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THE HISTORY OF

DETACHMENT 2, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

1 JULY 1971 - 31 DECEMBER 1971

RCS: USS-D3

FREEDOM THROUGH VIGILANCE

USAF SECURITY SERVICE

[redacted]

1 JANUARY 1972

[redacted]

Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron, APO San Francisco 96337

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THE HISTORY OF

DETACHMENT TWO, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

1 JULY 1971 - 31 DECEMBER 1971

Prepared by

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Approved By:

John V. Thompson

JOHN V. THOMPSON, Major, USAF
Commander

FOREWORD

This operational history of Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron is a narrative depicting the significant detachment accomplishments during the historical period 1 July 1971 thru 31 December 1971.

This history was prepared by Master Sergeant Carl A. Miller. All comments and suggestions are welcomed and should be directed to the Operations Officer, Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron, APO San Francisco 96337

[redacted]

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

1 July 1971	Position	31 December 1971
Lt Col E. E. Blackwell	Commander	Maj E. J. Ledet
Capt C. A. Chapelle	Operations Officer	Capt K. J. Wegner
Capt J. R. Baxa	Material Officer	Capt F. Loos
TSgt J. M. Stroud	First Sergeant	TSgt R. L. Murdock
SMSgt R. J. Naylor	NCOIC Operations	SMSgt W. E. McCollough
MSgt W. G. Tucker	Communications	MSgt D. T. Burns
TSgt W. M. Etherton	Mission Management	MSgt C. L. Turner
MSgt J. A. Chiovitti	Exploitation	MSgt J. E. Glenn
TSgt R. L. Murdock	Flight Operations	MSgt B. Lockett
MSgt D. F. Nelson	Administration	TSgt J. J. Nolan
TSgt E. Koskiniemi	Personnel	Sgt C. L. Robinson
SSgt J. B. Brewer	Security	MSgt E. Jones
MSgt N. M. Fritz	Maintenance	MSgt N. M. Fritz
SMSgt H. S. Johnson	Supply	SMSgt C. K. Meeks
SSgt D. R. Boston	Plans	MSgt K. N. Owens
TSgt W. E. Christian	SEFE	TSgt W. E. Christian

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

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CHRONOLOGY

5 July 1971	Major E. J. Ledet assumed command of Det 2, 6994 SS.
5 July 1971	Initial test of Project Cumbersome began.
5 July 1971	Rocket attack on DaNang Airfield, resulting in 5 killed and 37 injured.
15 July 1971	Rocket Belt Program implemented at DaNang Airfield
20 July 1971	Det 2 requested maintenance manning assistance.
31 July 1971	Project Cumbersome test halted due to breakdown of KY-8 cypher equipment.
2 August 1971	Det 2 normally tasked to participate in FIX/FAC, Black Bear program.
14 August 1971	Det 2 received authority to reconfigure voice processing positions.
15 August 1971	Det 2 received tasking for Project Abundant.
20 August 1971	First Project Abundant success.
25 August 1971	Rocket attack on DaNang Airfield, no damage.
25 August 1971	Det 2 received new reporting format for Project Abundant.
30 August 1971	Det 2 representive attended GDRS conference at Wheeler AFB, Hawaii.
2-3 September 1971	7AF team visits DaNang to survey available facilities for Det 2/362 TEWS to obsorb Det 1/361 TEWS assets.
23 September 1971	Det 2 representative attended Base Budget meeting.

[redacted]

[redacted]

29 September 1971	Det 2 met with 554 CES (Red Horse) and 362 TEWS to finalize construction plans.
2 October 1971	Brown Beaver Program implemented.
4 October 1971	Rocket attack on DaNang Airfield, no damage.
5 October 1971	7th Air Force queries impact of move of Det 1 to DaNang without new construction.
6 October 1971	Eight aircraft evacuated to NKP, due to severe weather associated with Typhoon Klaine.
8 October 1971	366 TFW issued, LAD 72-7-2, tasking wing organizations on support of move of Det 1 to DaNang.
10 October 1971	The eight aircraft returned from NKP.
16 October 1971	PSR issues Programs Action Directive (PAD) 71-300.
22 October 1971	Det 2 submitted first input to PAD 71-300.
22 October 1971	All operationally capable aircraft were evacuated to NKP, due to severe weather associated with Typhoon Hester.
25 October 1971	Project Cumbersome resumed.
28 October 1971	Aircraft returned from NKP.
3 November 1971	First personnel from Det 1 arrived at DaNang.
10 November 1971	Aircraft (9009) accident at NKP.
11 November 1971	Red Horse begun assembly of modulars for SI operations area.
12 November 1971	Det 2 personnel moved into lower floor of barracks 1631.
4 December 1971	Det 2 assigned strength peaked at 220.
8 December 1971	Project Left Twist implemented.

[redacted]

[redacted]

20 December 1971	Brown Beaver Program received favorable review by 7AF and was made a part of the TACAIR program in Laos.
29 December 1971	Det 2 requested authorization to take sanitized identification aids aboard mission aircraft.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CHAPTER I

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

MISSION

[redacted] Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron was an element of the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) stationed at DaNang Airfield, Republic of Viet Nam (RVN) conducting Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and Airborne Communications Intelligence (ACI) collection in support of the intelligence requirements of commanders responsible for tactical operations in Southeast Asia (SEA), and providing cryptologic operations with supplementary data to enhance the value and depth of their technical and analytical development.[1] This support was rendered by locating and maintaining surveillance of enemy radio transmitters and providing ACI of those targets which could not be adequately covered by ground-based intercept.[2] Special targets of interest were selected by the tactical commanders and tasked through the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC). ACC subsequently tasked the detachment, with technical support provided by the three Collection Management Authorities (CMA).[3] Each of these CMAs was responsible for specific areas as

[redacted]

[redacted]

follows: Seventh Radio Research Field Station (RRFS), Udorn, Thailand, for part of SEA Areas ten and eleven; Eighth Radio Research Field Station (RRFS), Phu Bai, RVN, for part of SEA Area ten and SEA Areas eight and nine; 330th Radio Research Company at Nha Trang, RVN for SEA Area seven and the other part of SEA Area ten.[4]

ORGANIZATION

(U) The detachment was subordinate to the Commander, 6994 Security Squadron, Tan Son Nhut Airfield, RVN.[5] The detachment had an integral support element consisting of administration, personnel, supply, airborne equipment maintenance, communications, and security and law enforcement. Personnel requirements in support of the mission were provided by a geographically separated unit (GSU) while personnel records were maintained at the consolidated base personnel office (CBPO), 6902 Support Squadron, Wheeler AFB, Hawaii. This structure is shown on the organizational chart.

Operations:

[redacted] The Operations Branch, located in the southwest corner of Da Nang Airfield, was the keystone for mission accomplishment and performed the vital functions of directing, coordinating and controlling resources to accomplish the mission.[6]

[redacted]

A complete discussion of the organization and functions of each section of the Operations Branch is contained in the detachment's USS D3 Report for 1 January thru 30 June 1971. Close coordination was maintained between the detachment and the 362d Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS), which operated and maintained the Pacific Air Force (PACAF) EC-47 aircraft based at DaNang.

Operational Relationships:

[redacted] The operational relationship of the detachment with other units in the ARDF program is shown in Appendix VI figure 3. ACC was the hub on which the ARDF program revolved, performing the coordinating function between the intelligence community, the consumer, and the supporting agencies. A simplification of these relationships would be to say that the consumer stated the intelligence he desired, the intelligence community provided technical support necessary to gather the information, and the supporting agencies provided the necessary equipment and personnel to perform the mission. In this sense the detachment was both a member of the intelligence community and also a supporting agency, providing technical knowledge and expertise as well as the personnel and equipment to perform the actual ARDF and collection functions. The 362d TEWS role was primarily one of a supporting agency, providing the airframes, maintenance, pilots and navigators to support the mission.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CHAPTER II

SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION

[redacted] Formal SIGINT tasking was received in Control Messages (CONMSG) for each absolute area from the appropriate CMA. These CONMSGs reflected the tasking generated at the weekly meeting of tactical commanders and other agencies at the ACC. The CMA generated Technical Data Lists (TDL) for those priority targets on which they held sufficient technical data to reasonably predict a schedule. The CMA tasked the airborne collection positions with only those specific communications entities which could not be effectively assigned to other SIGINT units.

TARGET PRODUCTIVITY

[redacted] ARDF target productivity is depicted on six charts in Appendix VIII. The first chart shows overall productivity while the next five show trends in each of the SEA areas flown. The decrease in overall productivity during October was caused by weather evacuations. The increase in the number of targets during November was attributed to the increased number of missions flown. The number of targets did not increase in proportion to the number of hours flown due to the advent of the monsoon season. [redacted]

atmospheric interference caused by the adverse weather, a decline in tactical activity, and a greater number missions tasked to fly in the less productive areas. The low productivity in SEA Area 11 was due in part to the emphasis placed on multi-channel targets in that area. Most multi-channel subscribers were units well protected by Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA). These guns prohibited the aircraft from flying close enough to the emitter to fix it in a reasonable period of time. Another problem caused by the long stand-off range was that the aircraft could not fly far enough to get the required LOB spread to resolve a fix.

AIRBORNE COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

[redacted] ACI was separated into two sections; Radiotelephone (RT) shown on charts in Appendix IX, and Manual Morse in Appendix X. Both are shown by overall effectiveness and by SEA Areas. ACI productivity increased in all areas except SEA Areas 8 and 11.

Radiotelephone Productivity:

[redacted] All the SEA Areas except SEA Area 8 show an increase in productivity. SEA Area 8 produced a steady decrease starting in September. This decrease was caused by the low level of tactical activity in this previously productive area.

Manual Morse Productivity:

[redacted] Manual Morse percentages are shown on charts 1

[redacted]

thru 6 in Appendix X. Productivity remained relatively stable except SEA Area 11 where only 13.2 hours were flown during December. The stability of Manual Morse Productivity was less affected by distance, atmospheric conditions, and low level of tactical activity than other modes of communication.

POSITION STATUS REPORTS

[redacted] Position Status Reports (PSR) were required when a mission resource was lost in excess of 24 hours in accordance with TECHINS 1056. The 90 PSR's issued reflected an average of 5.2 aircraft lost per day due to supply (NORS) or maintenance (IRAN), RAM, or Corresion Control) during the 184 day period from 1 July to 31 December.

COLLECTION MANNING

[redacted] The CMA's were authorized to designate the manning of the collection positions aboard the mission aircraft flown in their areas. Normal collection manning was one linguist for the Radiotelephone position and one Morse Systems Operator for the Manual Morse position. This could be changed to either two linguists or two Morse Systems Operators, depending on the best configuration for the area flown. This option may be the reason for the increases in productivity, however, on some occasions the manning was detrimental!

[redacted]

AIRCRAFT EXCHANGE

(U) In October, Detachment 2 assumed the responsibility to provide EC-47Qs (ALR-35/38 equipped) to Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand. Several radio operators from Detachment 3 were trained on the ALR-38 System as they flew missions with Detachment 2 crews. Since NKP did not have the maintenance facilities to perform phase maintenance on the EC-47Qs the aircraft were rotated back to DaNang for phase and other maintenance.[2]

(U) Detachment 2 received additional aircraft to compensate for the aircraft that would be TDY to NKP. These aircraft were EC-47 N/Ps and this caused a training situation for TDWS as their pilots were qualified only in the EC-47Qs with the R2000 engins. Several missions had to be cancelled to provide aircraft for this transation training.[3]

[redacted]

CHAPTER III

PROCESSING AND REPORTING

[redacted] The processing and reporting functions improved in quality although they were hampered by inadequate support from the CMA's. The data base maintained by this unit was refined with increased emphasis placed on completeness and accuracy.

PROCESSING

[redacted] Processing of General Directorate of Rear Services (GDRS) communications necessiated review and action to reconfigure the two voice processing positions.[1] This change enabled scanning of [redacted] for identification of ARDF targets and recognition of significant intelligence items.[2] Many lowgrade messages could be transcribed and quickly forwarded to CMAs for decrypting, translating and reporting. Plaintext messages could be flagged for priority transcription at the processing CMA, thus greatly increasing the timeliness of the intelligence gained from these facilities. In addition, the Master Program was also changed to authorize an additional voice processing position effective 1 January 1972.[3]

[redacted]

The position was not configured to include the demodulator necessary to process [redacted]; rather, it was intended to be used to process low-echelon tactical voice communications.

GDRS Conference:

[redacted] The detachment was represented by Sergeant Todd M. Melton, [redacted] at a GDRS conference conducted at Wheeler AFB, Hawaii, between 30 August and 4 September. Information concerning the equipment capabilities, structure of the GDRS organization, and a better understanding of GDRS functions was gathered as a result of this conference.

REPORTING

Abundant Reporting:

[redacted] Reporting requirement for Project Abundant changed several times [redacted]

Separate reports were established for each system;[5] than, on 25 August the format for both reports was simplified.[6] This unit had issued 78 [redacted] and 13 [redacted] reports as of 31 December. Since feedback was not provided on the intelligence gleaned from these messages the significance of this intercept was unknown.

[redacted]

[redacted]

ARDF Recovery Report:

[redacted] Although the ARDF Recovery Report (ARR) did not change, a message was received on 13 November notifying the detachment of a proposed change to the ARR format within a 30 to 90 day period; as of 31 December no change had been made.[7]

IDENTIFICATION RATE

[redacted] On 15 July, Pacific Security Region (PSR) requested the reason for a continued decline in the identification rate at this unit.[8] Specifically, PSR inquired about the period 26 June thru 2 July when a 28 percent identification rate was obtained. PSR apparently based its figure on ARDF targets only and not on total intercept. (Many ARDF targets do not have callsigns to aid in identification.) Of the 248 ARDF targets reported during the cited period only three additional targets were identified in feedback provided this unit. The identification rate for total intercept was approximately 49 percent.

[redacted] The identification rate was adversely affected by the almost continuous communications changes employed by the enemy since August. Continuity was lost on many Reference Designators (RD) and recoveries were further complicated by the advent of the

[redacted]

[redacted]

monsoon season and the resulting decrease in activity.

TECHNICAL SUPPORT

[redacted] Both the collection and reporting functions were hampered by inadequate technical support from the CMA's and in particular by the 8th RRFS. Several factors could have caused this degradation; the seasonal rotation of experienced personnel, reduction in manning factors caused by the withdrawl of Army elements from Viet Nam, and the increased area of responsibility assumed by the 8th RRFS.

Technical Data Lists:

[redacted] The Technical Data Lists (TDL) received from all three CMA's which supported the detachment were evaluated for the tasking periods 21 August thru 3 September.[9] The three items noted were: (1) Very few UHF targets were provided for the AIR-38 system. (2) Multiple targets, located in widely separated areas were being placed on TDLs. (3) There was limited tasking of the VHF capability.[10]

[redacted] During November many TDL's were not received or were not received in time to be placed on the mission aircraft.[11]

[redacted]

[redacted]

High-Speed Run:

[redacted] More effective utilization of airborne resources was possible when identification was made aboard the aircraft. The NSA produced High-Speed Ident Aid was one of the few documents authorized aboard mission aircraft for identification of ARDF targets. This Identification Aid was not received regularly despite repeated attempts to procure it from the CMA's.

Identification Change Report:

[redacted] Changes in enemy communications required that the data base maintained by the detachment be constantly updated. Several technical means of identifing enemy communications were extracted from the Identification Change Report (ICR). In this way the data base was kept abreast of the latest developments recovered by the CMA's. Several times, however, the identifications made by the CMA's could not be explained and queries were sent requesting clarification. The information received in the replies proved very beneficial and was requested on all identifications made based on newly-recovered technical data. The 8th ERFS requested and received authorization to place a comments section in the ICR to explain the identifications as requested. Not one ICR received

[redacted]

thru 31 December contained this information, even after repeated requests were made.

SEA Technical Summary (SEATS) Re-Ident:

[redacted] Another of the technical messages used to maintain the data base the SEATS Re-idents was also found to contain inaccurate data.[16] In response to a query sent from this unit, NSA replied: Idents cited in reference resulted from an internal machine process that attemps "last-resort" ident of contacts by degarbling receiver callsigns.[17]

DATA BASE

[redacted] The data base was refined and procedures were implemented to use all possible sources of technical data to maintain an accurate and complete a base as possible. A card file was generated to supplement NSA published Technical SIGINT Reports. Changes were made to the card file based on data received in the technical feedback reports such as the ICR and SEATS Re-ident Report.

AIRBORNE IDENTIFICATION

[redacted] When the NSA produced high-speed runs were not received or they were inaccurate because of communications changes: working

[redacted]

[redacted]

aids that could be taken aboard the mission aircraft were developed. After several ideas were investigated it was decided that a listing of transmitters callsigns (fixed), a callsign book (PRC), a listing of basics, and data to support the collection of low-level communications would provide a reasonable identification capability aboard the aircraft. Authorization to take sanitized working aids containing this data aboard the mission aircraft was requested.[18] The proposed aids represented more complete and accurate identification capability than even the high-speed run provided and were reduced to approximately the same total volume. As of 31 December authorization had not been received.

TDY TO CMAs

[redacted] Several analysts were sent on TDY to the various CMAs for the purpose of establishing an exchange of ideas and data.[19] The subjects of TDLs, High-Speed Runs, technical data on low-level exploitable message passers, and the communications changes and their effects were discussed. In particular, was discussed, RT coverage on the TDLs and the unit was offered the task of compiling TDLs for the detachment from data provided by the CMAs (in this case the 8th RRFS). There was an apparent misunderstanding as the CMA requested the detachment to prepare all TDL data for both MM

[redacted]

[redacted]

and RT. [redacted] This detachment did not have the expertise, manning, or necessary logs to compile TDLs for the missions supported by that CMA. Many of the problems discussed during the TDYs had not been resolved as of 31 December, however, valuable technical data was obtained and a better understanding of each unit's function was developed.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CHAPTER IV

LOGISTICS

(U) Logistics implemented new procedures and controls which reduced NORS outage rates and necessary forms were submitted to establish new supply levels and requirements. While several problem areas improved, they were not completely resolved. One area in particular, the maintenance manning situation, was not changed despite HQ USAFSS monitoring.[1]

MAINTENANCE

Manning:

(U) Manning continued to plague the maintenance section. Manning assistance was required from other units as assigned manning dropped as low as 44 percent of authorized strength.[2] The highest manning factor attained was 63 percent. This required maintenance personnel to work a 72 to 84 hour work week during the entire last half of 1971. In August, two personnel from the 6994 Security Squadron were provided to assist; again in October three personnel were provided by the 6988 Security Squadron for

[redacted]

three weeks. Pacific Security Region provided another man for 15 days in October. With the merger of Detachments 1 and 2, manning authorizations increased and more maintenance personnel were assigned; however, the manning percentage of authorized versus assigned did not change.

