2 OF 6

[redacted]

HISTORY

OF

DETACHMENT 3, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

1 January - 30 June 1971

RCS: USS-D3

[redacted]

30 June 1971

[redacted]

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE

[redacted]

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HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 3, 6994 SECURITY SQUADRON

1 January - 30 June 1971

[redacted]

Approved by:

WILLIAM D. GRAHAM, Major, USAF
Commander

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

# CHAPTER I

## MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

(U) The purpose of this chapter is to outline the mission, organization, command development and significant changes which occurred during this historical period.

### Executive

(U) Captain James R. Clapper, Jr., continued in the capacity of Detachment Commander until his permanent change of station (PCS) departure in early June, at which time Captain Lewis DeLaura, the Operations Officer assumed command.

On 13 June, First Lieutenant John A. Ritner, Jr., arrived on station as the new Operations Officer for the ensuing year.

### Mission

[redacted] Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron (Scty Sq), continued its role during this historical period of conducting Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and Airborne Communications Intelligence (ACI) collection in support of requirements defined by Controlled American Source (CAS), Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and Military Assistance Command Thailand (MACT). These tasks were performed in accordance with Operating Instruction (OPIN) 3564, and the applicable governing directives published by the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) in the form of Technical Instructions (TECHINS) and OPINS.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

To fulfill those requirements mentioned above, the Detachment was charged with conducting ARDF and Communications Intelligence (COMINT) collection activities against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao Forces operating in Laos. The Detachment continued to accomplish this by providing highly qualified airborne personnel to operate the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) equipment installed in five EC-47 aircraft which were provided on a rotating TDY basis from 360th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron, Tan Son Nhut, Republic of Vietnam (RVN), to Detachment 1, 360th TEWS.

In addition, Det 3 was tasked with timely air-ground support to Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Platforms (ACRP) operating over Laos. These primarily being the "Combat Apple" RC-135's from Kadena, and the "Bench Lance" and "Comfy Echo" aircraft from Cam Rahn Bay.

Organization

[redacted] During this documented period, Det 3 remained subordinate to the 6994th Scty Sq at Tan Son Nhut Afld, RVN. Operational control of the ARDF and COMINT collection effort continued to be exercised by MACV through the ARDF Coordinating Center (ACC) with technical control exercised by DIRNSA through Det 3's Collection Management Authority (CMA), the 7th Radio Research Field Station (RRFS) at Ramasun Station, Thailand, and some additional direction from the 8th RRFS, located at Hue/Phu Bai, RVN (for GDRS only).



[redacted]

[redacted]

## Communications

### New Communications Facilities

[redacted] In October 1970, the site concurrence letter for CE Scheme 1282-ACXO-6000K (Detachment 3, 6994 Scty Sq Communications Facility for TFA building) was drafted. Operations and the Air/Ground Radio section moved from the H-1 van complex into the TFA building. The Det 3 Communications Center remained in the van complex. The Critical comm Circuit (NDNA 1946) was deactivated and arrangements were made with AFSSO to provide over-the-counter service for critical comm traffic. The 6924th Scty Sq was deactivated which left the comm center with three OPSCOMM circuits (USM-704/ACC, USM-808, and USM-7), which were scheduled for relocation in the TFA building. Material necessary to install the communications facility for Det 3 was obtained from assets of the 6927 Scty Sq, when that unit was deactivated. However, the new communications facility for Det 3 never materialized. On 21 May 1971, an emergency CEIP was forwarded to CSAF and subsequently approved which provided for installation of communications equipment at Nakhon Phanom, U-Tapao, and Monkey Mountain in support of the "SENIOR BOOK/COMPASS FLAG" program. The CEIP called for the following:

a. Install equipment for seven OPSCOMM terminals, four pokers and adequate spares in the TFA building to terminate circuits to USM-7, USM-808, TACC-NS, 307SW SSO U-Tapao, NSA, JSPC, and Det 3.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. Install KY-8's in TFA building and in the "SENIOR BOOK" vans to support secure G/A/G link to the aircraft and secure link between CC-1 vans and the TFA building.

c. Move H-1 communications van and KY-8's for Det 3 from TFA building to the new Det 3 building.

d. Program new UHF G/A/G radios for Det 3 for installation in the new building to be constructed near the flight line.

On 25 June 1971, the site concurrence letter for C-E Scheme 0791AIKO-RFCV-9000-K was signed. This scheme called for the seven OPSCOMM circuits to support "SENIOR BOOK/COMPASS FLAG" operations, as outlined in the emergency CEIP. An operational date for this facility was 10 August 1971. Some of the equipment received from the 6927th Scty Sq would be used if required to meet the operational date. At the end of June, Det 3 had vacated the TFA building and moved back into the van complex so equipment installations for "COMPASS FLAG" could begin. The Air/Ground facility was relocated within the same room, in conjunction with the unit's move back to the van complex. This action left Det 3 with a split operation, specifically the Air/Ground facility in the TFA building and the remainder of the operations in the H-1 van complex.



[redacted]

Communications Security

(U) The Detachment's COMSEC objectives remain the same, to adequately train all unit personnel to ensure awareness of personal responsibility for security. The goal has been and will continue to be to preserve a record free of COMSEC violations. To date, all COMSEC deficiencies have been recognized and eliminated with the aid of available check lists and guidance from higher headquarters.

[redacted]

Personnel Authorizations

[redacted] Officers

| AFSC | Authorized | Assigned |
|---|---|---|
| A8035 | 1 | 1 |
| B8035 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 2 | 2 |

Enlisted

| AFSC | Authorized | Assigned |
|---|---|---|
| R100X0 | 1 | 0 |
| A202X0 | 11 | 9 |
| R202X0 | 13 | 12 |
| A203X1 (MD) | 13 | 11 |
| R291X0 | 5 | 5 |
| A292X1 | 29 | 34 |
| A29292 | 1 | 1 |
| R301X3 | 8 | 6 |
| R363X0 | 1 | 0 |
| R645X0 | 2 | 1 |
| R702X0 | 1 | 1 |
| A702X0A | 1 | 0 |
| R732X0 | 1 | 1 |
| R811X0 | 5 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 94 | 83 |



[redacted]

[redacted]

CHAPTER II

SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION

(U) The following is an account of the highlights of activities within the Airborne Operations section of Det 3 during the period of this report.

VHF Morse Intercept

[redacted] The 6994th Scty Sq informed Pacific Security Region (PSR) that Det 3 had been instructed to start a test to determine VHF intercept capabilities while flying Laotian orbits. The test directed the use of a G-175J in the Z2 position on two aircraft. It was acknowledged that down-loading one G-133 and adding a G-175J would degrade HF morse exploitable message collection and copy of back link activity. However, even though [redacted] is primarily interested in NVA, NVC, and Pathet Lao in Northern Laos, they, as well as 7th Air Force and MACV are interested in GRS activity along the Laotian/Vietnam border.[1]

The Detachment informed the 6994th Scty Sq that 35 missions were flown between 20 December 1970 and 4 January 1971, in an attempt to intercept VHF morse communications while flying Laotian orbits. The only manual morse intercepted during this test was one instance of automatic morse appearing in the VHF spectrum.[2]

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1. Msg [redacted], 6994 Scty Sq to PSR, 210820Z Dec 70.

2. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to 6994 Scty Sq, 050100Z Jan 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

The 6994th Scty Sq informed PSR that Det 3 had conducted the VHF morse test while flying all of the Laotian orbits during the period 20 December 1970 through 4 January 1971, with negative results. They suggested the reason for the ACRP intercept of subject communications was their high operating altitudes and a check of the area of VHF morse emanations would probably indicate the communications were not within Det 3's area of responsibility as the terrain in those areas was not conducive to VHF operations.[3]

Intercept Effectiveness

[redacted] informed the 6994th Scty Sq they were concerned with the declining rate of manual morse intercept effectiveness for Det 3 during the period 19 December 1970 through 1 January 1971. They further stated the decrease was especially noticeable due to the 72 percent effectiveness achieved for manual morse during the period 12 - 18 December 1970, and possibly indicated a serious problem.[4]

Det 3 did not agree with the supposition that the decline in manual morse intercept effectiveness indicated a possible serious problem. The measurement system used to gauge effectiveness was a

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3. Msg [redacted], 6994 Scty Sq to PSR, 060143Z Jan 71.

4. Msg [redacted], PSR to 6994 Scty Sq, 070019Z Jan 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

gross indicator of production only and did not measure the qualitative production, nor did it measure the all important variations in target activity.

The Detachment's Management Data Base indicated a general decline in production in all areas and in virtually all modes. The data base did however, indicate an increase in the acquisition of priority fixes. In this regard it must be noted that all of Det 3's missions are fragged as primary ARDF vice collection.

Also, target activity in Laos, as indicated in the SIGINT product reports available to this Detachment and supported by collateral intelligence, had been unexpectedly low, particularly during the last two weeks of December. In addition, during this same period, Det 3 was directed to conduct a VHF manual morse test which was conducted from 20 December 1970 through 4 January 1971. All the time spent searching for VHF targets on the 35 missions flown during this period, by the aircraft equipped with a G-175J on the Z2 position, was accomplished at the expense of the Z2 HF search mission.[5]

The 6994th Scty Sq informed PSR the decline in productivity could be attributed only to a like decline in tactical activity in Det 3's area of responsibility. Although there was a statistical

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5. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to 6994 Scty Sq, 080600Z Jan 71.

[redacted]

[redacted]

decrease in the manual morse intercept productivity (AMOC versus copy), the Squadron could not see any reason for PSR's undue concern. This assumption was based on the following reasons:

a. The 7[illegible]FS also experienced a decline in intercept from the Plaines De Jarres (PDJ) area during the referenced periods. (Area 15 decrease was responsible for overall unit decrease).

b. Exploitable message activity only decreased approximately two messages per mission.

c. The most significant change that occurred during the referenced period of decreased activity, when compared to fixes for 12 through 18 December, was the 18 and 20 percent increase in priority target acquisition during the period 19 through 25 December 1970, and 26 December 1970 through 1 January 1971.

d. Area 11 productivity remained relatively stable.

The 6994th Scty Sq further stated that norms of activity, both fix and collection, could not be established in an everchanging tactical environment and it was most unrealistic to try to compare periods of activity.[6]

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6. Msg [redacted], 6994 Scty Sq to PSR, 150148Z Jan 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

EC-47/FAC Operations

[redacted] 7th Air Force along with the 6994th Scty Sq, in an effort to expand the use of ARDF, developed a procedure whereby fix coordinates were passed from the ARDF platform to an orbiting FAC. The trial period for testing these procedures would be 30 days.

It was felt this action was necessary since the enemy was known to use low powered HF and VHF radios to coordinate their logistic activities in Southern Laos. The enemy has located the transmitter as much as three KM from his actual position to prevent discovery. Direct targeting of an Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) fix has thus proved to be fruitless. The immediate search of the fix area by a FAC, however, could possibly confirm and identify a lucrative target.

The primary purpose of this program was to determine the effectiveness of real time exploitation of ARDF fixes by a FAC. The ARDF operating areas which were in use in Southern Laos at that time were used for this effort. Those areas were designed to avoid high threat areas and to provide the best coverage of enemy transmitters, as developed by intelligence data and other sources. The EC-47 operations in these areas were:

a. 210A - An area bounded by XC9280, YC2-25, YC5540 and YC3590.

b. 210B - A circle, 20NM radius of XC4530.



[redacted]

[redacted]

c. 210C - An area bounded by XB3040, XC3000, YC0000, YB0050 and XB5540.

d. 210D - An area bounded by XA4080, XA4030, YB1025 and YA1080.

e. 611/911A - An area bounded by WD5040, WD2580, WE6000, ED8565 and WD9040.

The missions were initiated gradually by using an EC-47 in one operating area per day. This allowed time to finalize coordination procedures and eliminate problem areas. The trial exploitation was conducted only when it did not interfere with normal tac air operations. Hillsboro was the final authority to determine feasibility and advise the EC-47 aircraft (by secure voice using the AKAK-8098 nestor keylist) of suitable times or cancellations. Only fixes with a circular error of 1000 meters or less were used. The EC-47 crew relayed the following information to Hillsboro (ABCCC) by secure voice:

a. Type of target expected to be found, i.e., possible enemy location, possible hq, etc.

b. UTM coordinates of fix. (The EC-47 aircraft would remain clear of the fix area and continue normal operations).

Hillsboro relayed the fix information to the appropriate FAC for the area using the AKAC-275 (Wheel) with no reference being made to the source of the fix. RAVEN FAC's were incorporated in the trial



[redacted]

[redacted]

when available. The FAC searched the area, keeping in mind that possible targets could be within close proximity of the transmitter, but not necessarily co-located with it.[7]

7th Air Force advised the 6994th Scty Sq and its Detachments that the test would begin on 1 February 1971. The EC-47 aircraft operating in ARDF area 210C (Bolovens Plateau) on 1, 2 and 3 February 1971, would pass fixes to Hillsboro for relay to the RAVEN FAC's. Two EC-47 sorties were scheduled each day with ITOT's (initial time on target) of 0900H and 1400H with the EC-47 call-sign prefix being "FRONG". A maximum of four significant fixes were to be passed on each mission. The RAVEN FAC's had the AKAC-275 (Wheel) and were prepared to receive the encrypted coordinates from Hillsboro.[8]

The EC-47 missions for 4, 5 and 6 February 1971, were conducted in ARDF operating area 910B (Saravane Area). Two EC-47 sorties were flown each day with the ITOT's of 0900H and 1400H.[9] There were no EC-47 missions flown on 7, 8 and 9 February 1971, due to secure voice difficulties having been encountered between the EC-47 aircraft and Hillsboro.[10]

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7. Msg [redacted], 7AF to Det 3, 140730Z Jan 71.
8. Msg [redacted], 7AF to Det 3, 290515Z Jan 71.
9. Msg [redacted], 7AF to Det 3, 020710Z Feb 71/
10. Msg [redacted], 7AF to Det 3, 041045Z Feb 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

Due to higher priority operations, 7th Air Force cancelled all test which were scheduled for 10 thru 15 February 1971.[11] On 16 February 1971, 7th Air Force suspended all tests until further notice. The reason given was higher priority operations.[12]

The 6994th Sety Sq informed the detachments there were indications that the Fix/FAC exercise would resume during the first week of March. Beginning 26 February 1971, all EC-47 missions in Laos were directed to carry an extra KYK-3 keyed with the Hillsboro code. At least one mission in each of the frag areas in Southern Laos was to conduct a daily communications check with Hillsboro in the FM mode.

A summary of results obtained by the RAVEN FAC's during the EC-47/FAC targeting test thus far were:

a. 3 February 1971: Hillsboro passed ARDF fix XC3014 to [redacted] via secure voice. The fix was passed to RAVEN 42, who inturn discovered a large enemy complex of camouflaged structures. RAVEN 42 directed 11 T-28's and four F-100's against the target with the BDA (bomb damage assessment) being 15 structures destroyed and two secondary explosions.

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11. Msg [redacted], 7AF to Det 3, 090215Z Feb 71.

12. Msg [redacted], 7AF to Det 3, 161038Z Feb 71.





[redacted]

[redacted]

b. 4 February 1971: Hillsboro passed ARDF fix vicinity XC0040 to RAVEN 40. At XC002045, RAVEN 40 discovered camouflaged structures (number unknown) and bunkers. The target was struck by RLAF (Royal Laotian Air Force) T-28's with BDA of six structures and two bunkers destroyed.

c. 5 February 1971: RAVEN 43 was passed three fixes from Hillsboro, but was only able to VR one fix vicinity of XC0213. RAVEN 43 located four camouflaged structures, all of which were destroyed by RLAF T-28's.[13]

On 27 February 1971, all EC-47 missions fragged in Laos were directed to carry KY-8 secure voice key 8090 aboard the aircraft. The key would only be installed when required to provide a secure voice command and control link with ABCCC.[14]

On 26 February 1971, 7th Air Force directed all EC-47 crews to pass all ARDF fixes of (NVN) North Vietnamese units in the vicinity of the Lam Son 719 operating areas (TCHEPHONE) directly to available FAC's through Hillsboro/Moonbeam.[15]

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13. Msg [redacted], 6994 Scty Sq to Det 3, 250203Z Feb 71.

14. Msg [redacted], 7AF to Det 3, 250836Z Feb 71.

15. Msg [redacted], 7AF to Det 3, 260345Z Feb 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

On 15 March 1971, the 6994th Scty Sq directed all units to discontinue passing fixes to Hillsboro (ABCCC) as of 15 April 1971. Also advised at this time that 7th Air Force was attempting to obtain an operational feedback necessary for the program evaluation. The feedback and evaluation results would be forwarded when available.[16]

ALR-35 and ALR-38 AGE

(U) The 6994th Scty Sq, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN requested clarification of the future plans for the use of the ALR-35 and ALR-38 AGE from PSR, as pertains to the following:

a. The transfer of all ALR-34 AGE from Det 3 to the VNAF (Vietnamese Air Force).

b. The replacement of this AGE with a partial set of ALR-38 AGE and a third set of ALR-35 AGE.

Squadron assumed that the ALR-35 AGE was slated for Det 3, however, there was a possibility that Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq, Phu Cat AB, RVN might be tasked with maintenance support for the ALR-35 system. Det 1 had been directed by USAFSS to requisition a piece of ALR-35 AGE. Prior to this, the 6994th was prepared to send Det 1's ALR-35 AGE to Det 3. Squadron also querried if the ALR-35

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16. Msg [redacted], 6994 Scty Sq to Det 3, 150450Z Mar 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

AGE was still slated for this Detachment and if it was going to provide 601a authorization for the ALR-35 AGE. It was thought that if this action was not accomplished and Det 3 lost the ALR-34 AGE to the VNAF, the only AGE on hand would be the partial set of ALR-38 AGE which had not yet arrived.[17]

PSR stated that due to the proposed phasing of ALR-34 aircraft to the VNAF, four ALR-35 aircraft must be assigned to Det 1 to supplement their resources. Also USAFSS requested 7th Air Force to contact MACV and obtain/express views on the basing of the ALR-38's at NKP.

USAFSS proposals reflected the addition of four ALR-35Z's at Det 1, but did not acknowledge that the AGE at Det 3 nor the AGE at Det 1 would be required to support ALR-38's if they were deployed to NKP. The requirement for the ALR-34 AGE to be transferred to TSN for maintenance training, which is scheduled to begin 1 December 1971, and would eliminate ALR-34 maintenance capability of NKP had not been discussed at this time.

The proposal at this time is for the ALR-35 AGE at Det 1 to be transferred to NKP. This coupled with the arrival of the ALR-38 AGE at NKP in May, would provide a maintenance capability for the ALR-35's and/or ALR-38's.[18]

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17. Msg [redacted], 6994 Scty Sq to Det 3, 230230Z Feb 71.

18. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 270145Z Feb 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

USAFSS stated that with the procurement of additional ALR-38 AGE and the redistribution of current ALR-35 AGE, several AGE support configurations were possible. The following proposals were a few that were suggested by USAFSS:

a. NKP - All ALR-38 configuration (5 aircraft)

(1) Augment Danang with ALR-35 from TSN

(2) Phu Cat - All ALR-34 and COMJAM

(3) TSN - ALR-34/35 mix

(4) NKP - Airframe phase for ALR-38 at DNG

(5) NKP - Organizational maintenance for BRAVO equipment at DNG

b. NKP - All ALR-35 configuration

(1) TSN - Provide ALR-35 for NKP

(2) Phu Cat - All ALR-34 and COMJAM

(3) DNG - Present configuration (ALR-35/38 mix)

(4) TSN - ALR-34/35 mix

(5) NKP - Organizational maintenance for BRAVO equipment at TSN

c. NKP - ALR-35/38 Mix

(1) Augment DNG/NKP with ALR-35 from TSN

(2) ALR-35 at NKP phased from TSN

(3) ALR-38 at NKP phased from DNG

(4) NKP - Organizational maintenance for BRAVO equipment from DNG

[redacted]

[redacted]

(5) Phu Cat - All ALR-34 and COMJAM

(6) TSN - ALR-34/35 mix

d. ALR-35 at Phu Cat

(1) ALR-34/35 COMJAM mix at Phu Cat/Cam Ranh Bay

(2) NKP - ALR-35

(3) DNG - Present configuration (ALR-35/38)

(4) TSN - Reduced to zero aircraft concurrent with VIM plan, SSTB assuming TSN missions.

USAFSS believed that the above options represented the most feasible alternatives when the following factors were considered:

a. MACV had not accepted the idea of the ALR-38 being based at NKP.

b. ALR-34 AGE to be provided to the Vietnamese would be assets currently located at Det 3.

c. Additional ALR-35/38 AGE would not include full maintenance capability, even if combined at one location.

d. VIM plan cannot be implemented with current ALR-34 requirements at NKP.

e. MACV resources and mission requirements are unknown for future planning.

f. All options outlined above would affect 7th Air Force/460TRW (Tactical Reconnaissance Wing) Operational Maintenance and Training programs.



[redacted]

[redacted]

g. VHF implementation would cause either TSN or Phu Cat to be reduced to zero aircraft, dependent upon SSTB capability and MACV resource/mission requirements.

h. Base closures may affect ultimate basing of ARDF fleet.[19]

PSR believed that in view of USAFSS's many options it would be premature at that time to request that USAFSS CEMO (Communications Electronics Mgmt Office) issue E-AID authorizations to Det 3 for ALR-35 AGE. They also requested the 6994th to continue to cycle ALR-35 AGE items from Det 1 to their unit for repair/serviceability check so that the AGE would be serviceable if the need arose.[20]

Proposed Deployment of ALR-38 System to NKP

[redacted] PACAF and 7th Air Force discussed the need for VHF ARDF in Thailand, with May - June 1971, as the proposed deployment time frame. The number of aircraft to be deployed was not firm, but it appeared that a minimum of three ALR-38 ZULU equipped aircraft would be required.

