



USS-D3

DETACHMENT 2 OPERATIONS




CHAIN OF COMMAND



VI-1

USS-D3


OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND



APPENDIX VII  
ARDF TARGET PRODUCTIVITY

USS-113

ARDF TARGET PRODUCTIVITY ALL SEA AREAS



USS-D3

ARDE TANGSIH...  
[REDACTED]

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
TOTAL WORKED				764	1174	949
TOTAL FIX				581	770	651
TOTAL CUT				130	231	150
% FIX				74.1	65.6	67.9


HSS-03

ARDP TARGET PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA EIGHT

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
80						
60						
40						
20						
TOTAL WORKED				960	862	893
TOTAL FIX				711	609	634
TOTAL CUT				175	176	135
% FIX				71.1	70.6	71.0

USS-D9

ARDF TARGET PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA




[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

USS-D3

ARDF TARGET PRODUCTIVITY SE. AREA TEN



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]




APPENDIX VIII

RT ACI PRODUCTIVITY


USS-03

RADIOTELEPHONE AGL PRODUCTIVITY ALL SEA AREAS FLOWN




USS-D3

RADIOTELEPHONE ACF PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA SEVEN




USS-03

RADIO TELEPHONE AGE PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA EIGHT




899-03

RADIOTELEPHONE ACTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY AREA NINE



USS-03

TELEPHONE AGL PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA TEN




APPENDIX IX

MM ACI PRODUCTIVITY

USS-03


MANUAL HOUSE ACI PRODUCTIVITY ALL SEA AREAS FLOW






USS-03

MANUAL FISH ACT PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA SEVEN



USS-03

MANUAL MERSE ACI PRODUCTIVITY SBA AREA EIGHT



USS-B3


MANUAL WORK ACI PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA NINE

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AKOC				11,900	8,490	16,885
MIN. COPY				1,666	1,297	2,558
%				11.5	15.3	15.2



USS-03

MANUAL MORSE ACI PRODUCTIVITY SEA AREA T-1



APPENDIX X

PHOTOGRAPH OF COMMANDER



MSgt Mack/DSP

5 May 1972

Report of Visit to USA-808 (Phu Bai) 19-20 Apr 72

DC

CC

IN TIME1. Purpose of Visit: Mission Coordination2. Names of Visitors:

MSgt Daniel C. Mack  
 TSgt Troy M. Roberts  
 SSgt Robert C. Baker

3. Personnel Contacted:

MAJ Mason - Assistant Operations Officer  
 Lt Capucci - JIC Exploitation  
 CWO Hutton - OIS ASMS/Exploitation  
 MSgt Ganong - NCOIC Operations  
 SFC Bouvillian - NCOIC Airborne Systems Management  
 SFC Immen - NCOIC Exploitation  
 Sgt Dibbe - NCOIC MRF Spop  
 SFA Madland - 9 Area Analyst  
 SFA McCarty - 10 Area Analyst

4. Findings: The trip was arranged and coordinated through SFC Bouvillian, NCOIC of Airborne Systems Management (ASMS). We arrived at Phu Bai at approximately 1100 hrs. Sgt Bouvillian met us at the airfield and escorted us to the operations site and assisted us in getting temporary badges. He then introduced us to the personnel in ASMS and briefly explained the primary mission of the Airborne Systems Management Shop and also gave us an overall briefing of the analytical effort at Phu Bai. He further explained that a reduction in personnel, in addition to the assumption of CIA responsibility from Nha Trang had seriously hampered much of their efforts to provide full technical support to the aviation units. Sgt Bouvillian introduced us to MSgt Ganong, the NCOIC of Operations. Sgt Ganong welcomed us to the site and offered us any assistance we needed while there. We discussed TDI reliability with SFA Madland who is responsible for TDI's for SEA area 09. We were particularly interested as to why no VHF targets were included in TDI's for SEA area 09 since a large portion of targets in that area were on VHF. He explained that they attempted to task aviation units with targets according to MCOV requirements irrespective of frequency range. They prepare technical data on transmitters they feel

would be most likely to produce an ARDF fix on the desired reference designator (RD). He said that since we had brought it to his attention that a large portion of targets in SEA area 09 was in the VHF range, he would explore the possibility of having VHF targets included in TDL's. We also discussed the accuracy of TDL's with SFC Hadland and he agreed to look into efforts to improve them. TDL accuracy was discussed more fully with SFC Inman and will be covered in another portion of this report. SFC McCarty, who is responsible for TDL's in SEA area 10 was interested in securing AFR-35 and AFR-38 systems in the 10 area to put more emphasis on collection in those areas. We felt that the AFR-35/38 systems could be more effectively used in other SEA areas. We discussed TDL format and particularly one that would aid our analysts in handling TDL's to be carried aboard aircraft. At present, he is including all fragged areas in SEA area 10 on the same TDL. He agreed, however, to begin separating them by frag areas as soon as his co-worker returns from leave. We discussed identification change reports (ICR) with SFC Bonwillian and SFC Hadland. We explained that the ICR was a particularly sore subject because we had hoped to use it as an authoritative basis for updating our data base. We advised them that we could not use the ICR for data base updating because it frequently conflicted with traffic identification we based on the latest NSA and CMA identification aids. Our primary objective in discussing the problem was to have the CMA to include in the ICR their basis for changing the identification on our ARDF Recovery Report (ARR). We advised them that more than half of all the identification changes made by them were apparently completely arbitrary or were in direct conflict with our traffic identification data base. They conceded that a genuine problem existed but they were unable, due to reduced manning, to include justification for their changes on the ICR. The only encouraging note of the discussion was that they would emphasize careful evaluation of ARR identification to the analysts preparing the ICR. TSgt Roberts and Maj Mason discussed the assignment of a Det 2 analyst on THY (semi-permanent) status to Phu Bai. This concept is approved by the CMA's, 6994 56th Sq, and by HQR. Maj Mason was previously an Operations Officer at a CMA at which an Air Force analyst was assigned. He enthusiastically endorsed the idea of our providing a full time analyst to coordinate problems and arrangements between our unit and the CMA at Phu Bai. He said he would make a desk and working space available for our analyst and offered any other assistance in setting up the liaison position. We also discussed with Major Mason and CWO Hutton our desire to receive TACREPS they issue based on our intercept. They assured us that they would not include the source of the information in the body of the report but would look into the possibility of having us added to electrical distribution. He felt that an informal arrangement for a drop copy by courier would be too prone to "falling through the cracks" to ensure regular receipt. We discussed with 1Lt Capucci and SFC Inman the possibility of receiving CMA seats, primarily for the purpose of preparing supplementary TDL's. They were sympathetic, but would not add us to distribution without prior coordination with DIRNSA. They then showed us a DIRNSA message which prohibits lateral distribution of seats to other units unless specifically approved by DIRNSA. (According to the DIRNSA message, our distribution of seats to Det 3 is illegal.) They further declined to send us a drop copy of their seats via courier on the basis