Vibration Problems:

(U) The high failure rate of preamps and antennas continued to cause a burden on supply. An improved checkout procedure was developed by Captain John E. Baxa, [redacted] and SSgt Dan L. Loomis, [redacted] which decreased the rate of preamps being returned to the manufacturer. There were 232 items returned through supply for repair as they were not repairable at this station; 86 of these items were preamps (compared to 106 for the first half of 1971) and 11 were AN/ARR-38 antennas (compared to 24 for the first half of 1971). More durable replacement parts also reduced the turn-around frequency of these items, and the number of Emergency Unsatisfactory Maintenance Reports (EUMR) issued on this subject.[3]

SUPPLY

(U) The detachment had 43 NORS items from 1 July thru 31 December, 19 for pre-amps and 5 for antenna assemblies. Requests

[redacted]

for supply assistance were submitted and AF Form 1996 (Request for Special Level) accomplished to establish or increase supply levels for these items. NORS caused an outage of 363.5 days, roughly equivalent to the loss of two and one half aircraft per day during the last half of 1971. The most serious shortages were pre-amps and memory modules of which depot did not have sufficient assets on hand to meet demands.[4] Approximately 50 AF Forms 1996 were submitted after a review in December to determine the spares required to support the ALR-35/38 systems. The NORS rate was further reduced through closer controls of the repair cycle items. Additional space was requested to store the added number of spares resulting from the increase in assigned aircraft.[5]

(U) At a base budget meeting on 23 September the detachment representative pointed out that additional funds would be required to support the increase of personnel and aircraft programed for this unit.

[redacted]

CHAPTER V

SUPPORT

(U) Training, Flight Operations, Standardization/Evaluation Flight Examiner (SEFE) Section, Communications, and Security Police all continued to support the mission within their specific areas. These functions were greatly affected by the merger of Detachment 1 in November as discussed in Chapter VIII.

TRAINING

(U) Training continued to receive special emphasis during the last half of 1971. Three steps were taken to improve the effectiveness of the Training Section: (1) The Training Section was added to the in/out processing clearance sheet for more effective control of training records. (2) A central library was established for COCDC, ECI, and WAPS study references. COCDC tests were administered to personnel assigned to OLAA, 6924 Security Squadron, because testing facilities were not available at Monkey Mountain. The number of personnel on UGT increased from 1 in July to 14 by December 31 and would have been higher if the 20351 AFSC had not been dropped.[1]

[redacted]

(U) Records maintenance continued to be a problem. Approximately one-third of the Consolidated Training Records needed documentation of local job proficiency training.

[redacted] The Training Section conducted a ground training class for all airborne AFSCs, covering common training areas such as aircraft emergency procedures, local operational policies, and common equipment. The Voice Processing and ARDF Reporting Sections trained their personnel in their respective functions. Both sections' training programs were monitored by the Training Section. These programs guided the student through the ground functions and only after they were mastered did the student proceed to the airborne aspects.

FLIGHT OPERATIONS

(U) The problem of scheduling crews more than 24 hours in advance continued to complicate flight scheduling. In November, Flight Operations instituted a four-flight concept in an effort to better control and manage the assigned personnel.

STANDARDIZATION AND EVALUATION

(U) The SEFE Section reviewed all aircrew members' Flight Records (AF Form 846) and alleviated most of the discrepancies. The influx Detachment 1 personnel and the ALR-34 system required checkrides as Detachment 1 operators checked out in the ALR-35 and ALR-38 systems while Detachment 2 operators checked out with

[redacted]

[redacted]

the ALR-34 System.

(U) In October a TDY was conducted by TSgt William E. Christian, FR[redacted], and SSgt Arthur Silvin, FR[redacted], to Phu Cat Air Base, RVN, for the purpose of coordinating procedures and gathering material for checklists so that little degradation occured during the merger.

(U) The 6994 Security Squadron SEFEs visited the detachment in August and again in November. The areas of crew proficiency, operating procedures, training programs, SEFE administration, and effectiveness were rated outstanding.[2]

COMMUNICATIONS

(U) The merger of Detachment 1 and Detachment 2 assured 100 percent manning of the communications center. The permanent communications center that was being held in abyance was cancelled when it was determined that the present H-1 communications van would suffice for the rest of the time the unit remained at DaNang.[3] This cancellation made communications equipment available for shipment to other units.

(U) Three tape cutting positions (UGC-54) were located in the operations area during July. This enabled more timely dispatch of the various technical reports sent by the detachment.

[redacted]

[redacted] During Typhoon Hester and on several other occasions during circuit outages the working agreement with the U.S. Naval Facility, DaNang, insured timely delivery of ARDF results to consumers.

SECURITY POLICE

(U) Special emphasis was placed on combat preparedness and physical security. The bonker positions around the operations area were reconstructed to provide better protection. Field phones were installed in each bunker with the master phone located in the entry control gate, thus allowing communications between these positions during an emergency.

PLANS AND PROGRAMS

(U) The Plans and Programs Section reviewed Emergency Actions Plan and prepared drafts to provide for the additional personnel absorbed from Detachment 1. The Commander's Disaster Control Center Checklists were also updated and reviewed.

Typhoon Evacuations:

(U) There were two typhoon evacuations between 1 July and 31 December. The first occured on 6 October when eight aircraft evacuated to Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand due to severe weather associated with Typhoon Elaine. The aircraft returned to DaNang on 10 October. The second evacuation took place on 22 October when all operationally capable aircraft were again deployed to [redacted]

the safe haven site at NKP.[4] The eye of this storm, Typhoon Hester passed approximately 35 miles southwest of DaNang. The storm did not cause any major damage to detachment resources; minor damage consisted of water seepage and debris scattered throughout the area. With the return of the aircraft on 28 October normal operations resumed. The Emergency Actions Plans facilitated reactions to these emergencies and insured minimum impact on mission effectiveness.

Rocket Attacks:

(U) There were 3 rocket attacks on DaNang Airfield during the last half of 1971, compared to 12 during the first half. The first attack was on 5 July with one 122MM rocket impacting on the roof of a barracks, resulting in 5 killed, 37 injured, one barracks destroyed, one severely damaged and one slightly damaged. The other two rocket attacks were on 25 August and 4 October and resulted in only minor damage. While much of this decline was attributed to the monsoon season and some allied sweeps through treditional rocket launching areas, it was believed that the Rocket Belt program was also a deterrent factor.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CHAPTER VI

SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS

Project Abundant:

[redacted] Project Abundant was a covername for the use of [redacted] to gain intelligence from intercepted communications.[1] Detachment 2 was a source of systems [redacted] used by Front 4 and its associates. On 15 August the detachment was directed to participate in another aspect of this project. Front 4 planned a high point of tactical activity during the period 15-25 August and certain events made it necessary that last minute directives be sent from the headquarters to its subordinates. A message instructed the cryptographers to stand by the radios so these instructions could be decrypted and answered immediately. [redacted]

[redacted] The most lucrative targets for this operation were selected based on their echelon, frequency of AFDF fixes, and location.[redacted] The First Battalion of the 46th Infantry would assault

[redacted]

as soon as possible after a fix was passed by the mission aircraft. Complete co-operation was obtained from the 362d TEWS and the most highly skilled crews were scheduled to fly. Due to certain political complications the fix had to meet certain requirements before the assault force could be launched. On 17 August the operational elements of the assault force were in place and ready to react. Success came on 20 August at 0447Z when a heliborne assault was made on the Detached Element Front 4. Fourteen enemy were killed, two were captured, and a CHICOM K63 radio and six tactical code charts, eight sheets of cover designators/numbers, and 13 signal operating instructions were seized with no friendly casualities.[3] On 23 August after two less successful assaults the three company force was disbanded. While the desired [redacted] was not obtained the operation was very pleasing to the XXIV Corps.[4] Additional assaults were made, based on studies of ARDF fix clusters, resulting in several cave complexes being located and destroyed.[5]

Project Cumbersome:

[redacted] Project Cumbersome, plagued with problems ranging from poor weather to equipment malfunctions, resumed on 5 July.[6] ARDF aircraft were instructed to contact the ground station at

[redacted]

[redacted]

Ubon RTAB, Thailand, 45 minutes past the hour in order to maximize effectiveness and insure optimum measurement and evaluation. On 31 July a KY-8 cypher switch problem caused another suspension of the project. During this suspension a discone antenna was installed. The antenna and other equipment was satisfactorily tested on 18 October. The second 30 day test begun on 25 October and results showed that ARDF aircraft operating in Southern Laos could be provided tip-offs to enemy communications activity. Programming action was initiated to permanently establish a station for this purpose. The success of this test was attributed to the outstanding support and expertise displayed by all participating units.

Project Left Twist:

[redacted] On 8 December a devise which enables [redacted] communications to be exploited was positioned in the vicinity of YB308765. This unit was tasked to provide a sample of the intelligence being passed over the [redacted]. In addition an ARDF fix was requested to more accurately determine the exact position of the device. Tasking was received placing the transmitter on cast iron coverage.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Due to the short range of the transmitter (approximately 20 Kilometers) the primary mission was ACI with ARDF as secondary. Tasking for this project was terminated on 16 December with coverage being assigned to another airborne platform.[redacted]

Black Bear/Brown Beaver Program:

[redacted] On 2 August, a new aspect of the FIX/FAC concept was formally tasked to this unit.[redacted] The program was nicknamed Black Bear and provided for the relay of ARDF fix information to Forward Air Controllers (FAC) in the RVN, specifically SBA Areas 8 and 9. By 13 September it was noted that while the number of fixes being passed was consistent the number that were visually reconnoitred decreased.[redacted] When fixes were not passed while the mission was airborne they were passed over secure ground communications after the aircraft had recovered. As done in Project Abundant, studies were made to isolate clusters of fixes. The 3rd NVA Battalion was relocated and several cave complexes were destroyed as a result of these studies.[redacted] On 2 October the program was expanded to Laos under the name Brown Beaver.[redacted] On 20 December

[redacted]

[redacted]

the Brown Beaver program received favorable review by 7th Air Force and made a part of the TACAIR program in Laos.[redacted] While the program enjoyed some success the number of fix locations checked by the FACs remained low and feedback is limited due to lack of accurate BDA.

Rocket Belt Program:

[redacted] During the middle of July the Director of Intelligence 366th Tactical Fighter Wing and Detachment 2 personnel began an informal program designed to protect DaNang Air Field from standoff rocket attacks. All targets fixed within a 20 kilometer radius of the Air Field were passed to the DI who inturn co-ordinated with other intelligence sources and evaluated the threat to the Airfield. He then selected fix locations to be passed to artillery units for targeting. November saw a further development an an even larger area was brought into the program. When targets were fixed in this new area artillery was targeted as soon as possible. While other factors such as the monsoon season, Typhoon Hester and allied sweeps have helped keep DaNang relatively free of rocket attacks it was felt this program contributed to the safety of DaNang Air Field.[redacted]

AIR-38 System to SEA Area Twenty:

[redacted] During October Detachment 2 was tasked to fly

[redacted]

several ALR-38 missions in SEA Area 20 to search for and locate any multichannel targets in the suspect area. Several problems were encountered such as poor weather, equipment problems and lack of proper repair facilities. MACV commended the unit for their determined effort to fullfill this special ARDF request.[22]

Unlocated Enemy Units:

[redacted] MACV expressed concern over insufficient ARDF results on certain tactical units in SEA Areas 9, 10, and 11.[23] These units were believed to have moved since last being located and it was requested special efforts be made to locate them. All technical data available to this unit was compiled and ever effort made to locate these units. However, continunity on these specific units was lost when a communications change occured and they were not located.[24]

EC-47Q Accident:

(U) One incident occurred which required Airborne Incident Report (AIR) reporting in accordance with USAFSS Regularion 55-18. This incident happened on 10 November when an EC-47Q (Aircraft 8009) left the runway at Nakhon Phanom RTAB, Thailand, four times during takeoff roll and finally came to stop approximately 2500 feet from

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

the starting point.[25] Damage was sustained to both wingtips and one harizontal stabilizer. No damage was suffered by USAFSS equipment or any personnel aboard the aircraft.[26] The aircraft had not returned to operational status as of 31 December.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CHAPTER VII

EQUIPMENT

[redacted] Detachment 2 had three different ARDF systems assigned: The ALR-34, ALR-35, and ALR-38. The basic was the ALR-34.[1] The ALR-35[2] could be referred to as a computerized version of the ALR-34. The ALR-38[3] was a more refined system with an extended frequency range of 2-199 MHz vice 2-16 MHz for the ALR-34 and ALR-35. The concept of operation of the three systems was basically the same: Locate a desired target signal, tune the equipment in order to obtain sufficient signal strength to enable the system to determine a line of bearing (LOB), and maneuver the airborne platform to gather sufficient data to locate the emitter. These functions were accomplished by two men, the navigator and a radio operator assigned to the "X" console. At the same time a radio operator assigned to the "Y" position was collecting intelligence for the purpose of identifying the unit. This three man team formed the basic ARDF crew.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

The ALR-34, ARDF System:

[redacted] Since the ALR-34 did not have a computer to resolve the fix location and RADIUS, the navigator was required to hand plot. He was also required to use a different procedure to update the DOPPLER. Since the navigator was frequently busy, manually converting and computing fix data, the radio operator on the "X" console had the capability to take prints on a target, thus gathering the data for the navigator. (The "X" console was the same as on the ALR-35 with the exception of the print capability and the requirement that the print-enable switch at the "X" console be on while the navigator was making his doppler updates.)

The ALR-35, ARDF System:

[redacted] The computer utilized with the ALR-35 system had a memory core for 99 targets and could process as many as 20 LOB's to determine a fix location. While this system freed the navigator of the requirement to manually convert and compute fix data, it required him to monitor and edit the data used by the computer. The use of the system for working targets and navigation allowed the navigator to process target data quickly and accurately. Doppler updates were also simplified and more time was available to work targets.

The ALR-38, ARDF System:

[redacted] The computer utilized with the ALR-38 system also had a memory core for 99 targets. It could use 15 LOB's to

[redacted]

determin a fix location, however up to three targets could be combined to resolve one fix position. The refinement in the ALR-38 system changed the appearance of the "X"[5] console and removed the True Bearing Indicator (TBI), but the operation was still similiar. The programming of the data processor and the antenna system for the ALR-38 was different[6]. While the main DF antennas were three dipoles, as in the ALR-34 and ALR-35 systems[7], there were ten monopoles that were used to provide additional data for the computer. The most significient difference of the ALR-38 was the extended frequency range that enabled the General Directorate of Rear Services (GDRS) multi-channel communications facilities to be located.

[redacted] All systems had a self test that was conducted three times during the mission; before take-off, shortly after take-off and shortly before landing. These self tests differed between the 34/35 and 38 systems and required the "X" operator to be able to properly conduct them and determine if the equipment was fully operational. The difference between the systems made it necessary for the radio operator at the "X" console to be proficient in recognizing discrepancies in equipment setups, power requirements, malfunctions and the necessary procedures to correct them. His ability to correct a malfunction often determined the success of the mission, if it could continue or would return to base.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

CHAPTER VIII

MERGER OF DETACHMENT 1 AND DETACHMENT 2

(U) Rephasing an old military axiom "Wait and Hurry up," probably provides the best description of the closure of Detachment 1, 6994 Security Squadron at Phu Cat Air Base and its subsequent assimilation by this unit. Being at the bottom of the Totem Pole and recognizing that all things run downward, it is not the intent of this chapter of history to cover those higher-level actions and ramifications which occurred during the "talk-and-plan" stages in June, July, August, September and October. Rather, the reader at this point should review Part II of the Detachment 1, 6994 Security Squadron USS-D3 History where he will find a vivid and well-described sequence of events leading up to the actual "go" decision and implementation. This unit was kept abreast of developments relative to the situation, thanks to the close coordination between it and Detachment 1, and their parent unit at Tan Son Nhut Airfield RVN, but until the actual visit by 7th Air Force representatives to DaNang on 2 and 3 September, it had been a position of waiting but not getting involved.

7th Air Force Team Visits DaNang to Discuss Resettlement of 361 TEWS/Detachment 1, 6994 SS Assets:

(U) During the afternoon and evening of 2 September and again on 3 September, representatives from 7th Air Force, headed by Lt Col Clark, met with representatices of the 366 TFW, 362 TEWS and Detachment 2, 6994 SS.* It had been initially briefed by Lt Col Clark that General Lavelle (Commander, 7th AF) had sent the team to review the impact of the move to DaNang along with the following ground rules: no new buildings, no significant money expenditures, no impact on the VIM Program, consider drawdown of the 9th Special Operations Squadron (AC-119 "Stinger" Gunships based at DaNang), consider the move to DaNang of the 12 TFS, plan for an in-place date of 1 November. The team then explained the 7th AF position, reviewed the 366 TFW/DaNang position, and those comments put forth by the tenant units concerned--362 TEWS and Detachment 2, 6994 SS. In addition, existing facilities were toured, with the exception of Detachment 2 operations area for which none of the team held proper SI clearance. In response to the team's request, Detachment 2 compiled and submitted the following requirements for satisfying the merger:

1. Construction of an airconditioned ten-foot addition to the existing Bravo Maintenance Quonset building.

2. An additional 2000 square feet of floor space made available

* Offices Represented at This Meeting Were; 366 TFW: CC, CV, DM, BCE and DOX. 362 TEWS: CC, DO. Detachment 2, 6994 SS: CC.

to the SI Operations. Considering the ground rules, it was decided from the onset that portable or modular buildings would best suit the need, particularly since they could be installed with little or no disruption to the existing SI Operation. (This proved later to be an exceptionally wise decision.) The existing facility was already overcrowded and, as will be seen later, assumption of a mission triple--fold pressed the facility to a point of being rediculous until the new spaces were occupied. Short-lived consideration had been given to the possibility of attaching H-1 vans to the existing facility but the feasibility of doing such with its consequential disruption to everday operations could not be tolerated. Of course, construction of a duplecate facility was aganist the grain of the ground rules forbidding new construction and excessive money spending.

3. With the vehicle situation on DaNang already critical, including that of Detachment 2, a minimum of three vehicles was requested; one multi-stop van for operations flight crew transport and two multi-stop vans for Bravo flight line maintenance.