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19. Msg [redacted], USAFSS to PSR, 091625Z Mar 71.

20. Msg [redacted], PSR to 6994 Scty Sq, 130107Z Mar 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

In order to ensure that the systems could be successfully supported, USAFSS advised that (eight) March 1971 graduates of the AZK30173-1 course at Goodfellow AFB, Texas, were to be assigned to the 6994th Scty Sq complex. These personnel received training on the ALR-38 system and should be available to augment the ALR-38 proficient personnel from Det 2, 6994th Scty Sq.

The need for Tech Rep assistance at Det 3 for the ALR-38 systems was studied in view of the impact it may have on the mission capability at Det 2.

In order to prepare the ALR-38 MSK (Mission Support Kit) for deployment to NKP, it was recommended that Det 2 initiate supply difficulty letters on outstanding requisitions for items needed to replenish the MSK I/A/W Section F, Part One, Vol I, AFM 67-1. The letters were to contain a classified statement that MSK must be replenished to support the May - June 1971 deployment of the ALR-38 system to NKP.[21]

Det 2 stated that training radio operators should be no problem, as that unit could provide TDY assistance for the ALR-38 training at Det 3. The maintenance personnel could be provided with on-the-job ALR-38 experience through a TDY exchange.

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21. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 2, 192045Z Mar 71



[redacted]

[redacted]

Supply and maintenance of the AIR-38 system would be a definite problem. Supply, particularly, had been a limiting factor during the entire AIR-38 program. AIR-38 MSK would not support three aircraft for more than a one week period. If spares support for the AIR-38 at Det 3 was established, it would require:

a. A continual and timely spares replenishment of the MSK (and replacement of malfunctioning parts) at this unit by exchange of repairable for serviceable between Det 3 and Det 2, or ;

b. Load the entire AIR-38 ISSL at NKP Base Supply.

Det 2 believed that the total AIR-38 aircraft available would be reduced by the necessity of maintaining a mission spare at both locations.[22]

ARDF Mission Duration

[redacted] Hq 7th Air Force granted approval for the aircraft staging out of NKP to fly less than the minimal required five hours in order to man each CCZ aircraft with an A202. Prior to this action, the A202 was the first crew member to be removed from a mission when the fuel load was critical due to high temperatures.

Those missions which do not obtain a full five hours of flying time due to reduced fuel loads would not be considered reduced missions. This policy established the Airborne Analyst (A202) as a basic USAFSS crew member on the EC-47.[23]

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22. Msg [redacted], Det 2 to PSR, 260530Z Mar 71.

23. Msg [redacted], 7AF/6994 Scty Sq to Det 3, 040925Z Mar 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

Operations LAN SON 719

[redacted] During the period 6 February thru 19 March 1971, Det 3 flew a total of 54 missions in support of LAN SON 719. A total of 632 fixes/cuts were obtained, of which 25 percent were identified as MACV priority targets.

The percentage of priority targets could be considered high because of the emergence of new enemy units from North Vietnam into Laos and the implementations of tactical SOI's by some enemy units involved in the defense of TCHEPONE and adjacent areas/route structures.

Defense of Lauang Pra Bang

[redacted] During March 1970, NVA/PL forces announced their intentions to capture the King of Laos at the Royal Capital of Lauang Pra Bang. Additional sorties to support the RLA (Royal Laotian Army) in defense of Lauang Pra Bang were not authorized. Therefore, on alternating days the sortie scheduled to support the defense of LS (Lima Site) 32 were refragged to the Lauang Pra Bang area.

During the first four missions flown, the Detachment averaged 14.5 fixes/cuts per mission in the Lauang Pra Bang area. As the RLA expanded their defense perimeter around the Royal Capital, the average number of fixes/cuts per mission decreased to an average of 3.5 per mission which was during the last week of June, and indicated that the enemy forces were withdrawing from the immediate area.



[redacted]

[redacted]

Passing Fix Info to Hillsboro

[redacted] Det 2, 6994th Scty Sq querried Det 3 about its communications status with Hillsboro. Det 2 stated that they were unable to establish clear contact in cipher since 26 March 1971. Contact had been attempted numerous times by various mission aircraft in the 911 and 909 areas with results having been all "snow" on frequency of 44.2 FM secure as suggested by 7th Air Force.[24]

Det 3 informed Det 2 that communications with Hillsboro up through 28 March 1971, were excellent. However, from 29 March thru 1 April 1971, could not establish contact which was due to Hillsboro having FM secure voice problems. Det 2 aircraft, which recovered at NKP on 2 April 1971, mission 911A, had contact with Hillsboro as well as the 611A mission. With two aircraft having had good communications with Hillsboro on this date, the secure voice problem appeared to have been corrected. However, Det 3 would continue to monitor this situation and try to determine the exact reason for negative contacts with Hillsboro.[25]

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24. Msg [redacted], Det 2 to Det 3, 010635Z Apr 71.

25. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to Det 2, 020915Z Apr 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

Request for Mission Realignment

[redacted] On 24 May 1971, LS-32 came under siege by an estimated two enemy companies which launched a three-pronged attack in addition to rocket/mortar/recoiless rifle attacks.[26]

During the period 25 May thru 23 June 1971, Det 3 averaged ten fixes/cuts per mission. On or about 24 June, enemy forces started withdrawing from the LS-32 area. Consequently, Det 3's fix/cut rate decreased to an average of 3.5 fixes/cuts per mission in that area.

ACRP Tip-Off of SAM Communications to ARDF

[redacted] NRV [redacted] PROPOSED A TEST OF ACRP (Combat Apple) capability to tip-off ARDF aircraft on the NVA 238th SAM Regt Comms. Since "Combat Cross" aircraft are limited to monitoring only one secure frequency and because of the incompatibility of "Combat Apple" and ARDF crypto key list for air-to-air communications, downlinking to NKP for near real time tip-off to ARDF aircraft was the only existing tip-off path available. Following were the test procedures to be utilized for the test:

a. Inclusive dates for the test were 5 thru 18 June 1971 (coincides with two ARDF tasking periods).

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26. Msg [redacted], CAS UDorn to SSO MACV, 240455Z May '71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

b. ARDF missions involved in the test were left JAB JU-21A mission 709A and "Combat Cross" ALR-38 missions 909A/911A.

c. ACRP orbits involved were "Combat Apple" 8F802/803, which correspond to the time over target of the above ARDF platforms.

d. Tip-off procedures were: ACRP downlink to NKP; NKP passes to ARDF platforms. Det 3 was notified that "Combat Apple" tip-offs of the 238th SAM Regt Comms would take precedence over all other ARDF tip-offs during the test period.

e. Required reports:

(1) The 6990th Scty Sq was to submit a one-time report at the end of the test indicating number of 238th SAM Regt Comm Tip-offs initiated and the time of each tip-off with comments as desired.

(2) Det 2, 6994th Scty Sq/138RRG were to submit one-time reports at the end of the test indicating the number of tip-offs required; the time delay involved for each tip-off received; and the degree of success of each tip-off with comments as desired.

It was noted during previous efforts to tip-off SAM Comms, attempts were unsuccessful due to the brevity of the 238th SAM Regt Comms periods and the time delay from the ACRP aircraft to NKP to the ARDF aircraft. Therefore, increased emphasis was to be placed on timely tip-offs which were considered imperative if the test period was to be productive.[27]

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27. Msg [redacted], NSAPAC Rep Vietnam [redacted] to Det 3, 290346Z May 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

NRV [redacted] stated that since a fourteen day test had been scheduled for the ACRP aircraft to tip-off the 238th SAM Regt comms (RADS V0025-28) to ARDF platforms commencing on 5 June 1971, MACV-J2 required the targets be placed on the ARDF priority listing before they could be tipped-off to ARDF aircraft. Therefore, action to remove RADS V0025-28 from the ARDF priority coverage had been cancelled.[28]

Det 2, 6994th Scty Sq, Danang AB, RVN, informed PSR that during the test period they did not receive any logged tip-offs from Det 3. They further stated they were unable, by virture of SAM stand-offs, to get close enough to a SAM site to fix its comm facilities.[29]

The 6994th Scty Sq notified PSR Det 2 was unable to monitor NKP from the 909A area for the SAM tip-offs. Also, Det 2's ARDF aircraft must remain on the DSU (Direct Service Unit) ground-to-air tip-off net even when they are not passing fix info or exploitable messages to the ground, due to the high level of tactical activity in the area. Additionally, the 909A area is approximately 150 NM from NKP and separated by mountainous terrain, which further restricted the present tip-off procedures in the area.

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28. Msg [redacted], NSAPAC Rep Vietnam [redacted] to DIRNSA, 300155Z May 71.
29. Msg [redacted], Det 2 to PSR, 191020Z Jun 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

It was considered doubtful Det 2 would be able to acquire a valid fix on the SAM communications because of the short durations of the target communications and the excessive standoff range. However, Det 2 would make every effort to fix any transmitter tipped-off to them.[30] Results of the ACRP tip-off of SAM communications test have not been received as of this date.

Long Tieng A/G/A Communications

[redacted] informed PSR that, after a series of delays, due to inclement weather, installation of GRC-27/KY-8 gear commenced 12 June 1971. All area fifteen missions were advised to initiate test contacts on 16 June 1971, on 256.5 MHZ, utilizing "Willard Music" as the Long Tieng callsign.[31]

The 6994th Scty Sq directed Det 3 to initiate a daily comm status report for a two week period. It was assumed most of the problems would have been worked out of the system and during this period all reporting problems would be reported via the DURMIS.[32]

On 15 June 1971, PSR advised the 6994th Scty Sq to direct Det 3 to initiate communications with Long Tieng on 16 June 1971, in accordance with [redacted] message.[33]

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30. Msg [redacted], 6994 Scty Sq to PSR, 270220Z Jun 71.

31. Msg [redacted], [redacted] to PSR, 120933Z Jun 71.

32. Msg [redacted], 6994 Scty Sq to Det 3, 140410Z Jun 71.

33. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 150203Z Jun 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] informed PSR upon completion of installation, test contacts were initiated as of 16/0600Z, calling mission 615A. At 0600Z, they also proceeded to call 615B and repeated attempts until 0900Z with no success. On 17 June 1971, the area fifteen missions were directed to call "Willard Music" on 256.5 every fifteen minutes until the problems were rectified and/or set schedules were established.[34]

PSR directed Det 3 to comply with [redacted] instruction and also authorized direct criticomm contact with [redacted] to coordinate initial communications testing and procedures.[35]

Det 3 notified PSR all three area 15 missions monitored "Willard Music" on 16 June 1971, from 0215Z thru 1000Z, with negative results.[36] Also, that all area 15 missions would attempt contact with Long Tieng on 17 June 1971, per [redacted] instructions.[37]

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34. Msg [redacted], [redacted] to Det 3, 161113Z Jun 71.
35. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 161921Z Jun 71.
36. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to PSR, 162355Z Jun 71.
37. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to 6994 Scty Sq/PSR, 170200Z Jun 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

On 18 June 1971, Det 3 notified both the 6994th Scty Sq and PSR that all three area 15 missions attempted to establish contact with Long Tieng every fifteen minutes, beginning on the hour, but had negative results. Also, all aircraft monitored 256.5 MHZ for the duration of the missions with no response from Long Tieng.[38]

Det 3 had attempted contact during six missions with Long Tieng with no apparent results. At 17/0530Z Jun 71, mission 615A(2) was at UTM TG663164 (8.5 NM from Long Tieng) and attempted contact. In response, a "beep and rush" was received. To date, this has been the only contact.[39]

After two days of attempting communications with negative results on six missions (where degradation of ARDF occurred upon keying the UHF tactical transceiver), Long Tieng was requested to ascertain status of facilities so if they were not operational Det 3 would not degrade the area 15 missions by attempting communications with "Willard Music".

[redacted] advised Det 3 that problems encountered on the 17th of June originated on the ground at LS-98. The person manning the radios was apparently in and out during the hours of 1000-1600 local.

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38. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to 6994 Scty Sq/PSR, 180345Z Jun 71.

39. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to [redacted], 180800Z Jun 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

It was ascertained that the receiving gear was fully operational and that if there was a technical problem it would be the transmitter.[40]

Det 3 again notified [redacted] that attempts to contact "Willard Music" on 256.5 had been made by all area 15 missions since 16 June 1971, with negative contact. The unit was fully cognizant of the terrain around the site and even when the ARDF aircraft orbited directly overhead there still had been no contact. Det 3 then querried Long Tieng on whether the communications equipment was operational.[41]

In response to Det 3's query, [redacted] stated that on 23 June 1971, commencing at 0730Z, contact had been established and maintained sporadically until approximately 0930Z. They further stated that the 506th TECHS had the GRC27/KY-8 in peak operational condition and daily monitoring continued. [redacted] then requested Det 3 to continue periodic contact attempts until routine scheduling had been firmly established.[42]

On the 24th of June 1971, the 506th TECHS discovered "Broken Fingers" in the KYK-5 module of the KY-8. After the unit had been interchanged on 25 June, five-by-five contact with both 615A/B

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40. MSg [redacted], Det 3 to 6994 Scty Sq/PSR, 180830Z Jun 71.

41. MSg [redacted], Det 3 to [redacted], 230315Z Jun 71.

42. Msg [redacted], [redacted] to Det 3, 240421Z Jun 71.

[redacted]

[redacted]

missions was established from 0315Z to 0910Z. The aircraft distances from Long Tieng Valley for the contacts varied from three to seven nautical miles at an altitude of ten thousand feet.[43]

VHF DF, Northern Laos

[redacted] notified Det 3 that MACV-J2 scheduled a fourteen day test, to begin on 3 July 1971, to determine the capability of the ALR-38's to DF VHF communications in the "Barrel Roll" area. It seemed that NRV (C) had previously provided MACV a SEA VHF environmental study which indicated VHF signal activity in Northern Laos, particularly in the Lauang Pra Bang and PDJ areas. However, MACV believed ALR-38 DF capability against these targets should be determined before a firm decision was made to allocate resources.

[redacted] further stated that if test results proved favorably, VHF resources, with necessary base support facilities, should be in place at NKP with operations set to begin in early October 1971.[44]

DIRNSA tasked the 7RRFS to provide Det 3 with tech data on all NVA VHF radio terminals in Northern Laos, including suspected VHF areas of operation in order to support the test request.[45]

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43. Msg [redacted], [redacted] to Det 3, 260750Z Jun 71.

44. Msg [redacted], [redacted] to Det 3, 250216Z Jun 71.

45. Msg [redacted], DIRNSA to 7RRFS, 290419Z Jun 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

ALR-34/35 Basing

[redacted] The 6994th Scty Sq informed MACV, 7AF, Det 1, and Det 3 the ALR-34Z aircraft at NKP were to be exchanged for ALR-35Z aircraft in order to better support the VIM program. Exchange of the aircraft commenced on 13 and 14 June 1971 respectly, with the established completion date of transfer remaining 9 July 1971.

Aircrew training (Navigator/Operators) commenced immediately and required the addition of one more instructor crew member. It was estimated the additional weight and increased runway temperatures experienced at NKP, during this period, would result in additional reduced mission time of approximately thirty minutes. These reductions would be temporary in nature, lasting only through the initial training period which was estimated to be 30 days. These missions would not be reflected as reduced missions.[46]

The ALR-35Z ACE equipment, necessary to maintain the system at NKP, was transferred from Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq, Phu Cat AB, RVN.[47]

The Detachment completed the transition from the ALR-34Z to the ALR-35Z by 30 June 1971. By this date, all test equipment had arrived this station and the Sanders Tech Rep had completed the required training.[48]

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46. Msg [redacted], 6994 Scty Sq to MACV/7AF, 150137Z Jun 71.

47. Msg [redacted], PSR to USAFSS, 300435Z May 71.

48. Intvw (U), author with TSgt Dennis L. McDowell, Det 3 DM, 30 Jun 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

CHAPTER III

SIGINT PROCESSING AND REPORTING

(U) The following is an account of all pertinent activities within the Analysis and Reporting section of Det 3 for the period of this report.

Relocation of A/G/A Equipment

[redacted] A discussion between PSR and Det 3 concerned the desirability of relocating the A/G/A equipment, (KY-8's and G-1186/KG-20's) which was then located in the vans, to the operations area in room 201A, TFA building. During this discussion it was decided to avoid the lengthly lead time involved via the CEIP programming route, and accomplish the move on a more timely basis with the in-house maintenance capability.[1]

The Detachment stated that in-house maintenance capability to relocate KY-8's and the G-1186/KG-20's did exist, and could be used. Coordination was effected with AFCS to run the cables to the TFA building and through the wall of room 201A. AFCS requested three days advance notice prior to moving the equipment. The Detachment anticipated approximately three days downtime for the relocation.[2]

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1. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 180015Z Nov 70.

2. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to PSR, 220425Z Nov 70.



[redacted]

[redacted]

PSR requested they be advised if, after the relocation of the KY-8/G-1186/KG-20's, only one person would then be on duty in the van complex. They further stated it was their policy, except in unusual circumstances, that a minimum of two personnel be in the van complex at all times.[3]

Det 3 advised PSR that if the A/G/A equipment was moved into the operations area in TFA, only one person in the communications center would be in the van complex during non-duty hours. The Detachment felt the safety and security considerations would make this less than a desirable situation, but the advantages to be gained by moving the equipment into the operations area outweighed these potential drawbacks.[4]

PSR, after careful consideration, approved the moving of the A/G/A facilities into the operations area.[5] They then questioned the location of the KY-8 and G-1186/KG-20 equipment since a layout drawing had not been provided by Det 3 to show exact position of the gear. They stated that a copy of the floor plan made by the Pac Comm Area Engineer during the pre-CEIP site survey had been forwarded to Det 3 to confirm siting. The Detachment was to advise PSR

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3. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 240201Z Nov 70.

4. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to PSR, 250630Z Nov 70.

5. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 280133Z Nov 70.

[redacted]

[redacted]

upon receipt of drawings and confirm the equipment would be located in the position indicated on the scheme drawing.[6]

PSR was notified that, although Det 3 had not been given a copy of the floor plan layout by the Pac Comm Area Engineer during the pre-CEIP site survey, it believed the engineer had sited equipment at the center of the north wall in room 201A.[7]

PSR granted permission to relocate the A/G/A comm equipment (KY-8's, G-1186 and the KG-20's) upon receipt of the floor plan position layout by Det 3.[8]

PSR was notified effective 230100Z Dec 70, the Det 3 A/G/A facility (KY-8's and G-1186/KG-20's) would be down for approximately ten days in order to relocate the equipment and re-engineer the system.[9]

PSR stated the subject of reducing the downtime from ten days to an absolute minimum was being discussed in log/comm channels. They further stated during the period of inoperative A/G/A system, the ARDF crews were to be briefed on declaring condition "Fox" should critical intelligence be intercepted or otherwise acquired.[10]

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6. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 120020Z Dec 70.
7. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to PSR, 181245Z Dec 70.
8. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 190005Z Dec 70.
9. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to PSR, 220805Z Dec 70.
10. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 222349Z Dec 70.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Det 3 assured PSR there was an intense interest in obtaining operational status. Every effort was made to expedite the re-installation and re-engineering in order to finish well within the ten day period, to keep down time to an absolute minimum. Also, PSR was informed the ARDF crews were briefed on declaring condition "Foxtrot" per their instructions.[11]

The 6994th Scty Sq, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, advised Det 3 they would provide TDY assistance if it would help with an earlier relocation.[12] Det 3 rejected the idea of TDY assistance since another man would not speed the relocation unless a major aircraft system's problem was encountered which would cause the two maintenance technicians now detailed to the radio project to be returned to primary duties.[13]

PSR was notified the COMFY DISC (KY-8) communications had returned to normal operations at 030001Z Jan 71, on a frequency of 270.4 MHZ with alternate of 386.2 MHZ.[14] On 4 January 1971, Det 3 notified PSR the alternate frequency for the "COMFY DISC" should have been 351.5 MHZ vice 386.2 MHZ. The frequency of 351.5 MHZ

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11. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 130134Z Jan 71.
12. Msg [redacted], 6994 Scty Sq to Det 3, 240446Z Dec 70.
13. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to 6994 Scty Sq, 240840Z Dec 70.
14. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to PSR, 030615Z Jan 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

would be used as an alternate until KY-8 could be obtained for use on frequency of 306.2 MHZ.[15]

PSR requested the status of the KY-8 (COMFY BRIDLE) and G-1186 relocation on 5 January 1971.[16]

On 6 January 1971, Det 3 notified PSR the KY-8 (COMFY BRIDLE) and G-1186 operations would be restored at 031200Z Jan 71. The relocation of the comm equipment to the operations area had been completed.[17]

PSR requested Det 3 to confirm the A/G/A equipment had been sited in accordance with Pac Comm Area drawing number RFCVP02407FP000.[18] This was done on 14 January 1971, and Det 3 confirmed the siting was I/A/W the Pac Comm Area drawing.[19]

Pathet Lao Comms (Northern Laos)

[redacted] Det 3 queried the 7RRFS on the increase in communications activity on PL terminals since 1 January 1971. From ident change reports it was apparent the NSA working aid B64-007-70, dated 1 December 1970, was inaccurate as far as the majority of the LSGB's were concerned. Det 3 has not seen any tech items on LSGB SOI changes this year even though several SOI changes had seemingly

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15. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to PSR, 040210Z Jan 71.
16. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 050150Z Jan 71.
17. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to PSR, 061030Z Jan 71.
18. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 130134Z Jan 71.
19. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to PSR, 140130Z Jan 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

occurred. Det 3 requested all subsequent Pathet Laotian tech items issued by both the 7RRFS and DIRNSA, also, that the 7RRFS forward, via OPSCOMM, all known active LSGB notes.[20]

In response to the Det 3 query, DIRNSA added Det 3 to all future tech exchanges regarding Pathet Lao comms and further stated that maximum benefit could be derived by using the most current edition of NSA working aid B64 TSR 007-71, dated 1 January 1971, and the weekly electrical updates to the basic document.[21]

Det 3 informed DIRNSA that NSA working aid B64 TSR 007-71, dated 1 January 1971, had not arrived and this Detachment was still using B64 TSR 007-70, dated 1 December 1970.[22]

The 7th RRFS informed Det 3 that during an informal OPSCOMM with DIRNSA on 20 January 1971, DIRNSA stated the tech package would be forwarded from then, and Det 3 was added as an info addressee on all tech exchanges.[23]

Target Identification Rate

[redacted] On 1 January 1971, a major SOI change was noted in intercepted communications within North Vietnam and Laos. A minor

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20. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to 7RRFS/DIRNSA, 190300Z Jan 71.
21. Msg [redacted], DIRNSA to Det 3, 212303Z Jan 71.
22. Msg [redacted], Det 3 to DIRNSA, 221015Z Jan 71.
23. Msg [redacted], 7RRFS to Det 3, 230640Z Jan 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

change was also noted during March. The effect of these SOI changes was reflected in a decrease in fix identification rate of 50 percent and seats identification rate of 59 percent. This amounted to a decrease of nine percent and five percent respectively over the preceding six-month period. However, these averages reflected an increase of one percent and two percent over the corresponding first six months of 1970.

