY 3/71 and 1 officer/35 airmen for FY 72 to act as instructors had been published.

2. The command and control operations had been determined and defined.

3. Training facilities had been scheduled, identified, and equipped.

4. The in-country training program schedule had been finalized and approved.

5. Personnel, equipment, and supplies for training had been identified.

6. Training packages had been finalized and forwarded to DIRNSA for approval.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7. USAFSS operator instructors and training materials were in-country.

8. Logistical support procedures had been established IAW Chief of Staff, Air Force and USAFSS directives.

9. Technical order and supply data for AN/ALR-34 "G" equipment and AGE had been identified to AFAG.

10. "G" position equipment management procedures had been submitted to Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC).

11. The host base (377th GSG) had concurred and cooperated in the modification of buildings to accommodate training, outside the USAFSS operations controlled area.

12. Procedures were established for review/sanitization of materials and equipment.

13. The initial cadre of Vietnamese operators had been through the classroom work and were manning three daily ARDF sorties.

The majority of the PAD items were on schedule as of 1 July 1971.

[REDACTED] During the month of July 1971, progress continued without any pertinent drawbacks. In the area of assumption of the responsibility for the interface of the A/G mission operations with the ARDF data base, the SSTB was training for the preparation of the ARR. Tech data development and use was improving. Actual operator training was progressing well, with 10 students qualified as Class III operators and 12 in student status. Class II was in flight training.

[REDACTED] With the graduation of Class II from ground training, the necessity for increasing the number of sorties flown by the ARVN operators from 3 to 4 per day was made known to all concerned. The point was stressed

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

that the success of the first class had been remarkable, and a recommendation was proffered for the gradual phasing in of the VIM missions in order to reach the programmed level of seven sorties per day in October. (8) USAFSS, Pac Scty Rgn and AFSSO PACAF all concurred, and on 24 July, VIM flights were increased to four per day.

[REDACTED] On 1 July, NRV(C) advised DIRNSA that actions had been initiated to train the Vietnamese in production of ARRs for those EC-47 missions manned by ARVN operators. Interim procedures as established involved coordination between SSTB/509th RRG and 6994th Scty Sq. A system was initiated wherein ARRs, along with a copy of the appropriate operator log, were delivered to teh ACC, thereby allowing ACC to provide a quality check prior to transmission. Any questions requiring clarification were to be resolved through ACC/6994 Scty Sq coordination. (9) In view of the extra steps involved, NRV(C) requested that the three hour timeliness requirement imposed by TECHINS 2038 be waived, a recommendation with which DIRNSA readily concurred.

[REDACTED] To substantiate the 6994th contention that the program (as it stood in mid July) had been highly successful, a wrap-up of the productivity of flights manned by ARVN personnel for one week (26 June-2 July) was provided all concerned by NRV(C). Of 21 scheduled missions, 19 had been flown, with three of the 19 having been reduced. A total of 1794 minutes of HF Manual Morse intercept had been logged, an average of 94.4 minutes per mission. One hundred seventy-one targets had been worked, of which 101 had been fixed and 33 cut. Fifty-four of these targets had been identified. This showed an average of nearly 5 fixes per mission, and an identification rate of 40%. These statistics compared favorably with those of U.S. missions, and let creditability to the abilities of the ARVN oper-

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ators, as well as to the quality of instructions being provided by the
(10)
6994th Scty Sq.

[REDACTED] Since all echelons were extremely concerned over the possibility of degradation of ARDF as a result of the VIM program, very close scrutiny of the product was maintained. The 509 BRG, as the senior cryptologic collection agency in Vietnam and one of the major users of the output of the ARDF program, conducted a study of the quality/quantity of the ARVN product. During a one month period (17 June through 17 July), and covering 34 VIM missions (9 of which were reduced) 157 fixes/cuts were obtained, 92.9% of which had accompanying call-sign data. One hundred thirty-two of 146 fixes were passed to the ground for a pass rate of 84%. The quality of ARDF was high, in that the majority of fixes were below 1200 meter radius. Through analysis of call signs, 61% of the fixes were identified. In summary, the 509th said "quality of ARDF results obtained by VIM EC-47 operators indicates a high degree of professionalism and exceptional training as evidenced by the high percentage of fixes obtained with call signs and the average 1200 meter radius of fixes obtained. (11)

[REDACTED] As the month of August began, all PAD actions were on schedule, with the third class scheduled to begin on 9 August. Throughout the month, the training progressed in a very satisfying manner, with ARVN personnel flying four sorties per day.

[REDACTED] Some question as to the ultimate turn over of equipment arose in August when Lt Col Lang of SSTB met with members of NRV(C) staff to discuss pertinent problems. Lt Col Lang indicated that SSTB might be required to operate EC-47 aircraft in Military Region 1 (Danang area) and along the Laotian panhandle. Should such tasking be levied, the fact that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

only one set of AGE was available would preclude the permanent break-up of the 718th Reconnaissance Squadron into two separate operating locations. The potential for intercepting multi-channel intercept by the "Z" configured aircraft could not be overlooked. Since the SSTB had no demultiplex capability, Lt Col Lang was concerned as to whether SSTB was to be provided demultiplex equipment or if they would be expected to collect and provide recordings to DIRNSA for processing. These points were presented to DIRNSA on 4 August, along with a solicitation for comments/guidance. 6994th concern was minimal, since the capability for multi-channel intercept was an already established fact in the CGZ aircraft that had been tentatively identified for turn-over.

[REDACTED] As of 14 August, 6994th reported the operator training status as follows: (1) Class I - twelve students enrolled, one eliminated medically, ten upgraded to Category III, and one in airborne training; (2) Class II - twelve students enrolled, one eliminated medically, and eleven in airborne training; and (3) Class III - fourteen students enrolled in classroom training.

[REDACTED] On 11 August, Pac Scty Rgn queried the 6994th concerning the type of feedback program that had been established for the ARVN operators, if any. In response, 6994 Scty Sq advised that a daily feedback was provided on the Technical Summaries (TECSUM) prepared on SSTB EC-47 collection. This feedback was subsequently incorporated into TDLs when appropriate, and occasionally fed back to the ARVN operators. At that time, this was the only formal program in existence. A meeting was held between NRVC and 6994th representatives on 25 August to discuss types of feedback that was felt necessary to insure operator motivation and mission coverage. Such

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

interrelated items as TDLs, pre-mission briefings, in-flight target identification, aircrew motivation, and feedback were discussed. From insight gained at this meeting, it appeared that the major stumbling block was the reluctance of the SSTB analytical division to disseminate any more than the barest essential information. NRV(C) technical advisors to SSTB were addressing the problem in an effort to ensure full support and feedback on the ARDF program.

[REDACTED] Although not directly responsible for the compilation of aids to ease the language barrier, 6994th Scty Sq was constantly hampered by the lack of a common language base for cryptologic matter. Although an understanding of English was a prerequisite for the Vietnamese trainees, this was limited to general rather than technical terminology. Consequently, when DIRNSA announced the preparation of a working aid listing SSTB terminology for cryptologic subject matter with Vietnamese to English, English to Vietnamese, and an abbreviations listing (Vietnamese to English), the 6994th was highly enthused. This single aid served a greater purpose in resolving the technical language problem than any other document, and greatly enhanced the overall training program.

[REDACTED] In anticipation of the graduation of the third class from ground training on 1 September, on 28 August the 6994th Scty Sq suggested the incorporation of the fifth daily ARVN mission concomitant with the start of the 4-10 September tasking week. (12)

[REDACTED] In the PAD Progress Report (USAFSS PAD 71-3) reporting progress as of 31 August, 6994 Scty Sq reported that the training of SSTB personnel had progressed sufficiently to allow discontinuance of

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

of the duplication of ARRs on VIM missions. All but five of the graduates of Class II had been upgraded to Category II operators, with an additional four scheduled for upgrading in the first week of September. Class III, with 14 operators, was scheduled to complete ground training on 1 September.

[REDACTED] Throughout the month of September, the VIM program progressed as scheduled, appearing to have steadied itself into a routine. The third class completed training on 1 September and trainees were entered into flight training on 2 September. At that time, the sortie rate was increased to five per day (beginning with the 4-10 September tasking week). As of 30 September, a total of 21 students from Classes I and II were performing as Category III operators, and mission degradation was non-existent. Fourteen operators from Class III were undergoing airborne training, with 15 students having been identified for Class IV, scheduled to begin on 11 October.

[REDACTED] In the maintenance training area, three Vietnamese began informal training during the latter portion of August. By the end of September, positive assessment of these individual's abilities could be made. Professional abilities of the three ranged from excellent to fair, while comprehension of English was good to poor. However, it appeared that language would not be a barrier in the training of this initial group.

[REDACTED] In view of the excellent showing made by the initial classes, 6994th requested that the sortie rate be increased from 5 to 7 per day beginning with the tasking week of 2 October. NRV(C) concurred and USM-704 initiated coordination on 28 September to insure that tasking was commensurate with this proposal.

[REDACTED] As October began, so did drawbacks. Although the SSTB was

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

progressing and well on their way toward issuing technical reports (Unit 17, SSTB was expected to commence technical reporting in November), the operator training suddenly realized a pitfall. One student from Class II had been removed from the program due to lack of progression. The majority of the Class III operators were very slow in grasping a comprehension of airborne operations and potential for upgrading was virtually non-existent. The major problem was the lack of ability to communicate (the language barrier again) and poor, though improving, code ability. To further complicate the situation, only 14 vice the scheduled 15 operators were available to begin Class IV. Those provided were completely unfamiliar with any aspect of flying. Eleven of the 14 failed the first week's code check, while three failures (the first since training began) of the second week's written test were realized. At the close of October, it was obvious that SSTB had relaxed considerably in their selection criteria for ARDF trainees, a condition that threatened to delay progress of the Vietnamization program.

[REDACTED] As the month of November began, the lack of proficiency on the part of Classes III and IV precluded the scheduling of any additional VIM missions, consequently the sortie rate remained at the October 7 per day level. In upgrading actions, five of the 14 Class III graduates had been upgraded by the end of November. Lack of ability for target recognition and poor code proficiency remained the major reason for lack of progression. Class IV presented seemingly insurmountable problems. Upon completion of classroom training, only 6 of the 14 students possessed sufficient code proficiency to be entered into flight training. The remaining 8 were entered into concentrated code training, practicing for 6 hours daily on valid tapes. In addition, one student from Class III was grounded due

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

to lack of code proficiency and was given remedial code training. On the brighter side, four operators from Class I had been upgraded to Category IV Airborne Mission Supervisor (AMS)/Instructor Radio Operator (IRO) status, and one from Class II had been upgraded to Category III AMS.

[REDACTED] The same general situation prevailed throughout December, with the quality of inputs to the program having a profound effect upon the overall success. In spite of the pitfalls encountered in this area, most other facets were progressing satisfactorily. As of 31 December, ARVN Unit 17 was performing the scheduling function for four lines per day. Tasking messages, as provided by ACC, were being processed and applied to scheduling in an efficient manner. Position checklists, prepared by the 6994th Scty Sq VIM section were in use, while modified forms and logs were being prepared. In addition, Vietnamese Language checklists for filling out these forms were being compiled, while AMS and emergency destruction checklists were being translated.

[REDACTED] Progression of the training schedule had been somewhat slowed by the failure of SSTB to provide previously qualified individuals for training into the airborne program. The class scheduled to commence on 1 December was slipped to 15 December, while it appeared that Class VI, scheduled to begin on 1 February was not expected to start before early March 1972.

[REDACTED] At the close of 1971, the entire cadre of Vietnamese operators consisted of five AMS/IRO Category IV, four Category III AMS, 20 qualified Category III, 14 Category II in airborne training, and 21 Category I in ground training.

[REDACTED] In summary, the Vietnamization program was recognized at the outset as a very important facet of the overall SEA drawdown. Conse-

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

quently it was with mixed emotions that the cryptologic community in SEA embarked upon the endeavor. First and foremost in the minds of all concerned was the possibility that the quality of the ARDF program would suffer as a result of the Vietnamization process. MACV was strong in their insistence that such a result could not be condoned. As the draw-down of American forces was accelerated, positive intelligence concerning the location of enemy forces was a must, and only ARDF could be relied upon to provide this data. In addition, a great deal of AGI, especially in Cambodia, was gathered by the EG-47 fleet, and provided extremely important intelligence to MACV for military reaction purposes.

Consequently, as the plans for training of Vietnamese crews expanded, extreme care was taken to insure, at all costs, that the ARDF program would not be allowed to deteriorate. The most qualified operators available were chosen to conduct the training, especially the airborne portion, and strict adherence to upgrade provisions were stressed. When it appeared that SSTB was placing too little emphasis on selection criteria for trainees, immediate action was taken to secure NRV(C) intervention and stress to SSTB the importance of the program. Although NRV(C) was strong in pointing out the necessity for screening of all potential trainees to insure well qualified and motivated inputs, the situation grew progressively worse. At the outset it was difficult to ascertain the reason for this apparent apathy on the part of the Vietnamese - it seemed to those responsible that SSTB was actually torpedoing the program. When a complete review of the implications was made, it was apparent that the Vietnamese armed forces were no different from any other. When two services were involved (in this instance, the SSTB is composed of ARVN personnel, while

[REDACTED]

the ARDF program was for all practical purposes, to be controlled by the VNAF), there was a general feeling of antagonism and jealousy. Since the ARVN was responsible for providing the operators to perform SSTB ground intercept duties, they were apprehensive over providing their more qualified operators as ARDF trainees. As a consequence, the Vietnamization of ARDF suffered unforeseen setbacks.

[REDACTED] In the areas of direct SSTB support to ARDF, this situation did not manifest itself so drastically. They seemed more willing to provide trainees to assume scheduling and reporting functions, and these facets advanced well within the purview of the Vietnamization plan, and all programmed actions directives items were met on schedule.

[REDACTED] With almost one year having transpired since the beginning of Vietnamization actions, it has been generally agreed that the Vietnamese are capable of performing the ARDF mission, and a great deal of individual initiative and interest was exhibited by the trainees. The language barrier presented problems, while the awe with which lower ranking Vietnamese look upon officers and senior noncommissioned officers resulted in a great deal of hesitation on the part of airborne trainees to project themselves into a situation, and to recognize themselves as being as important to the mission as the officers aboard the platform. This condition was most obvious in the requirement for "X" console operators to coordinate with navigators. However, as navigators came to recognize this situation, they became highly cooperative and understanding, thereby relieving the feelings of awe and hesitancy that had prevailed. With the inclusion of Vietnamese navigators in the program, the language problem that had prevailed among the back-end crews was somewhat eliminated. At the close of

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the year, the lack of Vietnamese speaking operators at DSUs remained the major drawback to complete Vietnamization, and an American operator was still required on all missions to accomplish the necessary communications functions.

Southeast Asia Reductions:

[REDACTED] As the last six months of 1971 began, reduction of forces in Southeast Asia was of major concern to 6994th Scty Sq. A number of different aspects were pertinent, and all had a definite impact upon the ARDF program. As closure of USAF units progressed, the subject of command and control of the Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons was of major importance. At the same time, the programmed closure of certain air bases (Phu Cat Air Base and disposition of Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq was of primary importance) ⁽¹³⁾ demanded close scrutiny to prevent the loss of ARDF coverage. Drawdown of Army forces which resulted in the closure of DSUs had an adverse effect upon the speed with which ARDF results could be passed to ground commanders, while the void created in intercept parameters placed greater demands upon the AGI portion of the 6994th Scty Sq mission. Drawdown of Army direction finding platforms required USAF operation in areas to which they had not been previously fringed. Finally, the reduction of cryptologic spaces without any decrease in tasking promised to place increased demands upon those personnel remaining, while the future of AGC became tenuous, and the complete elimination of manpower spaces for the Communications Security function forecast the complete demise of that effort in 1972.

[REDACTED] At the close of June 1971, 6994th Scty Sq was involved in discussions as to the appropriate unit to assume command and control responsibility of the Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons, con-

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

comitant with the deactivation of the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
 (15)
 at Tan Son Nhut on 31 August 1971. Several different proposals had been
 made, the majority of which were unsatisfactory to the 6994th. The im-
 plication that command and control was to be fragmented and assigned to
 various organizations at different locations was strongly opposed by the
 6994th, stressing that retention of the function at Tan Son Nhut was of
 essence. This contention was aired repeatedly, due to the fact that co-
 ordination between the command and control function, 7AF, MACV, and 6994th
 Scty Sq was considered critical to the success of the ARDF program. Pac
 Scty Rgn supported the 6994th in this matter, and initiated coordination
 with PACAF to resolve differences in opinions. (14)
 (16)
 Although the 6994th Com-
 mander discussed the situation at length with 7AF, they stood firm in
 their decision to transfer command and control away from Tan Son Nhut,
 with the fact that a drawdown in American involvement at Tan Son Nhut was
 being advocated by higher headquarters one of the prime factors affecting
 this stand. (71-18)

() In a message of 12 August, 7AF pointed out that they con-
 sidered the 483d Tactical Airlift Wing at Cam Ranh Bay, RVN the most log-
 ical existing wing structure to assume the TEWS command and control respon-
 sibility. This decision was made with the assumption that the 361st
 TEWS and Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq would be transferred to Cam Ranh
 Bay when Phu Cat Air Base was closed, and action envisioned to occur in
 late October/early November 1971. (19)
 After exhaustive meetings and discus-
 sions, it became obvious that 7AF was to stand firm on their recommenda-
 tions to let any final decisions rest with PACAF.

() Although coordination continued throughout July and August,
 7AF stood firm on their decision to transfer the command and control to

[REDACTED]

the 483d TAW, still based upon the very tentative assumption that 361st TEWS and Det 1, 6994th would be relocated to that base. Since no firm decision was made on this relocation prior to the deactivation of the 460TRW, command and control was transferred to the 483TAW on 31 August, a situation that complicated matters even more when it was revealed that Detachment 1 and 361st TEWS were to be deactivated and resources were to be transferred to Danang and Tan Son Nhut. In spite of 6994th Scty Sq apprehension, the transfer caused very little degradation of the ARDF program. It was difficult to discern the reason for this, since for all practical purposes, the 483TAW was completely alien to the ARDF program. Much credit for the success must be given to 483d, since they refused to assume such responsibility without first hand knowledge of ARDF requirements. Although numerous TDYs and lengthy coordination visits were necessary, through vigorous actions the 483d proved fully capable of controlling the TEW squadrons from a "remote" location.

[REDACTED] Although the 483TAW was successful in their endeavors, they were to retain the position for a very short time. On 22 November, 7AF announced plans to close Cam Ranh Bay in early 1972. As a result of this action, the TEWS command and control again became a point of contention. Since existing wing structures within South Vietnam were at a premium, the early discussion revolved around the fragmentation of the responsibility. Since the 377th Combat Support Group at Tan Son Nhut was scheduled for upgrading to an Air Base Wing structure, early consideration was given to the return of the command and control to Tan Son Nhut. However, 7AF persisted in the fragmentation issue, and pressed with plans for the 366TFW at Danang to assume control of the 362d TEWS and Det 1, 360th

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TEWS (to be redesignated Detachment 1, 362d TEWS), while the 377th ABW at Tan Son Nhut would assume control of the 360th TEWS. This situation reverted to a pre 31 August stand for the 6994th, since fragmentation had always been considered less than desirable. In spite of USAFSS arguments against such an arrangement, by the close of 1971, plans were well formulated to accomplish the transfer, concomitant with the close of 483d TAW in early 1972.

[REDACTED] During the last six months of 1971, 6994th Soty Sq spent many hours coordinating the closure of Phu Cat Air Base, and the ultimate decision to deactivate Detachment 1, 6994th and the 361st TEWS. Before final decision was made, transfer to Phan Rang, Cam Ranh Bay, Ubon, Thailand, as well as the final decision to transfer assets to Danang and rearrange the entire complex EC-47 arrangement. Repeated mention was made of the transfer of any given number (6 to 11 were considered) to the Continental United States (CONUS). In spite of all considerations that were aired, the ultimate decision was to increase the Danang UE to 32, while 26 were to be assigned to the 360th TEWS at Tan Son Nhut. Twenty of the Tan Son Nhut aircraft were to be maintained in operational status, while 6 were held in reserve, tentatively slated for return to the CONUS.

[REDACTED] As discussions were held concerning the disposition of USAF ARDF resources, the status of the entire cryptologic community of SEA had to be taken into consideration. Any decision arrived at had to take the allocations for each Service Cryptologic Agency into consideration. Each ensuing day of early September brought new figures to bear, alternating from zero for USAFSS as of 1 July 1972 to any number of imaginable on any given date. Ultimate decision was made as a result of a meeting held in Saigon in early October. However, until this time, there were repeated

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

implications that the Air Force would be assuming all ARDF functions in South Vietnam, with the Army withdrawing their resources. This resulted in Air Force planners being forced to make provisions for any contingency, from retention of all EC-47 assets to the drawdown of the fleet and the return of any given number to the Continental U.S. As a result of the Saigon conference, the Air Force cryptologic space allocation was set at 1126, which provided for sufficient manpower to continue the ARDF program with a UE of 58 aircraft throughout the remainder of 1971. Additional allocations for the Army resulted in the retention of a number of Army Security Agency platforms and negated an anticipated void that would have been created by the removal of USAFSS ARDF from the Central Vietnam area. As a result of these actions, coupled with the DIRNSA stand that Cam Ranh Bay was unacceptable as a USAFSS ARDF staging base, the future of the USAF ARDF mission in SEA was relatively stabilized by the end of October.

[REDACTED] One outcome of the cryptologic conference that caused alarm within SEA was the tenuous status of ACC. Since all concerned SEA units recognized the ACC as a vital part of the ARDF management process, the fact that NSA planners had omitted ACC manning in the allocation of cryptologic spaces was deemed extremely important. Throughout the remainder of the year, the subject was repeatedly discussed, with no positive action having been taken concerning the future status of ACC as of 31 December.

[REDACTED] In summary, the 6 month period between 1 July and 31 December 1971 was one of the most important from a historical viewpoint that has ever been realized by the 6994th. Concepts were changed rapidly, all brought about by the pressure at all levels to achieve an orderly executed

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

drawdown posture. Conflicting interests, with 7AF/MACV pressures from both sides and national level decisions often negating the efforts of local planners made for a period of frustration and defeatism on the part of those who fully understood and appreciated the value of ARDF to the war effort. It was continually stressed by MACV that ARDF remained the single most important ingredient in the cryptologic community. At every opportunity, 7AF Intelligence and MACV stressed the need for ARDF to continue to cover the drawdown of American forces. On the other hand, pressures from PACAF, CINCPAC, and national levels dictated that 7AF planners continue to pursue the objective of drawdown. Consequently, what ensued was far from orderly. Although the need for continued ARDF coverage was generally recognized, pressure for continued drawdown began to take its toll of cryptologic spaces. As a result, the 6994th was forced to continue to satisfy mission requirements with an ever decreasing number of manpower spaces, requiring constant scrutiny and demanding efficient utilization of manpower authorizations to enable the unit to continue its support of the war effort. At the close of 1971, it appeared that the constant state of flux and uncertainty that had prevailed throughout the latter portion of the year would continue to challenge the unit as 1972 unfolded.

Chapter V

COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY OPERATIONS

[REDACTED] The Communications Security (COMSEC) Section of 6994th Scty Sq continued to perform its unique function of providing direct COMSEC support to tactical units in SEA during this historical period. This support was provided through the monitor, analysis, and reporting of voice conversations passed over intercept vulnerable USAF communications systems. The reporting of probable/possible intelligence losses, security compromises, and COMSEC weaknesses was accomplished through use of Communications Security Message Reports (CSMRs), Interim CSMRs, Informal Daily Summaries (DASUMs), and Communications Security Monthly Summaries (CSMSs). All these reports were designed to be forwarded directly to 7AF for their information/action. The high level of interest in COMSEC at 7AF was evidenced by the fact that all CSMRs destined for 7AF consumers were reviewed by the 7AF Chief of Staff before being released to the consumers. Further COMSEC support was provided to 7AF by COMSEC personnel who were members of the 7AF Operations Security (OPSEC) Working Group and Communications Cover and Deception Board. COMSEC was also called upon by 7AF to provide recommendations to improve their COMSEC status and for specific recommendations to eliminate specific problem areas. These actions were normally accomplished through the OPSEC Working Group or by personal contact with the sections concerned. Periodic COMSEC briefings were presented to newly assigned controllers from the 7AF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at Tan Son Nhut. These briefings outlined common COMSEC danger areas, presented a review of services the COMSEC section had available to TACC personnel, and included a question and answer

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

session on all aspects of COMSEC in SEA.

Equipment


■ To accomplish the mission of COMSEC support to 7AF tactical operations, specific types of equipment were used as follows:

YT0009Y - Telephone Monitor:

■ Two YT0009Y telephone monitor positions were used to monitor USAF telephone circuits originating/terminating at Tan Son Nhut Airfield. Each position contained two GS-80 magnetic tape recorders and two switching groups, giving a capability to selectively record conversations from any four of 22 circuits on each position. Periodic changing of circuits connected to the positions ensured a representative sampling of USAF telephone communications. Long-haul circuits were the primary target of the telephone monitor, except during special mission periods when local on-base telephones were connected. On 13 October, due to lack of activity and reduced manning, the Daily Hours of Coverage (DHOC) for the telephone positions was reduced from 24 to 16 hours (0700-2300H). Each YT0009Y position required one operator/analyst (using split headsets) per shift.

YT001Y - High Frequency Radio Monitor:

■ Three HF radio monitor positions were available during this historical period. One position was dedicated to monitor of the II Corps Direct Air Request Net. On 13 November, a second HF position was activated to monitor the III Corps Direct Air Request Net. These positions were manned for 11 DHOC, (0700-1900H), and required one operator/analyst for the two positions (utilizing split headsets) per shift. The third position was tasked only during a short TDY mission to Nha Trang AB, RVN.



[REDACTED]

Four antennas, three doublets and one omni-directional whip, were available for use with the HF positions.

YT0024 - VHF/UHF Radio Monitor Position:

[REDACTED] The VHF/UHF radio monitor position actually consisted of separate VHF and UHF receivers with their associated GS-80 magnetic tape recorders. One person, using split headsets, operated both positions. This position was normally tasked until 13 November, when it was converted to mobile configuration and used on a TDY mission to Nha Trang AB. Due to lack of VHF/UHF radio activity, the position was not tasked after the TDY. Four antennas, cut to various wave lengths, were available for use with the YT0024.

YTS-001 - Supervisor Position:

[REDACTED] This position consisted of an HF radio receiver and a switching group, providing a capability to monitor any of the other positions, and was not formally tasked during the entire historical period.