[REDACTED]

that it is unrealistic for one intercept unit to generate technical data based on another unit's intercept. They suggested that if we still wanted to receive their seats that we should address our request to DIRNSA. Upon DIRNSA's approval, they would gladly send us their seats. I discussed with SFC Inman the pathetic showing we were experiencing in fixing TDL targets. I advised him that the primary reason we wanted the GMA seats was so we could supplement the GMA TDL's, thereby improving the percentage of TDL targets fixed. He assured me that the current GMA TDL's were already as reliable as could be reasonably developed. He cited statistics for the 909A area where their ground intercept covers the same targets as our airborne tasking. The ground intercept verified that the TDL's were 75-80 percent reliable. That is, their ground intercept positions were given the same TDL's as were sent to the aviation units. These positions intercepted 75-80 percent of the targets using the callsigns, on the frequencies, and at the times listed on the TDL. He had no explanation why our TDL target fix rate is approximately 1 percent. Sgt Gibbs in the medium range direction finding (MRDF) briefed us on the role that function plays in relation to the ANDF program. They are primarily interested in determining the general location of targets of interest so that more specific location data can be obtained through ANDF. MSgt Baker talked with various analysts in the exploitation section to obtain up-to-date technical information on SEA area 909A. These analysts were helpful in every respect and Sgt Baker was able to return to Det 2 with a much more complete working aid for that area. Sgt Baker remained at Phu Bai until 20 April 1972 in order to get all available technical information. Overall, I feel that, while not many problems were completely resolved, the trip provided a good basis for establishing a profitable working relationship with our GMA at Phu Bai. We were able to personally contact most of the individuals there who has a job related to the ones we perform at Det 2. Everyone was helpful and offered any assistance they could render to help both the GMA and the aviation units do a better job.

*Daniel C. Mack*  
DANIEL G. MACK, MSgt, USAF  
Asst NCOIC Airborne Analysis and Reporting

Cy to: OC/6994 Stry Sq



7046  
Doc 3

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC SECURITY REGION (USAFSS)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96315

REF ID:  
REF OF: DOKT

SUBJECT: Standardization/Evaluation Report - Det 2, 699<sup>th</sup> Scty Sq

TO: Det 2, 699<sup>th</sup> Scty Sq (CC/DO)  
699<sup>th</sup> Scty Sq (CC/DO)

1. Names of FSR Examiners

Capt Michael T. Christy  
SMSgt David H. Winter  
TSgt William K. Daniels Jr

NOTE: SMSgt Maness (Hqs USAFSS/DOR) accompanied the FSR Stan/Eval Team

2. Dates: 21 - 25 January 1972

3. Missions Flown:

Capt Christy  
90EC, 22 Jan, AMS - SSgt Cusman  
90EB, 23 Jan, AMS - TSgt Wright

SMSgt Winter  
907A, 22 Jan, AMS - SSgt Baldwin  
910C, 23 Jan, AMS - SSgt Dougill

TSgt Daniels  
910C, 23 Jan, AMS - SSgt Sellers

SMSgt Maness  
90EA, 23 Jan, AMS - SSgt Fitzeruss  
907A, 24 Jan, AMS - SSgt Allen

4. Unit Evaluation:

a. Mission Statements:

(1) Det 2, 699<sup>th</sup> Scty Sq provides ARDF and airborne collection support to COMUSMACV, GAG and 7AF. Flying in the northern portion of the Republic of Vietnam, the Tri-Border area (EVA, Cambodia and Laos) and the Steel Tiger area of the Laotian Panhandle the unit conducts ARDF/airborne collection operations against EVA and Viet Cong tactical units and General Directorate Near Services (GDS) elements. The unit also collects a significant volume of both Morse and voice exploitable messages, derived from both enemy tactical and GDS communications. ARDF and exploitable message data is reported electrically after each mission to the appropriate CMA, ACC and NSA for further dissemination to tactical users. Additionally,

[REDACTED]

the unit has participated in the Brown Beaver and Black Bear programs which provide for secure air-to-air relay of fix information for utilization by F4C aircraft. When the US controlled site at Pakse, Southern Laos has been activated, Det Two has provided ADF fix data directly to the Pakse site via secure air-ground communications. These latter programs have greatly enhanced the capability of US Forces to exploit perishable ADF data in a timely manner and have contributed significantly to tactical ground operations and USAF interdiction efforts in Laos.

b. Standardization/Evaluation

(1) General:

(a) The unit's Stan/Eval section continues to operate under effective and highly qualified management. Stan/Eval procedures are closely adhered to and general administration of the Stan/Eval program is satisfactory. A review of USAFSS form 74's indicated that the unit's Stan/Eval Flight Examiners are conducting check rides in a satisfactory manner. However, a major objective of this visit was to evaluate each unit Stan/Eval section's procedures or system for ensuring that the Operations Officer and Commander are systematically provided with an assessment of the effectiveness of overall airborne mission procedures, the general level of proficiency of the unit's aircrews, and degree of adherence to emergency procedures and aircrew discipline requirements. A conscious and consistent monitoring of overall airborne mission performance with regular reporting to the Commander/Operations Officer should be the primary responsibility of the unit Stan/Eval section. Although the Stan/Eval section regularly initiates action to correct individual aircrew proficiency discrepancies and advises the Operations Officer of corrective actions at weekly staff meetings, Det 2 does not have an established system which ensures that the Stan/Eval section is performing their primary monitoring/assessment task. To assist the unit in developing a more effective Stan/Eval program, it is recommended that a directive be published requiring a formal written report to be submitted monthly from the Stan/Eval section to the Operations Officer. This report would provide the Stan/Eval section's assessment of the effectiveness of mission/aircrew procedures, general aircrew proficiency and degree of adherence to established procedures. Special emphasis should be placed upon trends noted, weak areas and potential problem areas. In preparing for submission of this report each month, the Stan/Eval section should collectively review all USAFSS form 74's, student evaluations, written examinations results and informal notes prepared by the unit SDF's during check rides in an attempt to isolate trends and problem areas. After preparing a draft of their findings, the Stan/Eval section should call a meeting (a) of all unit SDF's and IAC's to discuss problem areas in detail and solicit additional comments from the Cat IV Operator force. The final monthly report, complete with recommended solutions, would then be forwarded to the Operations Officer and Commander for appropriate corrective action. These reports would then form the basis for discussion by the unit Stan/Eval review panel as prescribed by USAFSSK 95-7.