Active Naval Participation in "COMFY SILK/COMFY BRIDLE"

[redacted] PSN sanctioned Navy participation in "COMFY SILK" during the period 15 January through 3 February 1971, to support the single CVA operations during this period. Entry into the "COMFY SILK" net was to satisfy the paramount requirement of providing extra support for the Navy single CVA operations in the Gulf of Tonkin. Navy participation would be limited to requests for amplifying data, tech support and mutual tip-offs. Preliminary arrangements would allow active Navy participation under the following conditions:

a. During single carrier operations, FAAWC and PIRAZ would become active subscribers.

b. Procedures established in the present net would be adhered to.

c. USKAK 8095 would remain in force.



[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

d. Airborne or ground units would not be utilized as relay terminals (except during critical situations).

Navy aircraft flying the Laos black track during 1700-2200Z time frame (Seawing/Big Look) inclusion into the "COMFY SILK" or "COMFY BRIDLE" nets appeared to be of no immediate problem. The Sprac Net (secure Navy) communications from "Seawing" to any terminal were not reliable in the established orbit. Consequently, there was no way to pass "Seawing" derived threat alert, TACAIR data to TACC-NS. Direct contact between "Seawing" and Danang or NKP would provide rapid communications to the TACC-NS controller. It was felt by PSR the inclusion of "Seawing" into the "COMFY SILK" (and "COMFY BRIDLE" net as backup) net with inputs through Danang/MMOB (and Det 3, 6994th Scty Sq/NKP) would be the most feasible approach. It was decided a test period would dictate the most practical route to take.[24]

PSR informed CINCPACFLT that active naval participation in the "COMFY SILK" communications net had been tentatively approved for the period begining 15 January 1971. Since that time, approval for permanent participation had been granted.[25]

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24. Msg [redacted], PSR to USAFSS, 220238Z Jan 71.

25. Msg [redacted], PSR to Det 3, 022135Z Feb 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

The 6924th Scty Sq informed PSR that VQ-1, Det B representative indicated that they would be ready to begin participation in the "COMFY SILK/COMFY BRIDLE" nets, effective 020606Z Feb 71. However, they were awaiting formal, specific authorization to participate from COMSEVENTH Fleet.[26]

COMSEVENTH Fleet implemented active participation in both the "COMFY SILK/COMFY BRIDLE" nets by naval units on 13 February 1971.[27]

The 6924th Scty Sq stated as of 2 March 1971, "Seawing" had not established contact with either Danang or NKP via the "COMFY SILK/COMFY BRIDLE" nets. On 3 March 1971, the 6924th representative visited with VQ-1, Det B personnel and discussed their lack of participation. There was apparently internal confusion among Det B personnel concerning their participation. After a lengthy discussion with Det B personnel, they agreed to attempt comm checks between "Seawing", Danang and NKP. At 031711Z Mar 71, "Seawing" made successful contact via "COMFY SILK" with Danang, and at 031735Z and 032004Z Mar 71, successful contacts were made via the "COMFY BRIDLE" net with NKP.[28]

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26. Msg [redacted], 6924 Scty Sq to PSR, 030735Z Feb 71.

27. Msg [redacted], COMSEVENTHFLT to CTF-77, 201401Z Feb 71.

28. Msg [redacted], 6924 Scty Sq to PSR, 040735Z Mar 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

AN/TSC-57 Operations from UDorn

[redacted] On 4 April 1971, the 6924th Scty Sq, UDorn, Thailand, notified the sigint community the AN/TSC-57 ground/air communications facilities at their unit had become fully operational and they would assume its reporting role in the "COMFY BRIDLE" net at that time. Upon becoming fully operational, they also assumed all net control (NCS) functions from Det 3, 6994th Scty Sq. Det 3 would become the alternate NCS unless the 6924th experience comm outages, at which time, Det 3 would then become the NCS.[29]

TACREP Reporting

[redacted] As of 30 June 1971, this Detachment had issued or relayed from the ACRP platforms 1021 TACREPS.

29. Msg [redacted], 6924 Scty Sq to Det 3, 020445Z Apr 71.



[redacted]

[redacted]

PRODUCTIVITY STATISTICS (Jan - Jun 1971)

| | JAN | FEB | MAR | APR | MAY | JUN |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HRS FRAGGED | 620 | 555 | 730 | 565 | 610 | 595 |
| HRS FLOWN | 617.0 | 543.1 | 714.1 | 604.0 | 603.2 | 585.0 |
| TGTS WORKED | 1074 | 1236 | 1287 | 1098 | 921 | 864 |
| TGTS FIXED | 982 | 1129 | 1156 | 991 | 872 | 790 |
| FIXES ID'D | 562 | 476 | 582 | 453 | 499 | 398 |
| MM & RT MSGS | 1554 | 1691 | 2004 | 1155 | 909 | 1013 |
| MIN MM COPY | 16086 | 15238 | 17545 | 12738 | 12539 | 10054 |
| MIN RT COPY | 7160 | 7512 | 8481 | 1296 | 3199 | 2283 |
| TGTS COPIED | 4560 | 3678 | 4547 | 2729 | 2828 | 2393 |
| TGTS ID'D | 2806 | 1923 | 2684 | 1688 | 1963 | 1368 |
| % TGTS ID'D | 62% | 52% | 55% | 61% | 69% | 57% |
| % FIXES ID'D | 57% | 42% | 50% | 45% | 57% | 50% |
| PRI FIXES | 378 | 308 | 372 | 344 | 311 | 225 |
| FIXES PASSED | 374 | 471 | 642 | 676 | 705 | 615 |
| MSGS PASSED | 227 | 147 | 373 | 362 | 491 | 606 |



[redacted]

[redacted]

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| ABCCC | Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center |
| ACC | ARDF Coordinating Center |
| ACI | Airborne Control Intercept |
| ACRP | Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Platform |
| AFCS | Air Force Communications Service |
| A/G/A | Air-to-Ground-to Air |
| AGE | Aerospace Ground Equipment |
| AMOC | Actual Minutes of Coverage |
| ARDF | Airborne Radio Direction Finding |
| BARREL ROLL | U.S. Air Operations over Laos; North of 18:30 degrees |
| BDA | Battle Damage Assessment |
| BIG LOOK | A Navy project which uses EC-121 aircraft equipped with COMINT and ELINT collection gear |
| BENCH LANCE | Consists of that part of BENCH ROYAL (Nickname for the PACAF ACRP) which operates in SEA. |
| CAS | Controlled American Sources |
| CEIP | Communications Electronic Implementing Plan |
| CINCPACFLT | Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet |
| CMA | Collection Management Authority |
| COMBAT APPLE | USAFSS-supported SAC Operations fragged under SAC OpOrd 60-FY-01 |
| COMBAT CROSS | USAF EC-47 aircraft performing ARDF/COMINT collection mission in SEA. |
| COMFY BRIDLE | ACRP KY-8/URC-58 air/ground/air communications - NKP Thailand |
| COMFY DISC | ARDF KY-8 air/ground/air secure voice net - NKP Thailand |
| COMFY ECHO | Applies to use of S-141 huts reconfigured for intercept aboard airborne platforms in SEA |
| COMFY SILK | A ground-to-air secure-voice system at the 6921th Scty Sq |
| COMINT | Communications Intelligence |
| COMJAM | Communications Jamming |
| COMM | Communications |
| COMSEVENTH FLEET | Commander Seventh Fleet |
| COMPASS FLAG | USAF executing an NSA request to equip a small number of PAVE EAGLE II, QU-22B aircraft with a remotely controlled COMINT payload (consisting of 16 collection positions). |
| COMSEC | Communications Security |



[redacted]

[redacted]

| | |
|---|---|
| CRICKET/ALLEYCAT | (Barrel Roll) Nomenclatures assigned to the ABCCC aircraft flying over Laos |
| CRYPTO | Cryptographic |
| CSAF | Chief of Staff Air Force |
| CVA | Carrier Vehicle Auxiliary (Attack Carrier Operations) in reference to those operating out of the Gulf of Tonkin |
| Det | Detachment |
| DF | Direction Finding |
| DIRNSA | Director National Security Agency |
| DNG | Danang |
| DSU | Direct Service Unit |
| DURMIS | Daily Unit Resources Management Information Summary |
| EMR | Exploitable Message Report |
| FAAWC | Force Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator |
| FAC | Forward Air Controller |
| FM | Frequency Modulation |
| HF | High Frequency |
| HILLSBORO/MOONBEAM | (Steel Tiger) Nomenclatures assigned to the ABCCC aircraft flying over laos |
| ITOT | Initial Time On Target |
| KM | Kilometers |
| LEFT JAB | Army ARDF Platform |
| LS | Lima/ST & L Site |
| MACT | Military Assistance Command Thailand |
| MACV | Military Assistance Command Vietnam |
| MHZ | Megahertz |
| Mission Areas | Flown by EC-47 aircraft operating out of; |
| 200 | Phu Cat |
| 400 | Army - UDorn |
| 600 | NKP |
| 800 | TSN |
| 900 | DNG |

[redacted]

[redacted]

| | |
|---|---|
| MM | Manual Morse |
| MMOB | Monkey Mountain Operations Branch |
| Msg | Message |
| MSK | Mission Support Kit |
| NCS | Net Control |
| NKP | Nakhon Phanom |
| NM | Nautical Mile |
| [redacted] | |
| NVA | North Vietnamese Army |
| NVC | North Vietnamese Communist |
| OPIN | Operating Instruction |
| OPSCOMM | Informal Operations Communications Channels |
| PDJ | Plaines De Jarres |
| PIRAZ | Position Identification Radar Advisory Zone |
| PL | Pathet Lao |
| Pri | Priority |
| PSR | Pacific Security Region |
| RAVEN FAC | FAC's operating in Laos |
| RLAF | Royald Laotian Air Force |
| RRFS | Radio Research Field Station |
| RT | Radio Telephone |
| RVN | Republic of Vietnam |
| SAM | Surface-to-Air Missile |
| SEA | Southeast Asia |
| SEATS | Southeast Asia Technical Summary |
| SEAWING | The unclassified reference pertaining to Naval reconnaissance flights operating between 0000H-0600H in the Black Track area over Laos. |
| SENIOR BOOK | Air Force operational test program |
| SIGINT | Signal Intelligence |
| SOI | Special Operating Instruction |
| SSTB | Special Signals Technical Branch |
| STEEL TIGER | U.S. Air Operations over Laos; South of 18:30 degrees. |
| TACAIR | Tactical Air (aircraft/courses) |
| TACC-NS | Tactical Analysis Coordination Center - North Sector |
| TACREP | Tactical Reporting |



[redacted]

[redacted]

| | |
|---|---|
| TDY | Temporary Duty |
| TECHINS | Technical Instructions |
| TECHREP | Technical Representative |
| TEWS | Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron |
| TFA | Task Force Alpha |
| Tgt | Target |
| TSN | Tan Son Nhut |
| UHF | Ultra High Frequency |
| USAFSS | United States Air Force Security Service |
| UTM | Universal Transverse Mercator |
| VHF | Very High Frequency |
| VIM | Vietnamization Improvement and Modernization |
| VNAF | Vietnamese Air Force |



[redacted]

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

AS OF 30 JUNE 1971

| | |
|---|---|
| Captain Lewis DeLaura | Commander |
| 1st Lt John A. Ritner, Jr. | Operations Officer |
| SMSgt William Schaule | NCOIC Operations/First Sergeant |
| MSgt James F. Hart | NCOIC Exploitation |
| MSgt Herbert E. Wallace | NCOIC Communications |
| TSgt Gerald D. Hoag | NCOIC Mission Management |
| TSgt Dennis L. McDowell | NCOIC Materiel |
| TSgt Charles Newkirk | NCOIC Personnel |
| TSgt Carl D. Ramey | NCOIC Airborne Operations |
| TSgt Robert H. Tucker | NCOIC Training |
| SSgt Randy D. Myers | NCOIC Administration/Security |
| SSgt Robert L. Sherwood | NCOIC Standardization/Evaluation |

[redacted]




[redacted]

Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron USS-D3

A2

Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron USS-D3

Detachment 3, 6994th Scty Sq

Van Complex



Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron USS-D3




A4

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

(Captain James R. Clapper, Jr.)

Captain Clapper assumed command of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron, Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, on 22 June 1970.

He was born on March 14, 1941, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He graduated from high school at the Nurnberg American High School, Nurnberg, Germany, in 1959. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Maryland in 1963, and a Master of Arts degree from St. Mary's University in 1970.

He was commissioned as a Distinguished Graduate in the Air Force ROTC program and was assigned initially to the USAFSS School at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. Following graduation from the Officer's Signal Intelligence Course in March 1964, he was assigned to the Air Force Special Communications Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. In December 1965, he was assigned to Headquarters 2nd Air Division (later designated 7th Air Force), Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN, as a Watch Officer and Desk Analyst in the Directorate of Operational Intelligence. Upon his return to the CONUS, he served as Aide To The Commander, USAFSS, for approximately three years.

Captain Clapper is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Class 67-C.

(Photo of Commander, Captain James R. Clapper, Jr., not available)

[redacted]

21 DEC 1970

4867

ZCZCDVU844
RR YADVIZ
DE YMRDQX 0015 3550822
ZNY MMNSH
R 210822Z
FM 6994 SCTY SQ
TO PACSCTYRGN/DOR
INFO DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ/DO
ZEM
[redacted] DO
SUBJECT: VHF MORSE INTERCEPT
REF: PSR DOR 172229Z DEC 70 (NOTAL DET 3 - CONTAINED IN MY INFORMAL OF 19 DEC.)

1. HAVE INSTRUCTED DET 3 TO START A TEST TO DETERMINE THEIR CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT VHF MORSE IN THE LAOTIOAN ORBITS. PLAN TO USE A G-175-J AT THE Z-2 POSITION IN TWO ACFT. HOWEVER, WISH TO POINT OUT THAT ANY VHF MORSE COLLECTION EFFORT WILL BE AT THE EXPENSE OF HF MORSE EXPLOITABLE MSG COLLECTION. USE OF THE G-175-J IN THE MORSE COLLECTION POSITION WILL BE FURTHER DEGRADING TO CONSUMER [redacted] REQUIREMENTS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE OPERATOR WILL NOT, IN MOST CASES BE ABLE TO COPY BACK LINK ACTIVITY. [redacted] IS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN NVA, NVC AND PATHET LAO IN NORTHERN LAOS WHILE [redacted] TO SOME DEGREE, AND OTHER CONSUMERS SUCH AS 7AF AND MACV ARE INTERESTED IN GDRS ACTIVITY ALONG THE LAOTIAN/VIETMAN BORDER. AS REF MSG STATES, ACRP AIRCRAFT ARE SUCCESSFULLY EXPLOITING THE GDRS SPECTRUM. WOULD EXPECT ANY CONTRIBUTION BY ARDF AIRCRAFT TO BE MINIMAL AND DUPLICATIVE.

2. WE WILL CONDUCT THE TEST AS REQUESTED BUT VALIDITY OF THE EFFORT IS QUESTIONABLE SINCE IT MUST BE CONDUCTED WITH MINIMUM DEGRADATION TO CONSUMER REQUIREMENTS AND WITHOUT DISRUPTION OF NORMAL TASKING.

3. WILL FORWARD RESULTS UPON COMPLETION OF TEST.

350
0015

[redacted]

[redacted]

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

INT

| TYPE MSG | BOOK | MULTI | SINGLE |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | X |

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 05/0100Z JAN 71

FROM: DET3 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: 6994 SCTY SQ/DO

[redacted] DO

SUBJ: VHF MORSE INTERCEPT

REF : UR DO 210320Z DEC 70

THIS UNIT HAS TRIED ON 35 MISSIONS, FLOWN WITH A G-175-J RECEIVER ON THE Z-2 CONSOLE TO INTERCEPT VHF MORSE IN OUR LAOTIAN ORBITS. THE ONLY MANUAL MORSE ENCOUNTERED DURING THIS TEST WAS ONE INSTANCE OF AUTOMATIC MORSE APPEARING IN THE VHF SPECTRUM; THERE WAS NO VHF MORSE COPIED BETWEEN 20 DEC 70-04 JAN 71.

SPECIAL INSTRUCT

| DATE | TIME |
|---|---|
| 05 | |
| MONTH | YEA |
| JAN | 7 |
| PAGE NO. | NO. PAG |
| 1 | |

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Capt De Laura

PHONE: 2020

[redacted]

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Lewis De Laura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: Lewis De Laura, Capt USAF
Operations Officer

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD FO [redacted] EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED. ☆ U.S. Government Printing

[redacted]

[redacted] 1030

ZCZCDVU592QOYFZMK
RR YADVIZDD
DE YMRDQK 0011 0060225
ZNY MMNSH
R 060148Z
FM 6994 SCTYSQ
TO PACSCTYRGN
INFO DET 3 6994 SIZSQ
ZEM
[redacted] DOR
SUBJ: VHF MORSE INTERCEPT
REF: DOR 172229Z DEC 70
AS REQUESTED IN REF, DET 3 CONDUCTED A VHF MORSE TEST IN ALL LAOTION ORBITS DURING THE PERIOD 20 DEC - 4 JAN. THE TEST, UTILIZING A G-175 J.(E AND A BAND TUNERS), ON THE Z-2 POSITION, WAS CONDUCTED AT A PERIODIC INTERVALS DURING 35 MSNS WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE REASON FOR THE ACRP INTERCEPT OF SUBJ COMMS IS THEIR HIGHER OPERATING ALTITUDES AND THAT A CHECK OF THE AREA OF VHF MORSE EMANATIONS WILL PROBABLY INDICATE THOSE COMMS ARE NOT IN DET 3'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AS THE TERRAIN IN THOSE AREAS ARE NOT CONDUCIVE TO VHF OPNS.
120
0011

[redacted]

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INT 1-2
FILE

3

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[redacted]

File C
INT

-7 JAN 1971 04 02

1271

[redacted]

ZCZCDVU349Y
RR YADVIZ
DE YHLAKZ 0006 0070054
ZNY MMMSH
R 070019Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 6994SCTYSQ/DORM
INFO DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/DORM
USAFSS/DOR
ZEM
[redacted] DOR
SUBJ: INTERCEPT EFFECTIVENESS.
1. HAVE NOTED WITH CONCERN THE DECLINING RATE OF MANUAL MORSE INTERCEPT EFFECTIVENESS FOR DET 3 OVER THE PERIOD 19 DEC 70 TO 01 JAN 71. THE DECREASE IS ESPECIALLY NOTICEABLE DUE TO THE 72 PER CENT EFFECTIVENESS ACHIEVED FOR MANUAL MORSE DURING THE PERIOD 12 - 18 DEC 70.
2. ALTHOUGH THESE FIGURES WERE DERIVED ONLY FROM THE Z2 POSITION, THEY STILL INDICATE A POSSIBLY SERIOUS PROBLEM. WEF TASKING CYCLE STARTING 02 JAN THIS HQS HAS INITIATED AN EVALUATION OF THE YANKEE POSITION INTERCEPT AS WELL AS THE TWO ZULU POSNS.
3. REALIZE THAT ANY EXPLANATIONS CAN ONLY BE TENUOUS AT BEST HOWEVER WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON THE MANUAL MORSE DECLINE.
170
0006

[redacted]

[redacted]

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4

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

[redacted]

| TYPE MSG | BOOK | MULTI | SINGLE |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | |

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DTG 08/0600Z JAN 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: 6994 SCTY SQ/DORM

[redacted] CC/DO

SUBJ: INTERCEPT EFFECTIVENESS.

REFERENCE: PACSCTYRGN DOR 070019Z JAN 71.

1. AS A GENERAL COMMENT, WE DO NOT AGREE WITH SUPPOSITION THAT DECLINE IN MANUAL MORSE INTERCEPT EFFECTIVENESS NECESSARILY INDICATES "A POSSIBLE SERIOUS PROBLEM." THE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM USED TO GAUGE EFFECTIVENESS IS A GROSS INDICATER OF PRODUCTION ONLY; IT DOES NOT MEASURE QUALITATIVE PRODUCTION, NOR DOES IT MEASURE THE ALL-IMPORTANT VARIABLE OF TARGET ACTIVITY.