YT001X - Transcribe Position:

[REDACTED] The two GS-80 magnetic tape transcribe positions were used extensively to transcribe local monitor tapes and those tapes recorded during TDY missions. Additionally, 6990th Scty Gp COMSEC monitor teams periodically used the positions for transcription during their frequent TDYs to SEA.

Manning

[REDACTED] COMSEC manning was 22 of 31 authorized on 1 July and 21 of 31 on 31 December, for an average of 66 percent manning during the entire period. Although manning was always below authorized levels, it had little adverse effect upon the section's ability to perform its duties.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Mission Accomplishment

(U) During this historical period, the success of the COMSEC mission was best illustrated by the listing and discussion of those significant reports submitted as a result of the monitor mission.

Communications Security Message Reports:

[REDACTED] CSMRs continued to be forwarded electrically to tactical commanders, and pertained to perishable intelligence losses requiring immediate attention. During this historical period, the COMSEC section issued a total of 53 CSMRs; 42 to 7AF, 10 to Pac Scty Rgn, and one to the 405th TFW (PACAF). The success of these reports is recapitulated as follows:

Strategic Air Command Special Interest: CSMR 230600Z Jul 71, issued via Immediate precedence to Pac Scty Rgn, reported that several B-52s at U-Tapao RTAFB, Thailand, were grounded due to wing structural failures and there were indications that the entire B-52 fleet could be grounded. Pac Scty Rgn immediately informed this unit to release this information to local SAC representatives at the Strategic Air Command Advanced Echelon at Tan Son Nhut. Subsequent communications with Pac Scty Rgn revealed that General Holloway (Commander, SAC) had conversed with M/Gen Stapleton (Comdr USAFSS) concerning this CSMR. It was determined that the problem was local at U-Tapao and appropriate actions had been taken to prevent further disclosures of this type of information.

SEA VIP/DV Activities: Thirteen CSMRs reported compromises, disclosures of sensitive information, etc., concerning VIP/DV activities within, into, and through SEA to 7AF and Pac Scty Rgn. The most Notable of these were: (1) The compromise of General Ryan's (CS USAF) codename while

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

touring SEA and (2) a planned visit by General Lavelle (Comdr 7AF) to Danang and Phan Rang Air Bases, RVN, five days prior to departure. Coincidentally or otherwise, at 1305H on the day General Lavelle planned to tour Phan Rang AB, the base received two rounds of 122MM rocket fire with one round impacting in the Officer's club compound. These CSMRs resulted in the publication of a 7AF (CS) letter, dated 8 November 1971, which outlined COMSEC protection required for VIP/DV travel information and a similar 7AF (CS) message to all SEA units, dated 8 December 1971. Subsequently, the COMSEC posture of VIP/DV activities improved almost 100 percent.

PACAF CIRCE Code Study: [REDACTED] Fifteen CSMRs were issued on CIRCE code compromises, resulting in a PACAF directed mission to study the CIRCE code operations in SEA. As of 31 December, it appeared that a new code device is being designed to replace the present CIRCE code, offering better communications security and easier, faster manual operation.

Interim CSMRs:

[REDACTED] In addition to normal CSMR reporting, the COMSEC section issued seven Interim CSMRs (handcarried reports which were delivered to 7AF within 15 minutes after monitor) to the 7AF TACC in accordance with 7AF Regulation 100-7. These Interim CSMRs reported information concerning: (1) A SAC KC-135 refueling altitude and location; (2) A General Officer combat sortie; (3) A Prisoner of War extract; and (4) several prior indications of USAF Tac Air strikes in the combat zone. The TACC, in turn, took immediate corrective actions, such as cancelling or diverting those activities, to protect USAF personnel and aircraft.

Informal Daily Summaries:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The next most influential report published by the COMSEC Section was the Informal Daily Summary to 7AF. This report was prepared and distributed on a daily basis to the 7AF TACC, Directorate of Command and Control, Fighter Frag Shop, Operations Security Office, and Directorate of Communications. The contents of these summaries were reported as intelligence items considered by COMSEC analysts to be of value to enemy intelligence gathering/analysis agencies. The success of this reporting vehicle was realized through the gradual decline of reportable items from several per day to one every few days.

COMSEC Monthly Summary:

[REDACTED] The COMSEC Monthly Summary, the most widely read report submitted by the COMSEC Section (1150 copy distribution to USAF units in SEA), was prepared in accordance with Pac Scty Rgn Regulation 200-2. These reports were designed to inform USAF tactical commanders in SEA of the COMSEC status of their units. 7AF considered these reports as COMSEC information/education tools, prepared as an aid to recognizing communications practices which could jeopardize the security of a project, mission, or exercise. Consumer response to one of the six GSMSs issued during this historical period gave indication of the success of these reports. HQ Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, queried the section about a specific item that had been reported in the October 1971 GSMS concerning a possible security compromise. Upon receipt of the 6994th reply, a special directive was issued to all Rescue and Recovery units in SEA, reminding them of the dangers of poor COMSEC procedures. Secondly, at the request of 7AF Directorate of Communications, two special features were written concerning the danger of not properly protecting DV/VIP travel information and another describing the dangers

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

and deficiencies of an illegal code called "Magic Numbers".

Special Missions:

Between 1 July and 31 December 1971, the COMSEC Section participated in six Pac Scty Rgn numbered COMSEC projects and performed three special communications studies. The studies were in support of 7AF, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), and 6990th Security Group COMSEC operations. A brief resume of each of these missions/studies follows:

Pac Scty Rgn Project 15-71-USAFSS (COMFY DRAGON):* This mission was directed by Pac Scty Rgn on 09 July. The purpose of the mission was to perform an Operations Security (OPSEC) survey of all facets of the 6908th Scty Sq and any units/functions in any way connected with that unit's operations. The 6994th was tasked to perform normal monitor, and to report by traffic extracts, any communications reflections of COMPASS FLAG/SENIOR BOOK** activity. Monitoring period for this mission was 1 through 30 September.

Pac Scty Rgn Project 16-71-PACOM/PACAF (BUFFALO HUNTER/COMBAT DAWN):***
On 1 July, a Pac Scty Rgn message tasked 6994th with providing all possible support to the CINCPAC OPSEC Survey Team and the 6990th Scty Gp mobile monitor teams in SEA. Between 4 and 16 August, the COMSEC Section provided radio, radiotelephone, and telephone monitor of Reconnaissance Drone operations in SEA. Traffic extracts and summaries of this

*COMFY DRAGON - Code name for USAFSS OPSEC program.

** COMPASS FLAG/SENIOR BOOK - AF operational test program of USAF execution of an NSA request to equip a small number of QU-22B aircraft with a remotely controlled COMINT payload.

*** BUFFALO HUNTER/COMBAT DAWN - Joint USAFSS/SAC drone reconnaissance system for COMINT collection using a Ryan 147 drone.

activity were forwarded to the 6990th Scty Gp for processing and release to the CINCPAC OPSEC team. 6994th Scty Sq also provided the 6990th Scty Gp with COMSEC/SIGINT correlation of the reconnaissance drone activity.

PacSctyRgn Project 18-71-PAGAF/PAGOM (ARDF OPSEC Survey): ()

This mission was generated by CINCPAC message on 31 July 1971 and a CINCPACAF message of 06 August 1971. As with the previous OPSEC surveys, the COMSEC Section was tasked to provide monitor of radio, radiotelephone, and telephone communications for reflections of ARDF activity. As a special monitor effort, the EC-47 on-board recorder normally used for COMINT recording purposes was modified to copy transmissions to/from the mission aircraft. Daily traffic summaries and sanitized traffic extracts were provided to the CINCPAC OPSEC team and the 6990th Scty Gp. The 6994th Scty Sq COMSEC Section also acted as a central coordination/relay/contact point for the 6990th Scty Gp mobile monitor team in SEA. In addition, 6994th provided the mobile monitor teams with callsigns, frequencies, identification, etc., of ARDF activities.

PacSctyRgn Project 20-71-PAGOM/PAGAF (IGLOO WHITE* Operations): ()

On 12 October, 6994th COMSEC was tasked by Pac Scty Rgn to provide monitor/analysis support for the CINCPAC OPSEC Survey of IGLOO WHITE operations. The tasking included monitor of radio, radiotelephone, and telephone communications during 0800 to 1600H daily from 14 through 20 October for reflections of IGLOO WHITE activity. 6994th provided traffic summaries and extracts to the 6990th Scty Gp for processing and release to the CINCPAC OPSEC team for inclusion in their final report.

* IGLOO WHITE - () Air support anti-infiltration system in SEA employing EC-121 aircraft.

[REDACTED]

Pac Scty Rgn Project 21-71-7AF (Udorn ABCCC Monitor): ([REDACTED]) On 28 August, 6994th Scty Sq was tasked by 7AF DGO and DOOS (COMSEC and OPSEC) to perform a COMSEC study of Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) communications. Three COMSEC personnel were sent TDY to Udorn RTAFB, Thailand to transpose seven track ABCCC tapes to 1/4 inch dual track tapes for transcription and analysis at the 6994th Scty Sq. An analysis report was generated by the COMSEC Section which pointed out four representative samples of COMSEC malpractices that made sensitive information of possible intelligence value susceptible to hostile intercept and exploitation. This report was forwarded to PACAF, MACV, 7AF, USAFSS, PSR, and the 6990th Scty Gp on 20 October. During the planning and monitor/analysis phases of this effort, HQ USAFSS evidenced considerable interest, possibly because this was the first PSR COMSEC mission assigned exclusively to the 6994th Scty Sq.

PacSctyRgn Project 22-71-MACV (Tri-Service MACSOG Survey): ([REDACTED])

This project was the OPSEC survey of a highly classified, compartmented, COMJSMACV function. 6994th was tasked to participate in this survey by 7AF at the request of MACV (J-222). Tasking was contained in a 7AF DGOO letter of 14 August 1971. Three 6994th COMSEC operator/analysts were sent to Nha Trang AB, RVN to monitor VHF/UHF radio communications from 15 to 28 November. Upon termination of the mobile monitor, the team returned to Tan Son Nhut, transcribed the tapes, and prepared the AF portion of the final report. As this was a MACV project, the Army Security Agency was designated as controlling authority and all copies of the Air Force report were forwarded to them for inclusion in the final tri-service report. Due to the extreme sensitivity of the information contained in the report, no USAFSS distribution was made and no file copies of the report were re-

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

tained by 6994th.

Special Study - ARC LIGHT Forewarning: [REDACTED] COMUSMACV (J3) message of 01 September requested the 6994th Scty Sq to perform a special monitor and analysis study of B-52 (ARC LIGHT) operations in SEA. The purpose of this study was to determine if possible, how enemy forces were being forewarned of impending B-52 strikes. During the period 1 through 15 September, a determined effort was made to monitor VHF and HF radio and telephone communications for ARC LIGHT related conversations. In addition, an ABCCC VHF/UHF radio tape was reviewed for ARC LIGHT reflections. On 28 September, a Special Communications Study letter report was forwarded to COMUSMACV (J-3), 7AF (DC, DOOS, and TACC), SAC ADVON, and the 6990th Scty Gp. This report pointed out that direct compromises of impending ARC LIGHT strikes were extremely rare and that the enemy is probably predicting B-52 strike times and targets by analysis of past strike patterns and stereotype mission procedures employed by the B-52s.

Special Study (DART): [REDACTED] At the verbal request of Brig Gen John, 7AF DCS Intelligence, 6994th undertook to perform a monitor, analysis, and reporting mission on the Depletable Automatic Relay Terminal (DART) sensor system. Monitor was conducted during the period 1 through 28 August. On 9 September, a Special Communications Study letter report was forwarded to 7AF, Pac Scty Rgn, and the 6990th Scty Gp. This letter contained a detailed analysis picture of the DART program. The information in the report was taken from the monitor and analysis of over 227 conversations passed over intercept vulnerable communications circuits in SEA.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Special Emphasis Monitor (CIRGE Code): [REDACTED] Between 22 and 26 November, a special emphasis monitor was performed on CIRGE Code usage in SEA. This monitor was at the request of the 6990th Scty Gp to assist in preliminary analysis for an upcoming study of the code system. In addition to forwarding traffic reflecting CIRGE Code transmissions, 6994th forwarded transcripts of all code related CSMRs issued during 1971 to the 6990th.

Special Project Monitor (F-105 Shootdown): [REDACTED] On 14 December, 6994th was included as an information addressee on a HQ USAFSS message to AFSSO Tactical Air Command, requesting diarized COMSEC traffic on an F-105 shutdown. This message acknowledged receipt of an AFSSO TAG message and stated that USAFSS units had been queried for COMSEC reflections of the shutdown. 6994th Scty Sq had already begun researching traffic for reflections of this activity, consequently were prepared when USAFSS and PacSctyRgn formally requested input. 6994th message on 15 December 1971 answered this request and contained a detailed report of COMSEC reflections, COMSEC/COMINT correlation of communications pertinent to the incident, and a resume of stereotype F-105 communications procedures that could have contributed to the shutdown. HQ USAFSS message of 17 December to AFSSO TAG repeated the 6994th Scty Sq message almost verbatim.

COMSEC Management

USAFSS Manual 200-4, Volume XIV, Test:

[REDACTED] The provisions contained in USAFSS Manual 200-4, Volume XIV (Test), dated 1 June 1971, were implemented by 6994th on 1 August. The testing period was scheduled to continue through May 1972, and during that time the manual is to be revised periodically to reflect any improvements in reporting methods. Essentially, the only change imposed

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

by the new manual was to incorporate information formerly contained in the COMSEC Management Summary into a machine formatted vehicle and subsequent forwarding of the information via message in the Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS). The basic purpose of the procedures implemented by the new manual was to formalize recording and reporting of daily performance data and provide local managers with data upon which they could base actions to achieve the greatest degree of self-guidance for attaining optimum performance from their resources. To this end, the 6994th feels that the new manual has been an unqualified success.

Future of 6994th Scty Sq COMSEC

Background:

() On 13 May, USAFSS initiated a proposal for the cessation of COMSEC operations in SEA. Contained in this proposal was a request for 6994th to determine the levels of COMSEC support necessary to 7AF for fiscal years 72 through 74, and to determine personnel strength levels at specific time frames throughout the three year period. Since the COMSEC monitor function of the 6994th is a 7AF directed function, on 13 May 1971, 6994th requested that 7AF provide the information concerning the level of support needed. In reply, 7AF indicated that 72-74 fiscal year requirements would be the same as those for fiscal years 70 and 71. In reporting this response to Pac Scty Rgn, 6994th pointed out that from the squadron viewpoint, HF/VHF/UHF radio monitor resources could be considered for drawdown, as the VHF/UHF equipment was not tasked at that time, and little information was being obtained from the HF monitor. It was further suggested that adequate support could be provided 7AF by quarterly mobile monitoring missions from the 6990th Scty Gp.

Situation as of 31 December 1971:

██████████ During the latter part of September a Pac Scty Rgn message again addressed the reduction of SEA COMSEC resources. This message indicated that a review of planning information concerning SEA residual cryptologic forces had no provision for retaining COMSEC support for 7AF and requested that 6994th Scty Sq Security Service Liaison Office so advise 7AF. (4) After official notification, 7AF DCS Communications/Electronics agreed to act as office of primary responsibility in staffing the matter at 7AF. Preliminary indications (unofficially) were that there would be no need for in-country COMSEC support after 30 June 1972. (5)

██████████ At the same time, USAFSS was also showing interest in the future of SEA COMSEC resources. A USAFSS message of 24 September 1971 indicated that in the immediate future USAFSS representatives were to attend a meeting at MACV headquarters to determine the total cryptologic posture in the RVN for the next fiscal year. As the USAFSS COMSEC position was dependent upon the component commander's need for direct support, it was requested that 6994th Scty Sq contact 7AF to confirm the COMSEC requirement and to determine any change in total effort caused by reduction. USAFSS further requested 6994th assessment as to the number of personnel that would be required to continue the direct support mission, and the number and type of COMSEC positions which should be retained in RVN to accomplish such a mission. (6)

██████████) On 28 September, 7AF reported that developments subsequent to May 71 indicated that tactical COMSEC support could be eliminated during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1972. (7) As a result of these actions, the paucity of projected manning resulted in Pac Scty Rgn authorization of a reduction in DHOC from 24 to 16 hours daily for the two telephone

██████████ ██████████

[REDACTED]

monitor positions. This reduction in DHOC was implemented on 13 October 1971.

([REDACTED]) As of 31 December, lateral coordination between USAFSS, Pac Scty Rgn, 6994th Scty Sq, and 7AF continued. However, it appeared that complete closure of the COMSEC function would be formalized and accomplished sometime during the 4th quarter of fiscal year 1972.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Chapter VI

MAINTENANCE/SUPPLY ACTIVITIES

[REDACTED] Logistical activities within the maintenance and supply areas were generally static during this historical period. All supply activities were routine in nature with the exception of assistance given the Air Force Advisory Group in relation to establishment of supply channels for the Vietnamization program* and minor assistance afforded Detachment 1, 6994th Stry Sq during deactivation. Maintenance actions fell within the three routine categories of COMSEC, ARDF, and Maintenance Management and the completely unique category of Vietnamization training.

Maintenance

COMSEC Maintenance:

[REDACTED] Although no technicians were dedicated solely to the maintenance of COMSEC equipment, no outages or lost position time were experienced during this historical period. Due to a critical manning situation throughout the complex throughout the period, COMSEC maintenance was performed through the dispatch of technicians from other work centers, with all scheduled inspections and maintenance tasks being performed in the allotted time. Proper and timely operator maintenance assisted greatly to bring about this high system reliability.

ARDF Maintenance:

[REDACTED] The local ARDF maintenance effort was well above USAFSS standards. Critical manning and combat conditions were overcome with exceptional results. As an example, a total of 38,680.4 flying hours were scheduled during this period, with only 448.6 (0.1%) of the scheduled time being lost as a result of special mission equipment malfunctions. A total

*See Chapter IV, this history for related information.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

of 5,864 combat missions were flown, with an equipment reliability of 97.8 percent. The "pride of the fleet" as she is affectionately known, is the ancient lady, Aircraft 43-049126. This aircraft flew a total of 110 consecutive no discrepancy flights for the special mission equipment during this time frame. This aircraft has been assigned to five different operating locations within Southeast Asia and continues to perform in an admirable manner.

Maintenance Management:

Technical and Logistical Support to Detachments: [REDACTED] The maintenance Branch of 6994th Scty Sq not only performs maintenance on Tan Son Nhut facilities, but provides technical and logistical support to the widely distributed squadron detachments. During this period, Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq at Phu Cat Air Base was deactivated, with the aircraft, personnel, and material resources successfully being relocated throughout the squadron complex. The logistical planning for the maintenance portion of this move was engineered by the material staff at Tan Son Nhut. This involved relocating 13 ALR-34 aircraft from Phu Cat to Tan Son Nhut and 7 ALR-34s from Phu Cat to Danang. In addition, 13 ALR-35 EC-47s were transferred from Tan Son Nhut to Danang. The entire cadre of the Phu Cat maintenance staff was transferred to Tan Son Nhut. Thirteen technicians were transferred from Tan Son Nhut, eleven to Danang and two to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand. This transfer of personnel was engineered to place the most experienced personnel with the applicable equipment. In addition, logistical support was required to adapt Danang for the influx of ALR-34 systems, not previously assigned to that location. An extremely important by-product of this closure was the transfer of ALR-34 AGE/Test Equipment to Tan Son Nhut for use in the Vietnamization training program. (2)

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During this period, a maintenance phenomenon developed which caused much consternation on the part of the maintenance personnel. Documented evidence has been amassed to indicate a minimum of 15 instances where "erratic bearings" or "swinging needles" were experienced by the operators while in flight. This unusual incident occurred primarily in two adjacent mission areas. Thorough ground checks of the equipment failed to reveal any discrepancies with the mission equipment, and subsequent flights into different mission areas verified proper operation of the ARDF equipment. There is no true indication of what is the determining factor for this phenomenon. However, a theory has been presented to higher headquarters. The most pertinent and logical theory is that the site being fixed was utilizing a number of transmitting antennas, causing the "swinging needle" effect. The second theory is that some mineral deposit activity, caused by variations in the weather, is responsible for the problem. At the close of the period, no satisfactory solution for the problem had been arrived at.

Vietnamization Training:*

[REDACTED] Three VNAF personnel with prior experience in the electronic career field began familiarization training on ARDF equipment in August of 1971. This training was scheduled to cover a four month period, and was taught by instructor personnel assigned to the maintenance complex. These three individuals will form the nucleus of the Vietnamese maintenance effort and serve as instructors in later classes. It is anticipated that these individuals will prove invaluable in surmounting language problems that are sure to manifest themselves as the training program begins formal

*See Chapter IV for related information concerning this program.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

expansion on 31 December.

[REDACTED] One of the major obstacles to overcome in establishment of the training facility was the rehabilitation of a building to house the classroom and shop training area. Since cost of Base Civil Engineering refurbishing this building was prohibitive, the 6994th Zonal Maintenance Force and other maintenance personnel as available undertook the project of re-arranging, installation of proper lighting, electrical circuits and air conditioning. This self-help project was completed on 3 December, with formal classroom training scheduled to begin on 31 December. Even though the program of training of Vietnamese to assume the maintenance responsibility presents a challenge, all concerned express optimism that the program will prove an unqualified success.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses, income, and transfers between accounts.

Next, the document outlines the process of reconciling bank statements with the company's records. This involves comparing the bank's record of transactions with the company's ledger to identify any discrepancies. Common reasons for differences include timing issues, such as deposits in transit or outstanding checks, as well as potential errors in recording or bank charges.

The document then addresses the preparation of the income statement. It explains how the profit and loss account is derived from the sales and cost of sales figures, adjusted for various expenses and gains. The goal is to determine the net profit or loss for the period, which is a key indicator of the company's financial performance.

Finally, the document discusses the preparation of the balance sheet. This statement shows the company's financial position at a specific point in time, detailing its assets, liabilities, and equity. It is crucial for understanding the company's liquidity and solvency, as well as for providing a snapshot of its overall financial health.

It is important to note that the accuracy of these financial statements depends on the reliability of the underlying data and the consistency of the accounting methods used. Regular audits and reviews are essential to ensure that the financial records are free from errors and fraud.

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
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
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


The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every receipt, invoice, and bill should be properly filed and dated. This not only helps in tracking expenses but also provides a clear audit trail for tax purposes. The author notes that many small businesses fail to keep proper records, which can lead to significant financial discrepancies and potential legal issues.

Next, the document addresses the topic of budgeting. It suggests that creating a monthly budget can help businesses control their spending and identify areas where they can save money. The author provides a simple template for a budget, including categories for salaries, rent, utilities, and other operating expenses. It is stressed that a budget should be reviewed regularly to ensure it remains relevant to the current business needs.

The third section focuses on managing cash flow. It explains that cash flow is the lifeblood of any business, and poor management can lead to insolvency. The author advises businesses to invoice promptly and follow up on late payments. Additionally, it suggests maintaining a reserve fund to cover unexpected expenses or downturns in business.

In the final part of the document, the author discusses the importance of seeking professional advice. While it is possible to manage a business on one's own, consulting with an accountant or lawyer can provide valuable insights and help avoid costly mistakes. The author concludes by encouraging business owners to stay organized, proactive, and open to learning from others in the industry.



The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every receipt and invoice should be properly filed and indexed for easy retrieval. This is particularly crucial for businesses that deal with a large volume of transactions, as it helps in identifying discrepancies and ensuring compliance with tax regulations.

Next, the document addresses the issue of budgeting and financial forecasting. It suggests that businesses should regularly review their financial statements to assess their current financial health and make necessary adjustments to their budget. This involves comparing actual performance against the budgeted figures and identifying areas where costs are exceeding expectations.

The third section focuses on the importance of maintaining a strong relationship with suppliers and vendors. It highlights that timely payments and clear communication are essential for ensuring a steady flow of goods and services. Businesses should also consider negotiating favorable terms and conditions to optimize their cash flow and reduce the risk of supply chain disruptions.

Finally, the document concludes by emphasizing the need for transparency and accountability in financial management. It encourages businesses to provide regular reports to stakeholders and to maintain open lines of communication with their financial advisors. This approach not only helps in building trust but also ensures that the business is on track to meet its long-term financial goals.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONSA

AAA Antiaircraft Artillery

AB Air Base

ABCCG Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center

ACC ARDF Coordination Center

ACI Airborne Communications Intelligence

AFB Air Force Base

AFLC Air Force Logistics Command

Afld Airfield

AFSSO Air Force Special Security Office

AGE Avionics Ground Equipment

AIR Airborne Incident Report

AMS Airborne Mission Supervisor

ARDF Airborne Radio Direction Finding

ARR Airborne Recovery Report



ARRS Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

ASA Army Security Agency

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

B



BDA Battle Damage Assessment

C


CC Combat Cross

CCZ Combat Cross Zulu

CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific

[REDACTED]

GMA	Collection Management Authority
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMNAVFORV	Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMJSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CRITIC	Critical Intelligence
GSMR	Communications Security Message Report
CSMS	Communications Security Monthly Summary
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
	<u>D</u>
DA	Department of the Army
DASUM	Daily Summary
DHOC	Daily Hours of Coverage
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DODSPEGREP	Department of Defense Special Representative
DSU	Direct Support Unit
DURMIS	Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary
	<u>E</u>
EMR	Exploitable Message Report
EWLO	Electronic Warfare Liaison Office
	<u>F</u>
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FM	Frequency Modulation
FRAG ORDER	Fragmentation Order

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NVA North Vietnamese Army

Q

OL-DD Operating Location Delta Delta

OPSEC Operations Security

P

PACAF Pacific Air Forces

PCS Permanent change of station

Pac Scty Rgn Pacific Security Region

PAD Programmed Actions Directive

PDJ Plaine des Jarres

PHC Phu Cat

Q

R

RD Radio Designator

R&R Rest and Relaxation

RRG Radio Research Group

RRFS Radio Research Field Station

RTAFB Royal Thai Air Force Base

RTB Return to base

RVN Republic of Vietnam

S

SAC Strategic Air Command

Scty Sq Security Squadron

SEA Southeast Asia

SEATS Southeast Asia Technical Summary

SEFE Standardization Evaluation Flight Examiner

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIGINT Signal Intelligence

SSLO Security Service Liaison Office

SSTB Special Security Technical Branch

T

TAC Tactical Air Command

TACC Tactical Air Control Center

TAW Tactical Airlift Wing

TDL Target Data List

TDY Temporary duty

TECHINS Technical Instructions

TEWS Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

TOT Time over target

TRW Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

TSN Tan Son Nhut

TTA Technical Tasking Authority

TTG Technical Training Group

U

UDL Unit Detail List

UE Unit Equipment

UHF Ultrahigh Frequency

USAFSS United States Air Force Security Service

V

VC Viet Cong

VHF Very High Frequency

VIM Vietnamization Improvement Modernization

VIMP Vietnamization Improvement Modernization Plan

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

VNAF

[REDACTED]
Vietnamese Air Force

VR

Visual Reconnoiter

W

WURMER

Weekly Unit Resource Management Report

X

Y

Z

7AF

Seventh Air Force

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

GLOSSARY OF CODENAMES

1. ARC LIGHT (U) B-52 Operations in SEA.
 2. BARRELL ROLL (U) North Laotian Area.
 3. BENCH LANCE (SHVCCO) PACAF ACRP (C-130) operating in SEA.
 4. BRAVO (U) USAFSS mission equipment aboard EC-47s.
 5. BUFFALO HUNTER [REDACTED] Strategic Air Command (SAC) drone program in SEA.
 6. COMBAT CROSS [REDACTED] USAF EC-47 aircraft performing ARDF/COMINT collection in SEA.
 7. COMBAT DAWN [REDACTED] Drone reconnaissance system for COMINT, a Ryan 147 drone, jointly operated by USAFSS and SAC.
 8. COMFY DRAGON (U) USAFSS OPSEC program.
 9. COMPASS FLAG [REDACTED] USAF executing an NSA request to equip PAVE EAGLE II, QU-22B aircraft with a remotely controlled COMINT payload consisting of 16 positions.
 10. IGLOO WHITE [REDACTED] Air support anti-infiltration system in SEA employing EC-121 aircraft.
 11. SENIOR BOOK (U) Air Force operational test program.
 12. STEEL TIGER (U) Laotian panhandle area.
- [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

APPENDIX 1
ORGANIZATIONAL AND
COMMAND CONTROL CHARTS

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

6994 SCTY SQ

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP




Chart #1





ARDF

OPERATIONAL CONTROL





CHART #2



ARDF
TECHNICAL CONTROL






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



ARDF

COMMAND CONTROL



APPENDIX 2
GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS
AND MISSION AREAS
6994th Scty Sq and Detachments





APPENDIX 3

EC-47 AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION

6994SS HR 1-71

BASIC COMBAT CROSS CONFIGURATION

"Y" Position

G-133 HF Receiver
Frequency Range - .5-30 MHz
G-176 Tape Recorder
Spectrum Display Unit

"X" Position

ALR-34 or ALR-35
Frequency Range - 2-16 MHz
G-12 Compass
Panoramic Scope

Function: X Position - ARDF, Y Position - Target Acquisition/
Air/Ground comms.