(b) The Chief SDF's routinely certify other SDF's regardless of rank. This is not a sound practice as the senior A2923 SDF is appointed chief and is not qualified to certify proficiency in all aspects of the 202/203 career field. SAC/STW is tasked to discuss this with the 69442 and recommend that 69442 SDF's (A11/203) do not certify the various Analyst and Linguist

[REDACTED]

SEFE's at the detachments.

(2) 846 Maintenance:

Maintenance of subject aircrew records was generally good. Pertinent data was included in the appropriate sections. Approximately 60% of the total 846's on file were reviewed for accuracy and completeness. This amounted to 95 of 162 records on file. All AFSC's were reviewed. Special note is made of the fact that a large number of the 846's were inherited from Det 1, 6994th and the 6994th Soty Sqdn due to transfer of personnel.

(3) No-Notice Evaluations:

Detachment SEFE's only performed 6 No-Notice Check Rides during the month of November 1971. This was primarily due to the large influx of newly assigned personnel from the 6994th Soty Sqdn and Det 1, 6994th Soty Sqdn which ceased operation on 7 November 1971. It should be noted that the SEFE Section conducted 74 systems upgrade check rides during this month. With the assignment of A1R-34 configured aircraft to the organization and arrival of personnel not familiar with the A1R-35/38 aircraft it was necessary to undergo an extensive upgrade training program. The SEFE section did conduct approximately 10% of their check rides as No-notice rides in December. Special attention should be given to USAFSSM 60-1 concerning two semi-annual checks per year with one being a no-notice.

(4) SEFE's/IRO's:

Only one instance was noted where a SEFE also performed additionally as an IRO. The unit was appraised of USAFSSM 55-7 requirements and immediate action was taken to correct this deficiency.

(5) Periodic Training Requirements:

The Standardization and Evaluation section has established a suspense system that identifies and records recurring flight training and flight physical requirements. Follow-up action in the form of a letter to the Operations Officer is taken on individuals who fail to meet specific requirements. There were no instances of outdated AF Forms 1042, Medical Recommendation for Flying Duty.

(6) USAFSS Form 74:

The unit is using outdated forms. The May 71 edition has been requested and will be phased in for use upon arrival. Form 74's on individuals for applicable systems (A1R-34/35, or 38) upgrade are only annotated in the remarks section. The appropriate action item in parts II, III, IV and V are not specifically addressed. USAFSSM 55-7, Vol II makes no provision for omitting entries (S, U, or N/A) in the applicable blocks.

(7) Specific Discrepancies in Aircrew Evaluation and/or Categorization Procedures:

It is recommended that flight examiners identify those individuals whose current airborne categorization will require frequent and close monitoring. Having identified a weak or potentially weak aspect of an aircrew member's performance, the flight examiner must ensure that appropriate follow-up actions, to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

include no-notice, special evaluations, and/or removal from flying status actions are taken. The follow-up check ride and USAFEE Form 74 should specifically address weak or failure areas associated in the previous check ride.

c. Training:

(1) General:

The unit has documented an excellent overall training program. Particularly exceptional is the initial ground orientation (Category I) training for newly assigned personnel. The local training regulation is well-written and is quite detailed in stating the training section's responsibilities. All newly assigned personnel are assigned to and responsible to the training section until general ground orientation is completed. All USMC's attend joint classes in emergency procedures and general unit mission orientation. At this point, maintenance and analysis personnel are released to their respective sections for specialized training and Z92/Z93 personnel continue formal training in common intercept equipment and target environment.

(2) A292 Specialized Ground Training:

Following the joint equipment/target environment phase, the training section continues specialized ARDF training for A292s. This phase deals in considerable detail with airborne mission procedures, traffic format, ARDF equipment/antennae, air-to-ground communications procedures and in-flight trouble shooting. Category II training for A292s is considered adequate and well documented.

(3) A203X1 Specialized Ground Training:

The newly arrived A203X1-AD begins his unit indoctrination and training by attending the Category II general training course. Completion of the majority of this general instruction then releases the trainee to the Voice Processing Section where his specialized training begins. We recommend that the A203 receive the entire general training course to better prepare him for his airborne duties and enhance his understanding of the entire mission. The trainee must receive this specialized linguistic and target entities instruction before he can be up-graded to Category II. It is the Voice Processing Section's responsibility to provide this instruction through the use of well documented lesson plans, training tapes, and qualified instructors. Satisfactory completion of this specialized training then qualifies the trainee for Category II testing to be administered by the unit training section.

Lesson plans and training outlines have already been prepared for the majority of material that will be presented. Training tapes have been received and with the exception of multi-channel intercept, contain all required voice communications that the bot 2 linguist may encounter. Qualified instructors are available and have been identified. Ground processing equipment, RYCOMS and FT-6 recorders are installed and will provide the necessary aural training and handcopy practice required during the specialized training phase.

To ensure that the specialized A203X1 training program is well-documented, current, and viable, the following actions must be completed and formalized:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(a) Written lesson plans must be finalized and must adequately cover all areas listed in the specialized training outline.

(b) Available training tapes need to be reviewed, selected cuts isolated and identified, and transcripts prepared for those cuts of traffic selected. Multi-channel training tapes with associated transcripts are mandatory if the trainee is to receive the required specialized training. Training tapes should include, but not be limited to, all possible voice entities that the Det 2 linguist may encounter. Terminology and communications procedures not normally intercepted from Det 2's current target areas may also be included to provide the entire A203X1-MB force familiarization with potential intercept.

(c) In coordination with the unit training section, a test must be developed that will cover both general and specialized instruction. This test will be used to determine the trainee's proficiency and readiness to up-grade to Category II.

(d) A suspense system should be initiated to ensure that lesson materials presented in the specialized training phase are monitored for accuracy, applicability, and currency. Along these lines, the entire voice effort, both intercept and processing, must continually be monitored and any alterations to current procedures and/or responsibilities should be readily identified for inclusion in the specialized training program. If the alterations or changes are significant enough, the entire A203 cadre must be up-dated on the new procedures. It is recommended that the above suspense and monitoring system be formally documented into an applicable local operating instruction.

#### (4) A202 Specialized Ground Training:

Incoming A202 personnel are entered into joint classroom ground training conducted for initial orientation, aircraft familiarization and emergency procedures. However, they remain only for the initial day of ground training. Recommend A202 personnel be required to attend the complete joint ground training course for familiarization with all aircraft equipment, proper logging procedures and duties of other crewmembers. Following joint ground training, the A202's are placed on wings and aids for ground support familiarization. At this point in the A202 training cycle, the specialized training program has been left to the individual instructor analyst. There is no centralized system for directing and monitoring the specialized A202 training that is necessary before the student analyst is prepared to begin training flights with an instructor analyst. Det 2 has recently developed a very general training outline for specialized A202 ground training. To expand upon this outline and to ensure that airborne analysts are specifically and fully prepared for airborne duties prior to initiation of Cat III upgrade training with an instructor analyst, the following actions must be completed and formalized:

(a) Appointment of a highly qualified individual to develop and conduct A202 specialized training.