2. THROUGH OUR OWN MANAGEMENT DATA BASE, WE HAVE ALSO NOTED A GENERAL DECLINE IN PRODUCTION IN ALL AREAS AND IN VIRTUALLY ALL MODES. FOR EXAMPLE, VOICE EXPLOITABLE MESSAGES DECREASED FROM 109 FOR THE PERIOD 19-25 DEC to 79 FOR THE PERIOD 19 DEC-01 JAN. PARENTHETICALLY, MERELY COUNTING EXPLOITABLE MESSAGES IS ALSO ONLY A GROSS INDICATER SINCE THEIR LENGTH WILL VARY FROM AS FEW AS TEN GROUPS TO AS MANY AS 200. THE ONLY MEASURED FACTOR WHICH HAS

| DATE | TIME |
|---|---|
| 8 | |
| MONTH | YEAR |
| JAN | 1971 |
| PAGE NO. | NO. OF PAGES |
| 1 | 2 |

DRAFTER: TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE 2020

RELEASER: SIGNATURE James R. Clapper Jr.

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR, Captain, USAF
Commander

SE [redacted]

[redacted]

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SEC [redacted]

| PRECEDENCE | RELEASED BY | DRAFTED BY | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ACTION ROUTINE | CAPT CLAPPER | CAPT CLAPPER | 2020 |
| INFO | | | |

RECENTLY BEEN ON THE INCREASE HAS BEEN ACQUISITION OF PRIORITY FIXES. IN THIS REGARD, IT MAY BE WORTHWHILE TO REMIND PAC SCTY RGN THAT ALL OF OUR MISSIONS ARE FRAGGED AS PRIMARY ARDF, NOT COLLECTION.

3. TARGET ACTIVITY IN LAOS AS INDICATED IN SIGINT PRODUCT REPORTS AVAILABLE TO US AS SUPPORTED BY COLLATERAL INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN UNEXPECTEDLY DOWN, PARTICULARLY DURING THE LAST TWO WEEKS OF DECEMBER.

4. WE WERE DIRECTED TO CONDUCT A VHF MANUAL MORSE TEST, WHICH WE CONDUCTED FROM 20 DECEMBER THROUGH 4 JANUARY. ALL TIME SPENT SEARCHING ON THE 35 MISSIONS FLOWN DURING THIS PERIOD BY AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH A G-175J ON THE Z-2 POSITION, WAS DONE AT THE DIRECT EXPENSE OF THE Z-2 HF SEARCH MISSION.

5. BY MEANS OF THE AIRBORNE ANALYST, WE HAVE MADE INTENSIVE EFFORTS AT QUALITATIVELY MANAGING ON-GOING COLLECTION ON THE AIRCRAFT, BY INSURING THAT EFFORT IS EXPENDED ONLY ON DESIRED TARGETS NOT COPIABLE ELSEWHERE (I.E. USM-7). WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO TIGHTEN ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES TO INSURE THAT ONLY ACTUAL MINUTES OF COPY ARE RECORDED. CUMULATIVELY, ALL OF THESE FACTORS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF SUPERFICIALLY INDICATING A "DECLINING RATE OF MANUAL MORSE INTERCEPT EFFECTIVENESS" WHEN SUCH IS ACTUALLY NOT THE CASE.

| CONTROL NO. | TOR/TOD | PAGE NO. | NO. OF PAGES | MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION | INITIALS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [redacted] | | 2 | 2 | [redacted] | |

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD 1 NOV 63 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

[redacted]

[redacted]

15 JAN 71 05 3140

ZOZCYU0883594
RR YADVIC
DE YRDOA 0058 0150244
ZNY YNNSN
R 15[illegible]
FM 6994 SCTY SQ
TO PACSCTYRGN/DOR
INFO DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ/DO
ZEN
[redacted] DOR
REFUR DOR 172019Z JAN 71.
1. THE DECLINE IN PRODUCTIVITY IN YOUR REF CAN BE ATTRIBUTED ONLY TO A LIKE DECLINE IN TACTICAL ACTIVITY IN THE DET 3 AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.
2. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A STATISTICAL DECREASE IN DET 3 MANUAL MORSE INTERCEPT PRODUCTIVITY (AMOC VS COPY), SEE NO REASON FOR UNDUE CONCERN AS: A. USM-7 ALSO EXPERIENCED A DECLINE IN INTERCEPT FROM THE PLAINE DES JARRES AREA DURING THE REFED PERIODS( AREA 15 DECREASE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERALL UNIT DECREASE). B. EXPLOITABLE MSG ACTY ONLY DECREASED APPROX TWO MSGS PER MSN. C. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OCCURRANCE DURING THE REFED PERIODS OF "DECREASED" ACTIVITY WAS, WHEN COMPARED TO FIXES FOR 12-18 DEC, THE 18 AND 28 PERCENT INCREASE IN PRIORITY TARGET ACQUISITION DURING THE PERIODS 19-25 DEC AND 26 DEC-1 JAN. D. AREA 11 PRODUCTIVITY REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE.
3. AS YOU ARE AWARE, NORMS OF ACTIVITY, BOTH FIX AND COLLECTION, JUST CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED IN AN EVERCHANGING TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT AND IT IS MOST UNREALISTIC TO TRY TO COMPARE PERIODS OF ACTIVITY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE WHEN EXTREMELY SHORT PERIODS OF TIME ARE UTILIZED IN THE COMPARISONS. ALSO, FEEL IT DOUBLY IMPORTANT TO LOOK AT THE PLATFORMS TOTAL PRODUCTIVITY RATHER THAN ONE INDIVIDUAL TOSN. (IN THE REFED PERIODS "Y" COPY TIME ACTUALLY INCREASED OVER PAST PERIODS) X
25[illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6

[redacted]

ZCZCDV003001
RR YADVIZ
DE YMRDOK 0006 0560207
ZNY MMNSH
R 250203Z
FM 6994 SCTY SQ
TO DET 1 6994 SCTY SQ/DO
DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ/DO
DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ/DO
INFO PSR/DO
USAFSS/DO
ZEM

[redacted]

7899

25 FEB 1971 12 13

COM 1

SUBJECT FIX/FAC EXERCISE

1. INDICATIONS ARE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO RESUME THE FIX/FAC EXERCISE DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF MARCH. COORDINATION WITH 7AF BEING ACCOMPLISHED AT THIS TIME. BEGINNING 26 FEB 71, REQUEST ALL MISSIONS IN LAOS CARRY AN EXTRA KYK-3 KEYED WITH HILLSBORO CODE. AT LEAST ONE MISSION IN EACH FRAG AREA IN LAOS SHOULD CONDUCT A DAILY COMM CHECK WITH HILLSBORO IN THE FM MODE. INITIAL TEST DISCLOSED THAT SECURE FM COMMM CAN BE ESTABLISHED AFTER THE PILOT CALLS HILLSBORO ON UHF PLAIN AND REQUESTS THEM TO MONITOR FM SECURE. ADVISE THIS HQ OF SUCCESSFUL CONTACTS AND ANY DIFFICULTY EXPERIENCED. THIS IS A COMM TEST ONLE. DO NOT PASS FIXES UNTIL SPECIFIC START DATE IS ANNOUNCED BY SEPARATE MSG.

2. HAVE FINALLY RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FEEDBACK FROM INITAL TEST PERIOD: A SUMMARY OF RESULTS OBTAINED BY RAVEN FAC'S DURING THE EC-47/FAC TARGETING TEST THUS FAR: A. 3 FEB - HILLSBORO PASSED ARDF FIX XC 30 14 TO [redacted] VIA SECURE VOICE. FIX WAS PASSED TO R42. AT XC 308 014 R42 DISCOVERED A LARGE ENEMY COMPLEX OF CAMOUFLAGED STRUCTURES. R42 DIRECTED 11/T-28'S AND 4/F-100'S AGAINST THE TARGET. BDA - 15 STRUCTURES DESTROYED AND 2 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. B. 4 FEB - HILLSBORO PASSED ARDF FIX VICINITY XC 00 40 VIA WHEEL TO R40. AT XC 002 043 R40 DISCOVERED CAMOUFLAGED STRUCTURES (NUMBER UNKNOWN) AND BUNKERS. TARGET WAS STRUCK BY RLAF T-28'S. BDA - SIX STRUCTURES AND TWO BUNKERS DESTROYED. C. 5 FEB - RAVEN 43 WAS PASSED THREE FIXES FROM HILLSBORO VIA WHEEL. R43 WAS ABLE TO VR ONE FIX VICINITY OF XC 02 12. AT XC 015 122 R43 LOCATED FOUR CAMOUFLAGED STRUCTURES. ALL WERE DESTROYED BY RLAF T-28'S. THIS CAN BE A VERY BENEFICIAL PROCEDURE AND ANY RECOMMENDATIONS YOU HAVE FOR IMPROVEMENT ARE SOLICITED. MUST EMPHASIZE THE PRIMARY MISSION TAKES PRECEDURES OVER THIS EXERCISE.

450
0006

[redacted]

13

[redacted]

Com 1-4
4100

25 APR 1971 05 25

ZOZCOKC557
PP YADVIZ
DE YMRCOK 0018 1050504
ZNY MMMSH
ZKZK PP NRL DE
P 1[illegible]45 0Z
FM 6994SCTY SQ
TO DET 1 6994SCTY SQ/DO
DET 2 6994SCTY SQ/DO
DET 3 6994SCTY SQ/DO
INFO P/OSCTYRGN/DOR
USAFSS/DORT
ZEV
[redacted]
SUBJ: EC-47/FAC TARGETING TEST
1. ALL UNITS ARE TO DISCONTINUE PASSING FIXES TO HILLSBOROUGH ABCCC AS OF 17 APR 1971. CONTINUE TO CARRY KEY-LISTS UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED.
2. 7AF IS ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN OPERATIONAL FEEDBACK NECESSARY FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION. WILL FORWARD ANY FEEDBACK AND RESULTS OF EVALUATION WHEN AVAILABLE.
100
0018
[redacted]

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16 DC

[redacted]

File: INT 1-1
1061
DM

R 2302307
FM 6994 SCTY SO
TO PACSCTYRON (DMW)
INFO DET 1 6994 SCTYSO (DM)
DET 3 6994 SCTYSO (DM)
ZEM
[redacted] DM
SUBJ: ALR-35 AND ALR-38 AGE (U)
REF: A. RSR MSG LOSX 3019157 JUL 70.
B. USAFSS LOXA LTR 29 SEPTEMBER 70.
C. USAFSS MSG OMMA 1620167 FEB 71.
D. USAFSS MSG OMMA 1916037 FEB 71.

USAFSS [redacted]

1. REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF FUTURE PLANS FOR THE USE OF ALR-35 AND ALR-38 AGE INVIEW OF THE FOLLOWING:
A. REF ALFA ASKED FOR COMMENTS ON:
(1) THE TRANSFER OF ALL ALR-34 AGE TO THE VNAF FROM DET 3 6994 SCTYSO.
(2) THE REPLACEMENT OF THIS AGE WITH A PARTIAL SET OF 38 AGE AND A THIRD SET OF 35 AGE.
B. INCLUDED 601A AUTHORIZATION FOR PARTIAL SET OF 38 AGE AT DET 3 AND DIRECTED DET 3 TO ESTABLISH THEIR REQUIREMENT FOR THIS AGE WITH THEIR HOST BASE. THIS WAS DONE COLN HOWEVER, NONE OF THIS AGE HAS YET BEEN RECEIVED. DET 3 IS SUBMITTING FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO THE HOST BASE.
C. WE HAD ASSUMED THAT 35 AGE WAS ALSO SLATED FOR DET 3, 6994 SCTYSO AS MENTIONED IN REFA A. HOWEVER, REF CHARLIE, PARA 2 INFERS THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT DET 1, 6994 SCTY SO MIGHT BE TASKED WITH MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR THE ALR 35 SYSTEM AND REFERENCE D DIRECTS DETACHMENT 1 6994 SCTYSO TO REQUISITION A PIECE OF 35 AGE EQUIPMENT. PRIOR TO THIS WE WERE PREPARED TO SEND DET 1'S 35 AGE TO DETACHMENT 3.
(2) QUERY IF ALR-35 AGE IS STILL SLATED FOR DET 3 AND IF DET 3 WILL BE PROVIDED 601A AUTHORIZATION FOR ALR-35 AGE. IF THIS IS NOT ACCOMPLISHED AND DET 3 LOSES ITS 34 AGE TO THE VNAF, THE ONLY AGE EQUIPMENT AT DET 3 WILL BE THE PARTIAL SET OF 38 AGE WHICH HAS NOT YET ARRIVED. THIS WILL SEVERLY LIMIT THEIR MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY. CP-3.

[redacted]

NNNN

17

0006

File: JNT 1-1

[redacted]

DM

R 27 1452 FEB 71
FM RACSCTYRGN
TO USAFSS/DO/DM
INFO 6994SCTYSO/DO/DM
DET 1 6994SCTYSO/DO/DM
DET 2 6994SCTYSO/DO/DM
DET 6994SCTYSO/DO/DM
ZE

[redacted]

DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOUR.
SUBJ: ALR735/38 DEPLOYMENT AND AGE SUPPORT.
REFS: A. 6994SS DM 2302302Z FEB 71, SUBJ: ALR-35/38
(NOTAL USAFSS AND DET 2) (S/USAFSS PRIVACY).
B. 6994SS DO 0402402Z FEB 71 S/NF).
C. USAFSSCV 291375Z JAN 71(S/NF)
D. AFSSO RACAF IN 2023362 FEB 71, SUBJ: BASING OF ALR 38
CONFIGURED EC-47Q ACFT AT NKP. (SHVCCO/AFEO) (NOTAL USAFSS AND
6994 UNITS)
E. USAFSS XRX 2302255Z FEB 71, SUBJ: VIM MANNING/MISSION
TASKING (SHVCCO/USAFSS PRIVACY) (NOTAL6994SS DETS).
F. PSR DM/DO 2501153Z FEB 71, SUBJ: ALR735/38 AGE (S/USAFSS PRIVACY)
(NOTAL USAFSS AND DET 3)
G. SSO MACV (J 2114) 2503372 FEB 71, SUBJ: INCREASED ARDF COVERAGE.
(NOTAL 6994SS DETS)
1. REF A REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF FUTURE PLANS FOR USE OF THE
ALR-35 AGE AT PHU CAT AND THE PROJECTED ALR-38 AGE FOR NKP, IN
LIGHT OF THE TRANSFER OF NKP ALR-34 AGE TO THE VNAF FOR TNG. (REF F
TNG WILL COMMENCE 1 DEC 71). REF'S B AND C ADDRESS VIM PHASING OF
ACFT WHICH INCLUDED THE ASSIGNMENT OF FOUR ALR-35 ACFT TO DET 1.
REF D REQUESTED USAF CONTACT MACV AND OBTAIN/EXPRESS VIEWS ON
BASING ALR738'S AT NKP.
2. PHASE II PROPOSAL IN REF C REFLECTS THE ADDITION OF
FOUR ALR735ZAT DET 1 AND DOES NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE ALR-35 AGE AT DET AGE AT
DET 1 WILL BE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT ALR738'S IF THEY ARE DEPLOYED TO NKP
AS ADDRESSED IN REF D. ALSO NOT DISCUSSED IN THIS EXCHANGE IS THE
REQUIREMENT FOR DET ALR-34 AGY TO BE TRANSFERRED TO TDY FROM MAINTENANCE
TNG WHICH BEGINS 1 DEC 71, AND WHICH WILL ELIMINATE ALR-34 MAINTENANCE
CAPABILITY AT NKP. THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL WOULD ALLOW THE ALR735 AGE AT
DET 1 TO BE TRANSFERRED TO NKP. THIS COUPLED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE
ALR-38 AGE AT NKP IN MAY, WILL PROVIDE A MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY FOR
ALR-35'S AND/OR 8'S. THE RESULTANT REDISTRIBUTION OF ALR-34/35 ACFT
AND AGE WILL NECESSITATE FORMAL CHANGES TO YOUR PHASE TWO PROPOSAL
AS FOLLOWS:
6994 SCTY SO SSTS DET 1 [illegible]
HEADING COLUMN 1 6994 SCTYSO. HEADING COLUMN TWO SSTS.
HEADING COLUMN THREE DET 1.
1. COLUMN 1 DELETE 5 ALR-35Z. (NOTE: CLN NO ENTRIES [illegible]

2. COLUMN TWO ADD FOUR ALR-34GC, COLUMN 3 DELETE 4 ALR-34GC.
. COLUMN ONE DELETE1 ALR-34Z, COLUMN TWO ADD 2 ALR-34Z, COLUMN T
ADD 4 ALR-34Z (COMMNOTE CLN END OF COLUMN ENTRIES), DET 31.
ADD FIVE ALR-35Z, . ADD 5 ALR-35Z, DELETE 5-34Z.
AN EARLY RESTATEMENT OF THE ABOVE TO ALCON CHOULD BE MADE TO ENSURE
SUFFICIENT TIME IS AVAILABLE PRIOR TO DEC 19 71, FOR NAVIGATOR AND
OPERATOR TRAINING ON ALR-35'S AND/OR ALR-38' SAT NKP.
EVEN THOUGH THE ABOVE DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS IS REQUIRED TO SATIFY
VIM PHASING, A SERIOUS OPERATIONAL PROBLEM ENVOLVES. DURING
THE INITIAL VIMTNG PHASES AND FULL ASSUMPTION OF MANNING BY THE 8STR,
SATISFACTION OF CURRENTLY DATED MACVV REQUIREMENTS IN SEA AREAS
ONE THRU FOUR, AND TWENTY, WILL BE SEVERELY DEGRADED. THE VIETNAMESE WILL
PROGRESSIVELY BE FLYING MORE OF THE AFCT AVAILABLE AT TSN.
CONSEQUENTLY DECREASING SATISFACTION OF MACV REQUIREMENTS, BECAUSE
OF THE DECREASED MISSIONS FLOWN BY 694TH CREWS. THE Z AIRCRAFT
THAT ARE DEPLOYED TO PHU CAT WILL NOT BE CAPABLE OF STOP-GAPPING THE
COVERAGE LOST BY 6994TH DECREASING MISSIONS BECAUSE OF THE
DRASTICALLY INCREASED FLIGHT TIME TO TSN FRAG AREAS FROM PHU CAT.
4. RECENT INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH PACAF PERSONNEL INDICATE THEY ARE
EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO BROACH THE SUBJECT OF RESOURCE REALLOCATION
IF IT INVOLVES INCREASED ASSETS AT NKP, BECAUSE OF HEADROOM PROBLEMS,
IN VIEW OF MACV'S NEW STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS ( REF G) AND
DISCUSSION IN PARA 3 ABOVE VMA QUERY YOUR VIEWS ON
OPENING DISCUSSIONS WITH PACAF/MACV ON REALLOCATING ACFT DISTRIBUTION,
PRINCIPLY INCREASING DET TO SATISY BLL MACV/ CAS LAOTIAN
REQUIREMENTS FROM NKP, AND COMPLETELY PHASING OUT DET 1.
BELIEVE THE PROPER EXECUTION OF THIS ACTION WILL SERVE TO STABILIZE
SATISFACTION ON MACV REQUIREMENTS, BUT

[redacted]

18'

[redacted]

P 2701457Z FEB 71
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO USAFSS/DO/DM
INFO 6994SCTYSQ/DO/DM
DET 1 6994SCTYSQ/DO/DM
DET 2 6994SCTYSQ/DO/DM
DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/DO/DM
ZEN
[redacted] DO/DM SECTION TWO OF TWO
DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOUR
SUBJ: ALR-35/38 DEPLOYMENT AND AGE SUPPORT
VVVVV
[redacted] (CONTINUED)
MACV REQUIREMENTS, WITH VIM ACTIONS CAUSING MINIMAL DISRUPTIONS.
288

[redacted]

NNNN

2

[redacted]

ROUTINE
R 281257 CURRENT
FM USAFSS
TO PACSCTYRGN
INFO 4604 SCTYSO
DET 1 4604 SCTYSO
DET 2 4604 SCTYSO
DET 3 4604 SCTYSO

[redacted]

CITE DOD/DMX/XRP
SUBJ: ALR-35/38 AGE DEPLOYMENT (UNIFORM)
REF: A PACSCTYRGN MSG DO/DM 2701457 FEB 71
B PACSCTYRGN MSG DOR 2701477 FEB 71
C USAFSS MSG CV 281357 JAN 71
D CINCPACAF MSG XP 281207 FEB 71

1. PROCEED WITHHOLDING DISCUSSIONS WITH PACAF/MACV ON RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS UNTIL OUTCOME OF REF B IS KNOWN.
2. WITH THE PROCUREMENT OF ADDITIONAL ALR-38 AGE AND REDISTRIBUTION OF CURRENT ALR-35 AGE, SEVERAL AGE SUPPORT CONFIGURATIONS ARE POSSIBLE.
   A. NAKHON PHANOM - ALL ALR-38 CONFIGURATION (5 UE)
      (1) AUGMENT DANANG WITH ALR-35 FROM TAN SON NHUT
      (2) PHU CAT - ALL ALR-34 AND COMYAM
      (3) TAN SON NHUT - LAP-34/35 MIX
      (4) NAKHON PHANOM - AIRFRAME PHASE FOR ALR-38 AT DANANG
      (5) NAKHON PHANOM - ORG MAINT FOR BRAVO EQUIPMENT AT DANANG
   B. NAKHON PHANOM - ALL ALR-35 CONFIGURATION
      (1) TAN SON NHUT PROVIDE ALR-35 FOR NAKHON PHANOM
      (2) PHU CAT - ALL ALR-34 AND COMYAM
      (3) DANANG - PRESENT CONFIGURATION
      (4) TAN SON NHUT - ALR-34/35 MIX
      (5) NAKHON PHANOM - ORG MAINT FOR BRAVO EQUIP AT TAN SON NHUT
   C. NAKHON PHANOM - ALR-35/38 MIX
      (1) AUGMENT DANANG/NAKHON PHANOM WITH ALR-35 FROM TAN SON NHUT
      (2) ALR-35 AT NAKHON PHANOM PHASED FROM TAN SON NHUT
      (3) ALR-38 AT NAKHON PHANOM PHASED FROM DANANG
      (4) NAKHON PHANOM - ORG BRAVO MAINT AT DANANG
      (5) PHU CAT - ALL ALR-34 AND COMYAM
      (6) TAN SON NHUT ALR-34/35 MIX
   D. ALR-35 AT PHU CAT
      (1) ALR-34/35/COMYAM MIX AT PHU CAT/CAM RANH BAY
      (2) NAKHON PHANOM ALR-35
      (3) DANANG - PRESENT CONFIGURATION
      (4) TAN SON NHUT - REDUCED TO 6 ACFT CONCURRENT WITH PHASE F, MIX PLAN SSTR ASSUME TAN SON NHUT MISSION
3. RECOGNIZE ABOVE OPTIONS MAY NOT INCLUDE TOTAL VARIETY OF CONFIGURATIONS; HOWEVER, BELIEVE THEY REPRESENT MOST FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVES WHEN FOLLOWING FACTORS ARE CONSIDERED.