4. Billeting spaces were the subject of considerable discussion because at the time planning was also in progress to gain an additional F-4 unit on DaNang while an Army Retrofit unit was also pressing for billeting about 300 people on DaNang. Detachment 2 plans for increased billeting were based on a 100 projection, the majority being aircrew members requiring air-conditioned quarters. Resolution of the billeting problem best

suited Detachment 2 when it was given the selection of 22 unoccupied and run-down Quonset huts previously occupied by U.S. Marine aircrews. This selection at least put the billets adjacent to the existing detachment cantonment. Extensive rehabiliation of the buildings and two latrine facilities was envisioned. The Quonset huts had once been airconditioned (therefore wiring and installation of units would have been minimal); they were divided into four, confortably; two-men rooms each with an outside entrance. It must be pointed out here that the detachment had an average of 135 assigned personnel at the time, with facilities for 165 (three 40 man airconditioned barracks, one 40 man barracks and a 5 man BOQ). Obviously, an additional 100 people could not be housed without extra space--Although as seen later, it was in fact done for a short period of time.

5. Detrimental to the Quonset hut billeting was a huge drainage canel and fence which separated the detachment canonment and the Quonsets. Of necessity, a bridge was required to preclude a half mile trip to circumvent the obstacle when traveling between locations.

6. Foreseeing only a nominal increase in workload, no requirements were stated for activities such as, administration, communications, personnel, security police, and supply. It was felt that their facilities were adequate to sustain the increase.

<u>12 TFS Does Not Move to DaNang:</u>

(U) What may seem insignificant or irrelevant to the reader

at this time was the JCS decision to deactivate the 12 TFS rather than relocate it to DaNang. This played an important role in the billeting of Detachment 2 personnel following the destruction caused by Typhoon Hester late in October.

Planning at DaNang for Expansion:

(U) Once requirements had been stated things still were up-in-the-air but civil engineers developed construction plans which were finalized on 29 September in a meeting with base civil engineering, 554 CES (Red Horse), 362 TFWS, and Detachment 2, 6994 SS representatives. Plans for that construction portion to Detachment 2 facilities were exactly as stated to the 7th AF team earlier in the month.

7th Air Force Queries Impact on Move Without Construction:

(U) On 5 October the 366 TFW/DOX contacted 362 TFWS and Detachment 2, 6994 SS regarding a 7th AF query into the impact of effecting the move to DaNang without the construction requirements being fulfilled. This was adamonthly opposed by both tenants but there was evidence of such action because Red Horse had been instructed to cease all construction, which in fact they did.

366 TFW Logistics Action Directive (LAD) is Issued:

(U) On 8 October the 366 TFW/LG issued LAD 72-7-2 under authority of 7th AF PAD 72-7-2. This LAD tasked the various wing organizations in support of the move.

Pacific Security Region Programmed Action Directive (PAD) is Issued:

(U) The 6994 SS had issued a sample PAD for control of actions but it was cancelled when PSR on 16 October issued PAD 71-300. This PAD provided programmed actions for the entire 6994 SS complex, and beginning 22 October the first input was submitted by Detachment 2.

Developments in Specific Areas of Interest:

(U) At this point it is considered impractical to discuss all developments in chronological order. Rather, each specific area will be addressed in chronological order as events moved toward completion. These will be billeting, transportation, logistics, the personnel increase, the mission increase, and an overall look at the detachment itself.

Billeting:

(U) Plans and progress were well underway toward meeting Y-Day: the quonsets were being rehabilitated by Philco Ford and Civil Engineering and it seemed that the billets would be ready by the end of October. Than Mother Nature stepped in and with a sweep of her hand (namily, Typhoon Hester) laid to waste the best laid plans of man. The typhoon viciously ripped through the DaNang area on 22 and 23 October and caused extensive damage to the air-field, particularly to barracks and hootches (SEA huts). Specially hard hit was the 366 Security Police Squadron, its personnel having huts blown out from under them with others losing roofs and walls. Emergency billeting requirements caused the 22 Quonset huts

(previously destined for Detachment 2 expansion use) to be allocated to house the security policement. In a fast reshuffle, the detachment was offered a modular barracks which had once been occupied by the 6924 Security Squadron when it was located at DaNang. The condition of that building was deplorable--two-story, open-bay, deteriorated, filthy and obviously unfit for occupancy. One thing was in the detachment's favor: The build- was at the start of a project which was to convert it into a 24 room, two-men per room, airconditioned barracks to house officers of the F-4 Squadron scheduled to relocate to DaNang. With that relocation cancelled, at least funding and planning were in-being. Actual construction, though, was another story. Emergency repairs undertaken throughout the base as a result of Typhoon Hester had caused diversion of all material and workcrews to priority projects. With "Y" date fast approaching it was obvious that no billets would be available for the Detachment 1 people. At that point the Detachment 2 Commander, assembled the unit personnel at two sessions and explained the housing situation and enormous problem developing. It was agreed that rather than subject the Detachment 1 people to the impossible conditions in the run-down barracks, all Detachment 2 personnel would double-up as necessary to house the influx. This meant as many as four people in a small two-man room, double-bunked, sharing furniture and even personal items since there was no room to move in lockers, personal equipment, and the like for

new people. At least, it made assimilation of the Detachment 1 force smoother and people couldn't help but get to know each other; it also provided a more decent place to live for a short period of time. Meanwhile, beds and bedding were obtained from base supply. Wall lockers were not available, and it was only after weeks of pressing the issue that 77 new steel wall lockers were air shipped from the States to Detachment 2; they were received on 10 December.

(U) From 3 November through 10 November, the influx began. The detachment saw its daily strength increase by 7, 4, 2, 14, 18, 14, and 7 people. This brought strength to 200 on 10 November, and by 12 November it was decided to move 24 people into the lower floor of the barracks being rehabbed (building 1631). The first floor had been subdivided into 12 rooms without doors or double walls, but it had to do for the time. So, people moved in—each with a bed, no locker, no desk, no table, no lamp, not even a waste basket. But here was where ingeinuty, resourcefulness, and togetherness common to the "GI" came into play—they put up with it and made it do. (Keep in mind that not once was there a letup in mission flying requirements').

(U) When it seemed that work crews could get back to normal operations, 366 TFW PAD 72-5-1 was issued to shape up the base in preparation for a vist by General Ryan, CSAF.

(U) On 6 December, carpenters once again began to work on the barracks and by the end of December all major construction was completed and the second floor was occupied. Only air

conditioners remained to be installed.

Transportation:

(U) Probably one of the most depressing situations on DaNang was that of the vehicle fleet—a run-down, aged fleet of over 1,000 of which about 300 were general purpose vehicles. With the VIM program in full swing scores of new and young vehicles were being turned over to VNAF with the older ones being retained for U.S. use. Throughout this six-month period, the average vehicle-out-of-commission rate was ten percent. Detachment 2 was never at 100 percent assigned vehicular strength and gloomy days were evident when a step-van and a six-passenger crew truck were lost for turn over to VNAF. Also, a van was turned in for repairs and ended up being salvaged.

(U) Actually, the Detachment 1 merger improved the situation because 7th AF directed transfer of its authorization to Detachment 2, six vehicles to add to Detachment 2's authorized five. Two pick-up trucks, a step-van, a carryall van, a six-passenger crew truck, and a 1.5 ton state bed were "inherited" from Phu Cat. Although the condition of the vehicles was no better than the DaNang Fleet, the number made outages more palatable. Breakdowns were continually experienced and it was only through many self-help hours expended by detachment personnel that its small fleet could be kept running. Most of the time eight vehicles were assigned to the detachment, but at least one was out of

commission for repairs or parts.

Logistics:

(U) Supply: Once it became apparent that the move would in fact terminate at DaNang it became necessary for Detachment 2 to place supply requisitions into the base system. After some difficulty in establishing procedures for transfer of materiel between Phu Cat and DaNang base supply systems, Detachment 2 submitted requisitions for all items it felt would be needed to handle the increase. These items included weapons, beds, mattresses, desks, chairs, lockers, filing cabinets, etc. Detachment 2 coordinated with Detachment 1 to obtain a list of items available for transfer thru the system. In addition, maintenance supply levels had to be upgraded and adjusted with the introduction of the AIR-34 and more AIR-35 systems. Most of the transfer of electronic gear bench stock was made by mission aircraft with the paperwork being followed up. In some cases the demand data had been loaded into the supply computer but levels were not sufficient to hold the quantities of some items being shipped. In these cases, rather than ship excess to WRAMA the items were reviewed and reverse posted to hold the property. In general, the supply system was able to adequately provide those items requested. The major critical item turned out to be lack of available wall lockers for the barracks, but this was eventually solved by air shipment discussed in the paragraph on "Billeting."

(U) Maintenance: Of all entities, maintenance seemed to take care of itself best. Although the ALR-34 was being introduced along with an increased number of ALR-35 systems, the changeover between Phu Cat, Tan Son Nhut, and DaNang went exceptionally well. Test and calibration equipment was transferred via mission aircraft while the supply function took care of establishing new levels of stock.

The Personnel Increase:

(U) Appendix XII presents a most impressive graph which shows the "warm body" strength of Detachment 2 during the period. The increase in personnel from Detachment 1 is evident beginning from "Y" date until it peaked at 220 on 4 December. The crews began arriving as they completed their missions, groups of two, three and four people at various intervals. In addition, normal airlift also brought in groups of people from both Phu Cat and Tan Son Nhut. From arrival, each man had to be processed in, billeted, oriented and prepared to fly missions without delay. The commander held special commander's calls for the new arrivals to welcome them, to explain the housing situation in perticular, and to ascertain that all was being done to make the unit continue without mission degradation. The huge increase was a shock to the detachments' system, but preparations had at least alleviated many areas which could have alienated the newcomers.

The Mission Increase:

(U) From an average of 6 missions a day to an average of 16 with as many as 18 per day - this was as great an impact on the unit's system as was the large personnel increase. The existing operations facility, a 1900 square foot Quonset building, was already crowded before the move and with the planning it was decided to go for complete floor space requirements stated in USAFSS Manual 86-2. Granted the operations functions basically remained unchanged except for an increased workload, but space storage had always been a problem and here was an out. From the onset, as was stated earlier, the best way to expand the SI facility was to install modular buildings adjacent to the Quonset. This permitted unintrupted SI operations during construction. Of the requested 2000 square feet, the offer to install three 30 by 50 foot modular buildings was accepted as this would nearly double the existing space. Modular units were shipped from Saigon on 5 October and arrived at the DaNang deep water port on 14 October. When finally delivered around 1 November, having been lost for almost 2 weeks, their condition was depressing. It had been obvious the space would not be available in time for "Y" day; now it was doubtful if it would ever be available. A "last-ditch" effort to obtain two new modulars on DaNang (still packed) failed since the units belonged to the University of Maryland Program. On 11 November, Red Horse construction crews began assembly of the units, an effort

which certainly took determination to come up with buildings from that junk. Parts were useless, floors and walls had to be refabricated, doors had to be rebuilt - all in all, it probably cost more to reconstruct the buildings than new ones would have cost. By than "Y" date had passed, the press was on, and the SI facility was bulging. Out of the materials on hand, Red Horse was able to construct two 20 by 30 feet and one 20 by 20 foot buildings, which was entirely satisfactory to the sardines in operations. Fortunately, during most of the time from "Y" day, the weather was favorable and crews were kept in the air rather than being held in operations. By the end of December it seemed that the three units would be occupied within two weeks. The 20 by 20 foot building was equipped for aircrew briefings while the other two would be used for SOFE, Training, Scheduling and a lounge/hold area. Indeed, it was time to expand from 1900 to3500 square feet.

General:

(U) From 3 November thru 31 December the detachment increased from 135 to 216 personnel with its mission rate increasing in average from 6 to 16 missions a day. Quarters for 100 extra people were requested by "Y" date but 200 people at one time were crowded into the existing barracks. Vehicles were requested but it turned out that for a time following "Y" day, the detachment had less vehicles than it had before "Y" day. Space in operations was requested, but

by the end of December that space was not yet available. Barracks furniture and air conditioning was requested, but by the end of December people were living in rooms without doors, only beds for furniture, and no air conditioning, yet they were flying Combat Missions daily. The entire move was one of "wait and hurry up," but the attitude of every member of the detachment was a constant recognition to get the job done, the mission accomplished, and the self-satisfaction realized.

[redacted]

GLOSSARY

AAA	Anti-Aircraft Arterilly
ACC	Airborne Radio Direction Finding Coordination Center
ACI	Airborne Communication Intelligence
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AIR	Airborne Incident Report
AIR-34	ARDF System, Frequency Range 02-16 MHZ
AIR-35	Computerized ARDF System, Frequency Range 02-16 MHZ
AIR-38	Computerized ARDF System, Frequency Range 02-190 MHZ
AMS	Airborne Mission Supervisor
ARDF	Airborne Radio Direction Finding
ARR	Airborne Radio Direction Finding Recovery Report
CBPO	Consolidated Base Personnel Office
C&D	Continuity and Development
CC	Combat Cross
CMA	Collection Management Authority
COCDC	Consolidated Operational Career Development Course
COMMSG	Control Message
CUT	The point at which two LOBs intersect
DF	Direction Finding
DI	Director of Intelligence
DSU	Direct Support Unit
DURMIS	Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary
EUMR	Emergency Unsatisfactory Materiel Report
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FIX	A point determined by the intersection of three or more LOBs
GDRS	General Directorate Rear Services
GSU	Geographically Separated Unit
ICR	Identification Change Report
IRAN	Inspect and Repair as Necessary
IRO	Instructor Radio Operator
LOB	Line of Bearing

[redacted]

[redacted]

MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MM	Manual Morse
NKP	Nakhon Phanom, Thailand
NORS	Not Operationally Ready-Supply
NSA	National Security Agency
OPINS	Operating Instructions
PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PRC	Rage Row Column
PSR	Pacific Security Region
RD	Reference Designator
RO	Radio Operator
RRFS	Radio Research Field Station
RT	Radio Telephone
RTAFB	Royal Thai Air Force Base
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEATS	Southeast Asia Technical Summary
SEFE	Standardization Evaluation Flight Examiner
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
TDL	Technical Data List
TDY	Temporary Duty
TEWS	Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron
TECHINS	Technical Instructions
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TOT	Time on Target
USAFSS	United States Air Force Security Service
WAPS	Weighted Airman Promotion System
X	An ARDF position that locates and tunes the signal
Y	An ARDF position that provides intelligence data to identify the signal being worked by X
Z1	An Airborne Radio Telephone Collection Position
Z2	An Airborne Manual Morse Collection Position

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX I

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF COMMANDER

APPENDIX I

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Major E. J. Ledet was born in Larose, Louiana. He enlisted in the United States Air Force in November 1952. After completing basic training and radio operator school he was assigned to the 37th Radio Squadron Mobile, a United States Air Force Security Service unit at Kirknewton, Scotland. After a one year tour in Scotland he was assigned to the 34th Radio Squadron Mobile at Wheelus Air Base, Libya, where he was selected as a member of the Pakistan site survey team. Returning to the United States in December 1955, he attended the Radio Traffic Analysis Course at the 6983 Radio Squadron Mobile at March Air Force Base, California. Subsequently he was assigned to the Air Force Special Communications Center at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. After a two-month separation from the service he again returned to the Air Force and the AFSCC for the next twelve months.

After graduating from Officer Candidate School in September 1958 he was assigned to the 6987 Radio Squadron Mobile at Shu Lin Kou, Taiwan where he served as a flight commander. Leaving Taiwan in 1960 he returned to the AFSCC until 1962 when he was selected as one of the initial cadre of AN/GLR-1 officers to be assigned to the 6915 Security Squadron at Hof, Germany. In July 1965 he was assigned as an instructor in the Signals Intelligence Officer

Course (OBK 8031) at Goodfellow AFB, Texas. In 1967 he traveled to Okinawa where he was assigned a staff position to the Chief, Joint Sobe Processing Center. Back to Goodfellow in 1969, he was Chief of the Managerial Training Division, responsible for the USAFSS NCO Academy, the OBK 8031 course, and the USAFSS Mission Improvement Conference.

Effective 5 July 1971, Major Ledet assumed command of Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron at DaNang Airfield, Republic of Vietnam. His keen interest in operations and active participation as an aircrew member in the capacity of radio operator established a rapport with the men of his command.

APPENDIX II

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

APPENDIX II

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

(U) The Awards and Decoration Section was responsible for maintaining a current file on all personnel assigned to the unit to verify award qualifications. The section also typed and coordinated all requests for awards and decorations to ensure timely submission to higher headquarters. In addition, the section processed the approved awards to ensure prompt presentation to each receipient. The chart displays the number of awards processed and the status as of 31 December 1971.

Award	Submitted	Approved	Disapproved	Pending
Distinguished Flying Cross	29	0	0	29
Bronze Star Medal	11	2	0	8*
Air Force Commendation Medal	17	7	1	9
Air Medal	244	216	0	28

* One Bronze Star Medal was changed to an Air Force Commendation Medal by 7th Air Force.

APPENDIX III

AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

[redacted]

APPENDIX III

AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

Aircraft Number	Type	Equipment
43-15668	EC-47N	ALR-34
43-15980	EC-47N	ALR-34
44-76668	EC-47P	ALR-34
42-93161	EC-47N	ALR-34
43-49865	EC-47P	ALR-34
42-93166	EC-47N	ALR-34
45-50925	EC-47P	ALR-34
43-16029	EC-47Q	ALR-35/Z1, Z2
43-49570	EC-47Q	ALR-35/Z1, Z2
42-93704	EC-47Q	ALR-35/Z1, Z2
40-48072	EC-47N	ALR-35
40-49260	EC-47P	ALR-35
40-24300	EC-47N	ALR-35
40-24313	EC-47N	ALR-35/Z1, Z2
40-93814	EC-47N	ALR-35/Z1, Z2
42-23882	EC-47N	ALR-35/Z1, Z2
43-77254	EC-47P	ALR-35/Z1, Z2
45-01102	EC-47P	ALR-35/Z1, Z2
43-48153	EC-47N	ALR-35/Z1, Z2

[redacted]

[redacted]

Aircraft Number	Type	Equipment
42-49491	EC-47P	ALR-35/Z1, Z2
43-48702	EC-47P	ALR-35/Z1, Z2
42-00665	EC-47N	ALR-35/Z1, Z2
45-00937	EC-47P	ALR-35/Z1, Z2
43-48009	EC-47Q	ALR-38/Z1, Z2
43-48087	EC-47Q	ALR-38/Z1, Z2
43-51131	EC-47Q	ALR-38/Z1, Z2
43-15204	EC-47Q	ALR-38/Z1, Z2
43-49208	EC-47Q	ALR-38/Z1, Z2
43-48636	EC-47Q	ALR-38/Z1, Z2
43-15681	EC-47Q	ALR-38/Z1, Z2
43-30730	EC-47Q	ALR-38/Z1, Z2
43-39771	EC-47Q	ALR-38/Z1, Z2

Prior to the merger of Det 1 and Det 2 only EC-47Q type aircraft were assigned to DaNang, three ALR-35 and nine ALR-38 equipped aircraft.