(b) Development of detailed lesson plans which stipulate systematic and planned instruction in all areas covered in the general training outline.

(c) Development of procedures designed to closely monitor the students progress through the ground training phase. These procedures should include

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

assignment of practice problems, hypothetical analysis situations and short written and/or verbal quizzes. These procedures should also include a requirement for periodic review and update of the A202 specialized training materials.

(4) In coordination with the unit training section, an A202 Category II Upgrade Examination must be developed for administering to student analysts upon completion of specialized ground training and prior to assignment to an instructor analyst for Category III Upgrade Training.

(5) A292 Category III Upgrade Training:

After successful completion of Category II training, student radio operators are assigned to instructors who are responsible for imparting Category III training. The unit has utilized 6994th Sety Sqdn Form 1 (Student Evaluation) to document student progress. The form is completed after each mission and is forwarded to the Stan/Eval and training section for review and is filed by the training section in the AF Form 623. The student evaluation is forwarded through the scheduling section so that the IRC/Student are scheduled for the appropriate system as recommended by the instructor. For reasons unknown, the 6994th Sety Sqdn has discontinued the Form 1. The Stan/Eval Team will investigate this situation upon arriving at Tan Son Nhut. Pending resolution, the unit should continue student evaluation procedures on an interim basis.

(a) Det 2 has implemented a procedure for 292s whereby an instructor from the training section monitors the final training flight prior to a student's upgrade. This is considered an excellent procedure for monitoring the IRC program and consideration should be given to instituting a similar procedure for monitoring the 203 and 202 instructor programs.

(b) Four A292 IRCs were observed in training performance during missions flown by the team. All four (TSgt Wright, SSgt Allen, SSgt Baldwin and SSgt Gussman) exhibited outstanding instructor techniques and were extremely professional and effective in their performances of instructor duties.

(6) A203 Category III Upgrade Training:

An excellent A202 IRC checklist has been developed to guide and standardize A202 IRC procedures. A203 IRC's utilize the 6994th Form 1 to evaluate each student's progress. However, the Form 1 is delivered to the training section for filing upon completion of each flight. This affords no opportunity for review of student progress or monitoring of IRC effectiveness. Recommended procedures be established requiring that each student evaluation is routed through the HCCIC, Voice Processing Section and stipulation of the requirement for the HCCIC to additionally review student progress and to closely monitor A203 IRC effectiveness.

(a) Sgt Mejia was observed by a FBR flight examiner in the performance of IRC duties. Sgt Mejia exhibited outstanding instructor techniques and was extremely effective in handling his student.

(7) A202 Category III Upgrade Training:

The unit A202 Category III training program is ineffectively managed with no evidence of adequate monitoring or control. No checklists or training outline is available to the Instructor Analyst. (ii) Student evaluation forms are not

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

utilized. Consequently, there are no procedures for monitoring II effectiveness, standardizing II training procedures, or assessing student progress. The unit NCOIC, analysis and reporting should be required to develop and monitor an effective ASD2 Cat III Upgrade training program. This program must include, at a minimum:

- (a) Development of an II checklist or training plan which specifies the phased areas of instruction to be covered by the IA.
  - (b) Development of a student evaluation form, to be completed by the IA after each flight. This form should be reviewed by the NCOIC, analysis and reporting unit forwarding to the training section for filing in the individual's AF Form 887.
  - (c) Establishment of a program requiring regular monitoring and systematic update of II procedures to ensure currency, standardization, and overall effectiveness.
  - (d) Category IV Upgrade Training: Several outstanding training innovations are included in the Cat 2 program. Of particular note are the planned seminars for upgrading AWC/ARO nominees. This idea provides for a final preparation of these key personnel for their increased responsibilities. Decision making in hypothetical situations is to be stressed.
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(9) Overall Training Recommendations: Recommend the following additions to Det 2 Regulation 50-1:

(a) A provision for quarterly review and update of course A2E 29271-2. Suggest the Training Section be the OPR for this requirement. Inputs should be required from an operations branch.

(b) Provisions should be included implementing the various training guides/lessons plans thereby making the entire training program official.

(c) Expand in greater detail the requirements and procedures for 202/203 Category II and III training.

(d) A provision for using the student evaluations as a tool for evaluating instructor performance and standardization of efforts.

d. Mission Performance:

(1) General: The overall airborne mission performance at Det 2, 699th Scy Sq was generally excellent. The evaluation of this portion of the unit's mission covered all areas from pre-mission preparation and briefing to post-mission debriefing and critique. Emergency procedures were observed and crew responses tested by use of bail-out drills and written emergency procedures questions. Aircrew responses and in-flight discipline were generally good with few discrepancies/inconsistencies noted. One potential problem area observed was the time required to don survival and personal gear during the bail-out drills. While this was the exception rather than the rule, it should be continually stressed to all crewmembers that the survival and personal gear must be pre-fitted and readily accessible if the crewmember is to don these items in minimum time. One other item that warrants mention is reminding each man that after the survival and personal gear has been donned, the nose gloves should be the next item donned. Aircrew coordination between USAFSS and TEWS personnel was excellent. Interphone procedures were outstanding and chatter was limited to only that which was mission essential. 362 TEWS front-enders were exceptionally receptive to ARDP mission profile requirements and cooperated fully with the AMS' requests for special orbits and flight routes that might improve fulfilling mission requirements. The below listed sub-paragraphs are keyed to the USAFSS Form 186 and expand on the unit's airborne evaluation.

(2) Pre-Mission: Pre-Mission preparation and briefings were generally excellent. The Det 2 briefing by both the AMS and Analyst was informative and well presented. The new briefing room has immeasurably aided in improving the overall quality and atmosphere of pre-mission briefings. The analyst briefing covered target data for both the primary and ingress/egress areas. Briefings were recorded and generally conform to the requirements of USAFSSM 59-7, Chapter 8, with the following exception. Emergency destruction tasks were not being briefed by the AMS or Analyst. This is a stipulated requirement of USAFSSM 59-7, Chapter 8, para 8-3, a, (2). We recommend that this item be immediately integrated into the pre-mission briefing.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(a) On 23 January 1972, mission 907A, the 362 TEWS briefing was delayed for 15 minutes due to the late arrival of a USAFSS crewmember. The AMS elected to wait for this man and by doing so, delayed both the Det 2 and 362 TEWS briefings.

(b) On 24 January 1972, mission 907A, the Z1 operator was late to both the Det 2 and TEWS briefings. The AMS asked the TEWS briefer to delay his briefing by approximately 4 minutes until the delinquent crewmember arrived.