B. ALR-34 ARDF [illegible] VIETNAMESE WILL BE ASSESTS CURRENTLY LOCATED AT DET 2, [illegible]

C. ADDITIONAL ALR-35/38 ARDF WILL NOT INCLUDE FULL MAINT CAPABILITY EVEN IF COMBINED AT ONE LOCATION AS OUTLINED

D. PHASE 3, VIMP PLAN CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED WITH CURRENT ALR-34 REQUIREMENT AT NAKHON PHANOM.

E. MACV RESOURCE AND MISSION REQUIREMENTS ARE UNKNOWN FOR FUTURE PLANNING

F. ALL OPTIONS OUTLINED ABOVE WILL AFFECT 7TH AIR FORCE/460 TFW OPERATIONAL MAINT AND TRAINING PROGRAMS

G. PHASE 3, VIMP IMPLEMENTATION WILL CAUSE EITHER TAN SON NHUT OR PHU CAT TO REDUCE TO ZERO ACFT, DEPENDENT UPON SSTG CAPABILITY AND MACV RESOURCE/MISSION REQUIREMENTS

H. BASE CLOSURES MAY AFFECT ULTIMATE BASING OF ARDF FLEET

[redacted]

4. WE CONCUR THAT PROPOSAL OUTLINED IN REF C MAY NOT HAVE REPRESENTED MOST DESIRABLE CONFIGURATION FOR PHUCAT, I.E., ALR-35 CONFIGURATION. HOWEVER, REALIGNMENT PROPOSAL PRIMARILY ADDRESSED RETENTION OFR RESOURCES AT PHU CAT DURING VIMP IMPLEMENTATION WHILE REDUCING ASSETS AT TAN SON NHUT SO:
A. AIRCRAFT PARKING FACILITIES COULD BE AVAILABLE.
B. SSTG MISSIONS COULD BE EFFECTIVE IN SATISFYING MACV REQUIREMENTS CONCURRENT WITH TRAINING/OPERATIONAL MISSIONS. C. US CAPABILITY WOULD BE RETAINED IN TRI-BORDER, NORTHERN CAMBODIA, AND SOUTHERN LAOS AREAS FROM PHU CAT.
5. BELIEVE AADP THAT PHU CAT DOES OR DOES NOT HAVE ALR-35S SHOULD BE RESOLVED BETWEEN USAFSS/PACAF UNITS SINCE CAPABILITY DIFFERENCE IS MINIMAL. REF D OUTLINES MACV CONCURRENCE IN ACCEPTING REF C PROPOSAL AND ACCEPTS SSTG ASSUMPTION OF TAN SONNHUT MISSION DESPITE MISSION DEGRADATION THAT MAY BE EFFECTED IN SEA AREAS 1 THROUGH 4 AND 38.
6. REF B OUTLINED POSSIBILITY, THOUGH SOMEWHAT REMOTE, OF SEEKING ADDITIONAL AIRFRAME RESOURCES AT NAKHON PHANOM. BELIEVE IT IMPERATIVE THAT WHEN CONSIDERATION IS GIVEN TO MORE THAN 5 AIRCRAFT AT NAKHON PHANOM ON A PERMANENT BASIS, PROBLEM OF FULL AIRFRAME SUPPORT, TO INCLUDE PHASE MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY, MUST BE READDRESSED. 7. BELIEVE ULTIMATE ARDF POSITION/AIRFRAME CONFIGURATION AND OPTION IS CONTINGENT UPON SUCCESS OF ACTIONS OUTLINED IN REF B. 8. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN RESULTS ARE KNOWN.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

IN71-1

ROUT MAR 13 05 21 '71

DET 3, 6994

RTTSZYUW RUHHWHA2393 0720249-SSSS--RUMOREA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 130107Z MAR 71
FM PSR WHEELER AFB HAWAII
TO RUMHFSA/6994SCTYSQ DM TSN AFLD RVN
INFO RUMUJGA/DET 1 6994SCTYSQ DMM PHU CAT AB RVN
RUMUJBA/DET 2 6994 SCTYSQ DMM DANANG AFLD RVN
RUMOREA/DET 3 6994SCTYSQ DMM NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI
BT

[redacted]

SUBJ: AL-35/38 AGE.
REF: A. UR DM 230230Z FEB 71.
B. PSR DO/DM 250158Z FEB 71.
C. PSR DO/DM 270145Z FEB 71.
D. USAFSS DOR/DMM/XRP 091625Z MAR 71.
IN VIEW OF THE MANY OPTIONS OUTLINED IN USAFSS MSG
BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS TIME
TO REQUEST THAT USAFSS CEMO ISSUE E-AID AUTHORIZATIONS TO
DET 3 FOR ALR-35 AGE. REQUEST YOU CONTINUE TO CYCLE ALR-35
AGE ITEMS FROM DET 1 TO UR UNIT FOR REPAIR/SERVICEABILITY
CHECK SO THAT THE AGE WILL BE SERVICEABLE IF THE NEED ARISES.
ADVISE BY 15 APR RESULTS OF INITIAL SERVICEABILITY CHECK.
GP-3.
BT
#2393
NNNN
IN 00162/MAR072 /ACK

20 DM

[redacted]

[redacted]

INT 17 1

Det 3, 6994

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* ROUTINE *
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MAR 20 06 48 '71

RTTSZYUW RUHHWHA3635 0790033-SSSS--RUMOREA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 192045Z MAR 71
FM PSR WHEELER AFB HI
TO RUMUJBA/DET 2 6994SCTYSQ DM DANANG AFLD RVN
INFO RUMMRSA/6994SCTYSQ DM TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN
RUMOREA/DET 3 6994SCTYSQ DMS DMM NAKHON PHANOM AB THAI

[redacted]

SUBJ: PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT OF ALR-38 SYSTEMS TO NKP (C).

PACAF/7AF HAVE RECENTLY REOPENED DISCUSSION ABOUT THE NEED FOR VHF ARDF IN THAILAND WITH MAY-JUN 71 AS THE PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT TIME FRAME. ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF ACFT TO BE DEPLOYED IS NOT YET FIRM IT APPEARS THAT A MINIMUM ( ) THREE ALR-38 ZULU EQUIPPED ACFT WILL BE REQUIRED. PURPOSE OF THIS MSG IS TO REVIEW MAINTENANCE/SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR VHF SYSTEMS AT NKP AND TO ENSURE THAT SYSTEMS CAN BE SUCCESFULLY SUPPORTED.

A. MAINTENANCE MANNING. USAFSS HAS ADVISED THAAT EIGHT MARCH 71 GRADUATES OF THE AZK30173-1 COURSE AT GOODFELLOW AFB WILL BE ASSIGNED TO 6994 SCTYSQ COMPLEX. THESE PERSONNEL HAVE RCVD TRAINING ON ALR-38 SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE AVAL TO AUGMENT ALR -38 PROFICIENT PERSONNEL FROM DET 2, 6994SS. THE DECISION TO USE SOME OF THESE NEW PERSONNEL TO DET 3, 6994SS FRM THIER UNITS OF ASSIGNMENT IN RVN IS A PREROGATIVE OF THE 6994 SS.

B. TECH REP ASSISTANCE. THE NEEDFOR TECH REP ASSISTANCE AT DET 3 FOR ALR-38 SYSTEMS SHOULD BE STUDIED IN VIEW OF THE IMPACT IT MAY HAVE ON MISSION CAPABILITY AT DET 2.

( ) POST-MISSION TESTING. IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR DET 3 TO HAVE VHF PMT CAPABILITY. REQUEST DET 2 COMPLIE A LISTING OF VHF TRANSCEIVERS, ANTENNAS, AND HARDWARE TOGETHER WITH A LISTING OF APPLICABLE TECH ORDER, AND FORWARD TO DET 3 FOR REQUISITIONING. KEEP THIS HQ ADVISED UR PROGRESS IN ATTAINING VHF PMT CAPABILITY AT DET 3.

D. DUPPLY SUPPORT. REF PSR DMS 182100Z MAR 71. IN ORDER TO PREPARE THE ALR-38 MSK FOR DEPLOYMENT TO NKP, RECOMMEND THAT UR UNIT INITIATE SUPPLY DIFFICULTY LETTERS ON OUTSTANDING REQUISITIONS FOR ITEMS MEEDED TO REPLENISH THE MSK IAW SECTION F, PART ONE, VOL I, AFM 67-1. LTR SHOULD CONTAIN CLASSIFIED STATEMENT THAT MSK MUST BE REPLENISHED TO SUPPORT MAY-JUN 71 DEPLOYMENT OF ALR-38 SYSTEMS TO NKP. FOR UR INFO, CH20, PART II, VOL II, AFM 67-1 REQUIRES THAT THE MSK BE TRANSFERRED TO NKP SINCE THE DEPLOYMENT WILL B IN EXCESS OF THIRTY DAYS.

E. ALR-35/38 PECULIAR TEST EQUIPMENT. USAFSS ADVISES THAT

DMS

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

REMAINING ALR-38 TEST EQUIPMENT AT SANDERS WILL BE RELEASED FOR SHIPMENT TO DET 3 WHEN ALR-38 T.O. VERIFICATION IS COMPLETED O/A 22 MARCH 71. WE HAAVE ALSO REQUESTED THAT USAFSS CEMO PROVIDE E-AID AUTHORIZATION AND SHIPPING DIRECTIVES FOR THOSE ITEMS OF ALR-35 (COMPUTER) AGE THAT WILL BE REQUIRED AT DET 3.

F. ALR-38 TECH DATA. REQUEST YOU ADVISE IF URUNIT HAS SUFFICIENT COPIES OF PRELIMINARY TECH DATA TO ALLOW FOR MINIMUM OF ONE COPY TO BE SENT TO DET 3 IN MAY-JUN TIME FRAME. IF NOT, TAKE ACTION TO REQUISITION THE ADDITIONAL COPIES REQUIRED. GP-3.

BT

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NNNN

IN 00314/MAR079 /ACK

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INT 1-
7588

20 [illegible] 1971

ZCZCDVAU826
RR YADVIZ
DE YMRDZO 0007 085054 1
ZNY MMNSH
R 260530Z
FM DET 2 6994 SCTY Sq
TO PSR/DO/DMM/DMSX
INFO 6994 SCTY Sq/DM
DET 3 6994 SCTY Sq/DMM
ZEM
[redacted] MAR 71
SUBJ: BASING OF ALR-38 ACFT AT A SECOND LOCATION (S)
REF A PSR/DMSX 192045Z MAR 71
B MY LO 181507Z OCT 70
C MY LO 151100Z OCT 70
D MY LO 070815Z SEP 70

1. THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN ADDRESSED IN THE PREVIOUS MSGS AND MOST OF THE SUGGESTIONS AND ANTICIPATED PROBLES REMAIN VALID. HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE PROVIDED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.
2. TRAINING OF RADIO OPERATORS SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM AS DET 2 CAN PROVIDE TDY ASSISTANCE FOR ALR-38 TRAINING AT DET 3.
3. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL MAY BE PROVIDED WITH ON THE JOB/ALR-38 EXPERIENCE THROUGH A TDY EXCHANGE SIMILAR TO THAT ESTABLISHED BY THE 6994 SCTY Sq. IN FEB 71 (IN SUPPORT OF PRESENT TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN LAOS) BETWEEN DET 2 AND DET 3. RECOMMEND AN IN PLACE MANNING FACTOR OF 1.5-2 BE ESTABLISHED FOR DET 3 FOR ASGN A/C, WITH PCS REASSIGNMENT OF NEW ALR-38 TRAINEES FROM 6994 SCTY Sq TO DET 3, PROVIDING MANPOWER CEILINGS ALLOW.
4. SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE OF THE ALR-38 WILL BE A DEFINITE PROBLEM. SUPPLY, PARTICULARLY, HAS BEEN A LIMITING FACTOR DURING THE ENTIRE ALR-38 PROGRAM.

5. ALR-38 MSK WILL NOT SUPPORT THREE ACFT FOR MORE THAN A ONE MOE PERIOD. IF SPARES SUPPORT FOR ALR-38 AT DET 3 IS TO BE ESTABLISHED. IT WILL REQUIRE (A) CONTINUAL AND TIMELY SPARES REPLENISHMENT OF THE MSK (AND REPLACEMENT OF MALFUNCTIONING PARTS) AT DET 3 BY EXCHANGE OF REPAIRABLE FOR SERVICEABLE BETWEEN DET 3 AND DET 2, OR B) LOAD THE ENTIRE ALR-38 ISSL AT NKP BASE SUPPLY.

6. OPTION (A) WILL REQUIRE FULL FIELD MAINTENANCE SUPPORT OF DET 3 BY DET 2 ON ALR-38 ITEMS. THIS WILL OBVIATE THE NECESSITY FOR IN-SHOP AGE AT NKP. BECAUSE A BLACK BOX EXCHANGE CONCEPT PRECLUDES LOCAL BENCH CHECK CAPABILITY, ADDITIONAL SPARES WILL BE NEEDED TO INSURE AVAILABILITY FOR FREE SUBSTITUTION OF PARTS DURING TROUBLE-SHOOTING AND REPAIR ON NKP BASED ACFT. TO MAINTAIN RELIABLE FIELD LEVEL REPAIR AND SUPPLY SUPPORT (IAW DIFM PROCEDURES) OF ALR-38 SYSTEM AT NKP, DAILY MISSIONS MUST BE SCHEDULED BETWEEN DANANG AND NKP; OTHER DIRECT TRANSPORTATION IS NON-EXISTENT, AND ITEMS WOULD HAVE TO BE ROUTED THROUGHT TSN AND BANGKOK--CAUSING DELAYS. IF PRESENT DANANG-NKP OPERATIONAL MISSIONS ARE MAINTAINED, THE POSSIBILITY OF ACFT ROTATION REMAINS INTACT. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT PMT/PHASE COULD BE PREFORMED AT DANANG; PMT FACILITIES AT NKP WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. TO MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR ACFT EXCHANGE THREE ACFT COULD BE DEPLOYED FROM DANANG ONE WOULD ACT AS SPARE, ONE WOULD FLY A 2-HOUR MISSION IN THE NKP LOCAL AREA (LAUNCH AND RECOVER NKP), AND THE THIRD FLY ON ALTERNATE DAYS BETWEEN NKP AND DNANAG.

7. OPTION (B) FULL BASE SUPPLY SUPPORT OF 3 ALR-38 ACFT PREMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO NKP: COMPLICATIONS WILL ARISE FROM THE FACT THAT DET 2 IS PRESENTLY OPERATING WITH NO MORE THAN ONE OR TWO SPARES OF MOST ITEMS. SUPPORT OF TWO OPERATING LOCATIONS WILL REQUIRE IDENTICAL SPARES LEVELS AT BOTH LOCATIONS. DO NOT BELIEVE TOTAL ASSETS EXIST IN THE AF INVENTORY TO GIVE THIS SUPPORT. ADDITIONALLY, ALR-38 AGE WILL HAVE TO BE PROCURED TO PROVIDE DET 3 WITH FIELD REPAIR CAPABILITY; DIFM CONTROLS BETWEEN DET 3 AND NKP BASE SUPPLY WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IF ALL DIFM REPAIRABLE PARTS WERE ROUTED TO DET 2 FOR FIELD LEVEL REPAIR. ADDITIONAL SPARES PROCUREMTENT WILL HAVE TO BE MADE BY DEPOT TO SUPPORT THIS ARRANGEMENT. A VIABLE SYSTEM OF LATERAL NORS SUPPORT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT WITHOUT MISSIONS BEING FLOWN BETWEEN DANANG AND NKP.

8. QUESTION THE RECOMMENDATION OF A ALR-34/38 MIX AT NKP. VERY FEW PARTS ARE INTERCHANGABLE BETWEEN THE TWO SYSTEMS. RATHER, IF A MIX IS NECESSARY, RECOMMEND A ALR-35/38 MIX, AS INTERCHANGABILITY OF SUB-ASSEMBLIES, MODULES, AND AGE UTILIZATON IS MUCH GREATER. SINCE TSN WILL BE INVOLVED WITH THE VIM PROGRAM WITH THE ALR-34, RECOMMEND THAT DET 2 AND DET 3 ABSORB THE ALR-35 ASSETS. THE ALR-34 ASSETS COULD BE DISTRIBUTED BETWEEN DET 1 AND THE 6994 AS OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND THE PROGRESS OF THE VIM PROGRAM DICTATE. SUCH AS REDISTRIBUTION OF ARDF ACFT WOULD MAKE SPARES SUPPORT MUCH MORE MANAGABLE, EVEN AT PRESENT PROVISIONING LEVELS.

9. THIS UNIT PRESENTLY HAS ONLY ONE COPY OF THE PRELIMINARY TECH DATA. TELECON WITH DET 3 REVEALS THAT THEY HAVE A PDO ACCOUNT AND CAN PLACE TECH DATA ON ORDER. WE HAVE ORDERED NEW COPIES THROUGH THE INDEX SUPPLEMENT; HAVE RECEIVED NO VALIDATED TECH DATA TO DATE.

10. SUPPLY MANNING AT DET 3 WILL HAVE TO BE INCREASED TO MANAGE THE NEARLY DOUBLED NUMBER OF ITEMS AND THE INCREASED FLOW OF REPAIRABLES.

11. BELIEVE TOTAL ALR-38 ACFT AVAILABILITY WILL BE REDUCED BY NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING A MISSION SPARE AT BOTH LOCATIONS. DANANG OPERATIONS PRESENTLY OPERATE WITH ONLY ONE SPARE ON MOST DAYS, AND WE ARE STILL FACED WITH A FAIRLY HIGH ABORT RATE. GP-1

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-2 APR 1971 02 25

ZCZCDVAU995
DR YMDVIZ
DE YMDZO 0013 0910920
ZNY MANSH
R 010635Z
FM DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ
TO DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ/DORM
INFO 6994 SCTY SQ/DORM
DET 1 6994 SCTY SQ/DORM
ZEM
[redacted] DOM APR 71
SUBJ: PASSING FIX INFO TO HILLSBORO
1. QUERRY YOUR COMM STATUS WITH HILLSBORO. HIS UNIT HAS NOT HAD CLEAR CONTACT IN CIPHER SINCE 26 MARCH. CONTACT HAS BEEN ATTEMPTED NUMEROUS TIME BY DIFFERENT MISSION AIRCRAFT IN THE 911 AND 909 AREA. CONTACT RESULTS HAVE ALL BEEN "SNOW"
2. USING FREQ 44.2 FM SECURE AS SUGGESTED IN 7TH AF 25GZ 67 FEB 71.
3. APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE ON THIS SUBJECT.
BT
0013

[redacted]

DOR

[redacted] 24

NNNN

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

C6m 1-4

SECURITY [redacted]

TYPE MSG XXX

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO ROUTINE

DTG 021 0915 APR 71

FROM: DET 3, 6994SS

TO: DET 2, 6994SS/DORM

INFO: 6994SS/DORM

DET 1, 6994SS/DORM

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

[redacted] DORM APR 71

SUBJ: PASSING FIX INFO TO HILLSBORO.

REF: YOUR DORM 01 0635Z APR 71, SAME SUBJ.

1. THIS UNIT HAD GOOD COMMS WITH HILLSBORO UP THROUGH 28 MAR. HOWEVER, FROM 29 MAR TO 01 APR, WE COULD NOT ESTABLISH CONTACT. OUR DURMIS FOR 300371 STATED THAT; "HILLSBORO INFORMED US THAT THEY WERE [redacted] HAVING FOX MIKE (FM) SECURE VOICE PROBLEMS."