APPENDIX IV

MANNING

[redacted]

APPENDIX IV

MANNING

AFSC	1 July 1971 Authorized	1 July 1971 Assigned	31 December 1971 Authorized	31 December 1971 Assigned
E4044	1	1	1	1
E8035	1	2	1	1
G8035	1	1	1	1
202X0	14	14	32	23
203X1	27	20	40	29
291X0	12	8	12	9
292X1	73	67	140	107
29292	1	1	1	1
301X3	15	13	34	23
304X4	4	3	4	3
645X0	3	3	5	3
702X0	8	10	10	9
732X0	2	2	2	2
811X0	10	6	11	9
Total	172	140	294	221

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX V

SEA AHDF AREAS

[redacted]



[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX VI

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS

USS-D3 [redacted]

DETACHMENT 2 OPERATIONS



CHAIN OF COMMAND

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE

HEADQUARTERS, PACIFIC SECURITY REGION

6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

DETACHMENT 2, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND



[redacted]

APPENDIX VII

MAPE OF BASE


A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
1-Det 2 Squadron Area
2-Det 2 SI Operations Area
3-EC-47 Revetments "T" Area
4-EC-47 Revetments "X" Area
OFFICE OF THE BASE CIVIL ENGINEER
CRASH GRID MAP

[redacted]

APPENDIX VIII

AEDF TARGET PRODUCTIVITY

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

OF TARGET PRODUCTIVITY ALL [illegible] AREAS [illegible]



DOT-A PIX	1000	1435	1225	458	1168	1590	6796
TIME OTHER TASKS	703.6	877.3	699.4	351.3	892.5	1113.6	4637.7
HOURS PLAN	1136.6	1288.6	1056.2	572.8	1445.2	1848.2	6999.6

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]



							TOTALS
TOTAL FIX	50	159	40	12	312	621	1194
TIME OVER TARGET	43.7	98.5	30.8	14.8	279.1	459.3	1026.2
HOURS FLOWN	83.7	136.9	51.4	33.2	468.2	752.9	1526.3

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible] PRODUCTIVITY [illegible] AREA FLIGHT

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
TOTAL FIX	450	509	692	216	448	539	2854
TIME OVER TARGET	204.6	308.4	281.4	144.0	313.9	354.6	1506.9
HOURS FLOWN	266.2	247.4	326.7	193.6	400.3	481.6	1915.8

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

A [illegible] PRODUCTIVITY [illegible]



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
[illegible] PLAN	346	549	251	134	129	69	1478
[illegible] OVER TARGET	295.5	414.6	254.3	98.2	110.1	36.7	1200.4
[illegible] PLAN	438.5	563.8	365.8	140.4	157.7	67.1	1733.3

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[redacted]

[redacted]

IN THE ST PRODUCTIVITY SEA SIGA TEP



							TOTALS
TOTAL FIX	92	86	173	68	205	351	971
TOTAL OTHER TARGET	72.2	58.4	85.2	61.9	149.5	257.0	690.2
TOTAL ALL	194.0	160.6	217.9	134.7	339.7	533.4	1580.3

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

A.V. [illegible] PRODUCTIVITY [illegible] AREA [illegible]



	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
TOTAL FIX	73	132	69	28	74	10	386
TIME [illegible] TARGET	81.6	97.4	47.7	41.4	39.9	6.0	314.0
[illegible] FLOWN	154.2	179.9	94.4	70.9	79.3	13.2	591.9

[redacted]

VIII.6

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX IX

RADIOTELEPHONE ACI PRODUCTIVITY

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-D3

RADIOTELEPHONE ACI PRODUCTIVITY ALL SEA AREAS FLOWN



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
HOURS FLOWN	1136.6	1288.6	1056.2	572.8	649.8	890.9	5794.9
AMOC	42315	52783	42430	21798	25596	32630	217552
MIN. COPY	12692	17232	13528	5083	5710	4280	58525
%	30.0	32.6	31.9	23.3	22.3	13.1	

[redacted]

 [redacted]

RADIOTELEPHONE ACI PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA SEVEN



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
HOURS FLOWN	83.7	136.9	51.4	33.2	91.4	96.9	493.5
AMOC	2635	5920	1855	919	3600	2899	17828
MIN. COPY	104	500	47	58	166	179	1054
%	3.9	8.4	2.5	6.3	4.6	6.2	

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

UCS-D3

RADIOTELEPHONE ACI PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA EIGHT



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
HOURS FLOWN	266.2	247.4	326.7	193.6	184.4	444.0	1662.3
AMDC	12184	12515	16900	8583	9183	19221	78586
MIN. COPY	4695	5692	7297	2223	2322	1423	23652
%	38.5	45.5	43.2	25.9	25.3	7.4	

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-D3

RADIOTELEPHONE ACI PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA NINE



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
HOURS FLOWN	438.5	563.8	365.8	140.4	152.7	67.1	1726.3
AMOC	17840	24914	15310	5883	6282	2247	77476
MIN. COPY	4895	8013	3780	1651	1817	985	21141
%	27.4	32.2	24.7	28.1	28.9	43.8	

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[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-D3

RADIOTELEPHONE ACI PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA TEN



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
HOURS FLOWN	194.0	160.6	217.9	134.7	142.0	289.7	1138.9
AMOC	4711	3564	5265	3919	3995	7903	29354
MIN. COPY	1181	1515	1331	600	650	1682	6959
%	25.1	42.5	25.3	15.3	16.3	21.3	

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[redacted]

USS-D3

[redacted]

RADIOTELEPHONE ACI PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA ELEVEN



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
HOURS FLOWN	154.2	179.9	94.4	70.9	79.3	13.2	591.9
AMCO	4945	5870	3100	2485	2536	360	19296
MIN. COPY	1817	1512	1073	551	755	11	5719
%	36.7	25.6	34.6	22.2	29.8	3.1	

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX X

MANUAL MORSE ACI PRODUCTIVITY

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

MANUAL MORSE ACI PRODUCTIVITY ALL SEA AREAS FLOWN



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
HOURS FLOWN	1136.6	1288.6	1056.2	572.8	1445.2	1848.2	7947.6
AMOC	85030	105572	84774	43815	79577	99150	492918
MIN. COPY	13234	17943	13429	8303	12799	17078	82786
%	15.6	17.0	15.8	18.9	16.1	17.2	

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[redacted]

USS-D3

[redacted]

MANUAL MORSE ACI PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA SEVEN



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
HOURS FLOWN	83.7	136.9	51.4	33.2	468.2	752.9	1526.3
AMOC	5270	11840	3710	1844	20846	30720	74230
MIN. COPY	354	1430	426	318	2943	4928	10399
%	6.7	12.1	11.5	17.2	14.1	16.0	

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[redacted]

U.[illegible]-93

[redacted]

MANUAL MORSE ACI PRODUCTIVITY SA [illegible] SIGHT



							TOTALS
HOURS FLOWN	266.2	247.4	326.7	193.6	400.3	481.6	1915.8
AMOC	24768	25030	33700	17352	28233	40625	169708
MIN. COPY	4016	3050	4185	3215	4100	6804	25370
%	16.2	12.2	12.4	18.5	14.5	16.7	

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-D3

[redacted]

MANUAL MORSE ACI PRODUCTIVITY .EA AREA MINE



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
HOURS FLOWN	438.5	563.8	365.8	140.4	157.7	67.1	1753.3
AMOC	35680	49828	30620	11774	12815	4454	145171
MIN. COPY	6555	9781	5151	2569	2208	1261	27535
%	18.4	19.6	16.8	21.8	17.2	28.3	

[redacted]

[redacted]

USS-03 [redacted]

MANUAL MORSE ACI PRODUCTIVITY - FOR ALPHA TEN -



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[redacted]

MANN - NURSE ACI PRODUCTIVITY [illegible]



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTALS
HOURS FLOWN	154.2	179.9	94.4	70.9	79.3	13.2	591.9
AMOC	9890	11740	6200	5011	4932	720	38593
MIN. COPY	968	2398	1019	752	1148	76	6361
%	9.8	20.3	16.4	15.0	23.3	10.6	

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX XI

PHOTOGRAPHS

PORTRAIT OF UNIT COMMANDER


U.S.

DET 2 SI OPERATIONS AREA

EC-47/AIR-34 OUTSIDE

EC-47/ALR-36 OUTSIDE



X CONSOLE ALR-38

[redacted]



[redacted]

X CONSOLE ALR-35

Y CONSOLE

[redacted]

[redacted]

21 CONSOLE


AUX 3
AUX 4
OUTPUT SELECT
APE RECORDER CONTROLS
MAIN POWER
2

Z2 CONSOLE

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

EC-47/CC "TWO SEATER" INSIDE

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

EC/47CCZ "FOUR SEATER" INSIDE

[redacted]



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AIR-35 NAVIGATOR POSITION

[redacted]



[redacted]

AIR-38 NAVIGATOR POSITION

[redacted]

APPENDIX XII

PERSONNEL STATUS (PVD) CHART

WEEKLY PERSONNEL STATUS (PFD)

USS-D3

[redacted]



[redacted]

Document # 1

[redacted]

ROUTINE
NOFORN

USA-563

USN-604

USN-704/AGS

INFO: USA-561/00

[redacted] 30 OCT 71

SUBJ: COLLECTION RANKING OF SEA ARDF/ELI MISSIONS.

1. THIS UNIT IS PRESENTLY TASKED TO MAN MPR COLLECTION POSITIONS ON MS-47 ALR-30 MISSIONS IN THE SEA AREA FOR VOICE COLLECTION: 1.4. A-O LINGUIST VICE THE NORMAL 1 LINGUIST, 1 MORSE OPERATOR. DURING THE TASKING WEEK ENDING 24 SEP WE A TOTAL OF 14.8 HOURS WERE SPENT ON TARGET IN THIS AREA, WITH 4 MINUTE OF HF VOICE AND NO VHF VOICE COLLECTED. DURING THE WEEK ENDING 01 OCTOBER 9.6 HOURS WERE SPENT ON TARGET WITH 17 MINUTES OF HF VOICE AND 2 MINUTES OF VHF VOICE COLLECTED.

2. THIS IS, BY FAR, THE LEAST PRODUCTIVE AREA WE PRESENTLY FLY IN TERMS OF VOICE COLLECTION. BASED ON THE DECISION TO MAN THIS AREA WITH TWO VOICE OPERATORS BE RESCINDED, AND THAT NORMAL, ONE LINGUIST/ONE MORSE OPERATOR, MANNING BE RESTORED.

2 1530
OCT 1971
1 1

[redacted]

CONRAD [illegible], Capt, USAF
Operations Officer

NAME AS REQUIRED

[redacted]

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION

MASTER PROGRAM CHANGE REQUEST [redacted]

Document # 4

SECTION I - IDENTIFICATION DATA		FOR USE BY HQ USAFS ONLY	
TO Pac Scty Rgn (DOX)	MPC NO 942-02-72	PWC NO 39	XRF NO 237
FROM HQ USAFSS (DO)	DATE OF REQUEST 14 Aug 71	DESIGN OFFICER [illegible]	CIP NO
		[illegible]	MPC NO P-5[illegible]-118
UNIT(S) AFFECTED Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq		[illegible]	OPINS [illegible]
SIGNATURE	TYPED NAME, GRADE [illegible] OFFICE SYMBOL		

SECTION II - NARRATIVE (Action required, justification, [illegible] comments)

1. This change deletes two YGP005 positions at Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq and adds two YGP005Y positions effective FY 2/72 - FY 3/73.

2. "Y" indicates each position is augmented with one TYCOM 1655 demodulator.

3. This action required to provide the unit with a demod capability for processing RA01/403 intercept.

[redacted]

NOTE: Attach additional sheet(s) if required; reference paragraph number.

USAFSS FORM 177 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION

JOINT REGIONAL

[redacted]

TYPE MSG | AX

ACTION PRIORITY

Document # 5

15 [illegible] Z SEPT

PRT 09545S

695 SS/DORM

[redacted] DOM SEPT 71

SUBJ: MASTER PROGRAM CHANGE REQUEST (MPCR) 42-22-7..

1. REQUEST FOLLOWING ADDITION TO USAFSSM [illegible] 1-72-1 BE EFFECTED.

REQUEST RYCOM (DEMOD) BE INSTALLED ON FOLLOWING POSITIONS.

PAGE 420, LINE 17, POE: YCP005 (SEARCH AIRBORNE PROCESSING).

JUSTIFICATION: REFERENCED EQUIPMENT WILL PROVIDE THIS UNIT WITH A CAPABILITY TO SCAN MULTICHANNEL INTERCEPT FOR CALLSIGNS IN AN ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE IDENTIFICATION OF ARDF TARGETS. IT WILL ALSO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES:

(1) PERMIT TRANSCRIPTION OF EXPLOITABLE MESSAGE TRAFFIC AT THIS UNIT, REDUCING DELAY INHERENT IN COURIER TO USM-803 AND TRANSCRIPTION AT THIS STATION.

DATE	TIME
13	[illegible]
MONTH SEPT	YEAR 71
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES

ENTER: TYPED NAME AND [illegible] TURNER/DOM PHONE 3248

RELEASE: SIGNATURE [illegible]

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND TITLE FOR: CONRAD A. CHAPELLE CAPT, USAF OPERATIONS OFFICER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

DD FORM 173

PREVIOUS EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

[redacted]

(2) PERMIT SCANNING OF TRAFFIC FOR PRIORITY NOT PLAIN LANGUAGE TRAFFIC, [illegible] OF SAME FOR PRIORITY DESCRIPTION AT USM-[illegible].

(3) DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER ASOF [illegible] MIGHT HAVE BEEN A FRIENDLY TRANSMITTER.

BACKGROUND: THIS UNIT IS PRESENTLY INTERCEPTING APPROXIMATELY 1700 MINUTES OF [illegible] TRAFFIC PER WEEK, PRIMARILY FROM GORS ENTITIES, WITH EVERY INDICATION THAT THIS VOLUME WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE. WE HAVE, AT PRESENT, NO WAY OF DEMODULATING THIS TRAFFIC ON THE GROUND. AS MOST OF THE TRAFFIC IS [redacted], SOME CAPABILITY TO AT LEAST SCAN THIS TRAFFIC ON THE GROUND IS CONSIDERED MISSION ESSENTIAL, FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED ABOVE. WITH THE PENDING TRANSFER OF THE [redacted] MISSIONS FROM THE [redacted] SCTY SQ TO THE [redacted] SCTY GP, PRESENTLY HELD DEMODULATORS AT THE [redacted] MAY BE AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFER TO THIS UNIT.

2. HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF PET DESIGNATOR EXISTS FOR SUBJECT POSITION CONFIGURED WITH A RYCOM (DEMOD).

[redacted]

[redacted]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY C[redacted]

TYPE MSG | PRIO | MULTI SINGLE: XX

PRECEDENCE

ACTION: PRIORITY
INFO: PRIORITY

Document # 6

DTG 10 2[illegible]Z/OCT 71

FROM: DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: 6994 SCTY SQ/DORM

[redacted] DOM OCT 71

SUBJ: MASTER PROGRAM CHANGE REQUEST (MPCR)942-03-72

1. REQUEST FOLLOWING TO USAFSSMP VOL 1-72-1 BE EFFECTED.

REQUEST THE INSTALLATION OF ONE ADDITIONAL YCP005 VOICE PROCESSING POSITION.

REQUEST THE INSTALLATION OF ONE ADDITIONAL YLP001 DATA PROCESSING POSITION.

2. JUSTIFICATION FOR ADDITIONAL YCP005 VOICE PROCESSING POSITION.

IAW 7AF PAD 72-7-2 THIS UNIT IS TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROCESSING OF INCREASED INTERCEPT, BASED ON A PROJECTED AIRFRAME INCREASE FROM 12 "Z" CONFIGURED ALR-35/38 AIRCRAFT TO 27 ALR-34/35/38 AIRCRAFT. THIS WILL RESULT IN AN INCREASE FROM APPROXIMATELY 50 MISSIONS PER WEEK TO APPROXIMATELY 135. MOST MISSIONS RECOVER BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 1[illegible] AND 19[illegible] LOCAL TIME AND ARE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

DATE: 10 | TIME: 1325L
MONTH: OCT | YEAR: 71
PAGE NO. | NO. OF PAGES

DRAFTER: TYPED NAME AND TITLE: DUGGER/DOM | PHONE: 3[illegible]8

RELEASER: SIGNATURE | TYPED NAME AND TITLE: FOR: CONRAD A. CHAPELLE, CAPT, USAF OPERATIONS OFFICER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

DD FORM 173

[redacted]

PROCESSED SEQUENTIALLY. THE REQUESTED ADDITIONAL PROCESSING POSITION WILL PERMIT THIS UNIT TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT LOW PROCESSING TIME AND PERMIT TIMELY EMR PRODUCTION TO CONTINUE.

3. JUSTIFICATION FOR ADDITIONAL YLP001 DATA PROCESSING POSITION. IAW 7AF PAE 72-7-2 THIS UNIT IS TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROCESSING OF INCREASED ARDF AND COLLECTION DATA, BASED ON A PROJECTED AIRFRAME INCREASE FROM 12 "Z" CONFIGURED ALR-35/38 AIRCRAFT TO 27 ALR-34/35/38 AIRCRAFT. THIS WILL RESULT IN AN INCREASE FROM APPROXIMATELY 50 MISSIONS PER WEEK TO APPROXIMATELY 135. MOST MISSIONS RECOVER BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 1200 AND 1900 LOCAL TIME AND ARE PROCESSED SEQUENTIALLY. EMR, ARR AND SEATS ARE POKED BY OPERATIONS PERSONNEL FOR DELIVERY TO COMMUNICATIONS CENTER. WITH THE PRESENTLY ASSIGNED 2 POSITIONS IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT ON ARR PRODUCT ALONE, DELAYS IN EXCESS OF 3 HOURS AFTER MISSION RECOVERY MIGHT BE EXPERIENCED. EMR AND SEATS TIMELINESS MIGHT BE SIMILARY DEGRADED. A THIRD POSITION WILL RELIEVE THIS PROBLEM AND PERMIT CONTINUATION OF THE UNITS LOW HANDLING DELAYS IN THESE PERISHABLE TECHNICAL REPORTS.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document # 11

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SEC [redacted]

TYPE MSG | BOOK | ROUTE | SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

Document # 12

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FILES

[redacted]

FROM: DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: 6994 SCTY SQ/DO

[redacted] DO SEP 71

SUBJ: TECH DATA LISTS

REF: UR DO 300230Z AUG 71, Same Subj.