(c) In view of the 2 above mentioned incidents and the apparent lack of a pre-determined and definite Det 2 brief time, it is recommended that the Detachment establish a written directive establishing set USAFSS pre-mission briefing times for each mission. These times should be prominently displayed together with the crew bus time, TEWS briefing time, and mission takeoff.

(3) Pre-Flight: The position checklists available for pre-flight procedures were generally excellent. However, during several of the flights flown by PSR Flight Examiners, operators were not observed using checklists. When this was brought to the unit's attention, we noted an immediate improvement in the operator's use of their checklists and closer adherence to specific items listed therein. Checklists for the Y, Z1, and Z2 positions specifically require that the G-176 recorders be checked for operation, tape loaded, and heads cleaned. Operators were observed not complying with this item on the checklist, especially as pertains to each of these 3 operators loading their recorders. This particular item will be mentioned in further detail within the next section, "Post Takeoff/Pre-Mission" procedures. Pre-Flight checks of survival and personal equipment were generally satisfactory. It was noted that USAFSS crewmembers normally carry "AWOL" bags on board the aircraft with personal items and foodstuffs. While this is an individual's prerogative and should normally not interfere with either aircrew performance or jeopardize flight safety, it is strongly suggested that the AMS periodically check the contents of these bags to ensure that mandatory survival equipment (E and B Kits, Water bottles, Flashlight, Etc) are not being stored in these bags but rather are in fact on the aircrewmember's person. Additionally, personal articles such as photographs, envelopes, letters, etc., are prohibited items aboard mission aircraft.

(a) In-flight observations noted that the Z1 operator sometimes pre-flights and loads the G-184 recorder amplifier and G-176 recorder on the Y position. Furthermore, the recorder on the Z2 position is not loaded nor is the G-184 activated as part of normal mission procedures. The practice of having one operator pre-flight and load his own equipment and additional selected equipment from another position is neither advisable nor a sound pre-flight procedure. Each operator is singularly responsible for the complete awareness and proper operation of all equipment located on his position. Furthermore, each piece of USAFSS equipment should be both pre-flighted and set-up or loaded for its intended purpose. 699483 Reg 37-7, dtd 1 Mar 1971, "Reporting Distress Signals", requires that distress signals encountered other than on UNF Guard (243.0 MHz) be recorded. It is therefore mandatory that each recorder on board USAFSS missions be properly pre-flighted, cleaned, and loaded in order to comply with this regulation. All associated recorder amplifier equipment should also be pre-flighted and activated to ensure that the requirements of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

699488 Reg 55-7 are met. Finally, each individual 6994th crewmember must be personally responsible for activating, pre-flight, and properly operating all associated equipment for his position.

(4) Post Takeoff/Pre-Mission: Equipment was turned on as soon as back-and power was applied. With the exception of the recording equipment on the Z2 position, all operators and equipment were generally prepared to search, perform ARDF, and copy within minimum time after takeoff. The G-175J tuner configuration on the Z2 position is not standardized. Aircraft 771 and 702 are equipped with an A/B band tuner configuration on Z2. Although this position is normally manned with an A292 at Det 2, the optimum tuner configuration for ARDF missions is A and B band covering the frequency range 10-90 MHz. The team will further discuss this item with the 6994 Scty Sq.

(a) On 24 January, 1972, Mission 907A, the Z1 operator did not have his RF logs or forms ready for use as soon as the back-and power was applied and the equipment set up. Consequently, when later during the mission the X operator tipped off Z1 that the target being worked was switching to voice, the Z1 operator had to leave his position and get his required logs and forms from the mission pouch. The AFS on each mission must ensure that all operators are properly briefed on the requirements for complete position and equipment set-up and furthermore that all operators and/or the analyst are prepared to begin work as soon as back-and power is applied.

(5) Mission Performance: The ARDF and collection aspects of each mission observed were generally good. Exceptions to this overall evaluation are listed separately below and deal with both recommended improvement areas and specific areas warranting commendation. As noted in the "General" comments above (para 4D (1)) coordination and interworking, especially between USAF38S crewmembers, was very good. For the most part, operator procedures for searching, ARDF, and collection were well-coordinated and professional. Air to ground comm procedures were timely, followed proper comm format, and did not interfere with mission requirements. Operators and analysts normally followed established priority tasking procedures outlined by 699488 Reg 55-14 and USAF38S 55-7. There were several instances of non-compliance with directed search procedures. These instances will be mentioned in detail below. The X operator worked closely with the Navigator and Y operator throughout each mission observed.

(a) On 23 January 1972, Mission 908A, the PSR Flight Examiner observed the Z1 operator not conducting search for collection targets, either assigned or otherwise. This period of inattentiveness lasted for approximately 10 minutes after which the Z1 operator resumed search for the remainder of the mission. Both the AFS and Operations Officer were briefed on this incident and corrective action had already been initiated by the Operations Officer. On 24 January, 1972, Mission 907A, the PSR Flight Examiner again observed the Z1 operator not fulfilling his search and collection responsibilities. In this instance, the operator appeared almost indifferent to the fact that his assigned responsibility was to search for assigned/non-assigned targets, and thereby tipped the X operator of possible voice activity.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

his search procedures and techniques were perfunctory and did not follow any pattern, i.e., HF, RLXX, and Multi-Channel. The above two instances serve to emphasize the continuing requirement for a thorough and continuing training and stan/eval program. It further points out the responsibility of the Airborne Mission Supervisor to keep abreast of his crew's actions and adherence to assigned duties. It is recommended that all concerned staff offices, section heads, and supervisory personnel make this a continuing item to be monitored and stressed.

(b) We further noted tendencies for the Y operator to neglect his search and collection responsibilities whenever he was not assisting the X operator or was not using the radios. Once again we reiterate the continuing requirement for all operators to conduct systematic and effective search whenever they are not directly assisting the X operator or manning the radios. The ARDF platform configuration and equipment/personnel limitations makes it imperative that all available resources be utilized to their maximum effectiveness. As noted in subparagraph D (4) (a) above, a concerted and continuing effort involving all echelons of Unit Managers and Supervisors must be channeled towards emphasizing this point, i.e., when not working a specific target or otherwise gainfully involved in the ARDF mission, the operators should always be searching.