Flight Time: 7 hours

Cruise Speed: 120 Knots

Crew Composition: Pilot, Copilot, Navigator, Flight Mechanic and
2 Operators.


Communications Radios: 1UHF radio, 1 VHF radio, 1 HF radio, and
1 FM radio.

Navigation Equipment: TACAN, Weather Radar, and Doppler

Navigator's Position Includes: Plotting table and Franklin Printer
that provides fix data readout from "X" position.

The ALR-35 system differs from the ALR-34 in that it is coupled with
a data processor. The processor converts the target magnetic bear-
ings to true bearings, calculates target location relative to the
selected doppler set point, and determines the circular error of the
fix. In the ALR-34 system, these functions are performed manually
by the navigator.

COMBAT CROSS (CC)



6994SS HR 1-71

COMBAT CROSS (ZULU) CONFIGURATION"Z1" Position

G-133 HF Receiver
Frequency Range - .5-30 MHZ
G-175J VHF Receiver
Frequency Range - 10-260 MHZ
G176 Tape Recorder

"Z2" Position

G-133 HF Receiver (2)
Frequency Range - .5-30 MHZ
G-176 Tape Recorder

"Y" Position

G-133 HF Receiver
Frequency Range - .5-30 MHZ
G-176 Tape Recorder
Spectrum Display Unit

"X" Position

ALR-34 or ALR-35
Frequency Range 2-16 MHZ
C-12 Compass
Panoramic Scope

Function: X Position - ARDF, Y Position, Target acquisition/collection/Air-Ground communications, Z1 Position - Intercept collection, and Z2 Position - Collection.

Flight time: 5 hours.

Cruise speed: 120 Knots.

Crew: Pilot, copilot, navigator, flight mechanic, 4 operators, and 1 airborne analyst.



Communications Radios: 1 UHF radio, 1 VHF radio, 1 HF radio, and 1 FM radio.

Navigation Equipment: TACAN, Weather Radar, and Doppler.

Navigator's position includes: Plotting table and Franklin Printer.

The ALR-35 system differs from the ALR-34 in that it is coupled with a data processor. The processor converts the target magnetic bearings to true bearings, calculates target location relative to the selected doppler set point and determines the circular error of the fix. In the ALR-34 system, these functions are performed manually by the navigator.

COMBAT CROSS (ZULU)



APPENDIX 4

ARDF PRODUCTIVITY STATISTICS

ARDF PRODUCTIVITY

EVALUATED AREAS	JUL		AUG		SEP		OCT		NOV		DEC		TOTAL	
	LOC	COMP	LOC	COMP	LOC	COMP	LOC	COMP	LOC	COMP	LOC	COMP	LOC	COMP
Missions Tasked	360	987	436	1275	319	954	325	910	366	1043	342	898	2148	6067
Missions Flown	336	877	427	1248	311	916	308	832	351	863	337	773	2070	5509
Hours Tasked	2129	6272	2624	8217	1941	6133	1877	5828	2683	6592	2270	5625	13524	38687
Hours Flown	1849	5473	2425	7675	1749	5520	1633	4853	2428	5125	2178	4600	12262	33246
Hours Over Tgt	1217	3366	1772	5286	1292	3844	1168	3336	1521	3402	1505	2978	8475	22212
Tgts Worked	1946	5021	2490	7811	1859	5632	1414	4522	2658	5566	2063	5037	12430	33589
Tgts Fixed	1303	3694	1632	5768	1144	4272	1004	3337	1889	3964	1512	3605	8484	24640
0-500 M	154	710	155	1235	75	978	79	596	175	537	165	426	803	4482
501-1000 M	695	1622	916	2911	636	2070	604	1581	1082	2253	898	1885	4821	12322
1001 Plus M	454	1363	561	1822	443	1224	321	1160	632	1174	419	1294	2860	7837
Targets Cut	356	735	451	1242	331	840	246	700	450	1047	366	872	2300	5436
Exploit. Msgs (Morae)	74	888	116	1595	119	1176	139	961	169	992	138	933	755	6535
Exploit. Msgs (Voice)	4	1099	8	2002	4	1460	30	785	29	925	29	809	104	7080
Fixes/Cuts Ident	1060	2223	1269	3927	854	2364	669	1784	1226	2150	1064	2000	6162	13848
Fixes/Cuts Ident Priority	769	1582	917	2322	646	1660	509	1283	877	1493	798	1394	4516	9734

ARDF ProductivityUnaccomplished MissionsLOCAL

	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
SCHEDULED MISSIONS	360	436	319	325	366	342	2148
ACCOMPLISHED MISSIONS	336	427	311	308	351	337	2070
UNACCOMPLISHED MISSIONS	24	9	8	17	15	5	78
UNACCOMPLISHED DUE TO:							
Equipment	15	5	3	8	0	0	31
Weather	3	1	2	9	15	2	32
No Aircraft	6	3	1	0	0	2	12
Misc:	0	0	2	0	0	1	3

COMPLEX

	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
SCHEDULED MISSIONS	967	1275	954	910	1043	898	6067
ACCOMPLISHED MISSIONS	877	1248	916	832	863	773	5509
UNACCOMPLISHED MISSIONS	110	27	38	78	180	125	558
UNACCOMPLISHED DUE TO:							
Equipment	24	8	15	16	25	23	111
Weather	89	10	20	48	129	76	372
No Aircraft	7	8	1	13	19	26	74
Misc:	0	1	2	1	4	0	8

ARDF ProductivityReduced MissionsLOCAL


	<u>TOTAL MSNS REDUCED</u>	<u>REDUCED MISSIONS CAUSED BY:</u>				
		<u>AIRFRAME</u>	<u>MSN EQUIP</u>	<u>FUEL</u>	<u>WEATHER</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
July	105	58	18	6	19	4
August	134	60	19	22	23	10
September	73	32	13	6	17	5
October	76	27	12	7	25	5
November	77	22	11	8	24	12
December	58	19	4	5	27	9
TOTAL	523	218	77	54	135	39

COMPLEX


	<u>TOTAL MSNS REDUCED</u>	<u>REDUCED MISSIONS CAUSED BY:</u>				
		<u>AIRFRAME</u>	<u>MSN EQUIP</u>	<u>FUEL</u>	<u>WEATHER</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
July	257	85	30	52	70	20
August	281	88	43	51	73	26
September	234	75	28	22	91	18
October	248	54	25	16	135	18
November	227	61	27	26	86	27
December	168	45	14	31	68	10
TOTAL	1415	408	167	198	523	119



PERCENTAGE OF TASKED MISSIONS FLOWN




PERCENTAGE OF TASKED HOURS FLOWN




PERCENTAGE OF FLYING
TIME EXPENDED OVER TARGET

4-5




FIXES PER FLYING
HOUR ON TARGET






PERCENTAGE OF FIXES/CUTS IDENTIFIED

— Local - - - - - Complex



PERCENTAGE OF FIXES/CUTS IDENTIFIED PRIORITY

— Local - - - - - Complex



Recurring Reports Statistics

Statistics presented below show monthly production of individual recurring reports issued by the Analysis and Reporting Section.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>ARR</u>			<u>SEA Technical Summaries (Gps/Segments)</u>		
	<u>US</u>	<u>VIM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>VIM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
July	264	91	355	80650/102	16400/20	97050/122
August	266	124	390	80869/105	19880/27	100749/132
September	200	146	346	47330/ 68	No VIM Seats	47330/ 68
October	147	203	350	41306/ 60	issued after	41306/ 60
November	156	197	353	46244/ 70	August.	46244/ 70
December	194	214	408	62230/111		62230/111
Total	1227	975	2202	358629/516	36280/47	394909/563

ARDF Identification Rate (SEA)

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>6994SS</u>	<u>USAF AVG</u>	<u>ARMY AVG</u>	<u>OVERALL</u>
July	74%	64%	50%	59%
August	70%	63%	45%	57%
September	66%	63%	42%	57%
October	59%	57%	45%	54%
November	57%	50%	38%	49%
December	57%			

BLUE BEETLE FIX/FAC Statistics

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MSNS SKED</u>	<u>TGTS PASSED</u>	<u>TGTS VR'D</u>	<u>AIR STRIKES</u>	<u>PREV PASSED*</u>	<u>PREV VR'D*</u>	<u>PREV STRUCK*</u>
July	132	197	83	11	60	32	2
Aug	187	239	64	3	47	36	2
Sept	178	192	41	2	47	36	1
Oct	177	124	16	0	1	0	0
Nov	113	65	10	1	0	0	0
Dec	257	189	29	2	0	0	0
TOTALS	1044	1006	243	19	155	97	5

* Previous targets were those known locations that were prepared by local analysts and passed to FACs during missions. In early October this procedure was discontinued since results did not warrant the time spent in preparing the data.

BLUE BEETLE Air Strike Data

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NR/TYPE STRIKE ACFT</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
2 July	4 F4s	Trails cut and 2 bunkers uncovered.
3 July	4 F4s	Six fortified fighting positing positions (FFP) destroyed, 3 others damaged.
4 July	2 A-37s	One FFP destroyed.
10 July	2 A-37s	Results not known due to heavy foliage.
13 July	4 A-37s	Nine bunkers (BKS) destroyed, 7 damaged, and two secondary fires.
14 July	1 AC-130	Ten small secondary explosions detected.
15 July	2 A-37s	Results not known due to triple canopy jungle.
18 July	2 A-37s	One FFP destroyed, one damaged, 1 sustained fire.
19 July	2 A-37s	Two FFP destroyed, 1 damaged, 1 grass fire.
20 July	2 A-37s	One storage building destroyed, 1 damaged, 1 BKS uncovered.
24 July	2 A-37s	Results not known due to heavy foliage.
30 July	2 A-37s	One FFP destroyed.
7 Aug	Unk	Strike made but no feedback available.
10 Aug	2 A-37s	One truck destroyed, 1 bridge partially destroyed, 2 sustained fires, secondary explosions and unknown number of bodies detected.
15 Aug	2 A-37s	Three FFP destroyed, 1 secondary explosion, 3 trenches uncovered.
12 Sept	2 A-37s	Radio site destroyed.
21 Sept	2 A-37s	One secondary explosion; fireball & smoke detected.
25 Sept	2 A-37s	Results not known due to darkness and foliage.
21 Nov	2 A-37s	Three FFP destroyed, 3 others possibly destroyed
25 Dec	2 A-37s	Truck convoy struck but no results known due to darkness.
30 Dec	2 A-37s	Three BKS destroyed.

APPENDIX 5
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF COMMANDER

BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GROVER S McMAKIN

On 18 July 1971, Lt Col Grover S McMakin assumed command of the 6994th Security Squadron, Republic of Vietnam. His previous duty assignment was at Headquarters, USAFSS, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, where he served as Staff Pilot from July 1965 through November 1968 and as Chief, Command Flight Division from November 1968 to November 1970.

Born on 1 July 1930 at Roswell, New Mexico, Lt Col McMakin attended New Mexico Military Institute, Roswell, New Mexico, graduating in 1948. He graduated from Oklahoma State University with a B.S. Degree in Agriculture in 1952.

Entering the Air Force as an Aviation Cadet on 1 July 1952, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant on 9 May 1953. After attending RB-26 Combat Crew Training school at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, he was assigned to the 366th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Sembach Air Base, Germany as an Aircraft Observer from October 1953 through October 1956.

Returning from overseas duty in 1956, he was assigned to pilot training at Bainbridge Air Base, Georgia from 1 December 1956 through 1 July 1957. Upon graduation, he attended basic B-25 training at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas from 17 July 1957 through 27 December 1957. From January through March 1958, he attended C-97 transition training at West Palm Beach Air Base, Florida, and was subsequently assigned to the Military Air Transport Service at Travis Air Force Base, California as a C-97 Transport pilot.

On 20 February 1959, he began his association with USAFSS, as Staff Transport Pilot at Kelly AFB, Texas. After serving from 15 May 1962 through 20 July 1965 in this capacity, he was assigned as Staff Pilot and later Chief, Region Flight Section at Headquarters, Pacific Security Region, Wheeler Air Force Base, Hawaii. Returning to duty at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, he became Staff Pilot and subsequently Chief, Command Flight Division at Headquarters USAFSS, a position he held from 1 November 1968 through 1 November 1970.

In November 1970, he entered the Signal Intelligence Officer School at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. Upon graduation, he attended EC-47 Combat Crew Training at England Air Force Base, Louisiana and was subsequently assigned as Commander, 6994th Security Squadron, Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Republic of Vietnam, his current assignment.

Lt Col McMakin's decorations include the Air Force Commendation Medal, the Air Medal, and Meritorious Service Medal.

His wife, the former Betty Burnside of Geraldine, Oklahoma and son Kelly, age 11, reside at 9910 Tioga Drive, San Antonio, Texas.

CAREER CHRONOLOGY

01 July 1952 Enlisted USAF as Aviation Cadet.

July 52 - Jan 53 Ellington AFB, Texas (Primary Aviation Cadet)
(Bombardier/Aircraft Observer training.)

Jan - Jun 1953 Mather AFB, California (Basic Aircraft Observer
Student)

09 May 1953 Commissioned Second Lieutenant.

Jun 53 - Sep 53 Shaw AFB, South Carolina (RB-26 Combat Crew
Training - Night Photo Reconnaissance)

Sep 53 - Oct 56 366 TAC Reconnaissance Wing, Sembach AB, Germany
(Aircraft Observer/Combat Crew Member)

Oct 56 - Jul 57 Bainbridge Air Base, Georgia (Student Officer
Pilot Training)

Jul 57 - Dec 57 Goodfellow AFB, San Angelo, Texas (B-25 Basic
Pilot Training)

Dec 57 - Mar 58 West Palm Beach Air Base, Florida (C-97 Transition
Training)

Mar 58 - Feb 59 Travis AFB, California (C-97 transport pilot - MATS)

Feb 59 - May 62 Kelly AFB, Texas (Staff Transport Pilot, HQ USAFSS)

May 62 - Jul 65 HQ Pacific Security Region, Wheeler AFB, Hawaii
(Staff Pilot/Chief, Region Flight Section)

Jul 65 - Nov 68 Kelly AFB, Texas (Staff Pilot, HQ USAFSS)

Nov 68 - Nov 70 Kelly AFB, Texas (Chief, Command Flight Division,
HQ USAFSS)

Nov 70 - Apr 71 Goodfellow AFB, Texas (Student, Signal Intelligence
Officer School)

Apr 71 - Jun 71 England AFB, Louisiana (EC-47 Combat Crew Training)

Jun 71 - Present Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Vietnam (Commander, 6994th
Scty Sq/EC-47 Combat Crewmember - Pilot)

DATES OF RANK

<u>RANK</u>	<u>TEMPORARY</u>	<u>PERMANENT</u>
Aviation Cadet	- -	1 July 1952
2d Lt	09 May 1953	09 May 1953
1st Lt (Reserve)	10 May 1954	10 Nov 1954
1st Lt (Regular)	09 May 1956	22 July 1957
Captain	19 Feb 1959	09 May 1959
Major	01 Dec 1965	09 May 1967
Lt Col	10 Aug 1969	- - - - -

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Air Medal

Meritorious Service Medal

Air Force Commendation Medal

Air Force Longevity Service Medal w/three Oak Leaf Clusters

National Defense Service Medal w/one bronze star

Air Force Occupation Medal

Air Force Expeditionary Medal

Vietnamese Service Medal

Expert Marksmanship Ribbon

Vietnamese Campaign Medal



DISTRIBUTION:

USAFSS/HO	(2)
6940th Security Wing/TAL	(1)
Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron	(1)
Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron	(1)

040026
208085
//ROUTINE//
SSN 8810
R 213501Z
FM DET 2 699485
TO DET 2 699485/00/00
INFO: 699485/00
ZEN

TUL
0108
R/F
DO
@692

CC/DO JUL 71

SUBJ: ALR-58 DEPLOYMENT TO NKP

1. AS YOU KNOW WE WILL BE FLYING THREE MISSIONS IN THE 15 BRAVO AREA FROM NKP ON THE 6, 7, 8TH OF JUL.
2. WE WILL BE SENDING UP SSGT SAMUEL MORTON (MTNCE) AND SSGT MICHAEL WILSON (OPS) ON 5 JUL, WITH THE CREW. SGT MORTON WILL HAVE A LIMITED SUPPLY OF ALR-58 UNIQUE PARTS, AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LAUNCH, RECOVERY AND MAINTENANCE OF MISSION EQUIPMENT. REQUEST ANY ASSISTANCE HE MAY REQUIRE AND WHICH IS WITHIN UR CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE, BE GIVEN. SGT WILSON WILL FUNCTION AS DET 2 PROJECT REPRESENTATIVE AND SHOULD BE THE FOCAL POINT FOR COORDINATION ON TECHNICAL AND SUPPORT MATTERS. HE WILL SUPERVISE OUR CREWS, LAUNCH AND RECOVER MISSIONS AND COORDINATE WITH UR ANALYSIS PEOPLE. HE IS ALSO A BACKUP AMS.
3. THE CREW WILL ALSO COME UP ON MONDAY AND WILL CONSIST OF THREE 202X1'S AND A 203X1. WE WOULD PREFER TO USE ONE OF YOUR ANALYSTS, AS THEY ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA. WORKING PROCEDURES WILL BE COORDINATED BY SGT WILSON, WHO WILL ALSO FUNCTION AS ONE EXTRA (BACKUP) RO/AMS. IN THE EVENT OF THE 203 BECOMING DNIF, WE WOULD LIKE TO FILL IN FROM YOUR UNIT.
4. ARR AND INFORMAL DURMIS INFORMATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE SENT IN THE SAME MANNER AS IS PRESENTLY DONE FOR THE 911A.
5. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE REQUIRED KY- EXTRACTS TO OUR CREW.
6. FOR DELAURA: SEE YOU IN WASH IN SEP. YOU GIVE ME A DRINK. BLACKWELL.

300
8810

MMVA

[REDACTED]

Doc #1

ZCZCRDA357RDM104
FP YMROR
DE YHLAKZ 0005 1820059
ZNY MMNSH
P R 010022Z
FM PSR
TO 6990SCTYSQ/DUR
DET 1 6990SCTYSQ/DO
INFO 6994SCTYSQ/DO
DET 2 6994SCTYSQ/DO
DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/DO
USAFSS/DDP
ZEM

RAF
PO
12 15
①
10
16

DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOUR
SUBJ: VHF ARDF IN PDJ
REF 6994SS DO 250600Z JUN 71 (NOTAL)
REF ADVISES THAT FOR A TWO WEEK PERIOD COMMENCING 3 JULY 71
ALR-50 ARDF AIRCRAFT WILL CONDUCT SAMPLING OPERATIONS OF THE VHF/
R1XX ENVIRONMENT IN NORTHERN LAOS. REQUEST ANY TECH DATA THAT YOU
MAY HOLD ON VHF/R1XX TARGETS KNOWN TO BE IN THE PDJ AREA BE FORWARDED
TO USA-564 ASAP.
120
0005

NNNN

Doc #2

3 N/F
366
90
9

-2 JUL 1971 12

13 1702Z 020708 864612
FM YWRDOR
DE YADVIL 0010 1831255
ZNY MMNSH
P 021255Z
FM DET 1 6990 SOTY SQ
TO DET 3 6994 SOTY SQ/DO
INFO 6994 SOTY SQ/DO
DET 2 6994 SOTY SQ/DO
RAC SOTY RGA/DOR
SOTY SOTY SQ/DOR
ZNY

SUBJ: VHF ARDF IN PDJ
REF: ROR 010022Z JUL 71
1. BENCH LANCE INTERCEPT IN THE PDJ HAS BEEN EXTREMELY SPARSE DURING THE PAST 20 DAYS. AS FAR AS IS KNOWN THIS STA. THE 165TH NVA REGT IS IN THE SOUTHEAST PART OF THE PDJ. THE ONLY KNOWN INTERCEPT FROM 165TH UNITS HAS BEEN ON FREQS 42.30 AND 43.20MHZ. THESE STATIONS USUALLY COME UP EVERY HOUR ON THE HOUR AND PASS 3 FIG PLAIN TEST TRFC.
2. BELIEVE THE 148TH NVA REGT IS STILL IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE PDJ, HOWEVER HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO ISOLATE ANY RECENT COMMS. FOLLOWING FREQS MAY POSS BE USED BY THE 148TH: 345.16 (0400Z AND 0500Z), 42.14 (0100Z AND 0200Z), AND 45.96 (NO SKED). ALSO FREQS 28.40 AND 2906MHZ WERE HEARD RECENTLY. (NO SKED).
3. BELIEVE ANALYSTS AT USM-7 AND USA-29 MAY BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO PROVIDE CURRENT TECH DATA.
13
0018



Doc #3

JOINT MESSAGE FORM

RESERVED FOR COMBATTANT USE

Handwritten notes:
JUL 71
113
2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 050825Z JUL 71

FROM: 6994 SGTY SQ TSN RVN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: PSA/DOR/WHEELER AFB HAWAII

USAFSS/DOE/SAN ANTONIO TEXAS

DO

SUBJ: BASING OF ALR-38/35 ARDF AIRCRAFT (C)

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE:

020829Z JUL 71

FM: COMBMACV

TO: 7AF

6994 SGTY SQ

INFO: 460 PRM

362 TEWS

DET 1, 360 TEWS

DET 2, 6994 SGTY SQ

DET 3, 6994 SGTY SQ

509 RR GP

7 RR FS

(J21) 7AF FOR DOPRS, 460TEW FOR DOJ, 509TH RR GP FOR ACC

SUBJ: BASING OF ALR-38/35 ARDF AIRCRAFT (C)

DATE	TIME
5	1300
MONTH	YEAR
JUL	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	MSgt Larson/drs	4891	
	SECURITY CLASS		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
			DAVID H ADEY, Major, USAF Operations Officer
			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

Doc # 4

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 68 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1969-357-001

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SE [REDACTED]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE INFO	Major Eddy	MSGt Larson	4094

1. [REDACTED] AT THE PRESENT TIME, MACV IS CONSIDERING MOVING ALR-35 (Q) AND ALR-38 AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY BASED AT DA NANG TO NAKHON PHANOM (NKP), THAILAND. THE FINAL DECISION WILL NOT BE MADE UNTIL AFTER SEVERAL TEST FLIGHTS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED BY ALR-38 AIRCRAFT INTO THE BANGKOK ROLL AREA OF LAOS (REF COMUSMACV 291350Z JUN 71). IF THE DECISION IS MADE TO MOVE THE AIRCRAFT, ANTICIPATE MOVING TWO (2) ALR-38 AND THREE (3) ALR-35 (Q) AIRCRAFT FROM DA NANG TO NKP AND REPLACING THEM WITH THE FIVE (5) ALR-35 AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY BASED AT NKP.
2. [REDACTED] REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSEES BEGIN ADVANCED PLANNING TO SUPPORT THIS ACTION IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THE TRADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SHOULD THE DECISION TO MOVE BE APPROVED. UNQUOTE.
2. PLANNING HAS BEGUN TO SUPPORT THIS ACTION. WILL ADVISE. GP-1

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]				
SECURITY CLASS	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS			DOC# 4-1	

27 JUL 68

2638426
2638421
2638452020R08493KZA392
RR VADNR
DE TOLAKZ 8824 2638247
ZNY
R 2638212
FM TROSCUTRSM
TO AFSSO PACAF/IA
INFO USAFSS/DO
6994 50/00
ZEM

R/F
DO

78

6 @

SUBJECT: UTILIZATION OF ALR-38 RESOURCES IN SEA
1. SINCE THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE ALR-38 VHF ARDF
SYSTEM TO SEA ONE YEAR AGO, ITS RATE OF SUCCESS AGAINST
VHF TARGETS HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF INTENSE RESEARCH AND
CONSIDERABLE USAF CONCERN. THE ALR-38'S PERFORMANCE
AGAINST VHF TARGETS IS CONSIDERED SUCCESSFUL AND INDICA-
TIVE OF THE CAPABILITY OF OUR ARDF SYSTEMS TO COPE WITH ENEMY
COMM REFINEMENTS. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY ENDEAVORED TO
IMPROVE OUR SUCCESS RATE AGAINST VHF TARGETS, PARTICULARLY
IN VIEW OF THE RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ENEMY'S UTILIZATION
OF THE VHF MODE. IN THIS REGARD, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED THE
VARIOUS IMPEDING OPERATIONAL FACTORS (HI-THREAT AREA,
EXCESSIVE STAND-OFF RANGE) WHICH DETRACT FROM MORE
EFFECTIVE VHF ARDF OPERATIONS.

2. ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH IMPACTS SIGNIFICANTLY UPON EFFECT-
IVE ALR-38 UTILIZATION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN FORMALLY SUR-
FACED IS THE ACTUAL MISSION TASKING ASSIGNED TO ALR-38
MISSIONS. AS YOU KNOW, THE 38'S ARE TASKED ACCORDING TO
THE MACV PRIORITY SYSTEM WHICH IS A REFLECTION OF THE ARDF
REQUESTS (REQUIREMENTS) SUBMITTED WEEKLY BY MACV'S SUB-
ORDINATE TACTICAL COMMANDERS. THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE
TRANSLATED INTO USABLE TASKING BY THE COLLECTION MANAGE-
MENT AUTHORITIES WHICH PROVIDE THE SIGINT TECH DATA
CORRESPONDING TO THE MACV PRIORITY ARDF TARGETS, ONE

Doc #5

RECENTLY CONCLUDING A RECENT TRIANGLE TRIP TO SEA) HAS
REVEALED THAT THE PRIORITY USE OF LISTINGS AND ACCOMPANY-
ING DATA FOR ALR-38 MISSIONS TASKS THESE PLATFORMS
PREDOMINANTLY AGAINST VHF RATHER THAN VHF TERMINALS.
SINCE THE PRIORITY TARGET LISTINGS REFLECT TACTICAL
COMMANDER'S REQUIREMENTS, OUR AIRCREWS MUST NECESSARILY
PLACE PRIMARY OPERATIONAL EMPHASIS (REQ SEARCH, ACFT
POSITIONING) ON THE VHF PRIORITY TARGETS. AS A RESULT,
VHF SEARCH EFFECTIVITY IS LESS THAN MIGHT BE REALIZED.
ON 27 JULY, 24 JUNE, 1971, WE FLEW 139 ALR-38 MISSIONS
IN SEA. THESE MISSIONS OBTAINED A TOTAL OF 547 FIXES
IN SEA. THESE MISSIONS OBTAINED A TOTAL OF 547 FIXES
AND THE OF WHICH ONLY 115 WERE OBTAINED AGAINST VHF TARGETS.
3. USUALLY, WE MUST RESPOND COMPLETELY TO MACV'S
PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT
MACV'S CURRENT TASKING OF THE 38 AGAINST A PREDOMINANTLY
VHF ENVIRONMENT REPRESENTS A LESS THAN EFFECTIVE UTILI-
ZATION OF THIS ALMOST TOTALLY UNIQUE RESOURCE. CORRESPOND-
INGLY, A VALID USARV REQUIREMENT FOR EXPANDED UTILIZATION OF
THE 38'S IN THE LUCRATIVE VHF ENVIRONMENT IN STEEL
TIGER. SINCE THE MAJORITY OF THE VHF TARGETS IN STEEL
TIGER ARE SCAB-RELATED, THEY ARE OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO
7TH AF. IN ITS ROLE AS AN ARVN CONSUMER, 7TH AF IS IN
THE BEST POSITION TO PRESS FOR EXPANDED UTILIZATION OF
THE ALR-38 IN THE LAOTIAN PAR ANGLE. A STRONGER VOICE
FROM 7TH AF IN THE COMPETITION FOR ALLOCATION OF SCARCE
ARVN RESOURCES WOULD VERY LIKELY CONVINCE MACV THAT THE
38'S CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED BY EXPANDING THEIR
OPERATIONS IN LAOS WHILE STILL PROVIDING ADEQUATE COVERAGE
OF THE RELATIVELY FEW VHF TERMINALS IN RVN AND THE DMZ
AREA.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ACTION REGARDING THE ABOVE. WILL BE AVAILABLE AT
YOUR CONVENIENCE FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS THIS SUBJECT
AND THE RELATED SUBJECT OF NXP BASING OF THE 38'S.

322

0824

WARR




Doc #5-1

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every receipt, invoice, and bill should be properly filed and indexed for easy retrieval. This not only helps in tracking expenses but also ensures that all necessary documents are available for tax purposes.

Next, the document outlines the various methods for organizing financial data. It suggests using spreadsheets to track income and expenses over time, and recommends regular reviews to identify trends and areas for improvement. The text also touches upon the importance of staying organized throughout the year to avoid a last-minute rush.


Finally, the document provides practical advice on how to manage cash flow and budget effectively. It encourages setting aside a portion of income for savings and investments, and offers tips on how to negotiate better terms with vendors and service providers. The overall goal is to help individuals and businesses achieve financial stability and success.



The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses and income. The document also highlights the need for regular reconciliation of bank statements and the company's records to identify any discrepancies early on.

In addition, the document provides a detailed overview of the accounting cycle, which consists of eight steps: identifying the accounting cycle, journalizing, posting, determining debits and credits, preparing a trial balance, adjusting entries, preparing financial statements, and closing the books. Each step is explained in detail, with examples provided to illustrate the process. The document also discusses the importance of maintaining proper documentation for all transactions, including invoices, receipts, and contracts.

The second part of the document focuses on the preparation of financial statements. It explains how to calculate net income, gross profit, and operating profit, and how to present these figures in a clear and concise manner. The document also discusses the importance of providing a clear and accurate explanation of the company's financial performance to management and investors. Finally, the document provides a summary of the key points discussed and offers some final thoughts on the importance of maintaining accurate financial records.



The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses, income, and any other financial activity. The text explains that proper record-keeping is essential for identifying trends, managing cash flow, and complying with tax regulations.

Next, the document addresses the process of reconciling bank statements. It provides a step-by-step guide on how to compare the company's records with the bank's records to identify any discrepancies. Common reasons for differences, such as bank fees, interest, or timing of deposits and withdrawals, are discussed. The importance of resolving these differences promptly to avoid errors in the general ledger is highlighted.

The third section focuses on the classification of expenses. It details how to categorize various costs into appropriate accounts, such as rent, utilities, salaries, and advertising. This classification is crucial for preparing accurate financial statements and for analyzing the company's cost structure. The text also touches upon the importance of using consistent accounting methods to ensure comparability over time.

Finally, the document concludes by stressing the need for regular audits and reviews. It explains that periodic audits help to detect and correct errors, prevent fraud, and ensure that the accounting system is operating effectively. The text encourages companies to establish a strong internal control system to minimize the risk of errors and to maintain the highest standards of financial reporting.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

CLASSIFICATION			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

DTG 02/0126 2 AMZ 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ/TAN SON NHRT AFB HAW

TO: PACSOTYRON/DO/WHEELER AFB HAWAII

INFO: HQ USAFSS DO/XR/KELLY AFB TEXAS

DO


1. THE FOLLOWING COMUSMACV MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE: (COMM CENTER HAS QUOTE ATCH MSG) UNQUOTE.
2. WE ARE COORDINATING WITH 7AF/460FRW TO DETERMINE THE PROPER MIX OF AIRCRAFT TO BEST SATISFY ABOVE REQUIREMENT. INITIALLY ENVISION 2 AIR-38 AND 3 AIR-35 EQUIPPED EC-47Q ACFT.
3. BELIEVE 15 OCTOBER DATE IS FEASIBLE. CURRENT GATING CRITERIA IS OUR ABILITY TO PROVIDE/TRAIN A SATISFACTORY MAINTENANCE CARRIER, WHICH, WITH THE MANNING OUT LOOK FOR DET 2 AS ORDIN AS IT IS, WILL BE DIFFICULT AT BEST.
4. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED. CR-4


SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FILE

DATE	TIME
02	0915
MONTH	YEAR
AUG	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	Same as releaser	4891	
SENDER	CLASSIFICATION	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
		DAVID H HUNT, Maj, USAF Operations Officer	
REGAINING INSTRUCTIONS		DOC # 9	





ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE ACTION ROUTINE INFO	RELEASED BY Maj Eddy	DRAFTED BY Same as releaser	PHONE 2891
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SUBJ: COLLECTION MACV AREA 15

1. FOR PAST TWELVE DAYS HAVE NOTED A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN COLLECTION EFFORTS MR-11; WHILE PORTION OF COLLECTION DECREASE MAY BE IDENTIFIED WITH WEATHER THIS FACTOR DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE AFFECTED WRMV RESULTS COMING OUT OF SAME MSH AREAS. ADDITIONALLY, THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN ENEMY FORCES OR ~~THEIR~~ THEIR ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE DECREASE IN ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS. LOW LEVEL VOICE COLLECTED BY CAS GROUND TEAMS REMAINS HIGH, INDICATING THAT THIS MODE OF COMMUNICATION HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY WHATEVER IS AFFECTING OTHER EFFORTS. REQUEST ADDRESSEE COMMENTS.

2. RELATED TO ABOVE, WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST MACV REVIEW POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING ONE ALR-38 TO NKP FOR COVERAGE AREA 15. DATE SET FORTH IN IAC 07415 STATED TRANSFER OF TWO ALR-38'S AND THREE ALR-38'S WOULD BE COMPLETED 15 OCTOBER 71 DUE TO PDJ OPERATIONS NOW UNDERWAY, FEEL THAT EVEN ONE AT THIS TIME WOULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO ENEMY INTELLIGENCE AND ASSIST FIELD COMMANDERS WITH PDJ OP. PLEASE ADVISE IF THIS CAN BE DONE AND EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE ARRIVAL NKP.

UNQUOTE

2. MACV J211-4 HAS QUERIED 7AF ON FEASIBILITY OF COMPLETING PROPOSED RELOCATION OF EC-470 AIRCRAFT TO NKP PRIOR TO 15 OCT. WE

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SECUR				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	Doc# 11-1

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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE INFO	Maj Eddy	Same as releaser	5891

ARE IN THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING OUR INPUTS TO THE RESPONSE, AND BELIEVE MESSAGE MUST INDICATE THAT THE ONLY IMMEDIATE SOLUTION IS THROUGH TDY OF ONE ALR-38 PER WEEK. AIRCRAFT WOULD DEPLOY FROM DMC TO NKP, FLY ROUND ROBIN FROM NKP FOR 3-5 MISSIONS, AND REDEPLOY TO DMC. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE AIRCRAFT/SYSTEM CAN BE MAINTAINED IN AN OR STATUS AT NKP FOR A MUCH LONGER PERIOD.

3. PROBLEMS INVOLVED WITH TRANSFER OF THE ASSETS AT THE PRESENT TIME ARE NOT NEW AND WHILE REDUNDANT ARE BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED BELOW.

A. 301XX MANNING. BOTH DET 2 AND 3 ARE UNDERMANNED. DET 3 WITH ONLY 8 AUTH/5 ASSCD IS ALREADY TAXED WITH THE LAUNCHING OF 4 ALR-35 MISSIONS PER DAY. THIS SYSTEM IS RELATIVELY NEW AT DET 3 AND ALL 301'S ASSIGNED ARE STILL NOT UP TO THE DESIRED PROFICIENCY. DET 2 HAS THE ONLY QUALIFIED ALR-38 PERSONNEL (19 AUTH/9 ASSCD/ 2 TDY FROM TSN.) THEY TOO ARE TAXED WITH THE LAUNCHING OF DAILY MISSIONS AND WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO PROVIDE TDY SUPPORT AT THIS TIME. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WILL HAVE TO BE DONE IN OCTOBER, IT IS NOT ENVISIONED THAT WE WILL BE IN ANY BETTER SHAPE AT THAT TIME.

B. TRAINING. THE CONTRACTOR TECH REP FROM DET 2 IS CURRENTLY TDY TO NKP AND IS PROVIDING TRAINING ON THE ALR-38. WE ANTICIPATE TRAINING WILL BE REQUIRED BEYOND THE OCT DEPLOYMENT DATE. UNLESS

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		7	41		
				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	Doc # 11-2

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

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ACTION ROUTINES	Maj Eddy	Same as releaser	
INFO			


A NEW CONTRACT IS LET FOR THIS REPRESENTATIVE HE WILL TERMINATE TRAINING IN APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK TO PREPARE FOR ROTATION TO THE COMUS (31 AUG). IF THIS OCCURS WE ANTICIPATE ADDITIONAL SLIPPAGE BEYOND OCTOBER UNTIL ADEQUATE MANPOWER CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR CONTINUED TRAINING/MAINTENANCE.

C. SPARES. WE EXPECT A CONTINUED HIGH MORS RATE IN CRITICAL ITEMS (PREAMP, ANTENNA, NAV CONVERTER, COMPUTERS, ETC) AND WHILE THERE MAY BE MINIMAL RELIEF IN THE OCT/NOV TIME FRAME, OPERATION FROM TWO LOCATIONS ONLY COMPOUNDS AN ALREADY UNACCEPTABLE CONDITION.

D. FRONT END RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE ENGINE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT, NAVIGATOR MANNING/TRAINING AND SUPPLY (PROPS, GENERATORS ETC).

4. WILL PROVIDE COPY OF 7AF RESPONSE WHEN AVAILABLE.

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REGRAIDING INSTRUCTIONS				Doc #11-3	



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
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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

I

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 260910Z AUG 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: PSR/DOR

INFO DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ/DO

DO

SUBJ: A1R-38 ACFT TO NKP

REFS: A. YOUR DOR 300308Z JUL 71

B. YOUR DOR 232232Z AUG 71 (NOTAL)

1. THOUGH THE MANNING OF 4 SEVEN-HOUR ACFT BY DET 3 WOULD NORMALLY REQUIRE MORE SPACES FOR MOST FLYING AFSCs THAN AUTH IN UDL, WE BELIEVE MANNING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH UDL RESOURCES WITHIN THE SQUADRON COMPLEX. THE IMPACT ON EACH FLYING AFSC IS DISCUSSED SEPARATELY BELOW:

A. A292XL. UNIT IS AUTH 24, BUT WILL REQUIRE 29. BOTH NUMBERS INCLUDE 4 OVERHEAD MANAGEMENT SPACES FOR SUPV, SEFB, MSH MGT FUNCTIONS. THE REQUIRED FIGURE IS BASED ON 110 FLYING HRS PER MONTH PLUS 12 PER CENT FOR DRIF, R&R AND LV. (BELIEVE 110 HRS PER MONTH IS ULTIMATE FIGURE TO USE FOR A SUSTAINED PERIOD OF TIME.) ACCORDINGLY, DET 3 MANNING WOULD REQUIRE CONTINUAL AUGMENTATION BY 1-5 A292XLS, WITH ACTUAL NUMBER DEPENDENT UPON HOW MUCH OVERHEAD/MGT A292XL SPACES CAN

DATE	TIME
26	1615
MONTH	YEAR
AUG	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	3

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SM SGT David/dre

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TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
DAVID H HEDY, Major, USAF
Operations Officer

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

Doc #13

DD FORM 173 NOV 68

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1969-367-001

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	INITIATED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE	Major Eddy		
INFO			

BE USED TO FLY.

B. A202XO. UNIT IS AUTH 9 AND WILL REQUIRE 9. BOTH NUMBERS INCLUDE 1 OVERHEAD SEPE SPACE. THE LATTER FIGURE (REQ'D) WAS COMPUTED AT 110 FLYING HOURS PER MONTH, INCLUDING 12 PERCENT FOR DNIF, R&R AND LV. NEED FOR MANNING AUGMENTATION WILL HINGE ON HOW WELL UNIT IS MANNED (ASSIGNED STRENGTH) IN AFSCS A202XO AND R202XO. BASED ON PAST AND PRESENT MANNING HISTORY, ONE OR BOTH AFSCs WILL ALWAYS BE BELOW AUTH THROUGHOUT MOST OF 6994 SS COMPLEX. SHORTAGE OF R202XO WOULD INCREASE A202 USE FOR ANAL/RPTG AND TECH SUPPORT FUNCTIONS AND DECREASE A202 AVAIL TO FLY. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO KEEP A202XO ASSIGNED STRENGTH AT AUTH LEVEL AND R202XO AUTH AT MINIMUM OF 90 PERCENT MANNED. ANTICIPATE AT MOST SHORT DURATION TDYS, NOT TO EXCEED 2 A202XO.

C. A203X1. UNIT IS AUTHORIZED 13 AND WILL REQUIRE 13. THE REQUIRED FIGURE IS BASED ON 100 FLYING HRS PER MONTH AND INCLUDES 12 PERCENT FOR DNIF, R&R AND LV. THE AUTH/REQ'D FIGURES EACH INCLUDE OVERHEAD SPACES FOR SUPV AND SEPE FUNCTIONS. CURRENT/PROJECTED MANNING IS GENERALLY FAVORABLE AND WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE NEED FOR TDY ASSISTANCE FOR A203X1 AFSC FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

D. A301X3. UNIT IS AUTH 8 AND WILL REQUIRE 8. EVERY 6994SS UNIT IS CURRENTLY UNDERMANNED AND IT APPEARS THIS CONDITION WILL

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
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SECURITY C				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	DOC # 13-1

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WHICH MAY BE USED.

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
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INFO	ROUTINE	Major Eddy	Sgt David


CONTINUE FOR SOMETIME. ONE A301X3 IS CURRENTLY TDY TO DET 3 AND WE ANTICIPATE CONTINUING TDY AUGMENTATION, BUT LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE WILL DEPEND ON A301X3 AVAIL THROUGHOUT THE SQUADRON.

2. IN SUMMARY, WE FEEL THAT THROUGH CAREFUL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT WE CAN PROVIDE SUFFICIENT MANNING FOR DET 3 THROUGH TDY AUGMENTATION. FURTHER, DO NOT ANTICIPATE DIFFICULTY IN REMAINING WITHIN CURRENT HEADROOM CEILING.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	3	3		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS			DOC # 13-2	

DD

WHICH MAY BE USED.



The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial data. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses and income. The text suggests that a systematic approach to record-keeping is essential for identifying trends and making informed decisions.

Next, the document addresses the issue of budgeting. It explains that a well-defined budget is crucial for controlling costs and maximizing resources. By setting clear financial goals and allocating funds accordingly, individuals and organizations can avoid overspending and ensure that their financial needs are met. The text provides practical tips on how to create a budget that is both realistic and flexible.

The third section focuses on the importance of regular financial reviews. It argues that periodic assessments of financial performance are necessary to catch any discrepancies or errors early on. This process involves comparing actual results against the budget and identifying areas where adjustments may be needed. The document stresses that these reviews should be conducted in a timely and thorough manner to prevent small issues from escalating into larger problems.

Finally, the document discusses the role of technology in modern financial management. It highlights how various software tools and applications can streamline processes, reduce errors, and provide valuable insights into financial data. From automated invoicing to advanced analytics, technology offers a wide range of solutions to enhance financial efficiency and accuracy. The text encourages readers to explore these tools and integrate them into their existing financial systems.

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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	DATE
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

SUBJECT: EC-47 AIRCRAFT TRANSFER (U).

- REFERENCES: A. COMUSMACV MSG DTG 310922Z JUL 71 (NOTAL)
B. 7AF DO/DM MSG DTG 130003Z SEP 71 (NOTAL)

1. REFERENCE A DIRECTS 7AF TO REALIGN EC-47 AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF CHANGING REQUIREMENTS. TO MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS, TWO ALR-38 AND THREE ALR-35 EC-47Q AIRCRAFT FROM DA NANG WILL REPLACE THE FIVE ALR-35, EC-47 N/P AIRCRAFT PRESENTLY OPERATED FROM NAKHON PHANOM. THE NKP EC-47 N/P AIRCRAFT MUST BE RELOCATED TO OPERATE OUT OF DA NANG. THE PROJECTED COMPLETION DATE FOR THIS TRANSFER IS 15 OCT 71.
2. REFERENCE B ADVISED CONCERNED UNITS TO INITIATE APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL, SUPPLY, AND MAINTENANCE ACTIONS NECESSARY TO ALLOW A SMOOTH TRANSITION OF AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL TO COMPLETE THE ABOVE ACTION.
3. THE FIVE ALR-35, EC-47 N/P AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM NET 1 OF THE 360TEWS AT NKP ARE US OF THE 360TH AT TEN. THESE AIRCRAFT REGULARLY ROTATE TO AND FROM TEN FOR PHASE INSPECTIONS AND MAJOR MAINTENANCE. RATHER THAN RETAIN THIS ROTATION SCHEDULE AFTER THE AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EC-47Q'S AT NKP AS WELL AS THE EC-47 N/P'S AT DA NANG SHOULD BE ASSIGNED BY THE 362TEWS.
4. REQUEST PACAF APPROVAL OF A PROGRAMMING DOCUMENT CHANGE TO REFLECT AN INCREASE OF FIVE IN 362TEWS US AND A REDUCTION OF FIVE IN THE 360TEWS US. THIS CHANGE WILL PERMIT THE CONSOLIDATION OF

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	3	DOC # 15-1	
REGRADEING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASS	

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SE [REDACTED]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION NOTIFIED			
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SUPPORT AT ONE LOCATION, WILL ELIMINATE THE LONG FLIGHTS TO AND FROM
 FOR PHASE INSPECTIONS, AND ALLOW THE 360TH TO ISOLATE ITS
 ACTIVITIES AND CONCENTRATE ON CURRENT AND PROGRAMMED VIETNAMIZATION
 RESPONSIBILITIES. CP-3.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 3	NO. OF PAGES 3	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION DOC#15-2	INITIALS
REGRADEING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	[REDACTED]

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM			
SECURITY			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION URGENT			
INFO			

DTG **11 0730 Z OCT 71**
FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ TSN RVN

TO: POC/DCR/WHEELER AFB HAWAII
INFO USAFSS/DCR/SAN ANTONIO TEXAS

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJ: RELOCATION OF EC-47 AIRCRAFT

File

1. RECENT TELEPHONE EVACUATION OF EC-47 ACFT FROM DANANG TO HEP ALLOWED FOR EARLY SWITCH OF EC-47H/P/Q ACFT. THE FIVE EC-47H/P THAT WERE TDY FROM TSN TO HEP (TAIL NOS 0-24300, 0-49260, 0-93814, 0-24313 AND 0-48072) WERE RELOCATED AT DANANG ON 10 OCT 71 WHEN DANANG BASED EC-47'S RETURNED HOME.

2. THERE ARE PRESENTLY FOUR ALR-35S AND ONE ALR-35 EC-47QS AT HEP. REALIZE PLANNING CALLED FOR Basing TWO ALR-35S AND THREE ALR-35S AT HEP, HOWEVER, ONLY ONE ALR-35 WAS OPERATIONAL WHEN ACFT RETURNED TO DANANG. FURTHER SWITCHING WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AS SOON AS ADDITIONAL ALR-35S ARE REPAIRS. GP-1

DATE	TIME
11	1400
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	2nd Sgt Larson/drs	1801	DAVID E EDDY, Major, USAF Operations Officer

SECURITY CLASS	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
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Doc # 16

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
...the eighteenth of these is the fact that the ...

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The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial data. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses and income. The document provides a detailed list of items that should be tracked, such as inventory levels, accounts payable, and accounts receivable. It also outlines the procedures for recording these transactions, including the use of double-entry bookkeeping to ensure that the books are balanced.

The second part of the document focuses on the analysis of the financial data. It explains how to calculate key financial ratios and metrics, such as the gross profit margin, operating profit margin, and return on investment. These metrics are used to evaluate the company's performance and identify areas for improvement. The document also discusses the importance of comparing the company's performance to industry benchmarks and providing a clear explanation of any variances.

The final part of the document covers the preparation of financial statements. It provides a step-by-step guide to creating the income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement. It also discusses the importance of providing a clear and concise explanation of the results and any significant changes in the company's financial position. The document concludes with a summary of the key findings and recommendations for future action.



the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are employed in the public sector has increased from 10.5 million to 12.5 million (12.5% of the population).

There are a number of reasons why the public sector has grown so rapidly. One of the main reasons is that the government has increased its spending on health, education and social services. This has led to a large increase in the number of people employed in these sectors. Another reason is that the government has created new public sector jobs in areas such as the police, fire service and the NHS.

The growth of the public sector has also been driven by the need to provide services to an ageing population. As the population ages, there is a need for more social care services, which are provided by the public sector. This has led to a large increase in the number of people employed in social care services.

Finally, the growth of the public sector has been driven by the need to provide services to a large and diverse population. The public sector provides a wide range of services, including health care, education, social care, and housing. This has led to a large increase in the number of people employed in the public sector.

The growth of the public sector has also led to a large increase in the number of people who are employed in the public sector. This has led to a large increase in the number of people who are employed in the public sector. This has led to a large increase in the number of people who are employed in the public sector.

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
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the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are living in poverty has increased from 1.2 billion to 1.6 billion (World Bank 2000).

There are a number of reasons for this increase. One of the main reasons is the rapid population growth in the developing world. The population of the world is expected to reach 8 billion by the year 2025, with the majority of the increase occurring in the developing world (United Nations 2000).

Another reason for the increase in poverty is the rapid technological change in the developed world. This has led to a concentration of wealth in the hands of a few people, while the majority of the population has become unemployed or underemployed (World Bank 2000).

There are a number of ways in which we can address the problem of poverty. One of the most important is to improve the quality of education and health care in the developing world. This will help to create a more skilled and healthy workforce, which will be able to compete in the global economy (World Bank 2000).

Another way to address poverty is to improve the distribution of income. This can be done through a variety of means, including progressive taxation, social insurance, and public provision of social services (World Bank 2000).

Finally, it is important to address the root causes of poverty, such as corruption and poor governance. This will help to create a more transparent and accountable system, which will be able to better serve the needs of the poor (World Bank 2000).

In conclusion, poverty is a complex and multifaceted problem that requires a comprehensive approach. By addressing the root causes of poverty and improving the quality of education and health care, we can create a more equitable and sustainable world for all (World Bank 2000).

The World Bank has a number of programs and initiatives that are aimed at addressing poverty. These include the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the World Bank Group (World Bank 2000).


The IDA provides concessional loans and grants to the poorest countries in the world. The IFC provides investment services and financing to private enterprises in the developing world. The World Bank Group provides a variety of financial and technical assistance to its member countries (World Bank 2000).

In addition to these programs, the World Bank also has a number of research and policy studies that are aimed at understanding the causes of poverty and identifying effective ways to address it (World Bank 2000).

One of the most important of these studies is the *World Development Report 2000: Attending to the World's Poor*. This report provides a comprehensive overview of the state of the world's poor and offers a number of recommendations for how to address their needs (World Bank 2000).

The report identifies a number of key areas for action, including improving the quality of education and health care, improving the distribution of income, and addressing the root causes of poverty. It also provides a number of specific recommendations for how to address these areas (World Bank 2000).

In conclusion, the World Bank has a number of programs and initiatives that are aimed at addressing poverty. By working together, we can create a more equitable and sustainable world for all (World Bank 2000).