1. IAW Ref, Sergeant Slagle of DOE, this unit compiled the following information which is forwarded in its entirety for ur use. Paragraphs are keyed to subparagraphs of Para 2 of Ref.

2. The following results were gleaned from tasking periods (A) 21-27 Aug and (B) 28 Aug - 03 Sept.

A. Multiple skeds at the same time in widely separated areas of the Frag.

907A Multiple skeds in the VHF voice only

907B Never

908A Twice - once on the 25th TDL 2 Tgts at Ø330Z

once on the 31st TDL 2 Tgts at Ø330Z

909A[1] Period A 2 TDL Tgts at Ø530Z

Period B 2 TDL Tgts at Ø530Z
(28-30Aug)
2 TDL Tgts at Ø900Z

DATE 4 | TIME 0830
MONTH Sept | YEAR 1971
PAGE NO. 1 | NO. OF PAGES 6

DRAFTER: TYPED NAME AND TITLE | PHONE 3048

RELEASER: SIGNATURE [signature]
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
CONRAD A. CHAPELLE, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer

SECURITY [redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

FORM 1 NOV. 63 173

[redacted]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECUR[redacted]

TYPE MSG | SECRET | MULTI | SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

INFO

TO

FROM:

TO:

From the 31st Aug to the 3rd Sept, the TDL provided acceptable multiple skeds.

909A[2] During both periods 2 Tgts at 1000Z

2 Tgts at 1200Z

909C Never

910A Very Acceptable

910D All 5 TDL Tgts had a 0100Z and 0300Z sked.

911A Very acceptable

B. Period of coverage.

TDL's for all msns for both skeds covered time on tgt only IAW fragged TOT.

C. Additional frags/skeds for high interest/pre-emptive targets are supplied on supplemental tech data listings that are very helpfull but could be more complete.

D. The information that is supplied normally is up to date.

E. TDL tasking compared to COMMSC tasking.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

DATE | TIME

MONTH | YEAR

PAGE NO. 2 | NO. OF PAGES

DRAFTER: TYPED NAME AND TITLE | PHONE

RELEASER: SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

SECURITY [redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD FO[redacted]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SEC[redacted]

TYPE MSG | BOOK | MULTI | SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

INFO

DTG

FROM:

TO:

Man	Period	Total TDL Tgts Per Man	TDL Tgts were COMMSG Rd's	Total COMMSG Rd's
907A	A/B	26	0	88/89
907B	A/B	9	4	88/89
908A	A/B	14/15	10	107/109
909A[1]	A	9	8	Approx 128
[redacted]	B	11-17	10-15	128
909A[2]	A	7-8	6-7	Approx 128
	B	9	8	128
909C	A/B	4	4	128
910A	A	18-20	11	19
	B	19	11	27
910D	A	No TDL's Received		
	B	5	0	27
911A	A/B	7-12	6-10	12

F. The following is the accountability of TDL's received in time to be placed in current days mission briefcase.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

DATE | TIME

MONTH | YEAR

PAGE NO. 3 | NO. OF PAGES

DRAFTER: TYPED NAME AND TITLE | PHONE

RELEASER: SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

SECURITY CL[redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD FORM [redacted]

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECUR[redacted]

TYPE MSG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

INFO

DTG

FROM:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

TO:

Msn	Pet	Times Flown	#TDL's that were received
907A	[illegible]	2	1
	B	2	1
	# received a TDL for the 28th but no Msn scheduled.		
907B	A	3	1
	B	3	1
908A	A	7	3
	B	7	4
909A[1]	A	7	6
	B	7	7
909A[2]	A	7	6
	B	7	7
909C	A	7	6
	B	7	7
910A	A	4	4
	B	4	4

DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
PAGE NO. 4	NO. OF PAGES

DRAFTER: TYPED NAME AND TITLE | PHONE

RELEASER: SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

SECURITY CLAS[redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD FORM 1 NOV. 63 173

A NO CHANGING LANGUAGE VIA COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECU[redacted]

TYPE MSG

PREC[redacted]NCE

ACTION

INFO

ITG

FROM:

TO:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

910D	A	3	0
	B	3	1
911A	A	7	7
	B	7	7

G. VHF tgts for Det 2 TDL's received:

Mon	Period	Total TDL Tgts Per Period	Total VHF TDL Tgts per Period
907A	A	26	21
	B	26	21
907B	A	9	0
	B	9	0
908A	A	44	[illegible]
	B	59	0
909A[1]	A	54	0
	B	100	3
909A[2]	A	45	3
	B	63	4

DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
PAGE NO. 5	NO. OF PAGES

DRAFTER: TYPED NAME AND TITLE | PHONE

RELEASER: SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

SECURITY CL[redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD FORM [redacted]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY [redacted]

TYPE MSG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

INFO

RESTRICTED COMMUNICATION SECTION

TTG

FROM:

TO:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

909C	A	24	0
	B	28	1
910A	A	78	0
	B	68	0
910D	A	0	0
	B	5	5
911A	A	69	0
	B	69	0

DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
PAGE NO. 6	NO. OF PAGES

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

SECURITY CLASS [redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

FORM [redacted]

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RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

JOINT M[redacted]

SECURITY CLASSIFI[redacted]

7 Nov 71 90 22z

(2)

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		XX	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

DTG

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: USA-563

TO: USM-[redacted]

INFO: USM-794/ACC

USA-564/DO

1 CY DO R/W

1 CY DOE

1 CY [redacted] R/F

[redacted] 06 NOV 71

SUBJ: NON-RECEIPT OF TECH DATA LISTINGS

1. THIS UNIT HAS BEEN EXPERIENCING CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY OVER THE PAST WEEKS IN RECEIPT OF TECH DATA LISTINGS FROM [redacted] STATION. ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS TDL'S FOR THE 8 AREA HAVE NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING AT ALL, OR HAVE BEEN RECEIVED LATE. THE SAME SITUATION TO A LESSER EXTENT EXISTS IN THE 9 AREA.

2. THIS AID, AS YOU KNOW, IS THE BASIC TASKING DOCUMENT USED BY ARRF CREWS IN THE AIR TO PLAN MISSION PROFILE TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS. WITHOUT IT OUR MISSIONS CANNOT BE AS EFFECTIVE. WITH THE CURRENT INCREASE IN OUR UNIT'S TASKING THIS TOOL ASSUMES EVER GREATER IMPORTANCE. REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN ASSURING TIMELY TRANSMISSION OF TDL'S IN THE FUTURE.

DATE	TIME
[redacted]	
MONTH NOV	YEAR 1971
PAGE NO. [redacted]	NO. OF PAGES [redacted]

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: DO/CHAPELLE

PHONE: 394-[redacted]

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: [redacted]AD A CHAPELLE, CAPT, USAF
[redacted]ATIONS OFFICER

[redacted]

Ø5Ø5Z

DFT 2 6994 SCTY SQ [redacted]

6994 SCTY SQ/DO

[redacted] DO

SUBJ: ADP REVIEW BY USN-808

REF UR DO MSG DTG 2[illegible]/1407Z NOV 71 (SAME SUBJ). THIS STATION COORDINATED WITH USN-808 VIA OPS-COMM REGARDING THEIR PROPOSED RETENTION OF THE DIRNSA ARDF T1 AID. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE T1 AID IS OF GREAT VALUE TO THE ASN COLLECTION/ARDF PROGRAM. USN-[illegible] REQUESTED TO REMAIN ON DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS AID AND TO FORWARD [illegible] TAPE TO THIS STATION VIA COURIER SO THAT AN ADEQUATE NUMBER OF COPIES COULD BE RUN OFF LOCALLY.

SAME AS RELEASER/[illegible]

JOHN E. GLENN JR., [illegible], USAF
[illegible] DOE

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document # 16

X

PRIORITY

30 0210 Z JUN 71

USA-563

USM-808

[redacted] DOE JUN 71

SUBJ: IDENT CHANGE REPORT

REF A: UR IDENT CHANGE REPORT 178-71

REF B: UR IDENT CHANGE REPORT 179-71

1. REF A ITEMS 2, 3, AND 6 WERE REIDENT TO VCMB 0673. TEMPO SHOWS THESE CALLSIGNS AND THE FREQ ARE USED BY VCMB K5338 AS REPORTED IN OUR ARR. PSE ADVISE.

2. HAVE NOTED IDENT CHANGES ON VHF TARGETS, MANY OF THESE IDENTS (0673., 0679. ETC) ARE BASED ON DATA SENT TO US FROM UR STATION VIA OPSCOMM/ CONCERNING IDENTS BASED ON CR. / SYSTEM.

3. REF B ITEM 3 ORIGINAL IDENT VCMC 17226 WAS BASED ON DIRNSA 861-98-71 252229Z MAY 71 ON WHICH YOU WERE AN ACTION ADDEE. PSE ADVISE REASON IDENT CHANGED TO VCMC .....

4. ONE OF THE PURPOSES FOR THE IDENT CHANGE REPORT IS TO ASSIST US IN MAINTAINING AN ACCURATE DATA BASE. SUGGEST

30 JUN 71

1 2

3048

HAUPT/DOE

Kenneth H. Haupt

for CONRAD A CHAPELLE, CAPT
OPERATIONS OFFICER

[redacted]

[redacted]

THE REASON FOR THE IDENT CHANGE BE INCLUDED IN A COMMENTS SECTION OF THE IDENT CHANGE REPORT TO ENHANCE THIS EFFORT. FURTHER WE WILL REQUEST DATA ON CASES THAT APPEAR THAT WE DO NOT CURRENTLY HAVE HOLD IN OUR FILES. WE CURRENTLY USE TEMPO, SEADEV, IDENT CHANGE REPORTS AND SEATS REIDENTS TO TRY AND MAINTAIN AN ACCURATE DATA BASE FOR IDENT.

5. APPRECIATE THE ASSITANCE YOU HAVE GIVEN US RECENTLY (GWIR CHARTS, MSG RELEASER LIST, TEMPO, AND OTHERS) THESE ITEMS HAVE HELPED US TO BETTER IDENT OUR TARGETS.

[redacted]

Document # 17

XX [redacted]

PRIORITY
PRIORITY

29 0310 Z AUG 71

USA-563

USM-808

INFO: DIRNSA
NRV (C)
USA-561
USM-704

HLL

4

[redacted] DOE AUG 71

SUBJ: RE-IDENTS

REF A: USM-808 IAPVJOPS/ASMG 19[illegible]55Z JUL

REF B: USM-[illegible] IAPVOP-AC 310155Z JUL

REF C: USM-8[illegible] IDENT CHANGE REPORT NR 239-71 271600Z AUG

REF D: USA-563 EMR 674 261536Z AUG

REF A WAS A REQUEST TO ALLOW COMMENTS IN THE IDENT CHANGE REPORT TO EXPLAIN RE-IDENTS, REF B GRANTED THIS REQUEST.

TI UNIT DESIRES COMMENTS ON CHANGES WHICH ARE BASED ON A NEW RD, NEW CASE, NEW BASIC OR A NEW LISTING FOR A BASIC OR RD. THIS WOULD ASSIST US IN MAINTAINING A CURRENT DATA BASE.

REF C REPORTS ITEMS 260508 AND 260512 AS VCXB VICE VCMB 29
[illegible] AS REPORTED IN THE ARR. REF D REPORTS A VCMG 23 R2 AUG 71
CY WAS PASSED BETWEEN THESE CALLS AND WAS THE BASIS 1 2

[illegible]8

Kenneth W. Haupt

HAUPT/DOE

CONRAD A CHAPELLE, CAPT
OPERATIONS OFFICER

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

FOR THE IDENT IN [redacted] ARTIAL CASE NOTATION IS IAW A WORKING AID RECEIVED FROM USM-808 VIA OPSCOMM AND ALSO SENT VIA COURIER AFTER A TDY TRIP.

ITEM 278868 VCMB K5242 B7728, B64 TSR001/32-71 11 AUG 71 LISTS BASIC 00030. CALLSIGN KOIN (PRC-K671) EQUATES TO QD067. QUERY IF THIS IS A NEW LISTING FOR BASIC B77287

ITEM 278834 VCMB 16857 E1786 LISTED AS BASIC QD004. CALLSIGN REPORTED IN ARR WAS KSC (PRC-1042) WHICH WAS REPORTED IN THE IDENT CHANGE REPORT KSC (PRC-L610) WHICH EQUATES TO BASIC QD005 WHICH IS LISTED FOR RB 00115 AS REPORTED IN ARR.

ITEM 278809 VCMB 06814 (SIC) M1190. NEITHER THE CASE OR RB ARE LISTED. DOES THIS REPRESENT A NEW RB AND CASE?

REQUEST BASIS FOR IDENT CHANGES LISTED ABOVE. IN CASES WHERE NEW INFORMATION IS USED IN REISSUES REQUEST SOME INDICATION IN A REMARKS SECTION AS PROVIDED FOR IN REF 2.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document # 22

1 2 PP RR 21 66 50 Z DEC 71

NO

USA-563

DIRNSA

INFO: USA-564
USM-7
USM-604
USM-808

[redacted] DOE

SUBJ: SEATS IDENT SUPPORT

REF B-64-4293-71 DTG 181249Z DEC SEATS IDENT SUPPORT

1. FOLLOWING IS A RANDOM SAMPLING OF SUPPORT RECEIVED VIA SEATS IDENT SUPPORT MESSAGES. READ: TOI, RCVR CALL/PRC, XMTR CALL/PRC, BASIC EQUATED TO THE ITEM, PRC DERIVED BY APPLING ADDITIVE TO BASIC, CALL LISTED FOR RESULTING PRC.

170043 KWV/N392 AWK/K379 HS701/M312/LUA HS778/K389/SQF

170223 PFQ/J235 CGP/K229 HS094/M606/SRX HS018/K629/ZJR

162337 CNJ/M290 COG/K811 HS689/M290/CNJ HS200/K811/COG

170004 FUK/H863 EGW/M916 RA959/E560/OMQ RA994/M506/TDC

170756 LNO/E517 IGD/K517 HS345/M956/PEX HS206/K817/ODR

2. PRCS WERE TAKEN FROM 864 WA 009-71 16NOV71. QUERY IF THIS IS A COMPLETE LISTING OR IF ADDITIONAL RECOVERIES HAVE BEEN MADE.

HAUPT/DOE

KENNETH U HAUPT/TSGT/USAF DOE ILH RNI

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. ONLY ONE ITEM ABOVE CHECKS OUT TO THE CALLSIGN ON WHICH THE IDENT WAS MADE (ITEM 162337). THE OTHER IDENTS DO NOT APPEAR TO MATCH WITH THE CALLSIGNS REPORTED. THESE SEATS IDENT SUPPORT MSGS ARE USED TO MAINTAIN AND CHECK THE DATA BASE HELD THIS STATION AND TO RECOVER ADDITIVES ON VARIOUS BASICS. REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF ABOVE IDENTS SO WE CAN CONTINUE TO USE THIS VALUABLE SUPPORT.

[redacted]

Document # 24

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

[redacted]

TYPE MSG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 29 0650Z DEC 71

FROM: DET 2 6994SCTTBQ

TO: 6994SCTTBQ/DO

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

FOR INFO REPT FROM CAPT WEGNER

SUBJ: ANALYTICAL AIDS AGAINST MIG ACFT.

REF OUR RECENT TELECON THIS SUBJECT.

1. PRESENT RESTRICTIONS ON TECHNICAL AIDS GARNERED ON MIG ACFT BY [illegible] SEVERLY HAMPERS THE AIRBORNE ANALYTICAL EFFORT AT DET 2. THIS IS DUE PRIMARILY TO THE TYPE OF CALLSIGN SYSTEMS USED BY TARGETS LOCATED IN THE DET 2 FRAG AREAS. THE MAJORITY OF THESE TARGETS UTILIZE DAILY CHANGING CALLSIGNS WHICH CAN ONLY BE IDENTIFIED BY APPLYING ADDITIVES TO THE PRC IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT AN ARBITRARY STATION BASIC.

2. A POINT OF INTEREST IS THAT AS WE UNDERSTAND, MOST OF THE TARGETS [illegible] BY THE 6994TH AND DET 3 USE FIXED AND NOTA TYPE CALLSIGNS, WHICH ENABLES THE ANALYSTS TO GENERATE WORKING AIDS FOR A SPECIFIC [illegible] ON A MORE OR LESS PERMANENT BASIS. THESE UNITS ALSO HAVE Secure COMMUNICATIONS WITH MIG ACFT, AND CAN IDENTIFY TARGETS FROM THE [illegible] BEFORE THE AIRCREW [illegible].

DATE	TIME
29	
MONTH	YEAR
DEC	1971
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 3

TYPED NAME AND TITLE | PHONE | SIGNATURE

[redacted]

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

KENNETH J. WEGNER, Capt, USAF

Communications Officer

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

[redacted]

TYPE MSG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

INFO

DTG

FROM:

TO:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS BE AUTHORIZED ABOARD MISSION AIRCRAFT AT DET 2:

A. PRC BOOK

B. FIXED CALLSIGN BOOK

C. LIST OF ARBITRARY BASICS

D. LIST OF PRIORITY RD'S

E. TECH DATA IN SUPPORT OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT TO INCLUDE CALLSIGNS, FREQS, AND SKEDS OF LOW LEVEL TRAFFIC PASSER NETS.

4. REASON FOR THESE ITEMS IS TO GIVE THE A2D2 THE TOOLS HE NEEDS TO IDENTIFY TARGETS AND ASSIST THE COLLECTION EFFORT AS WELL AS THE ARDF MISSION.