(c) The receiver/recorder alignment on the Z1 position allows the voice operator to record from either of three sources, HF RLXX, or Multi-Channel. Since the current crew configuration at Det 2 does not allow for 2 203X1 operators per mission, the voice operator should be as flexible as possible concerning his search and copy procedures. If the voice operator detects a multi-channel signal on his G-175J receiver, normal procedure dictates that he transfer the signal via a patching system to the Y console where the signal will be recorded at 15 ips. While this procedure allows the multi-channel signal to be recorded at 15 ips, it also effectively negates any further search that the Z1 operator can accomplish since his VHF receiver is now tied to the Y recorder. We recommend that after initially detecting a multi-channel or RLXX signal, the Z1 operator first determine if the signal should warrant his undivided attention, or if periodic monitoring of the signal would suffice. If the latter is the case, then we recommend that the Z1 operator immediately inform the Z2 operator to set up his G-175J on a specific frequency and the Z1 operator assist in center-tuning and setting up the frequency in question. The Y operator will then record the signal if it is multi-channel or the Z2 operator can record the signal if it is RLXX or HF. This will then allow the Z1 operator to both monitor the signal being recorded and further continue his search of the A and B bands by switching back and forth between the G-175J tuners.

(6) Despite the generally excellent airborne mission procedures observed during this visit, Det 2 aircrews are suffering from inadequate technical support and lack of specific technical guidance for both the ARDF and Collection mission. CMA-produced IBI's are of negligible assistance in guiding the mission. The local analysis section has not implemented procedures for ensuring that aircrews are provided with the most current and accurate technical data available. Additionally, the Airborne Analysts observed were generally unable to provide accurate mission guidance to the radio operators. The single most important factor relevant to this lack of effective airborne analysis is the current controversy concerning the amount and types of technical data which may be carried aboard combat cross mission aircraft. The majority of Det 2's missions encounter enemy nets utilizing daily

[REDACTED]

changing call signs. Also frequently encountered are MO's which utilize several sets of call signs. These factors make it absolutely necessary for the Det 2 Airborne Analyst to carry sufficient technical aids to enable him to provide mission guidance to the operator. The Stan/Eval team will further discuss this problem with the 6994th SS. If approval is granted to carry the necessary tech data, the unit analysis section must be prepared to re-implement procedures to ensure that the airborne analyst actively and continuously provides timely identification support to the ARDP mission as well as timely "drop a copy" guidance to the collection mission.

(a) Regardless of the final decision regarding tech data to be carried aboard the aircraft, the unit analysis section must effect the necessary internal organization and procedures necessary to provide increased tech support/mission guidance. Assignment of analysts to work specific entities or areas, requests to be placed on distribution for CNA SMTS and increased managerial emphasis upon locally-generated tech support are possible actions that must be considered. The team will discuss assignment & additional 202 personnel to Det 2 with the 6994SS.

(b) The unit voice processing section has developed procedures for ensuring that locally-generated tech data is provided to those missions flying in productive voice areas. Particularly noteworthy was the tech data on enemy multi-channel communications provided for missions flying in the southern Steel Tiger area. Again, the voice analysis effort suffers from a lack of tech support from the CNA. With the assistance of the 6994th SS, the unit is attempting to obtain the tech data necessary to expand the voice analysis/tech support program. This will be discussed further at the 6994SS.

(7) Post Mission/Pre-landing: The PSR Stan/Eval team observed no discrepancies during the post mission/pre-landing portions of the mission. All required duties to include equipment shut-down and area clean-up were performed well. All crewmembers were strapped in with nose gloves as prior to landing. As was the case with take-off instructions, wearing of EPU's is optional and at the discretion of the individual. The AMS should personally check to ensure that all classified material has been returned to the mission bag and that all crewmembers are ready for landing with equipment properly shut-down and sanitized.

(8) Post Flight/Debriefing: Counterpart debriefings are performed after the crew has returned to the Det 2 area. 6994 SS Form 2's were properly filled out and informative. We noted and commended the excellent post-flight inventory of all mission materials. The individual on duty from Mission Management physically checks off each item entered on the 6994SS Form 5. The AMS observes this inventory and he together with the BCM duty can guarantee that all mission classified material signed out is in fact returned to operations.

(9) Slingy/Touch Check: Materials and checklists contained in the mission bag were for the most part properly classified current, well maintained and applicable. Although each checklist contained a 30 day review list, we noted that there was some discussion as to the applicability of all items contained within the checklists. We recommend that the SCS section continually monitor these checklists to ensure that outdated data is removed and new data inserted. Furthermore, it is

[REDACTED]

recommended that the first item on each checklist require all RO's to make an initial security check of their position and immediate area as soon as they board the aircraft.

(a) We noted the lack of an analyst aircrew checklist and recommend that one be drawn up as soon as possible to identify the airborne analyst's specific aircrew duties and responsibilities aboard Det 2, 699438 missions.

e. Miscellaneous

(1) CIP's: The CIP read file was checked on 22 January 1972. There were only three CIP's on record, one of which (77-71) is as dated in December 1971. None pertained to mission accomplishment. Section Operating Instruction 11-2 dated April 1971 tasks the WCOIC Operations with monitor and maintenance of the CIP file. This has been re-written (dated 24 January 1972) to task the WCOIC, DORV (SEFS) with this responsibility. Flying personnel are tasked with annotating their individual CIP cardex file certifying awareness of each CIP. The AMS on each flight is responsible for ensuring crewmembers on his flight have complied with SOI.

(2) Flight safety information file: The flight safety information file was current, well maintained, and applicable.

(3) Antenna Cleanliness: We recommend that Detachment 2 initiate a program whereby the dirt and oil accumulated on the AN/ALB-38 underlying antennas are regularly wiped off prior to each mission. Any heavy accumulation of dirt, grime, or oil will almost definitely have an adverse effect on system AREF performance.

(4) Flight Management: Detachment 2 operates with a four flight (A292's) concept. A202's and A203's are scheduled for specific missions (when required) by the analysis or voice processing sections. The scheduling section schedules flying personnel for pertinent missions and details (duty drivers, Ops detail, and etc.). The unit does maintain a visible (mounted on a wall) mission schedule board which depicts personnel requirements for certain missions. A weekly schedule is made in advance but is necessarily subject to change according to mission requirements. The unit does not display a visible flying hours chart. Conversely, this data is posted to a separate sheet (one for each operator) on a daily basis. Information is extracted by the scheduling section from the individuals 6994 Form 9. The accountability sheet shows a monthly accumulation of flying hours on a daily basis. Quarterly hours are not automatically up dated. This data can be obtained by simply adding the three pertinent months together. DWIF, RAS, and leave are shown to support imbalances in personnel flying hours. The unit should ensure that a system is established for regular monitoring of quarterly flying hours.