2. DET 2 ACFT THAT RECOVERED AT NKP ON 02 APR (MSN 911A) HAD CONTACT [redacted] WITH HILLSBORO AND PASSED THREE (3) FIXES TO THEM. OUR 611A MSN (FIRST ONE OUT) HAD GOOD COMMS WITH HILLSBORO AND PASSED FOUR (4) FIXES TO THEM. OUR SECOND 611A MSN IS STILL IN THE AREA AND WE ARE UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEM.

| DATE | TIME |
|---|---|
| 02 | |
| MONTH APR | YEAR 1971 |
| PAGE NO. 01 | NO. OF PAGES 02 |

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

GERALD D. HOAG, TSGT, USAF
NCOIC, MISSION MANAGEMENT

PHONE 3790

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

Lewis De Laura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

LEWIS DE LAURA, CAPT, USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATI[redacted]

REGR[redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV 65 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

[redacted]

| PRECEDENCE | RELEASED BY | DRAFTED [redacted] | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ACTION ROUTINE | | | |
| INFO ROUTINE | CAPT DE LAURA | TSGT HOAG | 3790 |

DOK $$$/$7$$$$60$$$/$M$TH$TWO$OUT$OF$/$THREE$/$ACFT$HAVING$GOOD$

3. WITH TWO OUT OF THREE ACFT HAVING GOOD COMMS WITH HILLSBORO TODAY THE SECURE VOICE PROBLEM COULD BE CORRECTED. HOWEVER, WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE POST MISSION DEBRIEF LOGS FOR NEG CONTACT WITH HILLSBORO AND QUERY THE AMS ON EACH FLIGHT $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ TO DETERMINE THE EXACT REASON FOR NEG CONTACT.

| CONTROL NO. | TOR/TOD | PAGE NO. | NO. OF PAGES | MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION | INITIALS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | DORM/02P915E 1A.11 | |

SECURITY [redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS [redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 1709-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 M[redacted]

[redacted]

19 JUN 1971 15 23

COM 1

CAPT D. 5127 DORT

ZOZCDVA8 20CRDA822

RR YADVIZ
DE YMBDZO 0027 1721025
ZNY MMMSH
R 191302Z
FM DET 2 6994 SCTY SO
TO RSB/DOR
INFO 6994 SCTY SO/DO
DET 3 6994 SCTY SO/DO
6999 SCTY SO/DOR
ZEM
[redacted]00 JUN 71
SUBJ: TIPOFF OF SAM-AS SOC COMMS TO ARDF PLATFORMS.
REFS:
A. NRV(C) 2223462 MAY 71
B. RSB/DOR 1321302 JUN 71
1. DURING THIS TEST PERIOD WE RECEIVED NO LOGGED TIPOFFS FROM DET 3. WE ARE INFORMALLY ADVISED THAT THEY TIPPED OFF TARGETS TO US ON 5, 6, AND 13 JUN, IN THE 911A AREA. ON 5 JUN OUR LOGS SHOW NO TIPOFFS, AND TWO FIXES OBTAINED BY THE CREW AS HAVING BEEN PASSED TO DET 3 (U/I VOICE ON 37.01 MHZ FIXED AT XD188428 AND U/I MCHNL ON 44.31 MHZ FIXED AT XD026118). ON 6 JUN NO TIPOFFS WERE LOGGED FROM DET 3 AND ON 13 JUN NO CONTACT WAS MADE WITH DET 3. IN THE 999 AREA WE HAVE NO RECORDED CONTACTS WITH DET 3 ON ANY OF THESE DAYS OR AT ANY POINT DURING THE TEST. ALL TIPOFFS WERE RECIEVED FROM THE RESULTS PASSED TO ARMY DSU S-IN COUNTRY.
2. WE DO NOT FEEL THAT THERE IS GREAT POTENTIAL BENEFIT IN THIS PROGRAM AS WE ARE UNABLE, BY VIRTUE OF SAM STANDOFFS, TO GET CLOSE ENOUGH TO A SAM SITE TO FIX ITS COMM FACILITIES, EVEN WHEN WE ARE ABLE TO FLY ON THE EXTREME EDGE OF THE SAM STANDOFF ENVELOPE. WE ARE NOT OFTEN ABLE TO DO EVEN THIS, DUE TO AAA THREAT AREAS. FOR THIS REASON WE SUPPORT YOUR NON-CONCURRENCE WITH THE A-A TIPOFF SYSTEM. WE SUGGEST THAT TIPOFF TO NKP BE MADE ROUTINE AND WE WILL ATTEMPT TO FIX THESE TARGETS, BUT THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS IS LOW CONSIDERING STANDOFF AND SHORT XMSSN TIMES CITED IN REF ALFA.
3. SERGEANT ACRE S TOY WAS OF SOME BENEFIT IN THAT HE WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE SOME INFO ON MCHNL ACTY IN BARREL ROLL. SOME OF THE INFO HE PROVIDED WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO LOCAL TRAINING PROGRAM. HIS SIX FLIGHTS WITH OUR OPERATORS, MOSTLY WITH RELATIVELY NEW OPS, WERE MOST BENEFICIAL AND APPRECIATED. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HIS BCS ARRIVAL.
BT
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[redacted]

[redacted]

27 JUN 1971 07 15

ZCZCDVA084RDM151
RR YADVIZ
DE YMRDQK 0008 1780325
ZNY MMNSH
R 270220Z
FM 6994 SCTY SQ
TO PACSCTYRGN/DOR
INFO DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ/DO
DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ/DO
ZEM
[redacted] DORM
SUBJ: ACRP TIPOFF OF SAM COMMS TO ARDF ACFT
REF A: DET 2 DO 191020Z JUN 71
B: PSR DOR 222351Z JUN 71
C: DET 2 DO 240745Z JUN 71 (NOTAL)

1. DET 2 IS UNABLE TO MONITOR NKP FROM THE 909A AREA FOR SAM TIPOFFS. THEY MUST REMAIN ON THE DSU GROUND TO AIR TIPOFF NET EVEN WHEN NOT PASSING FIX INFO OR EXPLOITABLE MESSAGE TO THE GROUND, DUE TO THE HIGH LEVEL OF TACTICAL ACTY IN THE AREA. ADDITIONALLY THE 909A AREA IS APPROXIMATELY 150NM FROM NKP AND SEPARATED BY MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN, WHICH FURTHER RESTRICTS THE PRESENT TIPOFF PROCEDURES IN THIS AREA.
2. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT DET 2 WILL BE ABLE TO ACQUIRE A VALID FIX ON THE SAM COMMS BECAUSE OF THE SHORT DURATION OF THE TARGET COMMUNICATIONS AND THE EXCESSIVE STANDOFF RANGE, HOWEVER, YOU CAN REST ASSURED THAT THEY WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO FIX ANY EMITTER TIPPED OFF TO THEM.
3. DET 2 IS UNABLE TO EXPLAIN HOW THE STAN/EVAL TEAM MEMBERS GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO WORK MULTI-CHANNEL TARGETS WITH STANDOFF RANGES OF 70-80 MILES. THEY HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY STATEMENTS MADE BY THEIR PERSONNEL WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE TEAM MEMBERS THIS IMPRESSION.
4. SUBJECT AREA IN PARA 3 OF REF A WAS STEEL TIGER VICE BARREL ROLL, REGRET ANY MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN CAUSED.
5. BOTH THIS UNIT AND DET 2 AGREE WITH YOUR "NON-CONCURRENCE" STAND ON THE AIR-TO-AIR TIPOFF PROGRAM. IT IS OUR OPINION THE DISADVANTAGES OF THIS METHOD OF TIPOFF WOULD FAR OUTWEIGH THE RESULTS DERIVED.
6. RELATED SUBJ: DISCUSSIONS WITH SSG REPRESENTATIVE INDICATES THIS PROBLEM IS PRESENTLY BEING STAFFED AT MACV (J2114) AND COULD LEAD TO CANCELLATION OF THE ENTIRE PROJECT. WILL ADVISE.

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RR YADVIZ
DE YMRDCK 0011 1650418
ZNY YMNSH
R 140410Z
FM 6994 SCTY SQ
TO DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ/CC
ZEM
[redacted]
SUBJ: LONG TIENG A/G/A COMMS
REF YOUR CC 130340Z JUN 71
SUGGEST YOU INITIATE DAILY COMM STATUS REPORT FOR A TWO WEEK PERIOD. BY THEN MOST OF THE BUGS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT OF THE SYSTEM AND AT THAT TIME YOU CAN REVERT TO REPORTING PROBLEMS ONLY VIA THE DURMIS. WHEN REPORTING IN THE DURMIS FAILURES AT ATTEMPTS TO PASS TRAFFIC WILL BE INCLUDED IN LINE 812, HOWEVER, JUST TESTS WILL BE REFLECTED IN SECTION 9XX.
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CITE: DO
TOTG: 1509 33Z
FM: RSR
TO: 6994SS/DO
DET 3 6994/DO
INFO USAFSS/AT
DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS
6994/EXCLUSIVE FOR LT MIDDUSSI;
DET 3 6994SS/EXCLUSIVE FOR ~~SSGT WYER~~ Capt DeLaura
USAFSS/ EXCLUSIVE FOR MR DELAUIS
SUBJ: LONG TIENG/A/G COMMS
REF: [redacted] 1209 33Z JUN 71
1. REQUEST DET 3, 6994SS TAKE RE FOR ACTION AND INITIATE COMMUNICATIONS TO TIENG ON 16 JUN AS REQUESTED.
2. REQUEST DAILY REPORTING OF COMM TEST RESULTS AND SUBSEQUENTLY OF FIXES PASSED VIA DET 3 DURMIS. REFERENCE OF QUOTE LONG TIENG COMM TEST UNQUOTE FOR QUOTE FIXES PASSED TO LONG TIENG UNQUOTE WILL BE UTILIZED IN DURMIS REPORT. EXPANDED DISCUSSION OF OPERATION WILL BE HANDLED VIA USAFSS PRIVACY, "EXCLUSIVE FOR" MSGS UNTIL ADVISED OTHERWISE.

[redacted]

AMMM

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FLASH

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18 JUN 1971 19 50

Com 1-3-1

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ZZ YADVIZ
DE YHLAKZ 0035 1671930
ZNY MMNSH
Z 0 161921Z ZYH
FM PSR
TO DET 3 6994 SCTYSQ/CC
INFO 6994 SCTYSQ/DO
USAFSS/DO
CAS VIENTIANE
NSAPAC
[redacted]
ZEM
[redacted] DO
SUBJ: LONG TIENG A/G/A COMMS
REFS: A. [redacted] 161118Z JUN 71
B. PSR DO 150203Z JUN 71 (NOTAL).
1. REQUEST YOU TAKE REF ALPHA FOR ACTION AND INITIATE COMM CHECKS WITH WILLARD MUSIC ON 256.5 ON 17 JUNE. UTILIZE SECURE MODE ONLY.
2. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED DIRECT CRITICOMM CONTACT WITH [redacted] TO COORDINATE INITIAL COMMUNICATIONS TESTING AND PROCEDURES. PLEASE INFO ABOVE ADDEES.
3. REPORTING PROCEDURES REMAIN AS OUTLINED REF BRAVO. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FORTHCOMING.
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NN [redacted]

[redacted]

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

Com 1-3-1

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION IMMEDIATE

INFO

DTG 162355Z JUN 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PACSCTYRGN/DO

INFO: 6994 SCTY SQ/DO

[redacted]

SUBJ LONG TIENG A/G/A COMMS

REFS: A [redacted] 161118Z JUN 71

B: PSR DO 161921Z JUN 71

1. APPRECIATE AUTHORIZATION CONTAINED IN REF BRAVO. FORMAL REPORTING WILL BE INITIATED THIS DATE IAW PSR DO 150203Z JUN 71. FYI. ALL THREE 15 AREA MISSIONS YESTERDAY MONITORED "WILLARD MUSIC" FROM 0215Z thru 1000Z WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

2. REF BRAVO RECEIVED AND WAS PASSED VIA RADIO TO FIRST ACFT THIS AM AND THE REST WILL BE BRIEFED XXX PRIOR TO LAUNCHING. WILL KEEP ALCON INFORMED.

| DATE | TIME |
|---|---|
| 17 | |
| MONTH | YEAR |
| Jun | 71 |
| PAGE NO. | NO. OF PAGES |
| 1 | 1 |

DRAFTER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Capt De Laura — PHONE: 2020

RELEASER — SIGNATURE: Lewis De Laura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: Lewis De Laura, Capt USAF, Commander

[redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV 65 173 — REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

DTG 17[illegible]Z JUN 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3, 6994SS

TO: 6994SS/DO

PACSCTYRGN/DO

[redacted]

[redacted]

EXCLUSIVELY FOR CAPT COBEAN AT PSR, MAJOR EDDY AT 6994SS.

SUBJECT: LONG TIENG A/G COMM STATUS REPORT 01--71.

1. NEGATIVE CONTACT WITH LONG TIENG ON 16 JUN 71. NO APPARENT REASON.

2. ALL 615 MISSIONS THIS DATE WILL ATTEMPT CONTACT WITH LONG TIENG PER [redacted], MSG 16/1118Z JUN 71.

3. FOR PSR: QUERY IF USAFSS/AT IS TO BE INCLUDED AS ADDRESSEE FOR THESE STATUS REPORTS.

| DATE | TIME |
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| 17 | |
| MONTH: JUN | YEAR: 1971 |
| PAGE NO.: 01 | NO. OF PAGES: 01 |

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: GERALD D. HOAG, TSGT, USAF

PHONE: 3790

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Lewis D. Laura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: LEWIS DE LAURA, CAPT, USAF COMMANDER

SECURITY [redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

37

DD. [redacted] EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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SEC [redacted]

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

DTG 18/ Ø345Z JUN 71

FROM: DET 3, 6994SS

TO: 6994SS/DO

PACSCTYRGN/DO

[redacted]

EXCLUSIVELY FOR CAPT COBEAN AT PSR AND MAJOR EDDY AT 6994SS.

SUBJECT: LONG TIENG A/G COMM STATUS REPORT Ø2-71.

1. ALL THREE 615 MISSIONS TRIED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT EVERY FIFTEEN MINUTES BEGINNING ON THE HOUR BUT HAD NEGATIVE RESULTS.

2. ALL AIRCRAFT MONITORED 256.5 SECURE VOICE FOR THE DURATION OF MISSIONS WITH NO RESPONSE.

3. AM IN THE PROCESS OF GOING OUT FORMALLY TO [redacted] THIS DATE WITH WRAP-UP SO FAR AND ASCERTAINING THE STATUS OF COMM GEAR AT 98. OUR GEAR CHECKS OUT, AS EVIDENCED BY PASS RATES. TO DATE NOTHING FROM THEM. WILL KEEP ALCOM INFORMED.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

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| 18 | |
| MONTH JUN | YEAR 1971 |
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DRAFTER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: GERALD D. HOAG, TSGT, USAF — PHONE 5750

RELEASER — SIGNATURE: Lewis De Laura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: LEWIS DE LAURA, CAPT, USAF, COMMANDER

SECURITY CLASS [redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS [redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 [redacted] OF THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED.

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DTG 18/0800 Z JUN 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: [redacted]

INFO 6994 SCTY SQ/DO

PACSCTYRGN/DO

CAS VIENTIANE

NSAPAC

[redacted]

USAFSS/DO

[redacted]

SUBJ LONG TIENG A/G/A COMMS

AS OF 18 JUN

1. THIS UNIT HAS ATTEMPTED CONTACT DURING SIX MISSIONS WITH LONG TIENG WITH NO APPARENT RESULTS. AT 0530 Z 17 JUN 71, MISSION 615 A(2) WAS AT UTM TG 663164 ( 8.5NM FM LONG TIENG) AND ATTEMPTED CONTACT. IN RESPONSE, A "BEEP AND RUSH" WERE RECEIVED. TO DATE THIS HAS BEEN THE ONLY CONTACT. WE SHALL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS PER [redacted] 161118Z JUN 71.

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| MONTH | YEAR |
| Jun | 71 |
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DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Capt De Laura

PHONE: 2020

[redacted]

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Lewis De Laura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: Lewis De Laura, Capt, USAF

Commander

[redacted]

37

DD 1 NOV 63 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1968-337-861

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

DTG 18/0830 Z JUN 71

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: 6994 SCTY SQ/DO

PACSCTYRGN/DO

[redacted]

EXDLUSIVELY FOR MAJ EDDY AT 6994 AND CAPT COBEAN AT PSR
SUBJ LONG TIENG A/G/A COMMS

1. AFTER TWO DAYS OF ATTEMPTING COMMS WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS ON 6 MISSIONS( WHERE DEGREDATION OF ARDF OCCURS UPON KEYING UHF XCEIVER) I SENT THE FOLLOWING QUERY VIA OPSCOMM (INFORMAL) TO [redacted] QUOTE QOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD ASCERTAIN PRESENT STATUS OF FACILITIES ON LS-98 SO THAT IF THEY ARENT OPERATIONAL WE WONT DEGRADE OUR MISSION BY ATTEMPTING COMMUNICATIONS WITH THEM (EVERY TIME WE KEY UHF RADIO-WE LOSE ARDF CAPABILITY). 2. IF POSSIBLE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THIS A CURRENT UPDATE UNLESS YOU CAN SUGGEST WAY IN WHICH WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH [redacted] AT LS-98 UNQUOTE.

2. THEIR RESPONSE IS QUOTED FYI: QUOTE FROM [redacted] TO USA 564. 1. [redacted] ADVISES THAT PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED YESTERDAY MAY WELL HAVE ORIGINATED ON THE GROUND AT LS-98. THE GUY (THERE IS ONLY ONE INVOLVED) UP THERE WAS APPARENTLY QUOTE IN AND OUT UNQUOTE

| DATE | TIME |
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| MONTH | YEAR |
| JUN | 1971 |
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| 2 | 2 |

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: CAPT DE LAURA

PHONE: 2020

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Lewis D. Laura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: LEWIS DE LAURA, Captain, USAF
Commander

[redacted]

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1967-[illegible]

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

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| PRECEDENCE | RELEASED BY | DRAF[redacted]NE |
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| ACTION PRIORITY | CAPT DE LAURA | 2020 |
| INFO | | |

(MOSTLY OUT) DURING HOUR 1000-1600L. 2. SIGINT OFFICER HIMSELF WILL BE UP THERE TODAY AT ABOUT 1300 HRS. HE SUGGESTS THAT YOU TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE BOWL SHAPED SITUATION AT LS-98 AND THE NEED TO GET AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE. HE SEEMS CERTAIN THAT HIS RECEIVING GEAR IS FULLY OPERATIONAL AND THAT IF THERE ARE TO BE ANY TECHNICAL PROBLEMS, IT WILL BE WITH HIS XMITTER.

3. APPRECIATE THAT YOUR ARDF OPERATIONS ARE DEGRADED WHEN TRYING TO ESTABLISH CONTACT, BUT CONSIDER THE LONGER TERM BENEFITS TO BE GAINED TO BE WORTH ANOTHER GO OR SO. UNQUOTE. 3. HOPEFULLY SITUATION WILL IMPROVE AND REST ASSURED THIS PROJECT HAS OUR HIGHEST INTEREST FOR SUCCESS. WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP YOU INFORMED.

| CONTROL NO. | TOR/TOD | PAGE NO. | NO. OF PAGES | MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION | INITIALS |
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REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

Com 1-3-1

[redacted] SINGLE

PRECEDENCE X

ACTION

INFO PRIORITY

DTG

FROM: 23/03152 JUN 71

DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: [redacted]

INFO PACSCTYRGN/DO

CAS VIENTIANE

NSAPAC

[redacted]

USAFSS/DO

[redacted]

SUBJ LONG TIENG A/G/A CQMMS

1. COMMENCING 16 JUN THIS UNIT HAS ATTEMPTED CONTACT WITH LONG TIENG (WILLARD MUSIC) ON ALL 615 MISSIONS. TO DATE THERE HAS NOT BEEN ONE SUCCESSFUL CONTACT. QUERY IF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT IS OPERATIONAL AT LONG TIENG.

2. WE ARE FULLY COGNIZANT OF TERRAIN AROUND THE SITE AND EVEN WHEN OUR AIRCRAFT ARE ORBITING DIRECTLY OVERHEAD THERE STILL HAS BEEN NO CONTACT.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

| DATE | TIME |
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DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Capt De Laura

PHONE: 2020

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: Lewis De Laura, Capt, USAF

[redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

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☆ GPO: 1970-357-921

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ROUTINE

SUSPECTED DOM.