5. THE PRC BOOK IS REQUIRED TO ENABLE THE ANALYST TO WORK THE DAILY CHANGING CALLSIGNS. BY WORKING THE CALLS TO ARBITRARY BASICS, THE ANALYST IS ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE PRIORITY TARGETS AND DIRECT THE MISSION TOWARD OBTAINING DESIRED TARGETS ON THE PRIORITY LISTING. THE NSA HI-SPEED RUN DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL THE DAILY CHANGING CALLS, AND IS NORMALLY INCOMPLETE DUE TO CHANGING SOI'S. THE RUN IS NORMALLY OUT OF DATE BY THE TIME WE RECEIVE IT ANYWAY. ANOTHER

DATE | TIME

MONTH | YEAR

PAGE NO. 2 | NO. OF PAGES 3

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TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

[redacted]

TYPE MSG		MULTI	SINGLE
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION			
INFO		DTG	

FROM:

TO:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

ADVANTAGE OF THE IDENT AIDS IS THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC AREA AND WOULD ENABLE THE ASSESSOR TO IDENT TARGETS EVEN IF THE MISSION DIVERTED. THE COMBINATION OF THE HI-SPEED RUN, FIXED CALLSIGN BOOK, AND THE PRC AND ARBITRARY BASICS WOULD GIVE THE A202 AT LEAST 75 PERCENT OF THE IDENT CAPABILITY AVAILABLE TO HIM ON THE GROUND. THESE IDENT AIDS CAN BE MADE INTO SMALL COMPACT BOOKS.

6. ARBITRARY BASICS, RD'S AND CASE NOTATIONS WITHOUT BEING RELATED TO A SPECIFIC CALLSIGN IS MERELY THE ARBITRARY SYSTEM USED BY CONSENT TO IDENTIFY TARGETS. WITHOUT A KNOWLEDGE OF EXACTLY WHAT THEY ARE AND HOW THEY ARE RELATED, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RELATE AN RD OR BASIC TO A SPECIFIC TRANSMITTER IF THE MATERIAL WERE LOST.

7. IN ORDER TO DERIVE MAXIMUM BENEFIT FROM THE A202 PROGRAM, BELIEVE EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO PROVIDE HIM WITH THE TOOLS NECESSARY TO ADEQUATELY PERFORM HIS JOB, AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY HELP YOU COULD GIVE US ALONG THIS LINE.

DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
PAGE NO. 3	NO. OF PAGES 3

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	RELEASER	SIGNATURE
				TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

[redacted]

RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS

****
* UNCLASSIFIED *
****

Document # 25

6994

105

RTTEZDKW RUMMRSA3291 214/147-EEEE--RUMUJBA.
RTTEZDKW RUMMRSA3291 214/147-EEEE--RUMUJBA.
ZNY EEEEE SVC 4-7 ZDK RUMMRSA
R 02/1242Z AUG
FM 6994 SCTY SO TSN RVN
TO ZEN/6994 SCTY SO/PORT/
RUMUJGA/DET 1 6994 SCTY SO PHU CAT AB RVN
RUMUJBA/DET 2 6994 SCTY SO/DA NANG AB RVN
RUMOREA/DET 3 6994 SCTY SO/NAKHON PHANOM THAI
BT
UNCLAS E F T O I O
SUBJ: ANALYST/COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY COORDINATION.
REF 6994 SCTY SO REG 55-4, 24 JUL 71.
1. ABOVE REF REQUIRES MONTHLY VISITS TO PRIMARY CMMS BY EXPERIENCED ANALYSTS TO DISCUSS PROBLEM AREAS OF MUTUAL CONCERN.
2. IN VIEW OF HIGH LEVEL INTERST THIS SUBJ REQUEST IMMEDIATE AND CONTINUED ADHERENCE.
3. FOR DET 1, 6994: AS LONG AS YOU PROVIDE PERMANENT LIAISON TO YOUR PRIMARY CMA YOU ARE EXEMPT FROM THE REQUIRED MONTHLY VISITS.
BT
#3291

NNNN

IN 00081/AUG 02 /ACK

DOE

****
* UNCLASSIFIED *

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

[redacted]

TYPE MSG | BLOCK | MULTI | SINGLE X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

Document # 27

DTG 2006007 JUL 71

FROM: DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ DANANG AB RVN

TO: 6994 SCTY SQ/CC/TAN SON NHUT AB RVN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted] CC

SUBJ: MAINTENANCE MANNING ASSISTANCE

1. REF USAFSS DFRAC 162020Z JUL IN REPLY TO YOUR MSG.

2. REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE BOOKS SAY LET'S LOOK AT THE BODY COUNT HERE: TEN ON BOARD - FRITZ, JOHNSON, PEER, DIEHL, LOOMIS, ANDERSON, DIDATO, ABEL, M. SCHAEFER, AND TOWNSEND. DIDATO'S DEROS IS 4 AUG; PEER IS 4 AUG; DIEHL IS 16 AUG. SHAFFER AND MORTON HAVE DEPARTED. NOW WE'RE DOWN TO TEN BODIES WITH THREE OF THESE "PACKING THEIR BAGS".

3. I HAVE NO FAITH IN GASHIA OR SYLVIA AS IN PUTS, TO WIT: GASHIA WAS ORIGINALLY AN INPUT FOR DEC 70, WAS THEN SLIPPED TO JULY; THEN WAS ELIMINATED FROM TRAINING AT GAFB /REF 6994 DM/DP 130845Z JUL 71/. SYLVIA WAS ORIGINALLY AN INPUT FOR JAN, WAS SLIPPED TO FEB, THEN AUG. EVEN IF TSGT SCHEEL SHOWS IN AUG, I'LL ONLY HAVE EIGHT MAINTENANCE PEOPLE HERE. SSGT MORRISON, DOUGLAS J SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN JUNE GRADUATED FROM [redacted] 6 APR 71 [redacted] HAS NOT ARRIVED

DATE	TIME
MONTH JULY	YEAR 71
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 2

DRAFTER: TYPED NAME AND TITLE: CAPT BAXA | PHONE [redacted]

RELEASER: SIGNATURE | TYPED NAME AND TITLE: [redacted], LIEUT, MAJ, USAF

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

REPRODUCING INSTRUCTIONS: GP-1

DD FORM 1 NOV. 63 173 [redacted] OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

[redacted]

SINGLE

TYPE MSG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 2006002 Jul 71

FROM:

TO:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]. IN ADDITION THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED HAVE NOT ARRIVED; A1C DENT, JOHN A, MAY 71; SSGT KEY, GARRET M, JUN 71; SGT BRUCE, THOMAS R, MAR 71; SGT MANZ, RICHARD W, JUL 71.

4. LATEST PROJ GAINS ROSTER AVAIL HERE /24 JUN 71/ NOW ONLY SHOWS GASHI TKD 15 JAN 72, GILBERT 15 DEC 72, SQUIRREL 15 AUG 71, SYLVIA 15 AUG 72, ONE UNKD SGT 15 SEP 71 AND ONE UNKD SGT 15 AUG 71.

5. FYI, USAFSS ASSUMPTION RE NORTON IS WRONG. NORTON'S DATE ARRIVED STATION MAY HAVE BEEN 4 AUG 70, BUT HIS DEROS WAS 25 JUL BECAUSE OF TDY ENROUTE AT [redacted] TO ARRIVAL. HE DEPARTED HERE ON 6 JUL TO ENTER WATER SURVIVAL CLASS AT HOMESTEAD PRIOR TO 691688 REPORTING MONTH OF AUG. GP-1

DATE	TIME
MONTH JULY	YEAR 71
PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 2

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: CAPT BAKA

PHONE: [redacted]

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: R.J. LEONT. MAJ, USAF

[redacted]

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS: GP-1

DD FORM 1 NOV. 63 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: GPO1968 O-296-634

Document # 2811

DMZ

DMZM-[redacted]

COORDINATE COMMANDER

FILE ADM WEB

0994 (3)

(291A DM)

FESAYUW RUMMRSA2287 291/142-SSSS--RUMMJSA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 2001042 JUL

FM 6994 SCTY SQ TSN AVN

TO RUMMGHA/DSR/DMM/SHEELER AFB HAWAII

INFO RUMMGHA/6002 SPT SQ/ASSO SHEELER AFB HAWAII

RUMMRSA/USAFSS/DPMMA/DPRC

RUMMGHA/DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ/ASN/GA HANG AB XVII

[redacted]

[illegible] MANNING ASSISTANCE [illegible]

[illegible] USAFSS/DPRAC 1[illegible] JUL [illegible]

[illegible] INFO [illegible] AND [illegible] PERSONNEL AFSC [illegible]

[illegible] AND DEMIS AS [illegible] ALL PERFORM ALL MAINTENANCE

[illegible] DET 2 6994 SC[illegible]

[illegible] TOWNSEND

[illegible] BECKARD

[illegible] JOHNSON

[illegible] ANDERSON

[illegible] RUMMJSA2VDC [illegible]

[illegible] ROBERTS

[illegible] BOONE

[illegible] SCOTT

[illegible] BOWLER

[illegible] PERSONNEL ARE THE ONLY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL PRESENT-

[illegible] MY COUNTERPARTS [illegible] OF AFSC 301X2 AND T[illegible]

[illegible] AFSC 30XXX FOR [illegible] 1120. BASED ON [illegible]

[illegible] SHOW DET 2 TO

[illegible] PERCENTAGES

[illegible] SGT CASEY, YOUR

[illegible] TRAINING AT GOOD-[illegible]

[illegible] SCHOOL. SGT [illegible]

[illegible] 71 AND SSGT DITHE[illegible]

[illegible] WILL BE MANNED

[illegible] 6994 SCTY SQ HAS [illegible]

[illegible] FOR APPROX [illegible]

[illegible] ASSISTANCE TO DET

[illegible] 6994TH AND DET [illegible]

[illegible] COMPLETE MAINTENANCE

[illegible] MANNING ASSISTANCE

[illegible] CUT WITH CONTINUAL

[redacted]

SHIFTS. EFFICIENCY IS LOST DUE TO [illegible] PERSONNEL
CONTINUALLY [illegible] ON AIRCRAFT WITH HIGH-POWERED [illegible] AND PER-
EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY. REQUEST YOU [illegible] FOR
ASSISTANCE.

Document # 31

UNCLAS - F T C

FROM: [illegible]

TO: [illegible]

INFO: [illegible]

69M SCTY SQ/LGS/TAA [illegible]

[illegible] SUP SQ/[illegible]

[illegible] SQ/LGS/[illegible]

UNCLAS A F T C LGS

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

1. REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING A RELEASE FROM [illegible] OF THE FOLLOWING REQUISITIONS. THESE ITEMS URGENTLY REQUIRED.

STOCK NO	ADD	QTY	REQUISITION		SERIAL
5895-386262X[illegible]	MODULE	1 EA	FB5263 1293 0632	[illegible]	[illegible]
5895-386262X[illegible]	MODULE	1 EA	FB5263 1305 0636	[illegible]	[illegible]
5895-386262X[illegible]	MODULE	1 EA	FB5263 1372 0309	[illegible]	[illegible]
5895-386262X[illegible]	MODULE	1 EA	FB5263 1345 0945	[illegible]	[illegible]
5895-386262X[illegible]	MODULE	1 EA	FB5263 1331 0110	[illegible]	[illegible]
5895-386262X[illegible]	MODULE	1 EA	FB5263 1272 0439	[illegible]	[illegible]

2. [illegible] ASSY [illegible] FOR TRACE ITEM. ADVISE [illegible]

DATE: 13

DEC 71

1 1

TYPED NAME AND OFFICE: SAME AS RELEASER

PHONE: 4447

SIGNATURE: [illegible]

TYPE: CECIL [illegible], [illegible], USAF

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 54

JOINT MESSAGE FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLAS [redacted]

TYPE

PRIORITY

ACTION ROUTIN

INFO

Document # 32

FROM: DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ DANANG AB SVN

TO: HQ AFSC/LOSEA

INFO: WR-ALC/MMRCB/ROBINS AFB GA

PSR/LASS/WEEKLEY AFB NY

366 SUP SQ/BSMSE/DANANG AIRB SVN

UNCLAS [redacted] LOB

SUBJ: RETAIN TEMPORARY AUTHORIZATION FOR Red VANS

REF USAFSS/LOSEA 0514064 NOV 71

REQUEST THIS ACTIVITY RETAIN AUTHORIZATION FOR S/N'S 5415147 AND 5415123 AND UTILIZE AS SUPPLY STORAGE FACILITIES. AT PRESENT THERE IS NO STORAGE SPACE AVAILABLE TO HOUSE THE INCREASED QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES CREATED BY THE MOVE OF ALR-34 AND 35 SYSTEM TO THIS LOCATION. PLEASE CONSIDER THIS REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION OF LOSEA S/D71-153.

ADVISE

DATE	TIME
8	
MONTH NOV	YEAR 71
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 1

DRAFT

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: NAME AS RELEASER

PHONE 4047

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: HAYDEN S. JOHNSON, SMSgt, USAF MCCIO SUPPLY

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS [redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

FORM NOV 63 173

NEW ACCES EDITION OF 1 MAY 63 WHICH MAY BE USED.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED [redacted]

Document # 33

RTTEZYUW RUNTEJA0017 2561822-EEEE--RUNUUAA 21 SEP 71
ZNY EEEEE ZDC
R 131730Z SEP
FM USAFSS
TO AIG 8554
RUNTPDA/8548TECH INGBP/TE/GOODFELLOW AFB TX
ZEN/6960SPTGP/KELLY AFB TX
ZEN/6993SCTYSQ/KELLY AFB TX
ZEN/AFSCC/KELLY AFB TX
ZEN/AFCD/KELLY AFB TX
ZEN/OLAA ESR/KELLY AFB TX
XMT/TUSLOG DET 94
XMT/TUSLOG DET 284
BT
UNC[redacted]S [redacted] DET
BECAUSE OF THE DELETION OF THE FIVE LEVEL FROM THE 203X1 AFSC EFFECTIVE 1 JAN 72, THE 20391 CDCDC WILL BE DELETED AS A FORMAL CRSE FROM OUR INVENTORY. NO MORE ENROLLMENTS IN THIS COURSE WILL BE ACCEPTED AFTER 1 OCT 71. IN ADDITION, ALL PERSONNEL WILL BE DISENROLLED FROM THIS COURSE ON 1 JAN 72. THE TNG MATERIALS WILL CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE FOR SELF-STUDY FOR WAPS TESTING.
BT
#2017

NNN

IN 08130/SEP13. /ACK

162A
DA FOR TDP IN
OJT
TRAINC

[redacted]

File 3/5 RS

Document # 34

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: SSgt Preslar (DOV/2441)

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to Det 2, 6976th Sety Sq

TO: CC
DO
IG TDY

1. Purpose of visit was to conduct the quarterly standardization/evaluation inspection/assistance visit, familiarization with treatment operations, and to render staff assistance.

2. Names of Visitors: SSgt Michael D. Preslar
SSgt Jack L. Lukens

3. Personnel contacted: Maj Ledet, Commander
Capt Chapelle, Operations Officer
SMSgt Hayler, NCOIC Operations
TSgt Haupt, NCOIC Exploitation/Analysis
SSgt Wilson, NCOIC Stan/Eval Section
SSgt Stiles, NCOIC Scheduling

4. A comprehensive three section Standardization/Evaluation Management Checklist prepared by DO was used as a guide for the visit. Section 1 is documentation, Section 2 is administration, and Section 3 is crew/mission procedures. Evaluation findings were discussed with the Commander and Operations Officer prior to departure.

5. Items by section:

a. Section 1 - Documentation

(1) Cover sheets are filed on the top of each section in the AF Form 846 on each individual.

(2) All 846s that were inspected had the appropriate documents filed in the proper section.

(3) USAFSS Form 74a (Airborne Operator Flight Check) are signed by the examinee, the flight examiner, the examinee's supervisor, and the operations officer.

(4) Form 74s are filed in a timely manner. The only exception being when one of the indorsers is on leave, TDY, R&R, etc.

(5) Examinees satisfactorily complete all required written exams prior to being scheduled for flight checks. No ibtics evaluations are exempt from this requirement.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(6) Unless crews following the [illegible] are now being scheduled [illegible] the required time limits [illegible].

(7) The Form 7A2 that were improperly completed [illegible] have been corrected which reflected the performance of the crewmen during the flight check. The Form 7A2 are being accomplished [illegible] directives.

(8) A few 446s still do not have all the required training certificates. This has been a continuing problem for all units in the 6947th complex. Efforts have been made and are still being made to obtain the certificates on the few individuals that do not have them.

(9) All required training is properly documented on the AF Form 1291.

(10) All AF Form 942s that were checked reflect the flight examinations indicated by the USAFSS Form 74.

b. Section II - Administration

(1) The unit has an efficient system for scheduling semi-annual evaluations within required time limits. The Stan/Eval section utilizes a board to monitor due dates for flight checks for each individual. Individuals are then notified by letter, scheduled to test, and complete the flight check prior to the due date.

(2) No crewmembers were found to be in delinquent status.

(3) In the past, personnel who have exceeded six months between evaluations have been declared delinquent. This fact has been documented by letter and entered in the individuals AF Form 846.

(4) The scheduling section is notified of any delinquent personnel.

(5) Delinquent personnel are scheduled to fly with an instructor until they are recertified by a flight examiner.

(6) Personnel who do not participate in an operational sortie for more than 30 days are placed in non-current status. Any individual who is non-current flies his first operational mission subsequent to his non-currency date under the direct supervision of an instructor.

(7) All flight examiners and instructors are appointed on special orders.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(8) The unit has all required regulations and manuals on hand and up to date.

(9) The Stan/Eval section has sufficient written examinations on hand to satisfy all requirements.

(10) The scheduling section utilizes an efficient system for maintaining flying hour totals to insure that aircrew members do not exceed the 30 consecutive day or quarterly maximum flying hour requirements.

(11) A Stan/Eval Review Panel is conducted each quarter and the minutes of the panel are on hand.

(12) Trends noted in stan/eval results are used to direct the focus of proficiency/aircrew training. The Stan/Eval and Proficiency Training Sections closely coordinate and the training section is directly responsive to stan/eval trends and/or suggestions.

a. Section III - Crew/Mission Procedures

(1) At the pre-mission briefings observed all crewmembers reported on time and were in good flying condition.

(2) The pre-mission preparation is adequate.

(3) Mission material is inventoried and receipted for by the Airborne Mission Supervisor.

(4) The pre-mission briefing covers all required items.

(5) The briefings were presented in a very professional manner.

(6) All crewmembers were attentive to all items covered during the pre-mission briefing.