5. Follow-up Requirements:

a. Follow-up reporting to PacSctygen is required for the following items. Request a complete summary of actions taken to resolve the problem noted and to eliminate listed discrepancies:

(1) Paragraph 4b (1) (a). Suspense: 29 Feb 72

(2) Paragraph 4b (3). Suspense: 3 Feb 72

(3) Paragraph 4b (7). Suspense: 3 Feb 72

[REDACTED]

- (4) Paragraph 4c (3) (a), 4c (3)(b), 4c (3) (c), 4c (3) (d).  
Suspense: 29 Feb 72
- (5) Paragraphs 4c (4) (a), 4c (4) (b), 4c (4) (c), 4c (4) (d).  
Suspense: 29 Feb 72
- (6) Paragraph 4c (6). Suspense: 3 Feb 72
- (7) Paragraph 4c (7) (a), 4c (7) (b), and 4c (7) (c).  
Suspense: 29 Feb 72
- (8) Paragraph 4c (9). Suspense: 29 Feb 72
- (9) Paragraph 4d (2) (c). Suspense: 9 Feb 72
- (10) Paragraph 4d (3) (a). Suspense: 9 Feb 72
- (11) Paragraphs 4d (5) (a) and 4d (5) (b). Suspense: 9 Feb 72
- (12) Paragraph 4d (6). Suspense: ASAP after receipt of approval to  
any tech aids on aircraft.
- (13) Paragraph 4d (6) (a). Suspense: 29 Feb 72
- (14) Paragraph 4d (9). Suspense: 9 Feb 72
- (15) Paragraph 4d (9) (a). Suspense: 29 Feb 72
- (16) Paragraph 4e (3). Suspense: 3 Feb 72
- (17) Paragraph 4e (4). Suspense: 9 Feb 72

b. Proctykon will initiate action as outlined in paragraphs 4a(1)(b),  
4c(5), 4d(4), 4d(6), 4d(6)(a), and 4d(6)(b).

FOR THE COMMANDER

*Michael T. Christy*  
MICHAEL T. CHRISTY, Capt, USAF  
Chief, PROCTYKON Standardization/Evaluation Team



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Doc # 4

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
6984 SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

23 June 1972



REPLY TO: DO (Tagt Preslar/4891)  
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to Det 2, 6994th Soty Sq (26-30 May 72) (U)

TO: CC  
DO  
IN TURN

1. (U) Purpose of the visit was to conduct the quarterly standardization/evaluation inspection/assistance visit and to administer standboard evaluation to Detachment 2's chief flight examiners.
2. (U) Names of visitors: TSgt Michael D Preslar, Squadron A292E Flight Examiner.  
SSgt Jack L Lukens, Squadron A202D Flight Examiner.
3. (U) Personnel contacted: Maj Thompson, Commander  
SMSgt McCollough, NCOIC Operations  
MSgt Douglas, NCOIC Stan/Eval  
MSgt Payne, NCOIC Analysis/Reporting  
MSgt Bain, NCOIC Training  
TSgt Merrill, NCOIC Linguists  
TSgt Aore, Chief A203 Flight Examiner  
SSgt Maginness, Chief A202 Flight Examiner  
SSgt Hendricks, 202 Ground Trainer
4. (U) A comprehensive three section standardization/evaluation management checklist was used as a guide for the visit. Evaluation findings were briefed to the commander and the NCOIC of Stan/Eval prior to departure. The operations officer was on leave.
5. (U) A total of four missions were flown with Detachment 2 aircrews during the visit.
6. [REDACTED] (U) Findings:
  - a. [REDACTED] (U) Stan/Eval Section:
    - (1) [REDACTED] MSgt Douglas, the NCOIC of Stan/Eval, was administered a standboard check flight by the squadron A292 flight examiner. He is highly qualified in all areas of ARSF operations. Strongly recommend MSgt Douglas be retained in his present position of NCOIC of the Stan/Eval Section and chief A292 flight examiner. SSgt Maginness, the chief A202 flight examiner, was administered a re-certification standboard check flight by the squadron A202 flight examiner. He too was found to be highly qualified as a flight examiner.

[REDACTED]

(2) (U) The Stan/Eval Section is efficiently managed by MSgt Douglas. Stan/eval procedures are closely adhered to and general administration of the stan/eval program is satisfactory. All previously reported items contained in the PSR stan/eval report dated 25 Jan 1972 have been corrected. Close coordination exists with the Training Section to improve overall aircrew proficiency.

(3) (U) Maintenance of the AF Form 846 is being maintained according to AFM 60-1 and USAFSSM 55-7, Vol II. Aircrew member badge orders were not filed in the 846 on approximately 50 percent of the aircrew members assigned. Timely submission of requests for badge orders after an individual completes his 10th mission is desirable. Letters of delinquency were filed in the 846 on a few individuals that weren't actually delinquent. A misunderstanding of the definition of "semi-annual check" and "no notice check", and when they could be administered and how long after the different types of checks does an individual become delinquent caused this discrepancy. The Stan/Eval Section is now aware of the criteria and the incorrect letters of delinquency have been removed.

(4) (U) A review of USAFSS Form 74, "Airborne Operator Flight Check," indicates the flight examiners are conducting through flight checks. In most cases the remarks and recommendations sections of the form is being used in an excellent manner.

b. (U) Training. Det 2's ground training program continues to function in an outstanding manner. The program is well organized and effectively managed. Lesson plans and training outlines are current and thorough. PSR's recommendations for improving the ground training program for A202s and A203s have been accomplished. Each AFSC has extensive training material including guides and outlines, quizzes, practice problems, etc. A ground trainer is appointed for each AFSC. When the specialized ground training is completed, the student is administered a category II upgrade exam which he must pass before he is released to airborne operations for airborne training with an instructor.

c. [REDACTED] Mission Procedures/Performance:

(1) Pre-mission briefings are satisfactory. The briefing by the analyst included all the required information concerning the analytical/technical aspects of the mission. His briefing was informative and well presented. The briefing by the AMS was generally satisfactory but could be improved. Recommend the AMS stand up front facing his crew while he briefs. When his is finished, the analyst goes forward and presents his briefing. Additionally, the analyst briefed some items that should be briefed by the AMS, that is, latest OIF and PFB, etcetera. The briefing at the TEWS was about the same. When it came time for the 6994th to brief, the analyst went forward, announced he was briefing for the 6994th, delivered his briefing, then sat down. The analyst did announce who the AMS was and he announced the names of the other USAFSS crew members. The AMS was sitting in back of the TEWS crew members and they didn't look around

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

to see who the AMS was when his name was announced. To enhance the overall image of the AMS, strongly recommend he take an active part in the briefing. There should be two separate briefings by USAFSS personnel, one by the AMS and one by the analyst. Five FMS pre-mission briefings were observed. In each instance the aircraft commander and navigator briefed in a highly professional manner.

(2) Preflight procedures were satisfactory. A few people neglected to check their survival radios. Tape recorder heads weren't cleaned a couple of times. Except for these two items the entire preflight was excellent. Each operator checked his position equipment for serviceability and checked his parachute. Excellent safety procedures were followed. Everyone had their seatbelts fastened during taxi, takeoffs, and landings. Nomex gloves were worn for takeoffs and landings.