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RTTSZYUW RUMMRSA1253 1660241-SSSS--RUMOREA
ZNY SSSSS
R 150137Z JUN 71
FM 6994 SCTY SO TSN RVN
TO RHMSMVA/MACV/J2114
ZEN/7AF/DOPRS/
INFO ZEN/460 TRW/DOJ/
RUMOREA/DET 3 6994 SCTYSO NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI
RUMOREA/DET 1 360 TFWS NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI
RUHPHA/PSR/DORT/WHEELER AFB HAWAII
RUWTEJA/USAFSS/DORT/SAN ANTONIO TEXAS
ZEN/DODSPECREP TAN SON NHUT AB RVN.
BT

[redacted]

SUBJ: ALR-34/35 BASING/MSN DURATION
REFS: A. 6994 SS CC 250745Z MAY 71 (NOTAL)
B. MACV J211 291032Z MAY 71 (NOTAL)
C. 7AF DOPRS/6994SS DO 040925Z MAY 71 (NOTAL)
1. REF ALPHA DISCUSSED PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE ALR-35Z ACFT FOR ALR-34Z ACFT AT NKP TO BETTER PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR VIM. REF BRAVO CONCURRED WITH THIS ACTION. REF CHARLIE DISCUSSED REDUCTION IN MISSION DURATION CAUSED BY ADDITIONAL CREW MEMBERS AND INCREASED RUNWAY
PAGE 2 RUMMRSA1253 S E C R E T
TEMPERATURES.
2. EXCHANGE OF AIRCRAFT COMMENCED 13 JUN. AIRCRAFT 48153 AND 24300 WERE DEPLOYED TO NKP ON 13, 14 JUN RESPECTIVELY. BOTH ARE ALR-35Z CONFIGURED. ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE OF TRANSFER REMAINS 9 JUL.
3. AIRCREW TRAINING (NAVIGATOR/OPS) WILL COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY AND WILL REQUIRE ADDITION OF ONE MORE INSTRUCTOR CREW MEMBER. ESTIMATE THAT ADDITIONAL WEIGHT AND INCREASED RUNWAY TEMPERATURES CURRENTLY BEING EXPERIENCED AT NKP WILL RESULT IN ADDITIONAL REDUCED MISSION TIME OF APPROXIMATELY THIRTY MINUTES. THESE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE TEMPORARY IN NATURE, LASTING ONLY THROUGH INITIAL TRAINING PERIOD, ESTIMATED AT 30 DAYS. THESE MISSIONS, LIKE THOSE DISCUSSED IN REF CHARLIE WILL NOT BE REFLECTED AS REDUCED MISSIONS. GP-3.
BT
#1253
NNNN
IN 00311/JUN166 /ACK SD

FOR DORM PERSONNEL: READ PARA 3:

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BIBBS
NAUMAN
WOODS

DET 3 6994
DET 1, 360

DO DORM

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ZNY MMNSH
P R 300435Z
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TO USAFSS (DMXA/DOR)
INFO 6994SCTYSQ/DO/DM
DET 1 6994SCTYSQ (DO/DM)
DET 3 6994SCTYSQ (DO/DM)
ZEM
[redacted]
SUBJ: ALR-34/35 BASING
1. REF 6994SS DM 29/0702Z MAY 71 AND 6994SS DO/DM 29/0844Z MAY 71. THIS HQ CONCURS WITH 6994SCTYSQ REQUEST FOR RELOCATION OF ALR-35 AGE FROM PHU CAT TO NKP. REQUEST SHIPPING DIRECTIVES BE INITIATED AS REQUESTED IN REF "A" BY RETURN PRIORITY MSG.
2. FOLLOWING MACV MSG IS QUOTED FOR UR INFO: QUOTE.
P 291032
FM COMUSMACV
TO 6994TH SCTYSQ/CC
460TH TRW TSN RVN
PSR/DO/XR/XOM
DET 3 6994TH SCTYSQ/DO/NKP
360TH TEWS TSN RVN
ZEN/DODSPECREP TSN RVN
UNCLAS E F T O (J211)
SUBJ: VIETNAMINZATION IMPROVEMENT MODERNIZATION (VIM) /ALR-34-35 BASING
REF: 6994TH SCTYSQ SODN MSG CC, DTG 250745Z MAY 71. CONCUR. UNQUOTE.
3. ALSO REQUEST THAT USAFSS INITIATE ACTION OR ADVISE DET 3 TO SUBMIT PRIORITY REQUISITION FOR THE ALR-35 BMU CURRENTLY IN STORAGE WHAMA. GP-1
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0001

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[redacted]



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ZCZCUN112
RR YADVIZ
DE YHLAKZ 0007 3220021
ZNY MMNSH
R 180015Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO DET 3, 6994 SCTYSQ (DC/DMM)
ZEM
[redacted]
SUBJ : RELOCATION OF A/G/A EQUIPMENTS
DURING THE RECENT REGION TDY WE DISCUSSED THE DESIRABILITY OF RELOCATING THE A/G/A EQUIPMENTS (KY-8S AND G-1186/KG-20) PRESENTLY LOCATED IN VANS TO THE OPERATIONS AREA. IN ORDER TO AVIOD THE LENGTHLY LEAD TIME INVOLVED VIA CEIP PROGRAMMING ROUTE, THE RELOCATION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED ON A MORE TIMELY BASIS IF PERFORMED BY IN-HOUSE MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY. REQUEST YOU ADVISE YOUR CAPABILITY, IN COORDINATION WITH LOCAL AFCS, TO RELOCATE FOUR (4) KY-8S PRESENTLY LOCATED IN A/G/A VAN AND G-1186/KG-20 EQUIPMENT TO LOCATION IN OPS AREA PREVIOUSLY SITED.
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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 22 0425 Z NOV 70

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PACSCTYRGN (DCP)

INFO: 6994SCTY SQ (DC)

[redacted]

REF: PSR MSG 180015Z NOV 70 (NOTAL 6994 SS)

SUBJECT: RELOCATION OF A/G/A EQUIP.

WE HAVE IN-HOUSE MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY TO RELOCATE KY-8S AND G-1186/KG-20. COORDINATION EFFECTED WITH AFCS TO RUN CABLE OVER TFA BUILDING ON MESSENGER AND COME THROUGH THE WALL OF ROOM 201-A. AFCS WILL REQUIRE THREE DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE PRIOR TO RELOCATING EQUIPMENT. WE ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATELY THREE DAYS DOWN TIME FOR THE RELOCATION. PLEASE ADVISE IF THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE SATISFACTORY.

| DATE | TIME |
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| 22 | |
| MONTH NOV | YEAR 1970 |
| PAGE NO. 1 | NO. OF PAGES 1 |

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

Captain D/lah

PHONE 2020

RELEASER

SIGNATURE James R Clapper

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., Captain, USAF
Commander

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

DD 1 NOV 63 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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DE YHLAKZ 0025 3272245

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R 2[illegible]1Z

FM PACSCTYRGN [illegible]

TO DETAC, 6904SCTYSQ (DC)

INFO 6904SCTYSQ (DC)

ZEN

[redacted]

YOUR DG/DM 2234252 NOV 70.

PRIOR TO STAFFING RELOCATION ACTIONS, REQUEST YOU ADVISE IF, AFTER RELOCATION OF KY-3'S/G-1186/DG-20, ONLY ONE PERSON WOULD THEN BE ON DUTY IN THE VAN. POLICY THIS HQ IS THAT, EXCEPT IN UNUSUAL CORCUMSTANCES, MINIMUM OF TWO PERSONNEL MUST BE IN ATTENDANCE IN VAN COMPLEX AT ALL TIMES.

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 25 0630Z NOV 70

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PAC SCTY RGN

INFO: 6994 SCTY SQ

[redacted]

SUBJ: RELOCATION OF A/G/A EQUIPMENT. REF: UR DCO 240201Z NOV 70

1. IF A/G/A RADIO EQUIPMENT IS MOVED INTO OUR OPNS AREA IN TFA, ONLY ONE PERSON (IN THE COMM CENTER) WOULD BE IN THE VAN COMPLEX DURING NON-DUTY HOURS.

2. WHILE SAFETY AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ADMITTEDLY WOULD MAKE THIS A LESS THAN DESIRABLE SITUATION, WE FEEL THE ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED BY MOVING THIS EQUIPMENT INTO OUR OPERATIONS AREA OUTWEIGH THESE POTENCIAL DRAWBACKS. OUR TENTATIVE PLANS WITH AFCS WERE TO ~~REN~~ RUN A NEW LINE FROM THE TFA RADIO ROOM THRU THE BUILDING TO OUR AREA AND THEN RE-ENGINEER THE CONSOLE CONFIGURATION WHEN IT IS MOVED, ACTIONS WHICH WE ARE CONFIDENT WILL IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE AIR GROUND RADIOS. OUR ANALYSIS SECTION IS MANNED TWENTY-FOUR HRS A DAY AND EACH SHIFT IS HEADED BY AN E-6 WHO HAS OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR BOTH OPERATIONS AND THE COMM VANS DURING NON-DUTY HOURS. HE IS CHARGED WITH

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DRAFTER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: CAPT CLAPPER/lah — PHONE: 2020

RELEASER — SIGNATURE: James R. Clapper — TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., Captain, USAF Commander

SEC [redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED. ☆ U.S. Government Printing Office: 1969-332-16

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

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| ACTION ROUTINE<br>INFO | CAPT CLAPPER | A1C HUDSON | 2020 |

CHECKD OF THE VAN COMPLEX WHICH, OF COURSE, IS LINKED WITH THE TFA BUILDING BY PHONE. ADDITIONALLY, THE ANALYSTS MANNING THE A/G RADIOS CAN BE EMPLOYED MORE EFFECTIVELY IF THEY ARE INPROXIMITY TO THE SWING AND MID-SHIFT ANALYTIC FUNCTIONS.

3. FOR THESE REASONS, REQUEST THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO MOVE THE AIR/GROUND RADIOS INTO THE TFA BUILDING.

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RR YADVIZ
DE YHLAKZ 0020 3320134
ZNY MMNSH
R 280133Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO DET 3 6994SCTYSQ(DC)
INFO 6994SCTYSQ(DC)
USAFSS(COK)
ZEM
[redacted]
SUBJ: RELOCATION OF A/G/A EQUIPMENT.
REFERENCE DET 3 6994SS MSG 250630Z NOV 70 (NOTAL).
1. CONCUR WITH MOVING A/G/A FACILITIES INTO BUILDING. REQUEST YOU SUBMIT AF FORM 1146 IAW AFM 100-19 THRU THIS HQ TO PAC COMM AREA FOR APPROVAL OF USER INSTALLATION.
2. ONCE PCA APPROVAL IS GRANTED, THE FOLLOWING SECURITY PRECAUTIONS MUST BE COMPLIED WITH:
A. ENSURE THERE ARE SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL ON DUTY IN THE TFA COMPOUND TO RESIGND TO THE COMM VAN IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY.
B. THE DOOR LEADING INTO THE VAN COMPLEX SHOULD BE SECURED FROM INSIDE THE ENTRY SHOULD BE CONTROLLED BY COMM PERSONNEL AFTER DUTY HOURS.
150
0020

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* ROUTINE *
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RTTCZYUW RUHHWHA2450 3460137-CCCC--RUMOREA.
ZNY CCCCC
R 120020Z DEC 70
FM PACSCTYRGN WHEELER AFB HAWAII
TO DET 3 6994SCTYSQ DC NKP THAI
BT
[redacted]

SUBJ: ECR/A FOR USER INSTALLATION OF A/G/A EQUIIMENT.
REFUR AF FORM 1146, DTD 1 DEC 70.
SUBJ: REQUEST INDICATES THE KY-8 AND G-1186/KG-20 EQUIPMENT IS TO BE INSTALLED AT THE NORTH END OF ROOM 201A; HOWEVER, A LAYOUT DRAWING WAS NOT PROVIDED TO SHOW EXACT PLANNED LOCATION. A COPY OF THE FLOOR PLAN LAYOUT MADE BY PAC COMM AREA ENGINEER DURING PRE-CEIP SITE SURVEY IS BEING FORWARDED TO YOU BY MAIL FOR CONFIRMATION OF SITING. UPON RECEIPT OF DRAWING, CONFIRM THAT EQUIPMENT IS TO BE LOCATED IN POSITION INDICATED ON THE SCHEME DRAWING. AT THAT TIME WE WILL PROCESS YOUR ECR/A TO PACCOMM AREA FOR APPROVAL. FUTURE SUBMISSIONS OF ECR/A SHOULD INCLUDE A LAYOUT DRAWING DEPICTING PLANNED EQUIPMENT POSITIONING IAW AFM 100-19.
GP-4
BT
#2450
NNNN
IN 00122/DEC346 /ACK

[redacted]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

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ACTION ROUTINE

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DTG 18/2245Z DEC 70

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTYSQ

TO: , PACSCTYRGN

INFO: 6994 SCTYSQ

[redacted]

SUBJ: AIR/GROUND RADIOS.

REF: A. DET 3 DURMIS 15 DEC 70.

B. DET 3 DURMIS 16 DEC 70.

C. PACSCTYRGN MSG DCP 280133Z NOV 70.

D. PACSCTYRGN MSG DCP 120020Z DEC 70. (NOTAL 6994 SCTYSQ).

1. REFS A AND B DESCRIBE RECENT PROBLEM THIS UNIT'S AIR/GROUND RADIOS HAVE EXPERIENCED WHICH HAS PREVENTED OUR GROUND STATION FROM RECEIVING TRANSMISSIONS. AFTER TROUBLESHOOTING BOTH THE KY-8'S AND THE TFA RADIO EQUIPMENT, WE HAVE ISOLATED THE PROBLEM TO THE LINE RUNNING FROM THE A/G/A VAN TO THE TFA RADIO ROOM. AS AN EXPERIMENT, WE JERRY-RIGGED THE G-175J RECEIVER IN THE VAN WITH THE KY-8'S AND HAVE TODAY HAD SUCCESSFUL COMMS WITH OUR MISSION AIRCRAFT. THIS APPEARS TO CONFIRM OUR SUPPOSITION THAT THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE LINE CONTAINING THE RECEIVER CABLE PAIRS BETWEEN TFA AND THE VAN. FURTHER, IN THE COURSE OF THIS EFFORT, WE DISCOVERED THAT THIS LINE IS COMPOSED OF INTERIOR CABLE,

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DRAFTER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Cpt Clapper — PHONE 2020

RELEASER — SIGNATURE: Larry J. Johnson, SSgt

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., Captain, USAF, Commander

SECURITY CL [redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED. ☆ U.S. Government Printing Office: 1965-332-

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and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

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| ACTION ~~ROUTINE~~ | SSgt Johnson | Capt Clapper | 2020 |
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NOT DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND HARSH WEATHER CONDITIONS.

2. IN VIEW OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, WE WOULD LIKE TO MOVE THE EQUIPMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WITH REGARD TO REF D, WHILE WE WERE NOT GIVEN A COPY OF THE FLOOR PLAN LAYOUT BY THE PACCOMMAREA ENGINEER DURING PRE-CEIP SITE SURVEY, OUR BEST RECOLLECTION IS THAT HE SITED EQUIPMENT AT CENTER OF NORTH WALL.

3. PLS ADVISE.

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SECURITY CL[redacted]

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PP YADVIZ
DE YHLAXZ 0004 3530045
ZNY MMNSH
P 190005Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/DC
INFO 6994SCTYSQ/DC
ZEM

19 DEC 1970 03 04

[redacted]

SUBJ: A/G/A COMM RELOCATION.
REFS; A. YOUR DO/DM 181245Z DEC 70 NOTAL
B. MY DCP 120020Z DEC 70 (NOAL-6994SS)
C. MY LTR DCN 11 DEC 70 (NOTAL-6994SS)

PERMISSION IS GRANTED TO RELOCATED YOUR A/G/ COMM EQUIPMENT (KY-8, G-1186 AND KG-20) UPON RECEIPT OF FLOOR PLAN POSITION LAYOUT FORWARDED BY JC C. UPON RECEIPT OF REC , PROVIDE THIS OFFICE CONFIRMATION THAT EQUIPMENTS WILL BE POSITIONED AS REFLECTED ON THE PACCOMMAREA DRAWING AND WE WILL PROCESS AF FORM 1146 FOR PROPER APPROVAL. GP-1.

130
0004

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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PRECEDENCE

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DTG 22 0805 Z DEC 70

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTYSQ

TO: PACSCTYRGN/DCP/DOMXA/DMMM WHEELER AFB HAWAII

INFO: 6994 SCTYSQ/DO/DC

DET 2, 6994 SCTYSQ/DO

6990 SCTYSQ/DOR

DET 1, 6990 SCTYSQ/DO

6924 SCTYSQ/DO

8 RRFS

[redacted]

REF PACSCTYRGN DCP 190005Z DEC 70, SUBJ: A/G/A COMM RELOCATION (S)

1. EFFECTIVE 0100Z 23 DEC 70, THIS STATION'S A/G/A FACILITY (KY-8'S AND G-1186/KG-20'S) WILL BE DOWN FOR APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS IN ORDER TO RELOCATE EQUIPMENT AND RE-ENGINEER SYSTEMS.

2. FOR PACSCTYRGN. EQUIPMENT WILL BE XX SITED IAW PACCOMMAREA DRAWING NUMBER RFCVP02407FP000.

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DRAFTER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Capt Clapper — PHONE 2020

RELEASER — SIGNATURE: Larry J. Johnson, SSgt

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., Captain, USAF, Commander

SECURITY CLASSIFICA [redacted]

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 1473 REPLACES EDITION OF [redacted]

NNNNNZCZCDVU244
PP YADVIZ
DE YHLAXZ 0002 3570036
ZNY UUUUU
P 222349Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 6994SCTYSQ/DO
INFO DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/DO
USAFSS/DOR
ZEN

[redacted]

REF DET 3 DM/DC 220305Z DEC 70

1. SUBJECT OF REDUCING DOWN TIME FROM TEN DAYS TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM IS BEING DISCUSSED IN LOG/COMM CHANNELS.

2. DURING PERIOD OF INOPERATIVE A/G/A SYSTEM, ARDF CREWS SHOULD BE BRIEFED ON DECLARING CONDITION FOXTROT SHOULD CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE BE INTERCEPTED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED. INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD INCLUDE PRECAUTION AGAINST UNNECESSARY OR SUPERFLOUS ABORTS.

3. FULLY REALIZE UNLIKELYHOOD OF CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE BEING RECOGNIZED DURING AN OPERATIONAL MISSION, HOWEVER, THE POSSIBLITY DOES EXIST. SHOULD CONDITION FOXTROT BE DECLARED, REQUEST A RECAP FOR EACH INSTANCE, GIVING COMPLETE DETAILS, BE INCLUDED IN THE DURMIS.

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2002

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* ROUTINE *
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71 13 05 22

RTTCZYUW RUHHMHA1972 0130307-CCCC-~~RUMOREA~~
ZNY CCCCC
R 130134Z JAN 71
FM PACSCTYRGN WHEELER AFB HAWAII
~~TO RUMOREA/DET 3 6994SCTYSQ DC NKP THAI~~
INFO RUMORSA/6994SCTYSQ TSN AFB RVN
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: A/G/A COMM RELOCATION
REFS: A. YOUR AF FORM 1146 DATED 1 DEC 70, ECR/A.
B. MY DCP 190005 DEC 70.
C. MY DCE 050150Z JAN 71.
D. MY DCE 090216Z JAN 71.
REF "B" CONCURRED IN USER RELOCATION OF YOUR A/G/A EQUIPMENT (KY-8, 1186/KG-20) INTO THE TFA BUILDING AND REQUESTED CONFIRMATION BE PROVIDED THIS OFFICE RELATIVE TO SITING OF EQUIPMENT IN ROOM 201A. REFS "C" & "D" REQUESTED STATUS OF EQUIPMENT RELOCATION. WE MUST HAVE CONFIRMED SITING OF EQUIPMENT PRIOR TO FORWARDING REF "A" TO PACCOMMAREA FOR APPROVAL. PLEASE ADVISE. GP-1.
BT
#1972
NNNN
IN 00337/JAN013 /ACK

DET 3, 6994

11
DO

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[redacted]

[redacted]

NNNNZ CZ CDVU5 71
PP YADVIZ
DE YMRDQK 0008 3580454
ZNY MMNSH
P 240446Z
FM 6994 SCTYSQ
TO DET 3 6994 SCTYSQ
INFO PACSCTYRGN (DOR)
ZEM

[redacted]

SUBJ: A/G/A COMM RELOCATION (S)
REF YOUR 231100Z DEC 70, SAME SUBJECT. REQUEST THIS OFFICE BE ADVISED IF TDY ASSISTANCE WOULD PROVIDE AN EARLY RELOCATION. WE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH ONE (1) MAN, IMMEDIATELY.
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0008

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DTG 24 0840Z DEC 70

FROM: DET 3, 6994 SCTYSQ

TO: 6994 SCTYSQ / DO

INFO: PacSctyRgn/DOR/DC

[redacted]

REF UR DO 240416Z DEC 70, SUBJ: A/G/A COMM RELOCATION (S)

1. BARRING ANY UNFORESEEN PROBLEMS, WE BELIEVE WE CAN RELOCATE RADIOS IN-HOUSE. ASSIGNING ANOTHER MAN WOULD NOT SPEED RELOCATION UNLESS WE ENCOUNTER MAJOR AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS PROBLEMS, WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE TWO MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS NOW DETAILED TO THE RADIO PROJECT TO BE RETURNED TO PRIMARY DUTIES. WILL ADVISE YOU IF PROBLEMS OF THIS NATURE ARISE.

2. APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN AND OFFER OF ASSISTANCE.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

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| 24 | |
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DRAFTER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Capt. Clapper [redacted] — PHONE 2020

RELEASER — SIGNATURE: James R. Clapper — 13

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., Captain, USAF, Commander

SECURITY CLASSI [redacted]

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DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173 — REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED. ★ U.S. Government Printing Office: 1969-332-157

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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SECURITY C[redacted]

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PRECEDENCE

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DTG Ø3 / Ø615 Z [redacted] JAN 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PAC SCTY RGN/DO/DC

INFO: 6994 SCTY SQ/DO

DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ/DO

USAFSS/DO

[redacted]

SUBJ: RELOCATION OF A/G/A COMMUNICATIONS

REF: DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ DC/DM 2311ØØZ DEC 7Ø(NOTAL DET 2

1. THIS UNIT'S COMFY DISC (KY-8) COMMUNICATIONS RETURNED TO NORMAL OPERATION AT Ø3ØØØ1Z JAN 71 ON FREQUENCY OF 27Ø.4 MHZ WITH ALTERNATE OF 386.2 MHZ.

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DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: K KESSLER/DORTX

PHONE: 2Ø8Ø

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Lewis DeLaura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: LEWIS DELAURA, CAPT., USAF OPERATIONS OFFICER

SECURITY CL[redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD FORM [redacted] DITION OF 1 MAY 53 WHICH MAY BE USED.

★ U.S. Government Printing Office: 1969-332-167

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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DTG Ø4 1021Ø Z JAN 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PAC SCTY RGN/DO/DC

INFO: 6994 SCTY SQ/DO

DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ/DO

USAFSS/DO

[redacted]

SUBJ: OPERATIONS OF COMFY DISC COMMS(5)

REF: DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ DORTX-R/Ø3Ø615Z JAN 71

1. THIS UNIT'S COMFY DISC COMMS(KY-8) RETURNED TO NORMAL OPERATION AT Ø3ØØØ1Z JAN 71 ON PRIMARY FREQUENCY OF 27Ø.4 MHZ WITH ALTERNATE OF 351.5 MHZ VICE 386.2 MHZ AS WAS STATED IN REF. FREQUENCY OF 351.5 MHZ WILL BE USED AS ALTERNATE UNTIL A KY-8 CAN BE OBTAINED FOR USE ON FREQUENCY OF 386.2 MHZ.