(7) The AMS takes control and maintains it throughout the mission.

(8) Position starting assignments are assigned by the AMS.

(9) Tack data carried aboard mission aircraft was found to be adequate.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(10) Three pre-mission briefings were observed. At two of the briefings crewmembers were not physically checked for required items, dog tags, [illegible] kits, etc. The one briefing where crewmembers were checked, the AMS was a flight examiner. All three briefings were conducted by a duty analyst or an analyst on the crew. At all three briefings the AMS had little to say or do. Det 2 should place more emphasis on the duties and responsibilities of the AMS during the pre-mission briefing. The AMS should conduct the pre-mission briefing to include an analyst presenting the analytical portion. The AMS should physically check each crewmember for the required items during each pre-mission briefing. Agree

Don't agree

This is an equivocal item.

(11) The AMS does not conduct spot checks of emergency/aircrew knowledge on non-training flights. All aircrew members receive written examinations on emergency procedures on Initial, No-Notice, Semi-Annual, and Special Upgrade flights. In addition, aircraft commanders periodically ask emergency procedures questions and conduct egress training.

(12) The pre-mission briefing is not recorded as there is no recorder available for this purpose. A recorder has been on order for quite some time.

(13) When a recorder becomes available Det 2 will maintain briefing tapes for a 24 hour period.

(14) The combined briefing is adequate.

(15) The 362nd TEWS briefing contained all the required information and was presented in a professional manner.

(16) The USATRS crew presentation at the combined briefings was thorough and was presented in a professional manner.

(17) All crewmembers checked their life support gear for proper fit. Survival radios were checked for proper working.

(18) Parachutes were checked by all crewmembers observed for overall serviceability and inspection/repack dates.

(19) On the missions observed all equipment was pre-flighted prior to take off.

(20) If a malfunction is discovered during pre-flight it is reported and corrected prior to take off.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(21) Of the missions observed all crewmembers had their seat belts fastened and were gloves during take offs and landings.

(22) Mission equipment is activated and checked immediately after take off.

(23) Interphone procedures and aircrew coordination were outstanding on the missions observed.

(24) On the missions observed crewmembers appeared to be proficient in mission knowledge, procedures, and mission equipment.

(25) Except for the previously mentioned pre-mission briefing (item 10) the AMS performed his duties in an outstanding manner. The AMS maintained positive control of USAFSS personnel and resources throughout the mission.

(26) Logs and forms were maintained and completed IAW existing directives.

(27) Equipment shutdown is accomplished after all mission requirements have been met.

(28) The post mission security check was very thorough. The AMS personally double checked each position to insure that no classified information was inadvertantly left on the aircraft.

(29) All mission material was accounted for prior to leaving the aircraft and at the post mission debrief.

(30) Detailed debriefings are conducted but not recorded. Recording of the debriefings is no longer required.

(31) To the best of my knowledge all reports were accurate and complete.

(32) Overall view:

(a) Crew Proficiency: Outstanding. On the mission I observed the crew fixed 27 of 28 targets including 15 voice targets. A very outstanding mission.

(b) Operating Procedures: Outstanding on the missions observed.

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. Training Program: Very efficient. The Training Section and Stan/Eval Section coordinate closely to insure that accurate, up-to-date information is available to all flying personnel.

d. Stan/Eval Administration: Outstanding. The Stan/Eval Section is efficiently managed by highly qualified personnel.

e. Stan/Eval Effectiveness: Outstanding. From my observations during this visit it is apparent the stan/eval program at Det 2 is doing the job we want it to do.

Michael D. Presler

MICHAEL D. PRESLAR, SSgt, USAF
Chief, Squadron Stan/Eval

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document # 35

[illegible]

[redacted]

SUBJ: PERMANENT COMM FACILITY, DET 2, [illegible]

REF: SCHEME 64C [illegible]-[illegible]-71-02[illegible]

REF: MY QUICK [illegible] JUN 71 (NETAC 6994 SS).

1. [illegible] FOR SUBJECT PROGRAM NO LONG[illegible]

MISSION REQUIREMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE [illegible]

UNCERTAIN. REQUEST SUBJECT PROGRAM/SCHEME [illegible]

2. REQUEST RSS REVIEW AVAILABLE COMMAND ASS[illegible]

TO BE USED BY SUBJECT PROGRAM AND RECOMMEND [illegible]

DISPOSITION ACCORDINGLY. CPHL.

DT

[illegible]

[illegible]

TW [illegible]

Document # 36

[redacted]

XX

22 OCT 71 01 45Z

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY

USA-563

USM-704/ACC

USA-564/DO/CC

[redacted]

INFO: USA-561/DO/CC

PSR/DORT

USAFSS/DORT

USA-562

4 CGS

1 COM

1 CC R/

1 DO R/

[redacted] DO OCT 71

1. DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER FORECAST IN THE DANANG AREA IN ASSOCIATION WITH TYPHOON HESTER, 362ND TEWS IS EVACUATING ALL OPERATIONALLY CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAILAND. A TOTAL OF NINE AIRCRAFT WILL DEPLOY, AS FAR AS IS KNOWN AT THIS TIME. OF THESE, THE FOLLOWING ARE OPERATIONAL AT THIS TIME:

3 ALR-35, R-1830 (CCZ)

1 ALR-35, R-2000 (CCZ-Q)

1 ALR-38, R-2000 (MAXI)

IN ADDITION ONE MAXI IS ALREADY ON STATION AT NKP WHICH

22 1[illegible]

OCT 1[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

3314

CONRAD A CHAPELLE, CAPT, USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER

DO/CHAPELLE

S [redacted] UNNELS

[redacted]

[redacted]

WAS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO DANANG TODAY, BUT WILL NOT DO SO. THE REMAINING AIRCRAFT WHICH WILL DEPLOY ARE NOT PRESENTLY MISSION CAPABLE. ONE OF THE ALR-35 (CCZ) IS ACFT 735, ASSIGNED TO PHU CAT, WHICH WAS HERE DUE TO MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS.

2. FOR USA-564. PROJECT OFFICER IS CAPT CONRAD A CHAPELLE, PROJECT NCO IS TSGT JOHN LESLIE. THEY WILL PROVIDE POINT OF CONTACT FOR OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT MATTERS. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR BRAVO SHOP THAT A TOTAL OF FOUR OF OUR BRAVO MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WILL DEPLOY.

3. FOR USA-561/DM/DA. SGTS BROWN AND HAYES FROM YOUR ORGANIZATION WILL DEPLOY. REQUEST YOU SECURE APPROPRIATE TDY ORDER AMENDMENTS.

4. FOR [redacted] REQUEST YOU OBTAIN REQUIRED COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR A TOTAL OF 42 USAFSS PERSONNEL FOR AN ESTIMATED 3-4 DAYS.

5. FOR ACC. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE APPROPRIATE TASKING AND TECH INFO FOR MISSIONS TASKED WHILE DEPLOYED TO USA-564, PROMINENTLY FLAGGED FOR USA-563 DEPLOYED.

6. FOR USA-564. REQUEST YOU ADVISE 6[illegible] COMM OF DEPLOYMENT. WE WIL[illegible] REQUIRE 1 DESK, 1 TYPEWRITER AND NORMAL OFFICE SUPPLIES IN SI SECURE WORKING AREA, MISSION BRIEFING SUPPORT AS PRACTICABLE, BILLETING ARRANGEMENTS FOR 4[illegible] ENLISTED AND 1 OFFICER, AND SUCH VEHICLE SUPPORT AS YOU CAN OBTAIN FOR US FROM HOST BASE ASSETS.

7. FOR PSR/USAFSS/USA-564. WHILE NO TYPHOON CONDITION IS IN EFFECT FOR DANANG AT THIS TIME, WE ANTICIPATE DECLARATION WITHIN NEXT 6 HOURS. WE WILL ADVISE THROUGH NORMAL REPORTING CHANNELS.

8. FIRST DEPLOYMENT AIRCRAFT IS SCHEDULED FOR 220600Z DEPARTURE. LAST AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE ON THE GROUND BY 221300Z. PROJECT NCOIC WILL BE ON FIRST IN, PROJECT OFFICER ON LAST ONE.

[redacted] [redacted] PAGE 3

[redacted]

9. FOR ACC. REQUEST EARLIEST POSSIBLE DISPATCH OF TASKING INFO TO PRECLUDE VIOLATION OF CREW REST WHEN TASKING ARRIVES LATE.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document # 40

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

[redacted]

TYPE MSG		MULTI	SINGLE
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION			
INFO			

DTG 050730Z OCT 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: 6994 SCTY SQ/SO

[redacted] DO OCT 71

SUBJ: PROJECT ABERDANT FENCING

1. [redacted]

[redacted] DIRECTED A REPEAT OF PROJECT ABERDANT FOR THE PERIOD 16-26 SEP 71. UNLIKE THE FIRST ATTEMPT THE [redacted], WHICH DEPENDED ON IMMEDIATE (30 MINUTES OR LESS) REACTION TO ARMY FIX ON SPECIFIC TARGET, THIS OPERATION WAS BASED ON A [redacted] FIX CLUSTERS, ONE EACH FOR [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] AND [redacted] FIX CLUSTERS, OBTAINED OVER [redacted] EXACT 45 DAYS, INDICATED THAT THESE UNITS WERE STABLE IN LOCATION AND WERE ALL KNOWN TO BE USERS OF THE [redacted]. RESULTS, [redacted] ALL [redacted], WERE INCONCLUSIVE. [redacted]

2. [redacted] IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT IN [redacted] AT OR VERY CLOSE TO [redacted] OF THE FIX CLUSTERS A [redacted] COMPLEX WAS DISCOVERED. [redacted] A WIDE VARIETY OF [redacted] FROM WEAPONS AND [redacted] TO COPIES OF IN ARVN [redacted] AT THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY [redacted] ON 26 SEP WHICH [redacted] INDICATED THAT ONE

DATE: 5 MONTH: OCT YEAR: [redacted] PAGE NO: 1 NO. OF PAGES: [redacted]

PRINT NAME AND TITLE

[redacted]

[redacted] A. CHAPELLE, CAPT, USAF

[redacted]

DOE FOR FEED BACK (also Sent for Tenure)

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

[redacted]

TYPE MSG | MULTI | SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

INFO

DTG

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

TO:

[redacted]

TIGER HAD BEEN DEMOTED FROM MAJOR TO CAPTAIN FOR LOSS OF RADIOS AND EQUIPMENT.

3. ALL CAVES AND TUNNELS, INCLUDED ONE COMPLEX WITH 15 ROOMS, 4 TO 5 LEVELS, RUNNING WATER AND [illegible] SUPPLIES WERE EITHER BLOWN UP OR [illegible] WITH PERSISTENT CS GAS/[illegible]. FWD CASUALTIES (US): 2 KIA, 9 WIA, [illegible] (EFFAIR) CAPTURED. 2 VERY LARGE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, 15-20 CAVES/TUNNELS DESTROYED OR TREATED WITH CS. 1 CACHE (NFI) OF DAMAGED AND SHAPED CHARGES DESTROYED.

DATE | TIME

MONTH | YEAR

PAGE NO. 2 | NO. OF PAGES 2

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or printed) NAME AND TITLE

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document # 52

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURIT[redacted]

TYPE MSG	BOD	MULTI	SINGLE
		XX	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DTG 05 0547 SEPT 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM:

DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: 6994 SCTY SQ/BOM

[redacted] BOM SEPT 71

SUBJ: CUSTOMER FEEDBACK REPORT

1. APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK AGO, AT SUGGESTION OF THIS UNIT, 25TH TASS (HELIX FACS) BEGAN KEEPING A RECORD OF ALL BLACK BEAR FIXES ON A PLOT BOARD IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE CLUSTERS FOR INTENSIVE VERIFICATION. IN EIGHT DAYS, APPROXIMATELY TEN KILOMETERS NORTH OF LAST LOCATION OF 3RD NVA BN, ON WHO VR CONTINUITY WAS LOST TWO WEEKS AGO. SPECIAL VR OF THAT AREA IS BEING FRAGGED . . CONFIRM THIS LOCATION AND STRIKES ARE ANTICIPATED IF INFORMATION IS CONFIRMED.

DATE	TIME
05	1[redacted]
MONTH	YEAR
SEPT	1971
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE
ETHERSON/DOM	3[redacted]

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

FOR: CONRAD A CHAPELLE, CAPT, USAF

OPERATIONS OFFICER

SECURITY CLASSIFICAT[redacted]

Document # 53

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

20 OCT 71 10 47Z

#1406

ZFTCUR [illegible]
RT YMCETS
DE YMCMC [illegible]
ZFY [illegible]
ZNIS RRALL [illegible]
R 200447Z
FM 5008 SCITY
TO SINAS
INFO DET-1 [illegible]
DET 2 6998 S[illegible]
DET 5 6998 S[illegible]
ZEX

[redacted] SORV

SS USAF PASS TO INYSP; AFSSO AFSO PASS TO [illegible];
SSO RADAR PASS TO INNS; SSO CINCPAC FOR ATTN [illegible];
CINSAC PASS TO SCUS; USAFSS PASS TO SORT/[illegible]; [illegible] PASS TO
CCC; [illegible] PASS TO RTY.

SUBJ: WEEKLY COMBAT ACCESS FEEDBACK REPORT FOR 5-12 OCT 71.
1. BLUE BEETLE (C99ASS): A TOTAL OF 42 MISSIONS WERE
SCHEDULED TO WORK WITH FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS. TWENTY-
THREE TARGET REPORTS WERE PASSED TO THE FAC FOR VISUALLY
RECONNOITERED. FIVE OF THEM, AND SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY
WAS DETECTED. [illegible] AIR STRIKES WERE INITIATED [illegible]
BLUE BEETLE REPORTS.
2. BLACK BEAR (C99 FM OCT 3): FIXES PASSED VIA [illegible]
OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS HAVE EXPOSED READILY [illegible] FIX
CLUSTERS IN THE SANGRA ON 15 OCT HELIX PASS [illegible] AIR CAV
ATTACHED TO THE 2ND LIV CONDUCTED OPERATIONS AGAINST THE
THREE CLUSTERS. GROUND FIRE WAS EXPERIENCED [illegible] HELIC-
OPTER WAS LOST. EXTENSIVE BUNKER AND CAVE COMPLEXES WERE
UNCOVERED AND AIR CAV OPERATIONS CONTINUE. ON 17 OCT, AN
FA STRIKE WAS CONDUCTED AT YQ9589 BASED PRIMARILY ON
FIX DATA AND SI CORRELATION. THIS STRIKE RESULTED IN THE
DESTRUCTION OF SPIDER ANTENNA AND BUILDING ASSOCIATED
THEREWITH, 3 YAGI ANTENNAS WHICH APPEARED SIMILAR TO TV
ANTENNAS, AND 1 [illegible]-FOOT HOLE ANTENNA. 3
ENEMY KIA AND 5 POSSIBLE KIA. OBJ-42 SEEDING IN PROGRESS
FOR 22 OCT.
3. (REPORTED BY OCT 8 - INFORMATION SOURCE: 19TH SPIDER
O-2, 28 TASS 21.) AS A RESULT OF AN
ACCUMULATION OF FIXES, PRINCIPALLY OF 575TH ARTY BN,
19TH LIGHT INFANTRY HAS BEEN CONDUCTING OPERATIONS ON
CHARLIE RIDGE SINCE 5 OCTOBER, 3 TO 4 COMPANIES OF
INFANTRY AND 3 RANGER TEAMS HAVE BEEN COMMITTED TO THE
OPERATION. A LARGE CAVE, IMPROVED CAVE AND BUNKER COMPLEX
HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS INDICATE IT WAS
OCCUPIED BY ELEMENTS OF COMPANY 10 AND COMPANY 11 OF THE
275TH ARTY, C-34 BTN, 5TH INDEPENDENT BTN AND 20TH MOOR.
A NUMBER OF WEAPONS AND QUANTITIES OF AMMO WERE CAP-
TURED, INCLUDING RADIOS [illegible]

Done good
Stuff

INTEREST IN THE SAPPER [illegible] BY [illegible] (RSE [illegible]
AN [illegible] PROCESS). [illegible]
TOOLS [illegible]
[illegible]
NOT ABLE TO [illegible] OPERATION [illegible]
COMMANDO VAULT (TD, [illegible]) IS [illegible]
6. THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION REACTED TO THE [illegible]
FIXED BY SEND[illegible] AREAS OF 100 [illegible]
INSERTED [illegible] RECON OF [illegible]
RESULTS ARE [illegible].
7. THE [illegible] DIV [illegible] 27 ROK OF 17[illegible]
THREE OTHER [illegible] FIXES.
8. XXIV CORPS INTEL REPORTS THAT ASSETS [illegible] (DET2)
FIXES INDICATES 2 ENEMY UNITS, INCLUDING [illegible] ROCKET
TEAM, WERE DEPLOYED NEAR ATS4465 [illegible] ATS5[illegible] WITH THE
INTENTION OF ASSISTING LOCAL VILLAGES AND LNG[illegible] ROCKETS
ON [illegible] AND. XXIV INTEL [illegible] SEVERAL [illegible]
COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTS HAVE [illegible] INCREASE IN
ENEMY TACTICAL ACTIVITY, HOWEVER, WE DO KNOW THAT ITS TROOPS
REMAIN IN AREA 2 AND DO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO [illegible]
[illegible] SAPPER, UNKNOWN.
9. ADDITIONAL XXIV INTO REPORTS THAT DET 2 FIXED THE ENEMY
SAPPER BN ON 12 OCT INDICATING A 50KM MOVE [illegible] LAST FIX.
IT MAY BE RELATED TO NHAM DUC BUT CONFIRMING FIXES
NEEDED TO ESTABLISH LOCATION.
10. (XXIV) AIRCRAFT FROM B CO, 123 AVIATION, RECEIVED FIRE
WHILE FLYING OVER BS1[illegible]2 AND BS1[illegible]. ARDF AND INDICATED
CONTINUED ENEMY PRESENCE IN THIS REGION BY FIXING
SEVERAL U/I TERMINALS IN THE AREA DURING THE PAST WEEK.
11. (XXIV) DET 1 ARDF HAS LOCATED PROBABLE ASSETS SAPPER
BN ELEMENTS BY OF FORMER BASE AREA 124 BY SEVERAL
U/I FIXES ON 12 AND 13 OCT. ARDF HAS NOT LOCATED THE [illegible]
HDQTRS SINCE ITS 9 OCT FIX AT BS7[illegible]172.
12. (DET 3) AFSSO UDORN REPORTS THAT, OF 350 FIXES RECEIVED,
36 WERE USED FOR TARGET ANALYSIS BY HQ 7/13AF.
13. NO SATISFACTORY OR GROUND BEAVER FEEDBACK AVAILABLE
AT THIS TIME.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