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
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
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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASS [REDACTED]			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION PRIORITY			
INFO			

DTG 060500Z AUG 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PSR/DO

INFO: USAFSS/DO

DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ/CC

SUBJ: RAPID EXPLOITATION OF ARDF RESULTS IN NO LAOS (C)

REF [REDACTED] F47-1345-71 F47/D-573-71 030943Z AUG 71

1. REF MESSAGE INDICATES A UNIQUE INTEREST IN INTERDICTION THROUGH ARDF, DISCUSSES RATIONAL FOR AN [REDACTED] PROPOSAL AND REQUESTS DIRNSA CONCURRENCE WITH TIP OFF PROGRAM.
2. IT APPEARS THAT, AS IN PROJECT CUMBERSOME, THE REAL PLAYERS HAVE NOT BEEN INVOLVED. THERE IS, IN COORDINATION NOW, A 7AF DO MESSAGE WHICH EXPANDS THE FIX FAC PRINCIPLE TO INCLUDE LAOS AGAIN. PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED WITH 7AACS (ABCCG) AND OUS-AIMA (RAVEN FAC OPS) AND WILL BE INCLUDED IN THIS TASKING MESSAGE. BOTH STEEL TIGER AND BARREL ROLL AREAS ARE INVOLVED. 7AF HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY COORDINATION AS INDICATED IN REF.
3. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS, REFERRED TO REF ARE OFFERED:
 - A. PARA 4B CONVERSATION ON 2 AUGUST WITH ABCCG REP INDICATES THAT

DATE	6	YEAR	1971
MONTH	AUG	YEAR	1971
PAGE NO.	1	NO. OF PAGES	2

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	Major Eddy/drs	4641	[REDACTED]
RELEASER	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	
	DAVID H. EDDY, Major, USAF Operations Officer	DOC # 24	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]			

DD FORM 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 68 WHICH MAY BE USED.

★ GPO 1969-271-001

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECRET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	DATE
ACTION PRIORITY	Major Eddy	Major Eddy	
INFO			

HISTORICALLY RAVEN PACS HAVE REJECTED USE OF THE CODE WHEEL. ABCCC
 PASSES COORDINATES IN THE CLEAR TO THE AIRCRAFT OR SECURE TO GROUND
 CONTROLLER.

B. PARA 5. CONTACT WITH ABCCC DURING LS 719 WAS MARGINAL AT BEST.
 PRIMARY PROBLEM WAS ANTENNA LOCATION ON EC-47 IE BOTTOM OF THE
 AIRCRAFT WHICH CAUSED BLANKING DURING ATTEMPTS ON UHF. UTILIZING
 VHF REQUIRES ADDITIONAL TIME FOR ONE CONTROLLER TO CHANGE POSITIONS
 IN THE ABCCC AND SET UP TRANSMITTER BEFORE AND AFTER EACH CONTACT.
 THIS POSITION IS NOT MANNED ON A FULL TIME BASIS. THE SAME PROBLEMS
 ARE ANTICIPATED THIS TIME, AND BELIEVE BETTER RESULTS COULD BE OBTAINED
 FROM PASSING DIRECTLY TO A GROUND SITE. QUERY ANY INFO YOU MAY HAVE
 ON PROGRESS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDITIONAL TERMINALS.

C. PARA 6. MACV DECISION WAS NOT REPEAT NOT ALLOCATION OF 10 AIR-38
 SORTIES TO BARREL ROLL EXCLUSIVELY BUT TO ALL LACTION FRAG AREAS.
 ALTHOUGH DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THIS IS IMPORTANT. FIXES DERIVED FROM
 HF ALSO HAVE IMMEDIATE TACTICAL VALUE. FURTHER DO NOT UNDERSTAND
 INVOLVEMENT OF [REDACTED] AND NEED FOR DIRNSA CONCURRENCE.

4. HAVE IMPRESSION THAT WE MAY BE UNWARE OF SOME DIALOGUE WHICH
 HAS GONE BEFORE ON THIS SUBJECT. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS.

[REDACTED]	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	2	2		
[REDACTED]	TIONS			DOC #24-3

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses, income, and transfers between accounts.

Next, the document outlines the process of reconciling bank statements with the company's records. It stresses the need to identify and explain any discrepancies, such as bank charges, interest, or errors in recording. Regular reconciliation helps in detecting fraud and preventing errors from accumulating.

The following section covers the preparation of the income statement. It details how to calculate net income by subtracting all expenses from total revenue. The document provides a clear breakdown of operating and non-operating items, ensuring that the final figure accurately reflects the company's performance over the period.

Finally, the document discusses the balance sheet, which provides a snapshot of the company's financial position at a specific point in time. It explains how to ensure that assets equal liabilities plus equity, a fundamental principle of accounting. The document also touches upon the importance of disclosing related party transactions and other significant events that could affect the company's financial health.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

COMCENTER NBR: 0713
TIME OF RECEIPT: 12/0045Z AUG 71
DTG: R 110104Z AUG 71
FM PAC SCTY RGN
TO USAFSS/DOR
INFO 6994/DO
ZEM

SUBJ: RAPID EXPLOITATION OF ARDF RESULTS IN NORTHERN LAOS (C)
REF: USAFSS DOR 061900Z AUG 71.

1. [REDACTED] HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN MORE INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN US SIGINT EFFORTS AGAINST COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN LAOS THAN NRV(C) IN RVN. THIS IS PARTIALLY DUE TO THE UNIQUE INTEREST VESTED IN COMUS MACV WITH REGARD TO SIGINT IN RVN. FEEL THAT PROPOSALS AS STATED BY [REDACTED] ARE FULLY WITHIN THEIR CHARTER. AGREE THAT ASKING FOR DIRNSA APPROVAL SEEMS TO BE UNNECESSARY, HOWEVER WE ARE NOT PRIVY TO ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN PASSED VIA NSA CHANNELS.
2. BASED UPON GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY USAFSS CC DURING RECENT VISIT (MGEN STAPLETON STATED "WE MUST COOPERATE FULLY WITH DIRNSA OR HAVE A VERY GOOD REASON FOR NOT DOING SO."), RECOMMEND THIS SUBJECT NOT BE PURSUED FURTHER.
3. IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS POSED IN PARA 2 OF REF, THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED.
 - A. WE ENVISION NO CHANGE IN SUPPORT PROVIDED TO [REDACTED]. MOREOVER, PROPOSAL SHOULD ENHANCE THIS SUPPORT.
 - B. WE ALSO ASSUME COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN EC-47 AND ABCCC WILL BE VIA SECURE VOICE.
4. FOR 6994TH. REQUEST YOU CONFIRM PARA 3 ABOVE. WE FEEL ALSO THAT [REDACTED] SHOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW AND COMMENT ON THE [REDACTED] PROPOSAL.

290

This is a certified true extract copy.


GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAF
Operations Officer

DOC#26

TYPE MSG [REDACTED] BOOK [REDACTED] X

PRECEDENCE [REDACTED]

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO [REDACTED] DTG 16 0525 Z AUG 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PSR/DO

INFO: USAFSS/DOH

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJ: RAPID EXPLOITATION OF ANZF RESULTS IN NORTHERN LAOS (C)

REFS: A. PSR DO 1101023 AUG 71

B. [REDACTED] 147-2362-71 051/0-570-71 050712Z AUG 71

C. MY DO 060500Z AUG 71

1. YOUR REPLIES IN PARA 3 REF A ARE CORRECT
2. 7/13AF MSG IN PARA 2, REF B HAS NOT ARRIVED AT 7AF. WE WILL CONTINUE COORDINATION WITH ALL INTERESTED PARTIES.
3. 7AF PROPOSALS (PARA 2, REF C) STILL BEING PREPARED. THAT MSG WILL INCLUDE [REDACTED] AS ADDRESSEE.

DATE	TIME
16	0530
MONTH	YEAR
AUG	71
PAGE NO.	PAGE
1	1

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	EXTENSION
	SMSGT Davila/drs	4871	
RECEIVER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	EXTENSION	
	MAJOR H. EDIE, Major, USAF Operations Officer		

DOC # 20

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RR YMRDQR

DE YHIAKZ 0024 3370242

ZNY MMNSH

R 030159Z DEC 71

FM PSR

TO 6994SS/DO

ZEM

SUBJ: FIX/FAC PROGRAMS

REF OUR DO 022349Z DEC 71.

THE FOLLOWING PACAF MESSAGE IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFO.
QUOTE.

R 012100Z DEC 71

FM AFSSO PACAF

TO USAFSS/DOR

INFO PACSCTYRGN/DOR

SECRET COMINT CHANNELS INX

SUBJ: FIX FAC PROGRAMS

REF: A. USAFSS 181815Z NOV 71.

B. 7AF/INX 230030Z NOV 71 (NOTAL)

1. REF A REQUESTED DATA UPDATE OF FIX FAC PROGRAMS. REF B PROVIDED CURRENT STATISTICS ON PROGRAM, A RESUME OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRGMS AND OUTLINED FACTORS LIMITING THEIR EFFECTIVENESS.
2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRGMS HAS VARIED WITH THE GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION, OTHER FAC COMMITMENTS, RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR SUPPORT, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME FOR WHICH THE PRGMS HAVE BEEN IN BEING. THIS IS BEST ILLUSTRATED BY A COMPARISON OF THE BLUE BEETLE AND BROWN BEAVER PROGRAMS:

A. WHEN THE BLUE BEETLE PROGRAM WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED, 7AF WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE DEDICATED TACTICAL AIR AND FAC SUPPORT. INITIALLY THERE WERE SOME ENCOURAGING RESULTS: HOWEVER, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME THE VR AND SUBSEQUENT BDA DECREASED. THIS IS IN PART DUE TO AN INCREASE IN THE TEMPO AND CONCENTRATION OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN CAMBODIA AND SUBSEQUENT COMMITMENT OF FAC RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF FANK OPERATIONS. FAC ACTIVITY WAS CENTERED AROUND PHNOM PENH, TAY NINH, AND THE RUMLONG/CHENLA II AREAS. A LARGE ARVN CROSS-BORDER OPERATION IS TAKING PLACE IN THE TOAN THANG A.O. ALONG THE RVN BORDER. AS A RESULT, THERE MAY BE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON THE FACS WHICH WOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE BLUE BEETLE PROGRAM. A NUMBER OF THE FIXES RECENTLY PASSED TO THE FACS IN CAMBODIA FALL OUTSIDE OF THESE AREAS AND THE FAC IS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE VR. LATEST STATISTICS FOR THE BLUE BEETLE PROGRAM REFLECT THE FOLLOWING: FROM 1-10 OCT, 52 TARGETS WERE PASSED AND 10 VR'D. FROM 11-20 OCT, 31 TARGETS WERE PASSED AND 7 WERE VR'D. DURING THIS TIME NO TACTICAL AIR STRIKES WERE CALLED IN AS A RESULT OF THE

DOC#29

[REDACTED]

BLUE BEETLE PROGRAM. ONE FACTOR WHICH CANNOT BE QUANTITATIVELY ASSESSED IS THE NUMBER OF FIXES WHICH FALL IN AREAS WHICH THE FAC KNOWS FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE TO BE TRIPLE CANOPY JUNGLE. THE ENEMY HAS TRADITIONALLY OPERATED FROM HEAVY FOLIAGE AREAS IN CAMBODIA. THESE FACTORS COUPLED WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE FAC FLY AT AN ALTITUDE OF 4500 FT WHEN THERE IS A THREAT (PRESENCE OF 12.7 MM AAA), REDUCES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM IN CAMBODIA.

B. BROWN BEAVER CURRENTLY REFLECTS A MUCH GREATER PERCENTAGE OF VR AS WELL AS SIGNIFICANT BDA FROM AIR STRIKES CALLED IN AS A RESULT OF VR. BROWN BEAVER STATISTICS FROM 31 OCT TO 10 NOV SHOW 56 TARGETS PASSED, 28 VR'D, AND 4 STRUCK. FROM 11-20 NOV, 103 TARGETS WERE PASSED, 53 VR'D WITH 6 SUBSEQUENT AIR STRIKES. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN POSSIBLE TO REPORT BDA, THE FOLLOWING RESULTS ARE AVAILABLE AND CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE BROWN BEAVER PROGRAM:


- 31 OCT 1 TRUCK DESTROYED
- 07 NOV TROOP CONCENTRATION STRUCK, NO BDA AVAILABLE
- 09 NOV 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION, 2 STRUCTURES DESTROYED
- 11 NOV 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION, 4 SUSTAINED FIRES, 5 KBA, (RNO FOR TWO STRIKES)
- 17 NOV 1 BUNKER DESTROYED
- 18 NOV RNO
- 19 NOV 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION, 1 STRUCTURE DESTROYED, 4 SECONDARY FIRES
- 20 NOV 3 AIR STRIKES WITH 8 BUNKERS AND 1 STRUCTURE DESTROYED, 100 CU FT SUPPLIES DESTROYED AND 1 SECONDARY EXPLOSION.

REASONS FOR MORE SUCCESS IN LAOS ARE THAT FACs CAN DEVOTE MORE TIME TO VR OF ARDF FIXES AND HAVE MORE DEDICATED TACTICAL AIR AVAILABLE FOR STRIKES (A1S, F-4S, A-37S, AND LAOTIAN T-28S).

3. CONCUR WITH REF A THAT THE FIX FAC PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN AND CONTINUE TO BE OF VALUE. 7AF ADVISES THAT INTEREST IN THE PROGRAMS REMAINS HIGH AND THAT THEY ARE THE OBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE MANAGEMENT EFFORT AT THAT HQ AND SUBORDINATE UNITS. UNITS FLYING IN SUPPORT OF BLUE BEETLE AND BLACK BEAR, ALTHOUGH NOT ABLE TO DEVOTE OPTIMUM TIME TO VR, MAINTAIN RECORDS OF FIXES PASSED AND USE THESE RECORDS TO NOMINATE AREAS FOR FUTURE VR IF TIME BECOMES AVAILABLE. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO QUANTITATIVELY ASSESS THEIR ACTUAL VALUE, BELIEVE THAT THE PROGRAMS ARE WORTHWHILE AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE PROGRAMS FROM YOUR HQS ARE WELCOMED.

UNQUOTE
900

This is a certified true extract copy.


GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr, Capt., USAF
Operations Officer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DOC#29-L

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

PRIORITY

INFO

DTG 18 0420 Z OCT 71

FROM: (994 SCYI SQ)

TO: SSG MACY/J211-4

INFO 7AF/DMD/HANSTINGER

PER/DCR

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Ⓟ

DO R/F

SUBJ: ADF IMPROVEMENT ACTIONS

REF A. SSG MACY J211-4 131049Z OCT 71 (NOTAL)

B. AFDSD 7AF INR 211200Z OCT 71 (NOTAL)

1. IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE ADF EFFECTIVENESS, THE 6994 SCYI SQ POINTED OUT THAT UP TO ONE HOUR OF ADF TIME ON TARGET IS LOST WHEN BOTH EOLN POSITIONS ARE MARKED ON 5 HOUR OCE MISSIONS IN AREAS WHERE NO REAL AGI REQUIREMENT EXISTS. IT WAS BELIEVED ENTIRELY FEASIBLE THAT IMPROVEMENT OF TASKING OF EC-47 ASSETS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH A REBUND OF CONFIGURATIONS AND MANNING SITUATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, AN EC-47 MISSION CAN PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING VARIETY OF SUPPORT:

- A. 5 HOUR MISSION WITH TWO MORSE COLLECTION POSITIONS.
- B. 5 HOUR MISSION WITH TWO VOICE COLLECTION POSITIONS.
- C. 5 HOUR MISSION, ONE MORSE AND ONE VOICE POSITION.
- D. 5 AND ONE HALF HOUR MISSION, ONE MORSE OR ONE VOICE COLLECTION

DATE	TIME
18	0420
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
3	4

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

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TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

DAVID H BRY, Major, USAF
Operations Officer

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DOC # 30

DD FORM 173
1 NOV 68

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1968-387-881

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION PRIORITY	Major Eddy	SMgt Larsen	4891
INFO			

POSITION MANNED.

E. 6 HOUR MISSION - NEITHER COLLECTION POSITIONS MANNED.

F. THIS VARIABLE TASKING WAS APPROVED AND IMPLEMENTED FOR A 28 DAY TEST PERIOD ON 7 AUG. IT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RECOMMENDED TO CONTINUE THE TEST UNTIL A COMPLETE EVALUATION COULD BE COMPLETED. AS A RESULT OF THIS NEW TASKING THREE AREAS HAVE SHOWN AN IMPACT.

(1) PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON TARGET. SINCE THE FIRST WEEK IN AUGUST THE SQUADRON PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FLYING TIME WHICH IS SPENT ON TARGET HAS RISEN FROM 67 PERCENT TO 70 PERCENT. LOCALLY, IT HAS INCREASED FOUR PERCENT. EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF FLYING HOURS THIS EQUATES TO APPROXIMATELY 30 HOURS OR SIX MISSIONS PER TASKING WEEK.

(2) OUR FIX RATE PER HOUR ON TARGET REMAINS AT JUST OVER ONE PER HOUR, THEREFORE ANY INCREASE IN TOT HAS RESULTED IN AN ATTENDANT INCREASE IN FIXES OBTAINED.

(3) REDUCED MANNING OF SELECTED POSITIONS HAS NOT RESULTED IN A PARALLEL REDUCTION IN COLLECTION. EXPLOITABLES, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE INCREASED.

2. DURING 23-26 AUG, ACC REPRESENTATIVE VISITED USM-7, [REDACTED] TO DISCUSS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ARDY SUPPORT PROVIDED TO [REDACTED] IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE WEEKLY PRE PLANNED REQUEST FOR ARDY COVERAGE BEING RECEIVED FROM [REDACTED] IS TOO GENERAL IN NATURE

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			4		

SEC [REDACTED]	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
	Doc # 30-1

DD FORM 173-1 1 NOV 63

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY		
ACTION PRIORITY	Major Eddy	SMSGT Larson	4891
INFO			

AND THAT IT WAS USUALLY RECEIVED TOO LATE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. THE SYSTEM USED IN RVN WAS EXPLAINED, WHERE THE FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS MEET WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE CMA AND PRESENT THEIR REQUESTS. THE CMA, SINCE IT IS IN THE BEST POSITION TO KNOW TARGET COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY, RECOMMENDS THE NUMBER OF SORTIES BY TYPE AND FRAG AREA TO SATISFY THE FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS REQUESTS. IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND USM-7 AND THE CONTINUED USE OF OPS COMM TO THE ACC WOULD BETTER SATISFY THEIR NEEDS. COVERAGE IS NOW BEING REQUESTED AND THE [REDACTED] WEEKLY PRE PLANNED REQUESTS ARE BEING SENT OUT TWO DAYS EARLIER TO PRECLUDE BEING RECEIVED TO LATE AT THE ACC.

3. A RECENT EVALUATION OF THE TECH DATA LISTS PROVIDED BY THE CMA'S SHOWED A DEFINITE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THIS PRODUCT. DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE LOCAL CMA (USM-626), MACV J211-4, AND THE 509 HBG, SOME OF THE MORE GLARING INADEQUACIES WERE POINTED OUT. ONE OF THE BIGGEST PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE ADEQUACY OF THE TDL IS THE SCHEDULES. MOST SCHEDULES CONTAIN TIMES ON THE HOUR AND HALF HOUR WHEN IN ACTUALITY THEY SHOULD BE MORE PRECISE. (EG FIVE MINUTES OR 35 MINUTES AFTER THE HOUR). REVIEW OF CURRENT TDL'S REVEAL THE CMA IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE MORE ACCURATE SCHED TIMES ON THESE TDL'S.

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		3	4		
S [REDACTED]				REGRAIDING INSTRUCTIONS	DOC# 30-2

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION PRIORITY	Major Eddy	SSSgt Larson	4891
INFO			

4. THE FIX/PAC PROGRAM WAS EXTENDED TO COVER NORTHERN SOUTH VIETNAM (BLACK BEAR) AND LAOS (BROWN BEAVER) ON 31 JULY AND 2 OCT RESPECTIVELY. THE PROGRAM DIFFERS SLIGHTLY FROM THE CAMBODIAN (BLUE BEETLE) EFFORT IN THAT THE FIXES ARE PASSED TO A GROUND CONTROLLER (BLACK BEAR) AND TO THE AIRBORNE COMBAT CONTROL CENTER (BROWN BEAVER). THE FIXES ARE THEN PASSED TO THE PAC FOR VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE.

5. VMC OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRESS. THE FOURTH CLASS OF ARVN OPERATORS COMMENCED GROUND SCHOOL ON 11 OCT. THEY ARE NOW FLYING SEVEN MISSIONS A DAY (EFFECTIVE 2 OCT). A US CREW MEMBER IS STILL FLYING ON EACH MISSION TO HANDLE ANY PROBLEMS THAT MAY ARISE INCLUDING THE A/G/A COMMUNICATIONS. IN ADDITION, A LINQUIST IS NOW FLYING THE EULJ CONFIGURED MISSIONS TO INSTRUCT THE VIETNAMESE OPERATORS ON THE PROPER RECORDING/TUNING PROCEDURES OF VOICE SIGNALS.

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		4	4		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	
				DOC # 30-3	

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COM DIVISION CENTER

[REDACTED] ION			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		XX	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

DTG 05/2750 Z/ NOV 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ TAN SON NHUT, AFLB, RVN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: 880 MACV/SAIGON, RVN (MESSENGER)

INFO: 509TH BR GP (ACC) SAIGON, RVN (MESSENGER)
485 TAW/DCF
PBR/DCR/WHEELER AFB HAWAII

DOXAE Wallace
DOXAE Sigby

[REDACTED]

880 MACV FOR J-211-4

OBJ: ARDF IN RVN MR-1

THIS IS A JOINT 7AF/ 6994SQ MESSAGE

- DURING THE 3 NOV ARDF SCHEDULING CONFERENCE, DEPUTY/J2REMARKED THAT THE SITUATION IN MR-1 WAS STABLE AND THAT ARDF IS PRESENTLY PROVIDING SATISFACTORY COVERAGE. HE ADDITIONALLY SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS SOME SEA AREA NINE RESOURCES COULD BE DIVERTED OR CANCELLED. FURTHER, MACV ANALYSTS BRIEFED THAT ALL OTHER AREAS WITHIN THE RANGE OF DANANG BASED EC-47'S ARE ALSO BEING PROVIDED SATISFACTORY ARDF COVERAGE.
- IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, WE SUGGEST THE 362 TENG/DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ BE DOWNFRAGGED TO 50% OF POSSESSED ACFT VICE THE PRESENT RATE OF 75%, A FIGURE WHICH IS SELDOM ATTAINED. TASKING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD BE MAINTAINED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ENEMY ACTIVITY LEVEL IN MR-1 DEMANDS AN INCREASE. ADOPTION OF THIS RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE

DATE	TIME
05	0850
MONTH	YEAR
NOV	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE
	Capt Purkiss/mg	4891

R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE
	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE DAVID H EDUY, Maj, USAF Operations Officer

[REDACTED]	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
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Doc # 31

DD FORM 173 NOV 68

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1968-587-981

Deliberate

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE	Major Eddy	Captain Purkies	4891
INFO			

ARDF EFFORT IN THAT AREA IN THAT IT WOULD

A. ALLOW AIRCREWS MORE TRAINING TIME FOR TRANSITION INTO DIFFERENT MODEL EC-47'S AND DIFFERENT ARDF SYSTEMS REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THE PHU CAT CLOSURE.

B. ALLOW MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL TIME TO PERFORM MORE COMPREHENSIVE PHASE MAINTENANCE. WE EXPECT THIS WOULD REDUCE THE ABORT RATE CONSIDERABLY AND IN GENERAL MAKE FOR A MORE EFFICIENT ARDF SYSTEM.

C. GIVE THE DNG ORGANIZATIONS BREATHING ROOM TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR NEWLY ACQUIRED ASSETS WITHIN THEIR NOT-YET EXPANDED FACILITIES.

D. PROVIDE DNG ORGANIZATIONS EXTRA TIME AND MANPOWER TO RECOVER FROM THE RECENT TYPHOON.

3. BASED ON COL CEBEC'S STATEMENTS, WE BELIEVE THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT ANY IMMEDIATE DEGRADATION TO THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THE ACFT AND PERSONNEL WOULD, OF COURSE, BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES. THIS PLAN WILL PROVIDE FOR A MORE HIGHLY TRAINED AND ^{MAINTAINED} ARDF FORCE CAPABLE OF MEETING INCREASED DEMANDS DURING THE NEXT SERIES OF OPERATIONS IN MR-1.

GP-4

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		2	2		
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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
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PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

DTG 100530Z NOV

FROM: 6994 Scty Sq

TO: PACSCTYRGM/DOR

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SECRET COMINT CHANNELS USAFSS PRIVACY DO

SUBJ: ARDF IN MR-1

REF: A. 7AF/6994 050730Z NOV

B. TELECOM 10 NOV WINTERS/EDDY

1. DISCUSSED CONTENTS OF REF MSG WITH MACV J2114. THEY WOULD PREFER THAT WE CANCEL REF ALPHA AS THEY BELIEVE COL CREGO WAS INCORRECTLY QUOTED. THEIR CONCERN STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT HE WILL BE PASSING THROUGH HAWAII SOON AND YOUR BEING AN ADDRESSEE MAY HAVE RESULTED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH CINCPAC/NSAPAC/PACAF. AS COL CREGO HAS NOT SEEN THE MSG THEY OBVIOUSLY WOULD PREFER THAT IT IS NOT DISCUSSED AT THAT LEVEL. WE CONCUR.

2. RATHER THAN REPLYING TO OUR MSG DIRECTLY, AND STILL RECOGNIZING THE PROBLEMS/ADVANTAGES DISCUSSED MACV HAS CHOSEN ANOTHER DIRECTION? A MSG IS IN DRAFT AND HOPEFULLY WILL BE RELEASED TOMORROW TASKING THE AF TO SUPPORT A SORTIE RATE OF .5 PER ASSIGNED ACFT VICE .75 PER POSSESSED. THIS SORTIE RATE WILL RESULT IN A STATIC FIGURE OF 26 SORTIES PER DAY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS



DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	RELEASER	SIGNATURE
				TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE DAVID H EDDY MAJ USAF Operations officer

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
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DOC # 32

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY	RELEASE		PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

74F IS ABLE TO OFFER MORE. A CONDITION WILL BE INCLUDED THAT
IF ADDITIONAL ACFT ARE OPS CAPABLE THEY SHOULD BE OFFERED FOR
POSSIBLE TASKING.