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DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: K KESSLER/DORTX

PHONE: 2Ø8Ø

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Lewis DeLaura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: LEWIS DELAURA, CAPT., USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER

SECURITY [redacted]

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RR YADVIE
DE YALAKZ 0010 0050151
ZNY NNNSH
R 05 1152Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO DET 3 6994SCTYSQ/DC
INFO 6994SCTYSQ/DC
DET 2 6994SCTYSQ/DC
USAFSS/DO
ZEM

-5 JAN1971 06 00

[redacted]

SUBJ: RELOCATION OF A/G/A COMMUNICATIONS.
REF DET 3, 6994SS DORTX-R 030615Z JAN 71.
REQUEST STATUS OF KY-8(COMFY BRIDLE) AND G-1136 RELOCATION TO
OPERATIONS BLD [redacted]
0SS
7010 [redacted]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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DTG Ø6 / 1Ø3Ø Z JAN 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PAC SCTY RGN/DOMA

INFO: USAFSS/DOTOA

6994 SCTY SQ/DO

699Ø SCTY SQ/DO

6924 SCTY SQ/DO

DET 1, 699Ø SCTY SQ/DO

[redacted]

SUBJ: AN/URC 53 CAPABILITY REPORT FOR Ø6 JAN(1) (U)

THIS UNIT'S KY-8 (COMFY BRIDLE) AND G1186 OPERATIONS WILL BE RESTORED EFFECTIVE Ø612ØØZ JAN 1971. RELOCATION OF THIS UNIT'S RADIO EQUIPMENT TO OUR OPERATIONS AREA WITHIN TFA HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

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DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: K KESSLER/DORTX

PHONE: 2Ø8Ø

RELEASER

SIGNATURE: Lewis De Laura

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: LEWIS DELAURA, CAPT., USAF OPERATIONS OFFICER

SECURITY CLA[redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

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☆ GPO 1969-357-081

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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DTG 141015Z JAN 71

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: DET 3 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: PAC SCTY RGN (DCE)

INFO: 6994 SCTY SQ

[redacted]

SUBJ: A/G/A COMM RELOCATION.

REFS: (A) PAC SCTY RGN DCP 190005Z DEC 70

(B) MY DM/DC 220805Z DEC 70

(C) PAC SCTY RGN DCE 090216Z JAN 71

AS STATED IN REF "B", EQUIPMENT IS SITED IAW PACCOMM AREA DRAWING NUMBER RFCVP02407FP000. REF "C" NOT RCVD.

GP-3

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DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE 2020

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR, Captain, USAF
Commander

[redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD 1 NOV 63 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED. ☆ U.S. Government Printing Office: 1969-332-1

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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DTG 19/0300Z JAN 71

FROM: USA-564

TO: ZEN/USM-7

DIRNSA/B64

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DDI: ILH RNI

[redacted]

SUBJ: PATHET LAO COMMS (NORTHERN LAOS)

1. SINCE Ø1 JAN 71 THIS UNIT HAS OBSERVED A SLIGHT INCREASE IN COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY ON LSGB TERMINALS. FROM IDENT CHANGE REPORTS IT IS APPARENT THAT B64 TSR-ØØ7-7Ø DATED Ø1 DEC 7Ø IS INACCURATE AS FAR AS THE MAJORITY OF LSGB'S IS CONCERNED. WE HAVE SEEN NO REPEAT NO TECH ITEMS ON LSGB SOI CHANGES THIS YEAR ALTHOUGH SEVERAL SOI CHANGES HAVE SEEMINGLY OCCURED. IT IS ALSO EVIDENT THAT SOME DISAGREEMENT IN IDENTITIES EXISTS BETWEEN USM-7 AND DIRNSA I.E., CALLSIGNS CPD DE PAO. DIRNSA SEATS FEEDBACK REPORTS REFLECTED THIS CALL-UP AS LSGB JØØ82 (NO RD) HOWEVER USM-7 RE-IDENTIFIES THE SAME CALL-UP AS LSGB K78Ø3 RD L22Ø4.

2. REQUEST THAT USA-564 BE INCLUDED ON ALL SUBSEQUENT PATHET LAOTION TECH ITEMS ISSUED BY EITHER USM-7 OR

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DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: SSGT VERNON DE R HAND JR/DORTX

PHONE: 2ØØ8Ø

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: FOR: LEWIS DE LAURA, CAPT, USAF OPERATIONS OFFICER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

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DIRNSA. ADDITIONALLY, REQUEST USM-7 FORWARD, VIA OPSCOM, ALL KNOWN ACTIVE LSGB ROTAS.

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO PRIORITY

DTG 22/0515Z JAN 71

FROM: USA-564
R

TO: DIRNSA

INFO: USM-7

[redacted]

SUBJ: PATHET LAO COMMS

REF : A. MY DORTX 190300Z

B. YOUR B64-280-71, DTG 212303Z

1. REF BRAVO PARA 2: WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED B64 TSR 007-71 DTD 01 JAN 71 AND, IF THIS ADDITION ARRIVES AT THE SAME TIME AS PREVIOUS EDITIONS THEN WE MAY RECIEVE IT BY 01 FEB 71. WE ARE STILL USING B64 TSR 007-70 DATED 01 DEC 71.

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DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

JAMES S GLOVER

PHONE 2080

RELEASER

SIGNATURE James S. Glover

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

FOR: LEWIS DE LAURA, CAPT, USAF
OPS OFFICER

SECURITY [redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO 1969-357-60

22 JAN 1971 11 35

ARM
ZCZCDVU052
RR YADVIZ
DE YHLAKZ 0029 0220 [redacted]
ZNY MMNSH
R 220238Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO USAFSS/DOMX/DOR/DOKO [redacted]
INFO 6990SS/DO
6994 SS/DO
DET 3 6994SS/DO
ZEM
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SUBJ: ACTIVE NAVY PARTICIPATION IN COMFY SILK.
REFS: PSR DOMA, 120236Z JAN 71.
PSR DO, 132340Z JAN 71.

AS STATED IN REF BRAVO, WE HAVE SANCTIONED NAVY PARTICIPATION DURING THE PERIOD 15 JAN THROUGH 03 FEB 1971 TRFMUPPORT THE SINGLE CVA OPERATIONS DURING THE STATED PERIOD. ACTUAL SINGLE CVA OPERATIONS IS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FROM 15-23 JAN. MET WITH CINCPACFLT REPRESENTATIVES ON 18 JAN REGARDING CONTINUING ACTIVE NAVY INVOLVEMENT IN COMFY SILK NET. MEETING CLARIFIED A NUMBER OF PREVIOUSLY OBSCURE POINTS. PARAMOUNT REQUIREMENT AT THIS TIME IS TO PROVIDE EXTRA SUPPORT FOR THEIR SINGLE CVA (ONE CARRIER OPERATION WITHOUT BIG LOOK CAPABILITIES) IN THE GOT. WHEN THE NAVY IS IN THEIR SINGLE CVA (CARRIER) POSTURE, THEIR COMINT AIR DEFENSE COLLECTION, AND HENCE THEIR SOURCE OF THREAT DATA, IS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. THEREFORE, THE RECEIPT OF TIMELY THREAT DATA FROM COMBAT APPLE BECOMES IMPERATIVE. THIS REDUCED POSTURE OF CTF-77 WILL OCCUR FOR APPROXIMATELY EIGHT TO FOURTEEN DAYS EACH MONTH. IT IS DURING THOSE PERIODS ONLY THAT CTF-77 REQUIRES ACTIVE ENTRY INTO THE NET. CINCPACFLT, BASED UPON SEVENTH FLT REQUIREMENTS, FORSEES MINIMAL ACTIVE ENTRY BY PIRAZ OR CVA. THIS ACTIVE PARTICIPATION WOULD BE LIMITED TO REQUESTS FOR AMPLIFYING DATA, TECH SUPPORT AND MUTUAL TIP-OFF. PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING DRAFTED THAT WOULD PERMIT ACTIVE NAVY PARTICIPATION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: (A) DURING SINGLE CARRIER OPERATIONS FAAWC AND PIRAZ WOULD BECOME ACTIVE SUBSCRIBERS. (B) PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED IN THE PRESENT NET WOULD BE ADHERED TO. (C) USKAK 8095 WOULD REMAIN IN FORCE AND (D) AIRBORNE OR GROUND UNITS WILL NOT BE UTILIZED AS RELAY TERMINALS (EXCEPT CRITICAL SITUATIONS). CINCPACFLT REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN RECEPTIVE TO THESE STIUPLATIONS AND FEEL THAT THEY SATISFY ALL COMSEVENTHFLT REQUIREMENTS. NAVY AIRCRAFT FLYING THE LAOS BLACK TRK DURING 1700-2200Z TIME FRAME (SEAWING/BIG LOOK) INCLUSION INTO COMFY SILK OR COMFY BRIDLE APPEARS TO BE NO IMMEDIATE PROBLEM. SPRAC NET (SECURE NAVY) COMMUNICATION FROM SEAWING TO ANY TERMINAL IS NOT RELIABLE IN THE ESTABLISHED ORBIT. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS NO WAY TO PASS SEAWING DERIVED THREAT ALERT, TACAIR DATA TO TACC-NS. DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN SEAWING AND DA NANG OR NKP WOULD PROVIDE RAPID COMMUNICATION TO THE TACC-NS CONTROLLER. FEEL INCLUSION OF SEAWING IN COMFY SILK (AND COMFY BRIDLE NET AS BACK-UP) WITH INPUTS THRU DA NANG/MMOB (AND DET 3, 6994SS, NKP) IS MOST FEASIBLE APPROACH. A TEST PERIOD WILL DICTATE MOST PRACTICABLE ROUTE TO TAKE. FINAL RESPONSE TO CINCPACAF WILL BE DEFERRED PENDING YOUR APPROVAL. EARLY RESPONSE REQUESTED.

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Attach

UZS [redacted]

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PR YADVIZ
DE YHLAKZ 0070 0332142
ZNY MMMSH
R 022135Z
FM PSR
TO CINCPACFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT
USA-32
USA-564
INFO USA-522J
VQ-561
USA-522
ZEM
[redacted]

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SUBJ: ACTIVE NAVAL PARTICIPATION IN COMFY SILK
1. ACTIVE NAVAL PARTICIPATION IN COMFY SILK COMMS WAS TENTATIVELY APPROVED FOR THE PERIOD BEGINNING 15 JAN. SINCE THAT TIME, APPROVAL FOR PERMANENT PARTICIPATION HAS BEEN GRANTED. WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF REVISING APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES TO REFLECT THIS AUTHORIZATION AND FINALIZE NECESSARY PROCEDURAL CHANGES WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED. AT PRESENT, COMFY SILK OPERATIONS PROCEDURES ARE COVERED IN PSR OPORD 100-70 DATED 2 FEB 70. DURING THE PERIOD BEGINNING 15 JAN, USA-32 PROVIDED TO USN-27 EXTRACTS OF PERTINENT OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES.
2. THIS HQS IS DRAFTING A PLAN FOR ACTIVE NAVY PARTICIPATION AS FOLLOWS:
A. DURING SINGLE CARRIER OPERATIONS FAAWC AND PIRAZ WOULD BE ACTIVE SUBSCRIBERS.
B. PROCEDURES IN PSR OPORD 100-70 WOULD APPLY.
C. USKAK 3095 WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT.
D. AIRBORNE PLATFORMS WILL NOT BE USED ROUTINELY AS RELAY TERMINALS. WHILE MINIMIZATION OF AIRBORNE RELAY IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE NET, IT IS NOT MEANT TO PRECLUDE RELAY OF THREAT ALERT, TACREP, OR CRITICAL DATA WHEN NECESSARY.
3. AN EVALUATION PREPARED BY USA-32 INDICATES THAT NAVY PARTICIPATION DURING THE PERIOD 15-23 JAN WAS SUCCESSFUL. IF, BASED UPON THE OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE GAINED DURING THE 15-23 JAN PERIOD, YOUR UNITS REQUIRE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION/CLARIFICATION, REQUEST THEY COORDINATE DIRECTLY WITH USA-32. Atted 1
4. ADDITIONALLY, INCLUSION OF SEAWING FLYING LAOS BLACK TRACK IN COMFY SILK/COMFY BRIDLE IS APPROVED. AS PRESENTLY UNDERSTOOD, THE PRIMARY REQUIREMENT IS FOR SEAWING LAOS BLACK TRACK ENTRY FROM 0100-2600Z. TENTATIVE PLAN IS UTILIZATION OF COMFY SILK AS PRIMARY AND COMFY BRIDLE AS SECONDARY, WITH CONTACT THROUGH USA-32 AT DANANG AND USA-564 AT NKP RESPECTIVELY. COMFY BRIDLE COMMS PROCEDURES CLOSELY PARALLED COMFY SILK. DIRECT COORDINATION BY USA-32 WITH VQ-1 DET DANANG IS AUTHORIZED. USA-32 WILL PROVIDE COMFY SILK DATA AND ACT AS LIAISON [redacted] USA-564 (NKP/COMFY BRIDLE) AND VQ-1.

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-9 FEB 1971 00 07

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ZCZCDVU625
RR YADVIZ
DE YMRDZI 0023 0390800
ZNY MMNSH
R 080735Z
FM 6924 SCTYSQ
TO PACSCTYRGN/DOMA
INFO 6990TH SCTY SQ
DET ONE 6990TH SCTY SQ
DET THREE 6994TH SCTY SQ
ZEM
[redacted] FEB 71
SUBJ: ACTIVE NAVY PARTICIPATION IN COMFY SILK
REF: PSR DOMA, 02/2135Z FEB 71

1. WE HAVE COORDINATED WITH USN-27/CTG-77 TO ENSURE THAT THEY UNDERSTAND TEH PROVISIONS OF FAAWC AND PRIAZ PARTICIPATION IN COMFY SILD, AS SET FORTH IN REF. INTEND TO CONTUNUE THIS COORDINATION ON A FREQUENT BASIS WHEN USN-27/CTG-77 REPS ARE IN THE DANANG AREA AND VIA THE USN-27 OCC OPSCOMM CIRCUIT. ON 20/1 FEB CAPTAIN ANTHONY F. JENSEN WILL VISIT CTF-77 TO FURTHER COORDINATE/DISCUSS NAVY PARTICIPATION IN COMFY SILK. HE WILL ADVISE YOU OF THE RESULTS DERIVED FROM THIS INFORMAL VISIT.

2. WE HAVE ALSO COORDINATED WITH VQ-1 AND USA-564 TO AFFECT SEQSING PARTICIPATION IN COMFY SILK AND COMFY BRIDLE WHEN FLYING THE LAOS BLACK TRACK BETWEEN 0100 - 0600H (REF). VQ-1 DET BRAVO REP INDICATES THAT THEY ARE READY TO BEGIN PARTICIPATIN 0400606G IN COMFY SILK AND COMFY BRIDLE; HOWEVER, THEY ARE AWAITING FORMAL, SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION TO DO SO FROM COMSEVENTH FLEET.

3. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE PROVIDED FOR ACTION/ COORDINATION AT THEATER LEVEL.

A. REQUEST CINCPACFLT BE TASKED TO FORMALLY ADVISE USA-32, USA-522, USA-522J, AND USA-564, VIA CRITICOMM, WHENEVER SCHEDULES ARE ESTABLESHED FOR SINGLE CVA OPERATIONS OR CAHNGES MADE THERETO. WE HAVE INFORMALLY REQUESTED CTF-77 VIA USN-27 TO ADVISE US OF ALL SINGLE CVA PERIODS, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THIS REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE FORMALIZED THROUGH APPROPRIATE COMMAND CHANNELS SOONEST. (CVA OS SCHEDULE FOR THIS MONTH HAS BEEN REVISED, AND AT PREFNT CTF-77 ADVISES THERE WILL BE NO SINGLEVVA OPS DURING FEB 71, AS A RESULT OF T E ANTICIPATED HIGH LEVEL OF DRY SEASON ACTIVITY).

B. REQUEST CTF-77 (I.E., FAAWC AND PIRAZ) AND SEAWING BE TASKED THROUGH THEIR COMMAND CHANNELS TO ISSUE KY-8 CAPABILITY AND MONTHLY EVALUATION REPORTS FOR THE PERIODS THEY PARTICIPATE IN COMFY SILK OR COMFY BRIDLE. RATIONALE: THIS WILL KEEP SUBSCRIBERS INFVMED ON THE DAILY OPERATIONAL STATUS OF ALL TERMINALS. PSR AND COMMAND WILL HAVE AN ACCURATE AND REALISTIC EVALUATION OF THE COMFY SILK/COMFY BRIDLE OPERATIONS, INCLUDING AN ASSESSMENT OF EACH USERS CAPABILITIES, LIMITATIONS, OR PROBLEMS. REQUEST YOU SPECIFY ALL NAVY ADDRESSEES DESIRED ON AIR FORCE ISSUED KY-8 CAPABILITY AND MONTHLY EVALUATION REPORTS (I.E., CTF-77, VQ-1, COMSEVENTHFLT, CINCPACFLT).

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CZCDVA320
ADVIZ
E YMRDZI 0028 0630850 [redacted]
ZNY MMNSH
R 0407357Z
FM 6924 SCTY SO [redacted]
TO PACSCTYRGN/DOMA
INFO DET 3 6994 SCTY SO/DO [redacted]
ZEM
[redacted] MAR 71

SUBJECT: COMFY SILK/COMFY BRIDLE
REF PSR/DOMXA, 020247Z MAR 71 (NOTAL)

1. AS OF 2 MAR, SEAWING HAD NOT ACHIEVED CONTACT WITH DANANG/NKP VIA COMFY SILK/BRIDLE. ON 3 MAR 6924SS REP VISITED WITH VQ-1 DET BRAVO PERSONNEL AND DISCUSSED LACK OF PARTICIPATION BY SEAWING IN COMFY SILK/BRIDLE NETS. FROM THIS DISCUSSION WE LEARNED OF SOME INTERNAL CONFUSION AMONG DET BRAVO PERSONNEL CONCERNING THEIR PARTICIPATION. IN ESSENCE THE PROPER INSTRUCTIONS HAD NOT BEEN PROVIDED TO THE APPROPRIATE DET BRAVO FLYING PERSONNEL, DESPITE FREQUENT COORDINATION BETWEEN 6924 SS AND DET BRAVO DAY INTEL PERSONNEL. BELIEVE THAT THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN RESOLVED.

2. AFTER LENGTHLY DISCUSSION WITH DET BRAVO PERSONNEL, THEY AGREED TO ATTEMPT COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS BETWEEN SEAWING, DANANG AND NKP. AT 051711Z SEAWING MADE SUCCESSFUL CONTACT VIA COMFY SILK WITH DANANG. AT 03/1235Z AND 03/2004Z SUCCESSFUL CONTACTS WERE MADE VIA COMFY BRIDLE WITH NKP. NO INTELLIGENCE DATA WAS PASSED DURING THESE CONTACTS.

3. BASED ON THE ABOVE, WE ANTICIPATE INCREASED PARTICIPATION BY SEAWING IN BOTH COMFY SILK/BRIDLE NETS. 6924 SS WILL CONTINUE CLOSE COORDINATION WITH DET BRAVO TO ENSURE SUCCESS. HOWEVER, WILL ADVISE IF FURTHER DIFFICULTY IS ENCOUNTERED.

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File: COM-0873

ZCZCDV073
PP YADVIZ
DE YADVID 0070 0920512
ZNY MMMSH
P 022445Z
FM 6924SCTYSQ UDORN THAI
TO 6990SCTYSQ SOBE OKINAWA
DET 1 6990 SCTYSQ CAM RANH BAY RVN
DET 3 6994 SCTYSQ NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI
INFO USAFSS SAN ANTONIO TX
PACSCTYRGN WHEELER AFB HAW
6922 SCTY GP CLARK AB PHIL
6994 SCTYSQ TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN
ZEM
[redacted]
DO
FOR: DOKOA AT USAFSS; DOMA/XR AT PSR.
SUBJ: AN/TSC-57 OPERATIONS FROM UDORN.
A. DET 4, PSR DO 310705Z MAR 71.
B. PSR DO 312310Z MAR 71 (NOTAL USAFSS/6922SG)
1. REF BRAVO REGARDS URGENCY OF A/G/A SECURE COMMUNICATIONS TO/FROM 6924SS AT UDORN AND INSTRUCTS IMMEDIATE ENTRY OF AN/TSC-57 INTO THE COMFY BRIDLE NET FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO AIRBORNE MISSIONS.
2. EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE, THE AN/TSC-57 GROUND/AIR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AT THIS UNIT IS OPERATIONAL AND WILL ASSUME ITS REPORTING ROLE IN THE COMFY BRIDLE NET. THIS UNIT WILL ASSUME ALL NET CONTROL (NCS) FUNCTIONS FROM DET 3 6994SS WHO WILL BECOME ALTERNATE NCS. DURING COMM OUTAGES AT THIS UNIT, DET 3, 6994SS WILL BECOME NCS. OPS COMM FACILITIES BETWEEN THIS UNIT AND DET 3, 6994SS DOES EXIST AND WILL BE UTILIZED TO ASSURE MAXIMUM COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT TO AIRBORNE MISSIONS.
3. THIS UNIT DOES NOT YET POSSESS AN A/G/A HF G-1186 COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY. FREQUENCIES HAVE BEEN REQUESTED AND WHEN ASSIGNED (MID/END APRIL) WILL ADVISE ALCON. INSTALLATION OF HF LPA (637B-1A) IS IN PROGRESS.
4. REQUEST ACTION ADDEES ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT AND UNDERSTANDING, THIS MESSAGE.
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