ANNO2PORB2646
R YWRDZO
E YWRDOK 0030 2168918
NY WWORN
KZK RR HLL OLI LZZ RNI DE
R 040505Z
FM 6994 SCTY SQ
TO SIVAS (LESS 7TH AF)
INFO DET 1 6994 SCTY SQ
DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ
DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ
7TH [redacted] DORW
AFSSO USAF PASS TO INVSB; AFSSO AFSS PASS TO SORE; AFSSO
PACAF PASS TO INXS; AFSSO 7AF PASS TO INOR; SSO CINCPAC
FOR ATTN: 252; DIRNSA PASS TO B643; USAFSS PASS TO DORT/
OUI PSR PASS TO DOR; 6948 TTG PASS TO TTY.
SUBJ: WEEKLY COMBAT CROSS FEEDBACK REPORT FOR 24-30 JULY.
6994 SCTY SQ:
DUR[illegible] THIS PERIOD, A TOTAL OF 49 AIRCRAFT WERE SCHEDULED
TO [illegible]RK WITH FAC'S. 36 POSITION REPORTS WERE PASSED AND
THE FAC VISUALLY RECONNOITTERED (VR) 24. AIR STRIKES WERE
CALLED ON TWO TARGETS. 24 PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED TARGETS
WERE PASSED TO THE FAC, WHO VR'D 16. NONE OF THESE WERE
HIT. ON 24 JULY 2 A-37'S HIT ONE POSITION, HOWEVER HEAVY
FOLIAGE PREVENTED ANY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. ON 25 JUL,
2 A-37'S HIT ONE POSITION, DESTROYING ONE FORTIFIED
FIGHTING POSITION. AT 0246Z ON 28 JUL, [illegible] AIRCRAFT
OBSERVED NUMEROUS SMALL BOATS TRAVELLING UP AND DOWN A
RIVER NEAR THE VILLAGE OF XOM NHUT THANG. INFORMATION
WAS PASSED TO APPROPRIATE CONSUMERS AND AFT ORBITED THE
AREA FOR APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES. DURING THIS TIME NO
OVERT ACTIVITY WAS OBSERVED ON THE VESSELS.
DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ:
THE 9TH INF DIV REACTED TO 10 OF DET 1'S FIXES AND
EXPENDED A TOTAL OF 27BRDS, 19BRDS OF 105MM, 74RDS OF
[illegible] M. AND 13RDS OF 81M, IN TACTICAL SUPPORT.
DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ:
THE 25RD INF DIV REACTED TO 5 OF DET 2'S FIXES AND
EXPENDED A TOTAL OF 30RDS, 72RDS OF 105MM AND 6RDS OF
[illegible]MM, IN TACTICAL SUPPORT. ADDITIONALLY, THE FOLLOWING
IS QUOTED FROM A DET 2 MSG TO 6994 SCTY SQ, DTG 310055Z
JUL: (THIS CONCERNS A FIX OBTAINED BY DET 2 ON 19 JUL)
RESULTS OF THE 19 JUL 71 FIX ON 575TH ROCKET ARTY HAVE
JUST BECOME KNOWN. AFTER OUR FIX WAS REPORTED, A GOLF
COMPANY, 75TH RANGER BN PATROL WAS DEBRIEFED AFTER
RETURNING FROM THAT AREA AND REPORTED THEY HAD HEARD
GENERATORS OPERATING INTERMITTENTLY IN THAT AREA.
THAT NIGHT APPROX 500 ROUNDS OF MIXED 105/155MM WAS
PLACED ON THE TARGET AREA AND ON THE 28TH, NINE AIR
STRIKES WERE PLACED ON THE SAME AREA. HELO AND FAC
OBSERVERS REPORTED ABOUT 75 BUNKERS/STRUCTURES DAMAGED
AND/OR DESTROYED. MORE ARTY WAS PLACED ON THE TGT IN
THE NEXT TWO DAYS. ON 22 JULY THREE COMPANIES WERE
INSERTED. SOME BOOBY TRAPS WERE DISCOVERED AND A FEW
CONTACTS TAKEN BUT CONTACT WAS LIGHT. 575TH ARTY COMMS
CONTACTED TWICE ON JUL - SIGTATIONS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN
ESTABLISHING CONTACT. 21 JUL - RTO WAS MADE TO
ATTEMPT TO CONTACT [illegible]. AND UNIDENTIFIED ELEMENT
AIR STRIKES IN THE [illegible] AND UNIDENTIFIED ELEMENT
[illegible] TO [illegible] AND UNIT MOVING SIGN TO

245

Mismatch

[redacted] LAST OFFICER OF ONE OF REPORTED SERIOUSLY WOUNDED.
SURGICAL SUPPLIES NEEDED, ESPECIALLY SUTURE THREAD.
SHOVELS WERE REQUESTED TO CONSTRUCT NEW BASE CAMP."
DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQN
FOLLOWING REC'D FROM AFSSO 100CRA VIA DET 3: "DURING
THE PERIOD OF JUL - 1 AUG 968 FIXES RECEIVED OF WHICH
[redacted] WERE USED FOR TARGET ANALYSIS BY FG 7/12 AF."
THE FOLLOWING IS A SUPPLEMENT TO MY COPY FOR PERIOD
17-23 JULY OPT [illegible] 0209262Z JUL REFERS:
SUBJ: GAS BARRAGE ROLL FEEDBACK:
1. ON 15 JULY ARDF CUT THE HQS 1ST BN/174TH REGT AT
UG 162541. AT 1020L 16 JUL 2 X T-28'S STRUCK AND
SILENCED A 120MM MORTAR TWO AND ONE-HALF KMS REST OF FIX.
2. ON 20 JUNE ARDF CUT HQS 188TH AT UG 183562. RAVEN VR
OF AREA REVEALED TWO POSSIBLE RADIO ANTENNAS VIC OF UG
174586. GAS METERS N/W OF ABOVE CUT. THE ANTENNAS WERE
WHITE IN COLOR AND WERE STRUNG THROUGH THE TOPS OF TREES.
ONE WAS ABOUT 30 FEET LONG AND THE OTHER APPROXIMATELY 25
FEET IN LENGTH. RAVEN ALSO SIGHTED 25 NVA MOVING WEST
ALONG TRAIL.
3. ON 16 JULY ARDF CUT AN U/I ELE AT UG 115331 AND HQS
1 AND 2ND BN'S/174TH REGT AT UG 096526 AND UG 162541.
ON 16 JULY RAVEN OBSERVED THE FOLLOWING IN SAME AREA: LARGE
AMOUNT OF SUPPLIES IN TREES ALONG STREAM FROM UG 105533
TO UG 130332; 45-50 NVA TROOPS IN KHANG KHAY (UG 1553)
WALKING AROUND IN THE OPEN; A P85 85MM GUN AT UG 102552;
AND FRESH TRUCK AND TANK TRACKS VIC UG 1053.
4. ON 19 JULY AN U/I TERM 174TH REGT HQS CUT VIC UG
109491. ON 21 JULY 2 X A-1'S STRUCK TROOPS AND BUNKERS
VIC UG 101481, ONE KM SOUTHWEST OF CUT. STRIKE PRODUCED
ONE KBA, ONE SECONDARY FIRE AND SIX BUNKERS DAMAGED.
5. ON 21 JULY HQS 4TH BN/188TH CUT VIC UG 124526. ON
22 JUL 2 X T-28'S STRUCK TROOP CONCENTRATION VIC UG
[illegible]528 AND PRODUCED THREE PROB KBA.
6. ON 9 JULY HQS 1ST BN/174TH CUT VIC UG 149528. AND ON
16 JUL VIC UG 153542. ON 22 JUL 4 X T-28'S STRUCK TROOPS
CONCENTRATION AT UG 154556 PRODUCING FOUR PROB KBA.
7. ON 21 JULY HQS 14TH AAA BN CUT VIC UG 175512 AND ON
20 JUNE 188TH REGT HQS CUT VIC UG 175553. ON 21 JULY
RAVEN DIRECTED 29 RDS OF 155 HOW FIRE ONTO 10 ENEMY
TROOPS AT UG 175510 PRODUCING FOUR PROB KBA".

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

NOON
21 61922

Document # 37

#0065

[redacted]

[redacted]

RUDO

TO 699458/EO
FM DET 2, 699458

Document # 58

[redacted] 21 OCT 71
DTG: 130600Z

FOR MAJOR EDDY FM CAPT CHAPELLE

FLG INFORMATION AMPLIFIES REMARKS YESTERDAY ON SUBJECT OF 366TFW DOI FOR POSS RECOMMENDATION FM 7AF.

ALL AVAIL INFO FROM ALL SOURCES SCREENED DAILY FOR TARGET LEADS IN "ROCKET BELT".

WORKED OUT WORKING LEVEL AGREEMENT WITH ARVN 1ST TASK FORCE AND US ADVISERS AS WELL AS 196TH BGDE.

APPROX 350 TARGETS IDENTIFIED, PRINCIPALLY FROM ARDF, AND OFTEN CORRELATED WITH AGENT OR POW REPORTS, PERTAINING TO ROCKET LAUNCH OR CACHE SITES. MOST OF THESE FIRED ON BY ARTY THROUGH THIS' ARRANGEMENT, ALTHOUGH 196TH AND 1ST TF DO NOT NORMALLY FIRE ON ANYWHERE NEAR THAT HIGH A PERCENTAGE OF ARDF FIXES.

XXIV CORPS COMMENT IN SSO XXIV CORPS DISUM 020145Z INDICATES THAT ACTIVITY IN THIS PROGRAM ESTABL BY 366TFW DOI HAS BEEN OF VALUE IN THAT IT " UNDOUBTEDLY UPSET ENEMY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DANANG AREA".

A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PERIOD BEFORE THIS PROGRAM WAS SET UP AND THE RESULTS SINCE THEN IS REVEALING.

1 JAN - 5 JUL
ROCKET ATTACKS 20
IMPACTS 114
ON BASE 64
OFF BASE 50

B
1 C-130 DESTROYED
10 C-130 DAMAGED
1 F-4 DAMAGED
1 OV-10 DAMAGED
2 MISC ACFT DAMAGED
38 BLDGS DEST/DAMAGED
850,000 GAL POL DESTROYED
9 KIA (5 US)
59 WIA (39 US)

5 JUL - 10 OCT
ROCKET ATTACKS 3
(TWO ON BASE)
IMPACTS 13
ON BASE 5
OFF BASE 8

BDA
2 VANS DAMAGED
NO CASUALTIES

KKKK
////////////////////////END INFORMAL////////////////////////////////

Document # 60

0
05
ORA008
//PRIORITY//
SSN 0162
P 070645Z 7
FM 6994 SCTY SQ
TO DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ
DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ
[redacted]
SUBJ: ARDF COVERAGE IN SEA AREAS 9, 10 AN 11. (C)
1. MACV J2(GEN PTTS) HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER INSUFFICIENT ARDF RESULTS ON THE FOLLOWING TACTICAL UNITS WITHIN SEA AREAS 9, 10 AND 11: M0108, M0708, M0774, M1132 AND M3135.
2. IT IS HIGHLY POSSIBLE THOSE UNITS HAVE RELOCATED FROM THEIR NORMAL AO'S AND ARE NOT IN THE AREAS THE CMA'S PROVIDE THE TECH DATE FOR VIA THE TDL. BADED ON THE ABOVE ASSUMPTION REQUEST A THOUDUCH REVIEW OF AVAILABLE IN-HOUSE TECH DATE TO INSURE CURRENCY AND PROVEDE SUPPLEMENTAL TDL'S ON THESE TARGETS ON ALL MISSIONS OPETATION IN THE 9, 10 AND 11 AREAS. ALSO, REQUEST DATA BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN YOUR DETS TO INCLUDE THE TDL'S PROVEDED BY THE CMA'S.
3. ADVISE THIS HQS OF ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND ALSO RESULTS OF THE ABOVE ACTIONS.
200
0162

[redacted]

NNNN

JOINT MESSAGE FORM

Document # 61

[redacted]

TAPE USE | BOOK | MULTI | SINGLE

ACTION: DC [illegible]

INFO:

FROM: DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: 6994 SCTY SQ/DO
INFO: DET 3, 699455

[redacted] DOE AUG 71

SUBJ: AF [illegible] COVERAGE IN SEA AREAS 9, 10, AND 11.

REF UR: DC 0706452 AUG 71

1. ~~THE FOLLOWING [illegible] FROM~~ INFO:

[redacted]

LAPVJ OPS/ASMS

SUBJ: PRE-EMPTIVE TASKING

1. DUE TO LACK OF TECH DATA AND COMMS INACTIVITY, THE FOLLOWING RD'S HAVE BEEN DELETED FROM PRE-EMPTIVE TASKING EFFORT: M1132, M0708 AND R1786.

2. DIRECTED BY J2 MACV

UNQUOTE

2. WE WILL COMPILE AS MUCH DATA ON THESE RDS AS WE HAVE AVAILABLE HOWEVER DUE TO THE RECENT LARGE SCALE SOI CHANGE WE CAN NOT BE SURE THIS DATA WILL BE COMPLETELY ACCURATE.

3. TO ENSURE THE CMAS PROVIDE THE MOST CURRENT DATA SUGGEST THESE RDS BE PLACED BACK ON PRE-EMPTIVE TASKING.

DAY	TIME
9	0730
MONTH AUG	YEAR 1971
PAGE NO. 1	NUMBER PAGES 1

DRAFTER: TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Same as releaser | PHONE

RELEASER: SIGNATURE: [signature]
TYPED NAME AND TITLE: CONRAD A CHAPELLE, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV. 63 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

Document # 62

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

[redacted]

10 Nov 71 14 51z

TYPE MSG: XXX

PRECEDENCE

ACTION: FLASH

INFO: FLASH

DTG

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DD

DDI:RNI

RF

[redacted]

FROM: USA-563

TO: HQ USAFSS/DOR/~~XXXXX~~ DOP
AFSS FT MEADE
PACSCTYRGN/DOR
AFSSO USAF/INYSB
AFSSO 7AF/~~XXXX~~ INXCS

DIRNSA

NSAPAC

SSO MACV/J2114

NSAPACREP VIETNAM (C)

ZEN/USM-704/ACC

ZEN/USA-561

ZEN/USA-564

[redacted] DO NOV 71

1. DET 2, 6994SS AIR 08-71 (RCS: USS-V3)

2. COMBAT CROSS AIRCRAFT 43-48009, MISSION 910D

3. ~~XXXXXXXXX~~ INCIDENT

A. ONE EC-47

B. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

C. 02482/0948 LOCAL (NKP TIME)

DATE	TIME
10	1245
MONTH NOV	YEAR 1971
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 2

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: DO/CHAPELLE

PHONE: 3314

[redacted]

SECURITY

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
CONRAD A CHAPELLE, CAPT, USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER

RE [redacted]

[redacted]

D. NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB, THAILAND

4. USAFSS CREWMEMBERS:

SSG JOHN ALLEN FR [redacted] 85 MSNS ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ 6 MO 28DAYS IN SEA

SGT RONALD N AREVALOS FR [redacted] 110 MSNS 9 MO 28 DAYS IN SEA

SGT DONALD G BLOOMFIELD FR [redacted] 57 MSNS 5 MO 14 DAYS IN SEA

SGT ~~WXX~~ALTER M KOWALSKI FR [redacted] 68 MSNS 5 MO 7 DAYS IN SEA

5. AIRCRAFT LEFT RUNWAY FOUR TIMES DURING TAKEOFF ROLL AND FINALLY CAME TO STOP APPROX 2500 FEET FROM STARTING POINT. DAMAGE SUSTAINED TO BOTH WINGTIPS, ONE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER. DAMAGE TO USAFSS EQUIPMENT UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. THERE WERE NO CREW INJURIES. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION ACTIONS ARE BEING PURSUED BY 362ND TEWS. COMPLETE LISTING OF TEWS PERSONNEL IS ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Document # 63

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

[redacted]

PRECEDENCE

ACTION: IMMEDIATE

INFO:

DTG: 100[illegible]

FROM: USA-563

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: HQ USAFSS/DOR/DOP

AFSS FT MEADE

PSR/DOR

AFSSO USAF/INYSB

AFSSO 7AF/INXCS

DIRNSA

MSAPAC

SSO MACV/J2114

NSAPACREP VIETNAM (C)

ZEN/USM-704/ACC

ZEN/USA-561

ZEN/USA-564

DDI: [redacted]

[redacted] DO NOV 71

FOLLOWUP NR ONE AND FINAL TO MY AIR 07-71, DTG 100452Z NOV

1. PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS ARE THAT NO DAMAGE TO USAFSS EQUIPMENT WAS SUSTAINED. POSITION STATUS REPORT HAS, ~~[illegible]~~ HOWEVER, BEEN SENT DUE TO AIRFRAME DAMAGE. ESTIMATED

DATE	TIME
10	1400
MONTH: NOV	YEAR: 1971
PAGE NO. 01	NO. OF PAGES [illegible]

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: DO/CHAPELLE

PHONE: 3314

[redacted]

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: CONRAD A CHAPELLE, CAPT, USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET COMINT CHANNELS

[redacted]

INFO

DTG

FROM:

TO:

REPAIR DATE IS UNKNOWN.

2. THE FOLLOWING CREWMEMBERS FROM 362ND TEWS WERE ABOARD:

ACFT CDR CAPT TIMOTHY J BUER [redacted]FV

COPILOT CAPT DAVID CRUZ [redacted]FV

NAVIGATOR LT COL RICHARD SMIGELSKI [redacted]FR

FLT ENG SGT ANDRES GONZALES FR[redacted]

IN ADDITION THE FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO 362ND TEWS WERE BEING TRANSPORTED FM NKP TO DANANG AND WERE ABOARD AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT.

SGT THOMAS DRAKE [redacted]

RONALD

SGT XXXXXX SCHEBLER [redacted]

3. IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE USAFSS CREW WILL BE REQUIRED TO REMAIN AT NKP UNTIL THE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD HAS CONCLUDED ITS ACTIVITIES.

4. THIS IS A FINAL REPORT.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES

DRAFTER: TYPED NAME AND TITLE [redacted] PHONE

RELEASER: SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]