CERTAINLY IF SUCH ^ATASKING CHANGE IS TO BE PERMANENT THERE
ARE REDUCTION IMPLICATIONS WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED. WE WILL
PASS THE MSG WHEN AVAILABLE AND AT THE SAME TIME REQUEST UR
COMMENTS.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
				REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS	DOC #32-1

[REDACTED]

c. Yet another possibility might be to schedule those missions with TOT of after 1300L for a less than seven hour mission, the length of which would ensure leaving the target area by 1900L.

5. It would appear that the best solution to this problem would be a combination of those suggested above. We would appreciate your assistance in coordinating with ACC so as not to schedule TOT before 2300Z and to ascertain the possibility of para 4C above. As for those missions which are scheduled to remain on orbit after 1100Z, request authority to call for an RFI abort and properly notate the reduced mission as such in the DURMIS. However, if this is done, what would be the ramifications of the increase in the number of reduced missions? Your earliest guidance on this problem would be appreciated.

SIGNED

KIRMIT J. WEGNER, Captain, USAF
Operations Officer

1 Atch: Time on target
Statistics (S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DOC # 33-1

6 July 1971 - 17 Aug 1971

ZULU	22	23	ØØ	Ø1	Ø2	Ø3	Ø4	Ø5	Ø6	Ø7	Ø8	Ø9	1Ø	11	12	13	14
LOCAL	Ø6	Ø7	Ø8	Ø9	1Ø	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22

TARGETS WORKED	2	1Ø8	322	399	336	278	199	175	92	129	114	80	13	2
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TOT HRS	18	123	228	250	255	227	194	152	130	157	151	127	62	46	16	2	-
MIN	3Ø	45	35	10	45	35	50	10	30	20	40	05	35	15	50	40	30

66:15
28:50

DOC #33-2

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFI [REDACTED]			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		XX	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

DTG 13/0015Z SEP 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ
 TO: SSC MACV/J211-4
 509RRG/ACC
 INFO: PSR/DO

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS



A RECENT STUDY CONDUCTED BY DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ RELATIVE TO ARDF MISSION EFFECTIVENESS ILLUSTRATES A WASTE OF MANPOWER AND MATERIAL RESOURCES DURING EARLY MORNING AND EVENING HOURS. THE STUDY CONTAINS STATISTICS COMPARING THE AMOUNT OF TIME SPENT ON TARGET DURING EACH HOUR OF THE DAY FOR THE SIX WEEK PERIOD, 6 JUL THRU 17 AUG 71, AND THE CORRESPONDING RESULTS OBTAINED FOR EACH HOUR.

2. DURING THIS SIX WEEK PERIOD, ARDF EC-47 AIRCRAFT WERE ON TARGET A TOTAL OF OVER 18 HOURS BEFORE 2300Z FOR ONLY TWO TARGETS WORKED. ONE OF THESE TARGETS HAS NO PRIORITY ASSIGNED WHILE THE OTHER ONE WAS UNIDENTIFIED. THEY WERE ON TARGET A TOTAL OF OVER 66 HOURS AFTER 1100Z FOR ONLY 2 TARGETS WORKED. THESE TWO TARGETS WERE IDENTIFIED AS THE SAME UNIT (MO134-PRI ONE) AND IS FIXED ON AN AVERAGE OF EVERY OTHER DAY. AFTER 1000Z, THEY WERE ON TARGET A TOTAL OF 129 HOURS WITH 15 WORKED. IN COMPARISON, THE UNIT'S AIRCRAFT WERE ON TARGET

DATE	TIME
12	145
MONTH	YEAR
SEP	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
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DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	SMSgt Larson/tec	4891	
	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE		
	DAVID H EDDY, Maj, USAF Operations Officer		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]	REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS
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DOC #34

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE	Major Eddy	SMSgt Larson	4891
INFO			

DURING THE 0100Z HOUR DURING THIS PERIOD FOR A TOTAL OF 250 HOURS AND 10 MINUTES WITH 399 TARGETS WORKED.

3. THE REASON FOR THIS LACK OF SUCCESS DURING THE EVENING AND EARLY MORNING HOURS IS: (1) THE LACK OF TARGET ACTIVITY AND (2) THE INCREASED RFI, SKYWAVES, ETC. WHICH IS PREVALENT AT THESE TIMES OF DAY. THE LATTER MAKES DETECTION AND PHASE MEASUREMENT OF LOCAL TRANSMISSIONS, VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE.

4. THERE APPEAR TO BE SEVERAL SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM:

A. SCHEDULE MISSIONS TO BE ON TARGET DURING OPTIMUM TIME PERIODS.

B. REDUCE THOSE MISSIONS WHICH ARE SCHEDULED TO REMAIN ON TARGET AFTER 1100Z BY CALLING AN RFI ABORT WHEN THE SITUATION WARRANTS IT. NORMALLY THE UNIT IS FINISHING THE MISSION SORTIES AS SCHEDULED EVEN THOUGH TOT AFTER 1100Z IS UNPRODUCTIVE.

C. SCHEDULE THOSE MISSIONS WITH TOT OF AFTER 0500Z FOR A LESS THAN SEVEN HOUR MISSION, THE LENGTH OF WHICH WOULD ENSURE LEAVING THE TARGET AREA BY 1100Z.

5. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS PN THE ABOVE.

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		2	2		
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DOC #34-1

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE MSG

BOOK MULTY SINGLE

X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 29/0030Z DEC 71

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ TAN SON NHUT AFID RVN

TO: 6994SCTY SQ TAN SON NHUT AFID RVN/DOR

DET 2 6994SCTYSQ DA NANG AB RVN/DO

DET 3 6994SCTYSQ NAKHON PAHNM APT THAI/DO

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJ: ACC MSG IAPVOP-AC 270540Z DEC 71.

1. DURING THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS THIS OFFICE HAS HAD SEVERAL EXCHANGES WITH MACV-J2 AND THE ACC ON THE SUBJECT OF HOW THE 6994 COMPLEX CAN ASSIST THE CMAS.

2. AS YOU ARE AWARE, MUCH OF THE ARDF/ACI TASKING WE RECEIVE OFTEN DOES NOT REFLECT WHAT WE CONSIDER AN OPTIMUM APPROACH. AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER WE HAVE ALL SEEN THE NEED TO ADJUST ITOTS, SHORTEN, LENGTHEN SORTIE DURATION, ADJUST FRAG POINTS, ETC. IT WOULD SEEM THAT A PORTION OF THIS STEREOTYPED TASKING RESULTS FROM INSUFFICIENT MANNING AT THE CMAS AND MACV-J2 AND THE RESULTING INABILITY TO FIND TIME TO OVERSEE THE ENTIRE MISSION PROFILE.

3. THE COORDINATION REQUESTED IN REF MSG IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THE COORDINATION SUGGESTED IN PARA 2A OF REF MSG HAS BEEN TRIED BEFORE AND NEVER MET WITH TOO MUCH SUCCESS, AND BELIEVE

DATE	TIME
29	1645L
MONTH	YEAR
DEC	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
01	03

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE

SIGNATURE

DRAFTER

SIGNED

TYPED NAME AND TITLE
DAVID H. EDDY, Major, USAF
Operations Officer

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DOC # 35

DD FORM 173 NOV 68

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1968-357-001

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	DATE
ACTION ROUTINE	Major Eddy		4891
INFO			

IT IS UP TO OUR UNITS TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION IS PASSED. TO THIS
END, WE WOULD LIKE TO ARRIVE AT A FORMAL MEANS OF RELAYING THE RE-
COMMENDATIONS OF 6994TH ANALYSTS TO THE CMAS FOR THEIR USE IN
STATING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMING WEEK. THIS INFO COULD BE FWD
VIA OPSCOM, TO ARRIVE AT THE CMA EACH SUNDAY, AND COULD INCLUDE ANY
INFO DEEMED ESSENTIAL. FORMAT MIGHT BE AS FOLLOWS:

FM: USA-56X

TO: USM-626

INFO: ACC

USA-561/DO

SUBJ: ARDF TASKING RECOMMENDATIONS 4-10 JAN 72

1. FRAG AREA ADJUSTMENTS:
 - A. 820C. CHANGE FRAG PT TO WT6080. RECENT FIXES ON M0075 INDICATE MOVEMENT TO SE. CHANGE PROVIDES OVERLAP WITH 803G.
2. ITOT ADJUSTMENTS.
 - A. 801G. CHANGE ITOT TO 0200Z VICE 0100Z. COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN INCREASING AS ACFT IS DEPARTING AREA. FIRST HOUR - HOUR AND A HALF HAVE BEEN TOTALLY NON-PRODUCTIVE DURING LAST 30 DAYS.
3. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS SUCH AS MISSION DURATION BECAUSE OF NIGHT/AAA EFFECTS, ADDITIONAL/DELETION OF ENTITIES FROM TASKING, TYPE OF CCZ TASKING, ETC.

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		2	3	28/0845Z Dec 71	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]			REGRAIDING INSTRUCTIONS		

DOC # 35-1

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY [REDACTED]

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE	Maj Eddy		4891
INFO			

4. YOUR COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED ON THE ABOVE. ONCE THE PROCEDURE IS FIRM, WE WILL PROPOSE A 30 DAY TEST TO MACV/ACC/CMA AND IF SUCCESSFUL, WILL FORMALIZE IN APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
	DOC # 35-2

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:



//PRIORITY//

SSN 0263

P 110620Z AUG 71

FM 6994TH SCTYSQ

TO DET - 1 6994TH SCTY SQ

DET -2 6994TH SCTYSQ

ZEM

FOR CAPT CHAPELLE (DET-2) AND CAPT WEGNER (DET-1), MAJ EDDY SENDS THE FOLLOWING PAPER WAS PRESENTED TO GENERAL'S PARTY DURING THAI VISIT BY [REDACTED] I KNOW ITS TOUGH BUT CAN YOU PROVIDE YOUR THOUGHTS BY TOMORROW AM. I WILL WORK IT DOWN HERE AND JOINTLY MAYBE WE CAN GIVE AN ANSWER.

QUOTE:

1. ARDF CONTINUES TO BE HIGHLY USEFUL TOOL FOR KEEPING TRACK OF THE ENEMY. WE ARE CONTENT WITH LEVEL OF ARDF SUPPORT BEING AFFORDED US IN MR II; IT DOES NOT MEET OUR STATISTICAL REQUIREMENT I.E., FIXING 31 FIRST PRIORITY TARGETS IN MR II EACH DAY, BUT IT'S CONTRIBUTION TO OTHER KNOWLEDGE GAINED BY INTERCEPT AND COLLATERAL IS SUFFICIENT ENOUGH SO THAT WE HAVE A GOOD GRASP OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.
2. THE STORY IN MR III AND MR IV IS LESS COMFORTING. COMINT COLLECTION OF ENEMY UNITS KNOWN TO BE IN THOSE AREAS IS FAR BELOW THE LEVEL OF MR II. THUS MORE RELIANCE IS PERFORCE PLACED ON ARDF. UNFORTUNATELY ARDF RESULTS IN MR III AND MR IV ARE NOT GOOD, AS CAN BE SEEN BY STATISTICS COMPILED WEEKLY FOR PERIOD 29 MAY THROUGH 30 JULY (9 WEEKS). READ IN COLUMNS FOR WEEK, SORTIES SCHEDULED, PRIORITY I REQUESTED/FIXED, PRIORITY II REQUESTED/FIXED, PRIORITY III REQUESTED/FIXED, AND TOTAL FIXES MADE OF IDENTIFIED (NOT NECESSARILY REQUESTED) ENEMY STATIONS:

SEA AREA 10:

WEEK	SORTIES	PRI I R/F	PRI II R/F	PRI III R/F	TOT
1	35	25/5	9/3	17/0	19
2	28	25/3	9/0	17/0	9
3	34	27/5	9/0	16/0	16
4	33	31/2	8/1	14/0	7
5	27	25/4	4/1	11/3	12
6	28	26/2	5/1	13/3	14
7	45	24/3	4/0	11/1	8
8	35	28/3	5/0	11/1	6
9	35	27/5	5/1	10/0	18



DOC#36



SEA AREA	11				
1	11	11/5	5/1	9/0	15
2	11	14/3	4/0	5/0	7
3	11	13/3	3/0	5/0	6
4	11	12/2	3/0	9/0	6
5	11	13/3	2/0	8/0	7
6	11	13/3	2/0	8/0	6
7	11	14/3	2/7	7/0	11
8	11	15/5	2/0	9/0	15
9	11	11/8	7/0	6/0	19


3. PRIORITY I TARGETS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE FIXED DAILY, PRIORITY II EVERY OTHER DAY, AND PRIORITY III EVERY THIRD DAY. THUS THE 25 PRIORITY I TARGETS REQUESTED FOR WEEK 1 IN SEA AREA 10 WOULD MEAN 175 FIXES A WEEK IF THE REQUIREMENT WERE TOTALLY MET. THE 5 FIXES REPORTED FOR THE WEEK THUS FALLS WOEFULLY SHORT OF OUR STATISTICAL REQUIREMENT. BEING REALISTIC, HOWEVER, WE WOULD BE MUCH HAPPIER IF THE NUMBER OF FIXES ON PRIORITY TARGETS MERELY DOUBLED IT'S PRESENT RATE, AND WOULD PROBABLY EVEN STOP COMPLAINING ALTHOUGH IT WOULD STILL LOOK BAD STATISTICALLY.

UNQUOTE:

720

This is a certified true extract copy:

GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAF
Operations Officer



DOC #36-1

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:

//////////////////////////////////////INFORMAL//////////////////////////////////////

FM USA 562
TO USA 561

FOR MAJ EDDY (6994) AND CAPT CHAPELLE (DET2) FM CAPT WEGNER.
REF 6994SS DO 110620Z AUG 71

1. SINCE WE DON'T FLY IN SEA AREA 11, WILL COMMENT ABOUT THE ABOVE REF AS IT APPLIES TO SEA AREA 10.

A. THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THE LACK OF PRIORITIES 1, 2, AND 3 TARGETS FIXED IN THE 10 AREA APPEARS TO BE THE LACK OF TGT SIGNALS INTERCEPTED/AVAILABLE. THE VC JUST DON'T SEEM TO BE TRANSMITTING AS MUCH IN THAT AREA, AT LEAST IN THE 2-16 MEG RANGE.


B. TO BE LISTED AA PRIORITY, A TGT MUST BE IDENTIFIED AND THIS IS ANOTHER BIG PROBLEM, BREAKING THE TARGETS WITH CALLSIGNS BACK TO THE RADIO DESIGNATOR TO DETERMINE ITS PRIORITY. THIS PROBLEM BEGINS WITH THE TDL, WHICH ISN'T A TRUE TDL AT ALL FOR THIS AREA BUT ONLY A LIST OF CALLSIGNS THAT (HOPEFULLY) MAY COME UP ON THAT PARTICULAR DAY. ONCE INTERCEPTED, DUE TO THE WORKING OF THESE NETS AND THE UNIQUE CALLSIGN SYSTEMS THEY EMPLOY, THE CALLSIGN WILL NOT BREAK TO THE RADIO DESIGNATOR, WE DO NOT HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGH DATA BASE, AND EVEN AFTER MANY ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN ONE FROM THE PRIMARY CMA, WE ARE STILL NOT ABLE TO BREAK THE CALLS BACK TO ANYTHING MORE THAN VCMB WITH NO RDS IN THE MAJORITY OF CASES. WHEN TARGETS BECOME ACTIVE THEY ARE INTERCEPTED AND DPD, ALL ATTEMPTS ARE MADE TO ID THEM AFTER RECOVERY AT PHU CAT, AND ARE SUBSEQUENTLY USUALLY REPORTED IN THE ARR AS VCXB -/VCMB -.

C. THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE OUR RESULTS IN THE TEN AREA, SUCH AS THE MANY WX CANCELLATIONS THE PAST MONTH, MANY TARGETS IN THAT AREA LIE AROUND THE HIGH THREAT (AAA) AREAS, HOWEVER PARAS 2A, B ABOVE ARE THE MOST INFLUENTIAL.

3. IF THERE ARE ANY STATISTICS YOU NEED ON THIS THAT WE COULD PROVIDE, PLEASE LET ME KNOW EITHER TONIGHT OR TOMORROW MORNING.

//////////////////////////////////////END INFORMAL//////////////////////////////////////

This is a certified true extract copy.


GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAR
Operations Officer

DOC # 37

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
6994 SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DORA

30 Sep 1971

SUBJECT: Problems Associated with ARDF Effort in SEA Areas 10 and 11

TO: DO

1. Subsequent to Maj Gen Stapleton's briefing at [REDACTED] about ARDF results in SEA Areas 10 and 11, MACV J21 directed a study to identify and explore possible problems associated with ARDF productivity in these areas. NRV (C) was specifically charged with performing a detailed analysis of the transmitter reference designators (RDs) on assignment and their communications activity relative to the ARDF missions in the area and their resultant fixes. In support of this analysis, the ACC provided to NRV (C) details on actual missions flown.

2. To supplement the NRV (C) study, the ACC took a critical look at the existing procedures for establishing and satisfying consumer requirements in Laos. To this end, we found the following problems:

a. [REDACTED] was not effectively coordinating their requirements with USM-7. While USM-7 was responsible to consolidating technical data on all SEA Area 10 and 11 missions, over half of the 42 RDs purportedly requested by [REDACTED] were not reflected on daily Technical Data Lists (TDLs) produced by USM-7 for missions between 15 and 31 Jul. (TDLs for 29 May thru 14 Jul were not available).

b. [REDACTED] requirements were often received by ACC and MACV after tasking for SEA Areas 10 and 11 had been made. Also, these requests were very general in nature.

c. While USM-7's weekly requests should have been translating [REDACTED] requirements into specific frag areas for specific airframes, they were not. In fact, USM-7 seldom submitted a weekly request at all forcing us to furnish identical coverage week after week.

d. The number of priority targets in SEA Areas 10 and 11 requiring daily and almost daily fixes is too large and unwieldy. The sparse communications activity on many of them does not justify the assigned priority. ARDF resources available can not begin to satisfy the fix requirement as defined by the MACV criteria for priority targets.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

DOC #38

[REDACTED]

e. While [REDACTED] said they requested 29 and 13 Priority 1 RDs for SEA Areas 10 and 11 respectively, only a portion of these were reflected in their weekly requests.

2. At NRV's (C) request [REDACTED] submitted the following list as those RDs of interest during the period 29 May thru 14 Jul.

SEA Area 10		SEA Area 11
B6242	M0731	B0046
B6401	M1738	B0047
B7661	M1761	B0048
M0048	M1806	E0671
E0089	M2537	E1544
E0096	M2538	M0934
E1862	M2539	M3135
E2163	M4855	M4404
E2164	M5298	M6800
E2165	M5372	M7680
E2166	M5408	E0041
E0007	M8704	E0984
M0107	M5515	M5782
M0108	M7504	
	M5729	

(Ref: [REDACTED] msg 150730Z Aug 71.)

3. A review of USM-7's TDLs during the period 15 Jul to 3 Aug showed how many times the schedules for these RDs appeared during the entire period. (See Atch 1)

4. ACC took the following actions to improve existing procedures:

a. ACC representatives visited [REDACTED], USM-7, and [REDACTED] on 19-27 August to propose and discuss changes to these procedures. We pointed out that the weekly requirements message from [REDACTED] was too general in nature and that it was usually received too late for planning purposes. We explained that the message did in fact justify the coverage, but did not give specifics on the number and type of sorties needed to satisfy their requirements. Because it was general and usually did not ask for changes in target disposition or target frag areas, we had no choice but to allocate the same sorties week after week. We outlined the system used in the RVN whereby the Field Force Commander met with his respective CMA and presented his weekly request. The CMA then used his data on target communications activity to determine and recommend the number of sorties by type and frag area to satisfy the Field Force Commander's request. While the weekly requests from [REDACTED] contained basically the same type information as presented in the Field Force Commander's request, little coordination was effected with USM-7, who, in turn, never submitted a detailed

[REDACTED]

request for sorties by type or frag area. Since our visit, USM-7 has initiated these weekly requests in the format we proposed and is coordinating these requests with [REDACTED]. Additionally [REDACTED] is submitting their request two days earlier so that it can be used for weekly planning of ARDF tasking. So long as this increased coordination between USM-7 and [REDACTED] continues, the TDLs produced by USM-7 should become increasingly more responsive to [REDACTED] requirements.

b. As for the MACV priority list of ARDF targets, ACC has emphasized to J211-4 that the fix requirement for priority targets is unrealistic, the criteria for priority assignment needs to be redefined, and the priority list itself is much too long for practical use. This unrealistic priority system has contributed to the seemingly low ARDF productivity of SEA Areas 10 and 11, and has a similar effect when applied to any area of coverage. Recognizing that over 1100 targets are on the priority list and that 52% have not been active in communications for over three months, J211-4 is taking action to revamp the priority system, redefine the priority criteria, and insure that only reasonably fixable targets are included. His initial objective is to amend MACV Directive 381-23. Having achieved this goal he will implement new operating and procedural instructions to support the new priority system.

5. MACV J-21 currently has on his desk a message to USAFDS Commander, info [REDACTED], that outlines his awareness of the [REDACTED] complaint, these actions he has taken and those to be taken. We have asked that PSR be included as an information addressee.

6. Col Novy was furnished a copy of the NEV (C) study (dated 25 Sep 71). I believe that we should point out several glaring errors in their statistical evaluation of our effort in SEA Areas 10 and 11.

a. In Table 1, entry 1, (Priority One RDs Identified as Assigned), this list of 30 was reduced by 7 from 21 Jun 71 on. These deleted are noted in Atch 1. (Ref: [REDACTED] Message 210842Z Jun 71).

b. In Table 1, the second "Minus" entry (RDs inactive in comm) is an inaccurate figure for all periods. Since the end result desired is "Max Fixes Feasible", these RDs inactive on each day must be subtracted from total assigned. Or conversely, only the RDs active on each day should be considered. Table 3, column 2 shows the number of days each RD was active during the 49 day period. The aggregate of 320 days that all RDs were active in communications is equivalent to the total number of times all RDs were heard at least once during the 49 day period. Column 4 however tells us that 48 times the RDs were not fixable because their communications were five minutes or less. Deducting this from 320,

[REDACTED]

we find that the maximum fixes feasible for the 49 day period are 272. It follows then that 272 divided by 7 (quotient of 39) yields the "Max Fixes Feasible" for a seven-day period. This should properly be the line 7 entry in Table 1. Looking at the first period (column 1) in Table 1 and netting out 16 fixes for incorrecting fragging, weather, etc, we find that "Net Fixes Feasible" equal 23. The "Net Fix Percentage" for the first period then becomes 35%. This method similarly applied to all periods yields a dramatic increase across the board in the net fix percentage.

7. After discussing with NRV (C) the aforementioned fallacies in their evaluation, they assured us that the record would be corrected and all recipients could expect an amended version in the near future.

William K. Skaer Jr.
WILLIAM K. SKAER JR, Capt, USAF
OIC, DORA

1 Atch
Review, USM-7 TDLs

[REDACTED]

DOC #38-3

(REF: [REDACTED] Msg 210842Z Jun 71)


SEA Area 10


<u>RD</u>	<u>Avg No. SKEDS On Daily TDL</u>	<u>Last Fix (Location and Date)</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
B6242	one	XC 3918 21 Jun 71	Removed Fm Priority By Ref
B6401	zero	No Data Avail	" " " " "
B7661	zero	XC 4215 08 Sep 71	" " " " "
E0048	one	XC 4024 24 Sep 71	" " " " "
E0089	zero	No Data Avail	" " " " "
E0096	zero	XB 8280 13 Dec 70	" " " " "
E1862	zero	Unloc in 10	As of 28 Sep 71
E2163	zero	Unloc in 10	Removed Fm Priority By Ref
E2164	zero	XB 2384 29 Jul 71	
E2165	zero	XB 1988 23 Aug 71	
E2166	zero	Unloc in 10	As of 28 Sep 71
M0007	zero	YD 0727/23 May 71	
M0107	three	ZC 1822/17 Sep 71	Was In High Threat Area
M0108	two	XB 3082/31 May 71	
M 31	Two	XB 3192/4 Aug 71	
M1738	one	WD 6446/29 Sep 71	
M1761	five	XC 3922/26 Jul 71	
M1806	zero	XB 5442/18 Jun 71	
M2537	zero	XB 3995/9 Jun 71	
M2538	zero	XB 3448/20 Jun 71	
M2539	zero	XB 1982/1 Aug 71	
M4855	five	XC 4118/5 Aug 71	

[REDACTED]

DOC #38-4

M5298	zero	XG 9501 5 Jan 71	Removed Fr Priority By Ref
M5372	zero	No Data Available	
M5408	zero	No Data Available	
M5515	zero	XB 2586 4 Jan 71	
M7509	one	XB 9833 5 Feb 71	
M8704	zero	YB 6822 2 Jul 71	
M5729			No Info Available
M4404	zero	XC 2613 15 Aug 71	
SEA Area 11			
B0046	zero	WD 5942 1 Aug 71	
B0047	three	WD 5944 28 Jul 71	Hi Threat Area
B0048	zero	WD 5645 2 Jun 71	Hi Threat Area
E0671	sporadic (one)	WD 5841 3 May 71	Hi Threat Area
E1544	two	YA 5671 15 Jul 71	Priority 1 SEA Area 7
M0934	sporadic (one)	WD 6431 31 May 71	
M3135	three	WD 9551 29 Jul 71	
M4404	zero	XC 2613 15 Aug 71	
M5000	two	WB 7637 2 Aug 71	
M7680	four	WD 5644 6 Aug 71	
E0041	zero		Prob Loc In Hi Threat Area
E0984	zero	Unloc To Any Area	No Priority
M5782	zero	Unloc To Any Area	No Priority





...the first of these is the fact that the ...

...the second is the fact that the ...

...the third is the fact that the ...

...the fourth is the fact that the ...

...the fifth is the fact that the ...

...the sixth is the fact that the ...

...the seventh is the fact that the ...

...the eighth is the fact that the ...

...the ninth is the fact that the ...

...the tenth is the fact that the ...

...the eleventh is the fact that the ...

...the twelfth is the fact that the ...

...the thirteenth is the fact that the ...

...the fourteenth is the fact that the ...

...the fifteenth is the fact that the ...

...the sixteenth is the fact that the ...

...the seventeenth is the fact that the ...


...the eighteenth is the fact that the ...

...the nineteenth is the fact that the ...

...the twentieth is the fact that the ...

...the twenty-first is the fact that the ...

...the twenty-second is the fact that the ...



The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses, income, and any other financial activity. The document provides a detailed explanation of how to categorize these transactions and how to use a double-entry system to ensure that the books are balanced.

The second part of the document focuses on the process of reconciling the books. It explains how to compare the company's records with bank statements and other external sources to identify any discrepancies. This process is crucial for detecting errors, such as double entries or omissions, and for ensuring that the company's records are accurate and up-to-date. The document provides a step-by-step guide to performing a reconciliation, including how to investigate and resolve any differences.

The third part of the document discusses the importance of regular audits. It explains that audits are necessary to verify the accuracy of the financial records and to ensure that the company is complying with all applicable laws and regulations. The document provides a detailed explanation of the audit process, including how to select an auditor, how to prepare for the audit, and how to respond to any findings. It also discusses the benefits of audits, such as improved financial control and increased transparency.

The fourth part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial statements. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses, income, and any other financial activity. The document provides a detailed explanation of how to categorize these transactions and how to use a double-entry system to ensure that the books are balanced.

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records in a business setting. It highlights how proper record-keeping can help in decision-making, legal compliance, and financial management. The text emphasizes that records should be organized, up-to-date, and easily accessible.

Next, the document addresses the challenges of data management in the digital age. It notes that while digital storage offers convenience, it also introduces risks such as data loss, security breaches, and information overload. Solutions like cloud storage, encryption, and regular backups are suggested to mitigate these risks.

The third section focuses on the role of technology in streamlining business processes. It describes how automation and software tools can reduce manual errors, save time, and improve overall efficiency. Examples include using accounting software for invoicing and project management tools for task delegation.

Finally, the document concludes by stressing the importance of employee training and awareness. It suggests that regular training sessions can help employees understand the value of data and the correct procedures for handling information. This, in turn, leads to a more professional and data-driven organization.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:


DTG: 120905Z NOV 71
FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ TAN SON NHUT AFID, RVN
TO: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ/DO/ NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB TAHI
DET 1, 362 TEWS/DO/NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI
7 RRFs/UDORN THAILAND
INFO: SSO MACV (J-2114) (MESSENGER)
509 RRG (ACC)/MESSENGER
DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ/DO/DANANG AB RVN
362 TEWS/DO/DANANG AB RVN
483TAW/DOJ/CAM RANH BAY RVN
PSR/DOR/WHEELER AFB HAWAII
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)/MESSENGER
[REDACTED]
HQ USAFSS/DOR/KELLY AFB TEXAS

[REDACTED]
THIS IS A JOINT 7AF/6994SS MESSAGE

SUBJ: PROJECT CUMBERSOME (U)

1. PROJECT CUMBERSOME IS DESIGNED TO TEST FEASIBILITY OF SECURE A/G VHF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN EC-47'S, OPERATING OVER THE STEEL TIGER, AND DET J, 7TH RRFs AT UBON RTAFB. FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, SUCCESS TO DATE HAS BEEN MINIMAL. A FEW CONTACTS HAVE BEEN MADE, HOWEVER, AND READABILITY HAS BEEN EXCELLENT.
 2. IN ORDER TO FULLY TEST THE SYSTEM, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CHART EXACTLY THOSE AREAS WHERE A/G CONTACT CAN BE MADE. 7RRFS HAS PROPOSED A PROCEDURE WHEREBY MISSIONS OPERATING IN AREAS 10 AND 11 WILL LOG ACFT LOCATION, ALT, HEARABILITY ETC WHEN THEY RECEIVE IN THE BLIND XMSNS FROM UBON AND WOULD ATTEMPT CONTACT AS FREQUENTLY AS POSSIBLE. WE BLW THAT THIS PROCEDURE COULD INTERFERE WITH THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE ACFT (I.E. KEEPS ONE OPERATOR BUSY LOGGING, AND INTERFERES WITH DF/COPY WHILE TRANSMITTING).
 3. DET 1, 362 TEWS AND DET 3, 6994SS WILL BE TASKED TO FLY ONE SORTIE IN A BRAVO NORS ACFT, INITIALLY OVERFLY UBON AND THEN PROCEED TO SEA 10. THE DET 3 RO WILL ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH UBON WHILE OVER HEAD AND ALL CONTACTS WHILE IN AREA 10. LOGS WILL INCLUDE: ACFT POSITION, ALTITUDE, DIRECTION OF FLT, WEATHER, HEARABILITY, AND ANY OTHER REMARKS DEEMED NECESSARY. THE CREW WILL ATTEMPT TO COVER AS MUCH OF AREAS 10 DELTA, CHARLIE, AND BRAVO AS POSSIBLE, FURTHER MISSIONS OF THIS NATURE WILL DEPEND ON THE SUCCESS OF THIS ONE. DET 3 WILL COORDINATE TIME AND DATE WITH 7RRS AND DET 1, 362TEWS.
 4. REQUEST DET 1/DET 3 SUBMIT A CONSOLIDATED PLAN FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS TEST.
 5. THIS MESSAGE DOES NOT PRECLUDE DET J FROM ATTEMPTING TIP*OFFS UNTIL THIS TEST CAN BE CONDUCTED.
 6. FOR PSR: YOUR DOR, 100224Z REFERS.
- GP-1

This is a certified true extract copy.


GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAF

Operations Officer
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] DOC#43

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

COMM CENTER NBR: 1907

TIME OF RECEIPT: 31/1055Z AUG 71

DATE TIME GROUP: 310054Z AUG 71


PREC: ROUTINE

FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 6994TH SCTYSQ (DQ)

ZEM

SUBJ: ACCURACY OF TDL
USAFSS/STAFF TRIP DEBRIEF AT THIS HQS HAS INDICATED THAT TDL'S PROVIDED BY THE CMA WERE LESS THAN ACCURATE. AS THIS PROBLEM WAS NOT SURFACED DURING THE MAY STAN/EVAL VISIT, WE ASSUME DEGRADATION OF TDL ACCURACY TO BE OF RECENT OCCURRANCE. QUERY WHAT ACTIONS YOU HAVE INITIATED WITH USM-704 TO INCREASE TDL ACCURACY.
120


A certified true extract copy:


GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAF
Operations Officer

DOC #44

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CL



TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
			X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

NYG 010750Z SEPT 71

FROM 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: RSN/DOR

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJ: ACCURACY OF TDL

REF YOUR 311055Z AUG 71

1. NEED FOR IMPROVING TDL HAS BEEN A CHRONIC MATTER. AT OUR REQUEST, MACV (J2114) HAS DESIGNATED A PROJECT OFFICER TO WORK ON IMPROVING THEM AND HE HAS VISITED THE CMAS TO DISCUSS TDL EFFECTIVENESS.
2. WE HAVE TASKED LOCAL OPS AND EACH DET TO EVALUATE TDL AND HELP US IDENTIFY SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED. THEIR REPLIES ARE DUE HERE 10 SEP. WE WILL THEN PRESENT OUR FINDINGS AND WHERE POSSIBLE OFFER SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE TDL.
3. WE BELIEVE OUR CURRENT INDEPENDENT STUDY CAN PROVIDE A MEANINGFUL POINT OF DEPARTURE TO HELP GENERATE TDL IMPROVEMENT ACTIONS.



DATE	TIME
01	1450
MONTH	YEAR
SEP	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

CM2 Sgt David/drs


PHONE

SIGNATURE

SIGNED

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
DAVID H. KEDY, Major, USAF
Operations Officer

SECURITY



REMARKS INSTRUCTIONS

DOC # 45

DD FORM 175

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 68 WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO 1968-257-081

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
8996 SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DORM/MSgt McChesney/4641

13 December 1971

SUBJECT: COMBAT CROSS Operations for Period 4-10 December 71.

TO: CC

THRU: DO

INFO: 7AF/DOXRE (Maj Wallace)
483TAW/DOJ (Lt Col Gaste)

PART ONE

1. Aircraft assigned: 58 26 at TSN, 32 at DNG.
 - a. AIR-34 33 26 at TSN, 7 at DNG.
AIR-35 16 16 at DNG.
AIR-38 9 9 at DNG.
 - b. Aircraft available: 37 (daily average)
 - c. Local maintenance: 6 (daily average)
 - d. IRAN 4 TSN - 49103, 15512
DNG - 48087, 00925
 - e. Corrosion Control: 2 TSN - 73735: DNG - 15980
 - f. Other: 9 TSN - 00513, 16055, 16123, 09894,
76524 - NOS (awaiting disposition)
DNG - 00937/RAM at TSN
48009/RAM at NKP
08980/Pipeline to TSN-Programmed
aircraft exchange.

2. Mission accomplishment:
 - a. Missions scheduled: 211
 - b. Missions unaccomplished: 21
 - 2 Doppler 10.6 hours
 - 4 engine 27.2 hours
 - 3 No acft available 21.0 hours
 - 2 inverter 14.0 hours
 - 1 generator 6.7 hours
 - 1 other (Airframe) 5.0 hours
 - 8 weather 48.0 hours

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

DOC#46

[REDACTED]

c. Reduced missions: 31 3 engine 7.1 hours
 1 doppler 1.3 hours
 2 mission equipment 4.0 hours
 3 inverter 7.2 hours
 1 other (airframe) 1.7 hours
 13 fuel 13.4 hours
 8 weather 13.6 hours

d. Missions LIA: 17 11 weather 24.2 hours
 2 inverter 1.6 hours
 1 engine 1.3 hours
 1 other (airframe) 3.0 hours
 1 no avail acft .4 hours
 1 other (other) .5 hours

e. Aborts w/no lost time: 7 1 engine, 1 computer, 1 inverter,
 1 generator, 2 doppler, 1 compass.

f. Lost time:

(1) Actual lost flying
 time: 180.8 Airframe 80.8 hours
 Bravo 4.0 hours
 Weather 61.6 hours
 Other 34.4 hours


g. Fragged flying time: 1310.0

h. Actual flying time: 1139.4

i. Total time on target: 750.8

j. Summary of lost time:

(1) % of loss attributed to AIRFRAME: 44.7
 (2) % of loss attributed to BRAVO: 2.2
 (3) % of loss attributed to WEATHER: 34.1
 (4) % of loss attributed to OTHER: 18.1


 GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAF
 Operations Officer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DOC#46-1

PART TWO

3. Mission Results

a. Missions Scheduled	211		
b. Missions Accomplished	190		
c. Sorties Flown	201		
d. Targets Worked	1274		
e. Fixes Achieved	941		
f. Cuts Achieved	217		
g. Priority Targets	377		
h. Fixes/Cuts Passed A/G	1038	(89.7% pass rate)	
i. Fixes/Cuts not Passed	120		
		Acft radio malfunction	8
		No contact DSU	38
		Not Plotted	12
		Insufficient Time	28
		KY-8 inopv	18
		DSU busy	15
		excessive static	1
j. Fixes/Cuts Identified	542		
k. Morse Messages			
(1) Copied	314		
(2) Exploitable	208		
(3) Passed A/G	80		
(4) Not Passed	128		
		Insufficient Copy	1
		KY-8 inopv	3
		Insufficient Time	79
		No contact DSU	27
		DSU busy	1
		DSU copied	2
		Excessive static	15
l. Voice Messages			
(1) Copied	234		
(2) Exploitable	227		
(3) Passed A/G	10		
(4) Not Passed	217		
		Not Transcribed	215
		Insufficient Time	1
		Dsu copied	1

4. ALR-38 Results

a. Missions Flown	30
b. Targets Worked	287 (245 HF - 42 VHF)
c. Targets Fixed	197 (168 HF - 29 VHF)
d. Targets Cut	54 (45 HF - 9 VHF)

5. Fix CEPs

a. ALR-34 Fixes	474
(1) 250-500M CEP	79
(2) 501-1000M CEP	253 (70.0% of fixes were below 1000M CEP)
b. ALR-35 Fixes	270
(1) 250-500M CEP	35
(2) 501-1000M CEP	158 (71.5% of fixes were below 1000M CEP)
c. ALR-38 Fixes	197
(1) 250-500M CEP	8
(2) 501-1000M CEP	65 (37.1% of fixes were below 1000M CEP)

Henry X Mioduski

HENRY X MIODUSKI, 1Lt, USAF
OIC, Mission Management

1 Atch: AMOC/Copy Data and
Flt/Area Coverage

Doc 46-3

AMOC/COPY DATA

	LOCAL	VIM	DET 2	DET 3	TOTAL
MM AMOC	10505	17010	29026	8496	65037
HF MM COPY	1021	4234	5186	2161	12662
VHF MM COPY			99	103	202
RT AMOC	2240	4370	11607	8899	27116
HF RT COPY		215	425	262	902
VHF RT COPY			1117	1153	2270

FLT/area Coverage

MACV AREA	LOCAL	VIM	DET 2	DET 3	TOTAL
01		13			13
03	4	18			22
07			36		36
08			25		25
09			6		6
10			19	7	26
11			3	4	7
15				11	11
20	$\frac{27}{31}$	$\frac{17}{48}$	$\frac{89}{89}$	$\frac{22}{22}$	$\frac{44}{190}$

DOC #46-4

JOINT MESSAGEFORM



TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		XXX	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

DTS 20/0840Z OCT 71

FROM 6998 SCTY SQ, TAN SON NHUT AFID, RVN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: SIVAS

ELL/LZZ/RMI

INFO: DET 1, 6994SS, DEU CAT AB, RVN
 DET 2, 6994SS, DA NANG AB, RVN
 DET 3, 6994SS, NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB, THAILAND
 BEN/AFSSO 7AF (INXS)



AFSSO USAF PASS TO INISE; AFSSO AFSC PASS TO SDRS; AFSSO PACAF
 PASS TO INIX; SSO CINCPAC FOR ATTN, 232; DIRNSA PASS TO B645;
 USAFSS PASS TO DORT/DM; JBR PASS TO DOR; 6940TTG PASS TO TTY.
 SUBJ: WEEKLY COMBAT ORGS FEEDBACK REPORT FOR 9-15 OCT 71.

1. BLUE BERTIE (6994SS): A TOTAL OF 42 MISSIONS WERE SCHEDULED TO
 WORK WITH FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS. THIRTY-THREE TARGET REPORTS
 WERE PASSED TO THE FAC WHO VISUALLY RECONNOITERED FIVE OF THEM. NO
 SIGNIFICANT ACCELYEN WAS DETECTED. NO AIR STRIKES WERE INITIATED B
 BASED ON BLUE BERTIE REPORTS.

2. BLACK HELL (DA FM DET 2): FILES PASSED VIA AUTOSEVOCOM OVER
 THE PAST TWO MONTHS HAVE REPOSED READILY APPARENT FII CLUSTERS IN
 THE 2 AREA: ON 18 OCT HELIX PASS AND AIR CAV ATTACHED TO THE 23RD
 DIV CONDUCTED OPERATIONS AGAINST THE THREE CLUSTERS. GROUND FIRE

DATE	TIME
20	
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	4

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

THOMAS N. MCCHESEY, MSGT, USAF

SIGNATURE

SIGNED

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

DAVID H. EDDY, MAJOR, USAF
 OPERATIONS OFFICER

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DOC #47

DD FORM 173 NOV 68

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1960-387-000

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO ROUTINE			

WAS EXPERIENCED AND 1 HELICOPTER WAS LOST. EXTENSIVE BUNKER AND CAVE COMPLEXES WERE UNCOVERED AND AIR CAV OPERATIONS CONTINUED. ON 19 OCT, AN F4 STRIKE WAS CONDUCTED AT IC097913 BASED PRIMARILY ON FIX DATA AND SI CORRELATION. THIS STRIKE RESULTED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF SPIDER ANTENNA AND BUILDING ASSOCIATED THEREWITH, 3 YAGI ANTENNAS WHICH APPEARED SIMILAR TO TV ANTENNAS, AND 1 40-FOOT POLE ANTENNA. 3 ENEMY KBA AND 6 POSSIBLE KBA. CBU-42 SEEDING IS REQUESTED FOR 20 OCT.

3. (REPORTED BY DET 2 - INFORMATION SOURCE: 196TH BRIGADE S-2, 20 TASS DI.) AS A RESULT OF AN ACCUMULATION OF FIXES, PRINCIPALLY ON 575TH NVA ARMY BN, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY HAS BEEN CONDUCTING OPERATIONS ON CHARLIE RIDGE SINCE 3 OCTOBER. 3 TO 4 COMPANIES OF INFANTRY AND 3 RANGER TEAMS HAVE BEEN COMMITTED TO THE OPERATIONS. A LARGE CAVE, IMPROVED CAVE AND BUNKER COMPLEX HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS INDICATE IT HAS CONTAINED ELEMENTS OF COMPANY 10 AND COMPANY 11 OF THE 575TH ARTY, Q-84 BTN, 9TH INDEPENDENT BTN, AND 70TH RECP. A NUMBER OF WEAPONS AND QUANTITIES OF AMMO HAVE BEEN CAPTURED, INCLUDING RADIOS, R-40S, AK-47S. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IS THE CAPTURE OF A "STERNERY QUADRANT" (USED FOR AIMING ROCKETS), TEST METERS FOR ROCKET MOTORS, ASSEMBLY TOOLS FOR ROCKET BODIES. CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES TO DATE: EN; 6 KIA, 1 WIA/POW,

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOO	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	4		
				INSTRUCTIONS	DOC #47-1

DD FORM 173-1

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION	ROUTINE			
INFO	ROUTINE			

FRD: 2 KIA (US), UNK WIA, BUT NONE WHO WERE NOT ABLE TO RETURN TO DUTY. OPERATION CONTINUES. COMMANDO VAULT (15,000 LB BOMB) IS FRAGGED FOR 16 OCT.

4. THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION REACTED TO THREE OF DET 2'S FIXES BY EXPENDING 84 RDS OF 105 MM ORDINANCE. THEY ALSO INSERTED RF/PF TROOPS FOR A GROUND RECON OF ONE FIX AREA. RESULTS ARE UNKNOWN.

5. THE 23RD INF DIV EXPENDED 27 RDS OF 175MM ORDINANCE ON THREE OTHER DET 2 FIXES.

6. XXIV CORPS INTEL REPORTS THAT AGENTS REPORTS AND ARDF (DET 2) FIXES INDICATE 2 ENEMY UNITS, INCLUDING A 575TH ROCKET TEAM, WERE DEPLOYED NEAR AT934669 AND AT936669 WITH THE INTENTION OF HARRASSING LOCAL VILLAGES AND LAUNCHING ROCKETS ON DA NANG AB. XXIV INTEL GOES ON TO REVEAL QUOTE: COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTS HAVE REVEALED NO INCREASE IN 575TH TACTICAL ACTIVITY, HOWEVER, WE DO KNOW THAT ITS TEAMS REMAIN IN AREA 2 AND DO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO FIRE ON DA NANG. UNQUOTE.

7. ADDITIONAL XXIV INFO REPORTS THAT DET 2 FIXED THE 404TH SAPPER BN ON 13 OCT INDICATING A 30 KM MOVE SW OF LAST FIX. UNIT MAY BE RETURNING TO KHAM DUC BUT CONFIRMING FIXES NEEDED TO ESTABLISH LOCATION.

8. (XXIV) AIRCRAFT FROM B CO, 123 AVIATION, RECEIVED FIRE WHILE

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INSTRUCTIONS					DOC #47-2

DD FORM 173-1
1 NOV 55

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO ROUTINE			

FLYING OVER BS105822 AND BS100818. ARDF HAD INDICATED CONTINUED ENEMY PRESENCE IN THIS REGION BY FIXING SEVERAL U/I TERMINALS IN THE AREA DURING THE PAST WEEK.

9. (EXIV) DET 1 ARDF HAS LOCATED PROBABLE 406TH SAPPER BN ELEMENTS SW OF FORMER BASE AREA 124 BY SEVERAL U/I FIXES ON 12 AND 13 OCT. ARDF HAS NOT LOCATED THE BN HDQTRS SINCE ITS 9 OCT FIX AT BS715172.

10. (DET 3) AFSSO UDORN REPORTS THAT, OF 369 FIXES RECEIVED, 86 WERE USED FOR TARGET ANALYSIS BY HQ 7/13AF.

11. NO BARREL ROLL OR BRAON BEAVER FEEDBACK AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		1	4		
				ACTIONS	DOC#47-3

DD FORM 173-1
1 NOV 53

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

[REDACTED]			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION PRIORITY			
INFO			

DTG 10/0940 2 JULY 71

FROM: 6994 SQTY SQ

TO: PACSCTYRGM/AR/DO

INFO: HQ USAFSS/AR

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

(P)

SUBJ: VIM EC-47 TNG

FLIGHT TNG FOR THE SECOND CLASS OF ARVN RADIO OPERATORS COMMENCED 10 JUL. FOURTEEN STUDENTS ARE INVOLVED IN THIS TNG. THREE EC-47 MISSIONS PER DAY WILL BE DEDICATED TO THIS EFFORT.

2. DURING THE PERIOD SINCE THEIR GRADUATION TO PRESENT, THE FIRST CLASS OF STUDENTS HAS DEMONSTRATED A REMARKABLE CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THE ARDF MISSION.

3. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A MEANS OF FURTHER TNG FOR THE SECOND CLASS, AND CONTINUED PROFICIENCY FOR THE OPERATORS CURRENTLY QUALIFIED WE REQUESTED AUTHORIZATION OF A FOURTH VIM MISSION PER DAY WITHIN THE CURRENT TASKING. THIS MISSION WOULD BE FLOWN IN AREAS WHERE THEIR PROFICIENCY HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED AND WILL INCLUDE A US OPERATOR ON BOARD. NO DEGRADATION OF SYSTEM/MISSION PERFORMANCE WILL BE EXPERIENCED.

4. SHOULD THIS APPROACH PROVE SUCCESSFUL, WE MAY EXPECT TO PHASE IN

DATE	TIME
10	1715
MONTH	YEAR
JULY	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

DD RIF

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE
	CAPT Collins	4894

R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE
	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE DAVID H KIDY, MAJ, USAF Operations Officer

CAT	ONS	DOC# 48
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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

STATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION PRIORITY	MaJ Eddy	Capt Collins	4891
INFO			

[REDACTED]

A FIFTH MISSION WHEN THE THIRD CLASS BEGINS FLIGHT TRAINING (SEPTEMBER). THIS WILL HAVE THE ADDITIONAL BENEFIT OF PHASING THE VIM PROGRAM INTO THE SEVEN SORTIES/DAY SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER.

5. WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT REDUCTION OF 6994TH PROJECTED PERSONNEL INPUTS BEYOND THOSE SCHEDULED AS A RESULT OF INCREASED VIM SORTIES WOULD BE UNDESIREABLE. AS THIS PROPOSAL WILL HAVE TO BE COORDINATED WITH MACV, NRV(C), AND SSTB, REQUEST YOUR EARLIEST CONCURRENCE TO INSURE NO LOSS OF ^{ARVN} OPERATOR MOTIVATION AND CONTINUITY.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2	2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS

DOC #48-1

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial data. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses and income. The document provides a detailed list of items that should be tracked, such as inventory levels, customer orders, and supplier invoices. It also outlines the procedures for recording these transactions, including the use of specific forms and the assignment of responsibilities to different staff members.

The second part of the document focuses on the analysis of the recorded data. It describes various methods for identifying trends and anomalies in the financial performance. This includes comparing current data with historical trends, as well as benchmarking against industry standards. The document also discusses the importance of regular reviews and audits to ensure that the records are accurate and up-to-date. It provides a step-by-step guide for conducting these reviews, from the initial data collection to the final reporting and analysis.

The final part of the document discusses the implications of the financial data for the overall business strategy. It explains how the recorded information can be used to make informed decisions about resource allocation, pricing, and marketing. The document also highlights the importance of transparency and communication in the financial reporting process, ensuring that all stakeholders have access to the necessary information to make their own assessments.

...the first of these is the fact that the ...

...the second is the fact that the ...

...the third is the fact that the ...

...the fourth is the fact that the ...

...the fifth is the fact that the ...

...the sixth is the fact that the ...

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...the eighth is the fact that the ...

...the ninth is the fact that the ...

...the tenth is the fact that the ...

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...the fifteenth is the fact that the ...

...the sixteenth is the fact that the ...

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...the eighteenth is the fact that the ...

...the nineteenth is the fact that the ...

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records in a business setting. It highlights how proper record-keeping can lead to better decision-making and financial stability. The text emphasizes the need for consistency and thoroughness in all entries.

Next, the document addresses the challenges of data management in a rapidly changing environment. It suggests that businesses should invest in reliable software and training to ensure that their data is secure and accessible. The importance of regular backups and security protocols is also mentioned.

The third section focuses on the role of technology in modern business operations. It explores how digital tools can streamline processes and improve efficiency. Examples of various software solutions are provided, along with their benefits and potential drawbacks.

Finally, the document concludes with a call to action, encouraging businesses to embrace innovation and continuous improvement. It stresses that staying ahead of the competition requires a commitment to learning and adaptation.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		I	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

DYD

280500Z Aug 71

FROM: 6994 SGTX SQ TSN RVN

TO: RVN (C)

SSO MAG/J211-4

INFO PSE/IR/DO

USAFSS/IR

AFSSO PACAF/INTE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

(P)



SUBJ: VIM EC-47 TRAINING

REFS: A. 6994 SGTX SQ CE/DO 100940Z JUL 71 (NOTAL RVN (C), MACV, AND AFSSO PACAF).

B. USAFSS FOR 132110Z JUL 71 (NOTAL RVN (C), MACV, AND AFSSO PACAF).

C. 6994 SGTX SQ DO 140600Z JUL 71 (NOTAL MACV, PSE, USAFSS, AND AFSSO PACAF).

D. PSE DO 142800Z JUL 71 (NOTAL RVN (C), MACV, AND USAFSS).

E. DOWNSHEET LTR DTD 15 JUL 71 (NOTAL PSE, USAFSS, AFSSO PACAF).

ALL REFERENCED CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNED THE INCREASE OF VIM MISSIONS FROM THREE TO FOUR PER DAY. THAT ACTION WAS IMPLEMENTED ON 24 JULY

DATE	TIME
27	1205
MONTH	YEAR
AUG	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

ORAFITER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

Tsgt Reynolds/dra

PHONE

4921

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

DAVID H HEDY, Major, USAF

Operations Officer

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

DOC# 52

DD FORM 173 NOV 68

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1968-387-001

Do P/F

ABBREVIATED MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONSULTATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY
ACTION PRIORITY	Major Eddy
INFO	

WITH EXCELLENT RESULTS. REFERENCE WAS ALSO MADE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF PHASING IN A FIFTH MISSION IN SEPTEMBER WHEN THE THIRD CLASS BEGINS FLIGHT TRAINING. SINCE THIS APPROACH HAS PROVEN SUCCESSFUL, WE WOULD LIKE TO PHASE IN A FIFTH MISSION PER DAY STARTING WITH THE 4 SEPTEMBER TASKING WEEK. OUR THIRD CLASS OF 14 STUDENTS WILL COMPLETE THE GROUND PHASE OF TRAINING ON 1 SEPTEMBER. IF YOU CONCUR PLEASE COORDINATE WITH APPROPRIATE AGENCIES TO PROVIDE TASKING FOR FIVE VIN MINS DAILY BEGINNING WEEK OF 4-10 SEPTEMBER. ANTICIPATE NO DEGRADATION OF SYSTEM/MISSION PERFORMANCE AS A RESULT OF THIS ACTION.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2		
SECURITY CL	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				
	DOC # 52-1				

DD FORM 1 NOV 63

WHICH MAY BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

DTG 30 0700Z JUN 71

FROM: 6904, SOVI SO THE NW

TO: PEE/IR

INFO USAPED/DO/IR

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJ: SEA RESOLUTIONS (N)

REF USAPED IR 274388 JUN 71

1. AT OUR REQUEST, A MEETING WILL BE HELD ON 30 JUN WITH MEMS FROM 7AF PLANS, 460TH AND 679CH. PURPOSE IS TO DISCUSS THIS MEETING FUTURE IN LIGHT OF PACEF REQUEST FOR REINVESTIGATION OF A NEWS WRITING. ESPECIALLY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF OUR INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS, THIS WILL BE THE FIRST CHANCE THE 460TH HAS HAD TO EXPRESS THE OPERATIONAL VIEW.

2. ONE APPROACH, WHICH HAS BEEN MAKING HEADWAY TODAY IN THE 460TH, IS TO CONSIDER ASSIGNING THE TEN SQUADRONS AVAILABLE TO THE EXISTING WING AT THESE VARIOUS LOCATIONS I.E. 12FW, 960W HQ. FUNCTIONS CURRENTLY PERFORMED BY THE 460TH DOY (UNDER LIAISON, TEAM MANAGEMENT, SUPPORT, ETC) WILL BE RELEGATED TO 7AF. WE BELIEVE THIS UNNECESSARILY FRAGMENTED THE MANAGEMENT AND WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE AS MENTIONED IN REF. UNFORTUNATELY OUR

DATE	TIME
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MONTH	YEAR
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1	2

REMARKS ABOUT THE 460TH PLANNED APPROACH ARE INTERESTING AND

DRAFTER
 TYPED NAME AND TITLE
 Same as Releasee/Ar
 PHONE
 4891

RELEASER
 SIGNATURE
 TYPED (for stamped) NAME AND TITLE
 DAVID H EBY, Major, USAF
 Operations Officer

SECURITY

REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

DOC# 53

MMW



file 32-c
6
DO

-2 JUL 1971 06 44

150
13

TI: 30642VZ OZ CRDA5220L AB826KZ 4446
RR YMRDQR
DE YHLAKZ 0025 1833435
ZVY MMNSH
R 020221Z
FM PACSCTYRCN
TO 6994SCTYSO
INFO USAFSS/DO/XR
ZEM



SUBJ. SSE REDUCTIONS (U)
REFS: A. 57-1 /4 291413Z JUN 71.
B. 6994SS DO 300930Z JUN 71.

1. APPRECIATE INFO CONTAINED IN REF BRAVO. REF ALPHA PROVIDES MOST CURRENT USAFSS VIEWS PERTAINING TO SEA REDUCTIONS.
2. THIS HEADQUARTERS DOES NOT FAVOR APPROACHES OUTLINED IN REF BRAVO PARA 2. BECAUSE OF MANAGEMENT FRAGMENTATION AND THE NEED FOR A CENTRAL LIAISON FUNCTION WITH 7AF AND MACV.
3. FOR USAFSS: THIS HEADQUARTERS IN COORDINATION WITH PACAF WILL REEXAMINE THE ALTERNATIVES IN REF ALPHA AND ADVISE ALCON OF OUR FINDINGS.



133
0028



DOC#54



JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMBINED JOINT CENTER

Jul 3 1971

SECURITY

PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

DTG

020805 Z JUL 71

FROM: 6994 80TH SQ TSN RVN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

VO: PGR/XR

INFO USARPAC/DO/ER

SUBJ: SBA REMOVALS (U)

REF KY DO 300930Z JUN 71

1. RSM MEETING WAS HELD 1 JUL IN 460TH CONFERENCE ROOM AND WAS CHAIRED BY COL DALE FLOWERS, 460TH COMMANDER. REPRESENTATIVES FROM 7AF PLANS, 7AF RECON OPS, 460TH OPS, 360THAS AND 6994 DO WERE PRESENT.

2. INITIAL DISCUSSION WAS ORIENTED TOWARDS RESPONSE TO PACAF QUERIES CONCERNING POSSIBLE RSM TSN WING AT TSN. THE ADVANTAGES OF COLLOCATION OF CENTRALLY BASED MANAGEMENT WERE DISCUSSED. 7AF XP TOOK A STAND THAT THERE WAS MUCH PRESSURE TO BRING USAF PARTICIPATION AT TSN AND TSN AS MUCH OVER TO THE VICTORVILLE AS POSSIBLE, AND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. WE WERE UNABLE TO OFFER CONVINCING AND CONCLUSIVE RATIONALS FOR ESSENTIALITY OF MAINTAINING TSN MANAGEMENT AT TSN. OUR ARGUMENTS CENTER AROUND BASE OF COORDINATION AND INTANGIBLE LOSSES IN EFFICIENCY IF ANOTHER DISTANT WING TOOK OVER TSN. 7AF XP AND 460TH

DATE	TIME
2	1430
MONTH	YEAR
JUL	71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	3

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE
	SAME AS RELEASER/STW	4091		TYPED (or MONOGRAM) NAME AND TITLE
SECURITY				REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DOC 55

DD

WHI

ABBREVIATED JOURNAL MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	[REDACTED]
ACTION	Major Eddy	[REDACTED]
INFO		[REDACTED]

MEMS ARE UNABLE TO VIEW CRITICALLY OF TENS PARENT LOCATION IN SAMS 7
NIGHT AS WE DO.

3. THE 460TH DO PRESENTED HIS PROPOSAL FOR ASSIGNING TENS TO EXISTING
WINGS, HOWEVER IN HIS INTRODUCTION THE 460TH DO STATED THAT HE
PREFERRED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SINCE THE SINGLE WING PHILOSOPHY WAS
ACCEPTED BY ALL.

4. THE DISCUSSION CONTINUED IN AN EFFORT TO AGREE ON WHICH WING 7AF
WOULD PROPOSE. THE 315 TAW WAS MENTIONED AGAIN AS WELL AS A NEWCOMER FOR
CONSIDERATION, THE 483 TAW AT CBB. THIS WING IS CURRENTLY MADE UP OF
SEVEN C-7 SQUADRONS AND WAS INTRODUCED BECAUSE OF OUR REQUIREMENT FOR
SECURE FACILITIES. AT THIS POINT CBB WAS AGAIN MENTIONED AS THE MOST
LIKELY FOR RELOCATION OF THE EC-47 ASSETS. THE 6994 DO AND 460 DOJ
CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AT TSN AND RESULTANT
DISCUSSION LED TO RECOGNITION THAT AT LEAST A WING LIAISON FUNCTION
WAS REQUIRED AT 7AF. 2-4 SQUADRONS WERE ENVISIONED, A NUMBER THAT WE
BELIEVE IS TOO RESTRICTIVE TO ACCOMPLISH NECESSARY FUNCTIONS.

5. WE ARE UNSURE AT THIS TIME EXACTLY WHAT 7AF RESPONSE WILL INCLUDE.
IN ALL PROBABILITY NO RESPONSE WILL BE MADE UNTIL AFTER GEN BEAN'S
VISIT DURING WEEK OF 17TH. HE IS EXPECTED TO COMMENT ON THE TENURE
OF CBB AS WELL AS OTHER AF Basing DECISIONS. IT DOES NOT APPEAR
HOWEVER THAT IF 7AF IS TO BE SWAYED FROM THEIR POSITION OF NO TEN
WING AT TSN, MORE EMPHATIC DIRECTION WILL HAVE TO COME FROM PACAF.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2	3	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
SECURITY	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

DOC # 55-1

DO :

DO NOT BE USED.

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
ACTION PRIORITY	Major Eddy	[REDACTED]
INFO		

RECOMMEND YOU ATTEMPT TO HAVE PACAF DIRECT/STRONGLY SUGGEST A "CLEAN"
 THE TENS WING. IF YOU AGREE AND IF YOU INTEND TO PURSUE THIS FURTHER,
 PLS ADVISE AND WE WILL SEEK ALLIES AT THIS END (EG MACV). ALSO REQUEST
 YOU ENUNCIATE ARGUMENTS FOR LEGAL TENS WING TO ENSURE WE HAVEN'T OVER-
 LOOKED ANYTHING.

6. RELATED SUBJECT: REQUEST COMMENTS PERTINENT TO MY MSG DO 220655Z
 JUN 71, ~~RE: CLOSURE/REDISTRIBUTION~~ OF PHJ ASSETS.

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				DOC# 55-2	
SECURITY CLASS				REG	DOC# 55-2

DD FORM 1 200

IT MAY BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

*File
32C
JTC*

SECURITY

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

DTG *11/0200Z*
10/2000Z JUL 71

FROM 6994 SCTY SQ

TO PSE/DO/XR

USAFSE/DO/XR

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJ: SEA REDUCTIONS

AT MY REQUEST, ON 3 JULY 71 MAJ EDDY AND MYSELF MET WITH 7AF (XP) STAFF IN ANOTHER EFFORT TO CONVINCE THEM OF NEED TO RETAIN TENG COMMAND AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT ELEMENTS AT TSM. OUR BEST ARGUMENTS FAILED TO SWAY THEM, PRINCIPALLY DUE TO DIFFICULTY IN THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF INTRICACIES OF ARDF OPERATIONS, AND WERE LOOKED UPON AS A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE RATHER THAN NECESSITY. 7AF (XP) STILL PROPOSES TO RESUBORDINATE TENG, PROBABLY TO 483TAW AT CRB, AND RETAIN A SMALL WING LIAISON FUNCTION AT TSM. WE THEN SPOKE TO B/GEN JOHN WHO AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER AND WHILE SYMPATHETIC, ADVISED THAT CURRENT REDUCTION EXERCISE WOULD MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO RETAIN OR ESTABLISH A WING AT TSM.

2. ON 7 JULY 71, I HAD OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW PROPOSED 7AF (XP) RESPONSE TO PACAF (XP) MSG 280011 JUN 71, PRESENTLY IN 7AF (IN) CHANNELS FOR COORDINATION PRIOR TO COORDINATION BY COMMAND SECTION.

POSITION CITED STILL CALLS FOR RESUBORDINATION ON BASIS OF SAVINGS

DATE	TIME
10	2145
MONTH	YEAR
III	1071
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
	1

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE <i>Col [Signature]</i>	REL E A S E R	SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>
		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE LEON S INCE, COL, USAF	

SECURITY			
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DD FORM 1300, 1 MAY 68

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO 1968-257-091

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
ACTION PRIORITY		
INFO		

BEN DIFFICULT TASK OVER THE YEARS DUE TO DIFFERING ORIENTATIONS OF FRONT END/BACK END PERSONNEL. NECESSARY RAPPORT WOULD BE VERY HARD TO MAINTAIN.

P. MACV PROGRAM MANAGER, J21, WAS UNAWARE UNTIL RECENTLY OF PLANNED WING DEACTIVATION, AND ORIGINAL PLANS STAFFING DID NOT INCLUDE THAT ELEMENT (NOR THE 699A SQTY SQ).

A. GEN JOHN RECOGNIZED INTANGIBLE NATURE OF ABOVE ARGUMENTS, AND WHILE SYMPATHETIC TO OUR CAUSE, DID NOT FEEL THEM SUFFICIENTLY COMPELLING TO "PROVE" ANOTHER ARRANGEMENT UNWORKABLE (SUCH AS, REMOTE WING WITH TSN LIAISON ELEMENT). (AGREED!) I REITERATED MY BELIEF THAT REGARDLESS OF NOMENCLATURE (WING, GROUP, OTHER) IT IS IMPORTANT TO RETAIN THE COMMAND AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AT TSN IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. GEN JOHN DID NOT COORDINATE ON PROPOSED 7AF (XP) MSG (WHICH IS IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED PACAF MSG) AND SENT MEMO TO XP (9 JUL 71) ^{COVERING} FOLLOWING PARAPHRASED POINTS. (COPY OF MEMO BEING FORWARDED VIA COURIER).

EVEN THOUGH MACV CONCURRED IN WING DEACTIVATION, IT DOES NOT RULE OUT PROPOSING A REDUCED TSN WING STRUCTURE AT TSN, ESPECIALLY SINCE ARDY PEOPLE AT MACV WERE NOT CONSULTED ORIGINALLY. MACV (J211) HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT MOVE OF TSN CONTROL ELEMENT AWAY FROM TSN.

B. AGREED THAT ASSIGNMENT OF TSN TO ANOTHER EXISTING WING COULD BE DONE WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE MISSION DEGRADATION AND WITH MANPOWER SAVINGS.

C. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO ASSIGN TSN TO A WING NOT COLOCATED

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION IONS DOC#56-3

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

WITH A TEN SQ. CRB WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE, PROVIDING EARLY
DECISION IS MADE TO TRANSFER 361TEWS FROM PHU CAT TO CRB.

D. FROM PERKLY ARDF MANAGEMENT STANDPOINT, BEST ARRANGEMENT WOULD
BE CREATION OF SMALL HEADQUARTERS AT TSN TO PERKLY CONTINUED, DIRECT,
AND DAILY INTERFACE BETWEEN TEWS MANAGEMENT, 6994 SCTY SQ, AND MAGV/
ACC.

E. IF FIRM DECISION IS MADE NOT TO RETAIN A TEN WING OR GROUP STRUCTURE
AT TSN, DETERMINATION OF WHICH WING TO TAKE OVER TEWS SHOULD AWAIT
FINAL DECISION REGARDING RELOCATION OF 361TEWS.

5. HAVE JUST BECOME AWARE THAT THERE IS LARGER GAP IN TEWS PARENT-
HOOD PLANNING THAN I HAD ENVISIONED. ACCORDING TO 460TRW DEACTIVATION
PAD, WHICH WE HAD NOT SEEN TILL TODAY, WING DEACTIVATES 1 SEP 71, WITH
EFFORT TO COMPLETE ALL ACTIONS BY 14 AUG 71. ONLY MENTION OF TEWS IS
THAT THIS MATTER WOULD BE TREATED SEPARATELY (SIC!). AS I CAN GATHER,
460TRW IS SUPPOSED TO BE WORKING ON A PAD TO ADDRESS TEWS MANAGESHIP
RESPONSIBILITY. THE 460 (DOC) REPRESENTATIVE, WHO SHOULD BE MOST KNOW-
LEDGEABLE ON THESE MATTERS, IS APPARENTLY UNAWARE OF BASIC
PLANNING TO BE DONE. IN FACT THAT NO REAL PLANNING/PROGRAMMING HAS BEEN
DONE ON SUCH THINGS AS FREQUENT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN NEW WING AND ACC,
MOVE OF DOC, STORES, RECOMMERA. IN FACT, SINCE IT HASN'T BEEN DECIDED
WHICH WING TO PUT THE TEWS UNDER, NO PREPARATIONS HAVE BEGUN FOR A
SPECIFIC WING TO UNDERTAKE THIS NEW RESPONSIBILITY. THEREFORE,


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REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				DOC#56-4	

773-1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS MESSAGE MAY BE USED.

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
ACTION		
INFO		

THE 460TH PHASES OUT IN LATE AUGUST AND MOVE OF 361/DET 1, 6994SS
 WON'T OCCUR TILL LATE FALL, AND CONSIDERING LEAD TIME IN COMMUNICA-
 TION PROGRAMMING, FOR EXAMPLE, IT APPEARS THAT THERE WILL BE A PRO-
 LONGED GAP IN TENS MANAGEMENT, UNLESS, OF COURSE, A TENS CONTROL
 ELEMENT IS RETAINED AT TEN FOR THE INTERIM, AT LEAST. (11) ALSO,
 AVAILABILITY OF CRE AS HOST FOR 361/DET 1, 6994SS/TENS WING HINGES
 ON SUCCESS OF COMPASS FLAG/SENIOR BOOK OPERATION AT NKP, WHICH WOULD
 INTERFERE WHEN DET 1, 6994SS FACILITIES COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. IF
 PLAN LANG IS DECIDED UPON, LEAD TIME FOR SI FACILITIES, SECURE COMMUNI-
 CATIONS, NIGHTTIME, WOULD INVOLVE CERTAIN DELAYS. IT WOULD APPEAR
 INCREDIBLE THAT TENS MANAGEMENT WOULD BE ALLOWED TO FLOUNDER DUE TO
 PRESSURE TO CLOSE DOWN BY A CERTAIN DATE. OBVIOUSLY, THE POTENTIAL
 IMPACT ON THE AEF PROGRAM WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE IF THIS SITUATION
 WAS ALLOWED TO OCCUR.

6. WE ARE THOROUGHLY CONVINCED THAT ALL AVAILABLE AVENUES SHOULD BE
 USED TO MEET A SCHEDULE WHICH WILL BE COMMENSURATE WITH STATED
 USAFSS/POL/... OBJECTIVE.

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REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				DOC 36-5	

173-1

[REDACTED]


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133234ZCZCRDC872
PP YMRDQK YMRDQR
DE YWQADK 0070 1332204
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK PP NRL DE
P 132200Z
FM USAFSS
TO PACSCTYRGN/DOX
6994 SCTYSQ/CC
INFO CINCPACAF/XR
7AF/XR
ZEM

[REDACTED]

1. REQUEST THAT YOU: (A) DETERMINE THE LEVELS OF COMSED SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED TO 7AF IN SEA FOR FY72-FY74; AND (B) PROVIDE PERSONNEL STRENGTH LEVELS AT SPECIFIC POINTS WITHIN THE STATED TIME FRAME FOR THE 6994 SCTY SQ. THIS SHOULD REFLECT THE CHANGES DUE TO WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM SEA AND USAFSS RESPONSE THERETO.
 2. THIS INFORMATION IS REQUIRED BY NSA ON 17 MAY 71. YOUR REPLY SHOULD ARRIVE AT THIS HEADQUARTERS IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO ENABLE US TO MEET THIS SUSPENSE DATE. GP-1
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This is a certified true copy:


GEORGE F. LOGAN, Jr., Capt., USAF
Operations Officer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DOC#57

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DCO

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: COMSEC Support (monitoring)


TO: 6994 Security Squadron

1. Reference your 6894 Scty Sq (DOS) message 130225Z May 71.
2. The levels of COMSEC support to be provided to 7AF in SEA for FY 71-74 will be the same as in FY 70-71. You will be advised of any changes in COMSEC support due to withdrawal of U.S. forces from SEA.

FOR THE COMMANDER

W.A. OWEN Jr., Lt Col, USAF
Director of Communications Operations
DCS/Communications-Electronics

This is a certified true copy:


GEORGE F. LOGAN, Jr., Capt., USAF
Operations Officer

DOC #58

JOINT MESSAGEFORM						SECURITY C					
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		ACT	INFO					DATE - TIME	MONTH	YR	
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BOOK YES	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS										
<p style="text-align: center;">FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ/TAN SON NHUT AFLD, RVN</p> <p style="text-align: center;">TO: PSR/DOS/WHEELER AFB, HAWAII</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[REDACTED]</p> <p>SUBJ: 7AF COMSEC MONITOR SUPPORT (U)</p> <p>REF USAFSS DOS 132200Z MAY 71</p> <p>1. REF MSG FIRST INDICATION THIS UNIT AND 7AF HAS OF REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH DRAWDOWN ACTIONS FOR COMSEC SUPPORT TO 7AF/MACV. WE WILL CONTINUE TO COORDINATE WITH 7AF AND MACV TO ESTABLISH FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND CHANGES THERETO FOR TACTICAL COMSEC SUPPORT.</p> <p>2. 7AF RESPONSE TO USAFSS MSG QUOTED FOR YOUR ACTION: LTR FROM 7AF (DCO) TO 6994 SCTY SQ DTD 15 MAY 71, SUBJ: COMSEC SUPPORT (MONITORING)</p> <p>QUOTE:</p> <p>1. REFERENCE YOUR 6994 SCTY SQ (DOS) MESSAGE 130225Z MAY 71 (THIS WAS RETRANSMITTAL OF USAFSS MSG).</p> <p>2. THE LEVELS OF COMSEC SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED TO 7AF IN SEA FOR FY71-74 WILL BE THE SAME AS IN FY670-71. YOU WILLBE ADVISED OF ANY CHANGES IN COMSEC SUPPORT DUE TO WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM SEA.</p> <p>UNQUOTE. SIGNED BY W. A. OWEN JR. LT COL USAF, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS?</p>											
DISTR:											
DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS					
CMSgt Livingston, NGOIC DOS, 4891											
R E L E A S E R	TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE						[REDACTED] <i>DOC#59</i>				
	GARY D. BELCHER, Capt, DO, 4891										
	SIGNATURE										
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BOOK MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

FROM:

TO:

3. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, NO CHANGE IN COMSEC RESOURCE POSTURE IS CON-
TEMPLATED BASED UPON DIMINISHING REQUIREMENT: HOWEVER, VIEWPOINT OF
PERSONNEL THIS UNIT IS THAT VHF/UHF/HF MONITOR RESOURCES COULD BE
CONSIDERED FOR PROGRAMMED DRAWDOWN. THE UHF/VHF EQUIPMENT IS NOT
TASKED AT PRESENT TIME AND VERY LITTLE INFORMATION IS OBTAINED FROM
HF. IN ADDITION, BELIEVE THAT ADEQUATE COMSEC SUPPORT DURING
DRAWDOWN COULD BE PROVIDED BY QUARTERLY MOBILE OPERATIONS BY DET 1
6927. REQUEST YOUR GUIDANCE/COMMENTS CONCERNING THIS MATTER. GP-1

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DISTR:

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
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2670510ZCZCRDA462
PF YMRDQR
DE YHLAKZ 0008 2670204
ZNY MMNSH
P240145Z SEP 71
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 6994SCTYSQ/SSLO
ZEM

SUBJ: COMSEC SUPPORT 7AF
REVIEW OF PLANNING INFO ON SEA RESIDUAL CRYPTOLOGIC FORCES INDICATES
NO PROVISION FOR RETAINING COMSEC SUPPORT FOR 7AF.
REQUEST YOU ADVISE 7AF OF THIS MATTER. IF 7AF DESIRES
CONTINUANCE OF THIS SUPPORT, REQUEST THEY PROVIDE A
STATEMENT OF SUPPORT AND TIME FRAME REQUIRED. IN VIEW
OF CURRENT PROGRAMING ACTIONS TO REALIGN CRYPTOLOGIC
RESOURCES, REQUEST ABOVE INFORMATION BE OBTAINED AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE.

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This is a certified true copy:


GEORGE F. LOGAN Jr., Capt., USAF
Operations Officer

DOC # 60

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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PAGE 01 OF 01	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE ACT INFO	LMF	CLASS AAAA	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY		
		PP				DATE - TIME 25 0155Z	MONTH SEP	YR 71

BOOK

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: 6994SCTYSQ

TO: PACSCTYRGN/DOX/DOS

DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOUR

SUBJ: COMSEC SUPPORT TO 7AF

REF PSR/DOX 240145Z SEP 71

SSLO AND CHIEF COMSEC OPNS 6994SS DISCUSSED REF MESSAGE WITH 7AF

DC THIS DATE. DC AGREED TO ACT AS OPR IN STAFFING MATTER AT 7AF,

AND WILL ADVISE MY OFFICE OF OFFICIAL 7AF POSITION AS SOON AS

DECISION IS MADE. OFF-THE-RECORD, DC FELT THERE WOULD PROBABLY

BE NO REQUIREMENT FOR IN-COUNTRY COMSEC SUPPORT PAST 30 JUNE 72.

WILL KEEP YOU POSTED.

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SAME AS RELEASER

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE
DAVID J. CADE, Major, SSLO, 4427

SIGNATURE

SIGNED

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DOC #61



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Z 02 CRDB4 85
PP YMRD CR
DE WYQADK 2047 2672014
ZNY MMNSH
P 24205Z SEP 71
FM USAFSS
TO PSR/DO
6994 SOT YSQ/CG
ZEW

1. IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE USAFSS REPRESENTATIVES WILL ATTEND A MEETING AT MACV HEADQUARTERS TO DECIDE THE TOTAL CRYPTOLOGIC POSTURE IN SOUTH VIETNAM FOR THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR. AS PART OF THIS MEETING THE NEED FOR THE CURRENT USAFSS DIRECT COMSEC SUPPORT EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE ADDRESSED.
 2. THE CURRENT USAFSS POSITION IS DEPENDENT UPON THE COMPONENT COMMANDER'S REQUIREMENT FOR DIRECT SUPPORT.
 3. REQUEST YOU CONTACT PACAF AND/OR 7AF TO CONFIRM THE ABOVE REQUIREMENT AND DETERMINE ANY CHANGE IN TOTAL EFFORT CAUSED BY REDUCTION. THESE COMMANDS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT OUR CURRENT COMSEC EFFORT WILL BE COMPETING AGAINST OTHER RESOURCES IN A MANDATORY REDUCTION ENVIRONMENT.
 4. SUBJECT TO PACAF/7AF RESPONSE AND/OR THEIR EXPRESSED NEEDS, WE WILL NEED YOUR ASSESSMENT AS TO:
 - A. NUMBER AND TYPE OF COMSEC POSITIONS WHICH SHOULD BE RETAINED IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
 - B. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO CONTINUE THE DIRECT SUPPORT MISSION.
- . YOUR RESPONSE IS REQUIRED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME AND CERTAINLY BEFORE THE MEETING AT MACV PRESENTLY SCHEDULED FOR FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER 1971.

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DOC#62

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THIS IS A TRUE COPY:

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DCO

28 Sep 1971

SUBJECT: COMSEC Support to 7AF (SSLO 25 Sep 71)


TO: USAFSS/7AF Liaison Officer

1. [REDACTED] CINCPCAF message DCO 150101Z May 71 requested a time for eliminating COMSEC support provided by the 6994 Security Squadron. 7AF DCO 211015Z May 71 established a time frame of FY 4/72-1/73.
2. [REDACTED] Subsequent developments indicate that tactical COMSEC support can be eliminated during FY 4/72.
3. (U) This answers your letter, subj: COMSEC Support to 7AF, dated 25 September 1971.

FOR THE COMMANDER

FRANK M MILLIKEN, Lt Col, USAF
Asst Director of Communications Operations
DCS/Communications-Electronics

This is a certified true copy.


GEORGE F. LOGAN, Jr., Capt, USAF
Operations Officer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DOC # 63

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