(3) Overall in-flight mission procedures were excellent. Operators turned on their equipment and started searching as soon as back-and power was applied. Crew coordination and intercom discipline was excellent. The airborne analysts were highly proficient and were effective in directing and coordinating mission tasks. The supplemental TDLs carried by the analysts proved to be accurate and were superior to the CMA TDL. It was noted on one mission that upon returning to base, the Z2 operator turned off his equipment 30 minutes prior to entering the landing pattern. The Z1 operator turned his off 10 minutes later.

(4) Post-mission procedures were satisfactory. The AMS conducted a thorough security check of each position and was the last person to leave the aircraft. The debrief was conducted in a satisfactory manner. The debriefer inventoried the mission briefcase in the presence of the AMS and signed the 6994th Soty Sq Form 5, "Mission Briefcase Checklist," certifying all material was accounted for.

d. (U) Airborne Operations:

(1) The unit CIF is well maintained. When a new item for the CIF is published, a termination date is included with the item. The termination date on several CIFs had passed without the CIF being deleted or continued with a new termination date. If a termination date is assigned then the CIF should be reviewed for currency on or before the termination date. All crew members of five crews checked and signed off the latest CIF.

(2) The flight safety bulletin contained excellent and interesting safety information. Since only one entry (the last one) was dated, it was difficult to ascertain whether the FSB was being regularly updated. All crew members had signed off the latest FSB. Each new bulletin should be dated.

(3) The Scheduling section posts flying hours daily to ensure personnel don't exceed the maximum allowable.

[REDACTED]

e. (U) Miscellaneous. A special emphasis item that was checked during this visit concerned aircrew conduct. Because of certain incidents that occurred during the PSR stan/eval visit in January, and contained in their report dated 25 January, we were looking for possible recurrences. We didn't find any. For all missions, all crew members were on time and in good condition for the pre-mission briefing. We didn't observe anyone sleeping or displaying a general inattentiveness toward airborne duties. This applied to the T-28 crew members also.

7. GDS date - declassify 31 December 1978.

*Michael D Preslar*

MICHAEL D PRESLAR, TSgt, USAF  
Chief, Squadron Standardisation/Evaluation

Cy to: Det 2/DO

READ AND INITIAL

TSgt Acre JA (DORV)

TSgt Schenover \_\_\_\_\_ (DORV)

TSgt Brown, N. MB (DOT)

SSgt Luther LB (DORV)

SSgt Roerig RA (DORV)

SSgt Robinson \_\_\_\_\_ (DOT)

Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron

1. General Comments. Det 2, 6994th Stry Sq was visited 31 May - 5 June 1972.

Seven operational missions were flown and comments on those missions are contained in the body of this report. Comments on other areas of interest are also provided.

2. Analysis and Reporting: (AAR). There has been a marked improvement in the AAR since the last PacSecygen Stan Eval visit in May 72. However, there are some areas that still require improvement. These areas, plus other specific items are discussed in detail below.

a. Tech Data List (TDL) Preparation. Presently each mission has the CPM prepared TDL, the NSA produced high speed traffic identification aid and the airborne analyst's locally produced TDL. These aids are a definite asset to the analyst and allow him to direct intercept and identify priority targets. The local TDL is produced by each analyst for the mission and area that he flies. This procedure is excellent for each individual mission and for the individual analyst but if for any reason the aircraft was diverted or an analyst change was necessary the effectiveness of the "Personal" TDL would be reduced. Recommend that a unit, mission TDL (by area) be produced by the Airborne Analysis section and carried on each mission. Then all locally produced tech aids would be available to all personnel.

b. Area Continuity. Even though the analyst fly in the same area as much as possible, there is a possibility that continuity could be improved by producing an airborne TECSUM on each mission flown and leaving it in the mission bag for at least ten days. By doing so the Analyst each day could tell exactly what had been copied on previous days and who/what to look for the following days. The TECSUM should be completed in duplicate and the second copy should be provided to the I.D. Analyst for cross reference. The content/format of a proposed TECSUM log was discussed with the NCOIC of Airborne Analysis.

c. Collection: Instructions pertaining to what type five figure (5F) traffic (primarily manual Morse) to collect and what type to drop are very vague. NSA has been asked for low/medium grade crypt system identification characteristics, and specific tasking instructions will be issued when NSA responds.

d. It is suggested that an alphabetical card file be started on unidentified call signs (by transmitter and receiver call). In addition to the call signs and other tech data specific emphasis should be placed on msg or analysis.

e. Duties for Airborne Analysts should be Standardized. Specific duties and work areas should be documented. There are a number of routine duties that the analyst could perform to free the "X" or "Y" operator for position operation. These duties include, but are not limited to, log preparation, portions of the debrief, and portions of the A/C Bonus. One example of the above requirements for specific duties occurred on the 9072N mission on 29 May. On that mission the only exploitable message was copied in full on both the "X" and "Y" positions simultaneously. Additionally, two ECM's were issued on the same exploitable message.

f. Det Two is also experiencing the same difficulty as Det Three getting product/technical reports based on their own intercept/ARDF. The problem will be discussed with WINSMA.

g. Radio Telephone Processing/Reporting: The only processing done on radio intercept is exploitable message reporting. The traffic that does not contain exploitable messages is forwarded to USM-608 for processing.

3. Mission Management. The primary interest item in mission management was DURNID reporting. Specific items were on entries in sections three and six.

a. Section Three. Missions reported as reduced for two or more reasons in section 331 are reported with times for each cause. This requires the reader to

[REDACTED]

scan each line entry and perform a simple mathematical function to determine total reduced time for a mission. To standardize reporting in the 699th complex, it is recommended that the following format be used to report missions which are reduced for two or more reasons: 831 RM 907HE 059. LIS 025. MSN AA DUE TO RADIO PROBLEM. RTB PROBLEM CORRECTED. MSN RELAUNCH THEN AA MK 054. ACFT 5581. (Note. This format is currently used by Det 3 699th). The entry immediately following the mission number is "TOTAL" reduced time for that mission. Remaining entries are unchanged.

b. Section Three and Six. Reference USAFSSM Reg 2223302 Apr 72, 1E/DOA/1972. Subject: DURMIS reporting. Several instances have been noted where data reported in sections three and six was not reported in accordance with the reference. Differences noted were in times and reasons reported for reduced missions. To resolve this problem, and insure accurate reporting it is recommended that those personnel preparing and reviewing the DURMIS make sure the data contained in these two sections is comparable.

3. Stan/Eval. Only two specific items of interest were discussed with the 699th Stan/Eval, both of which concerned USAFSSM 55-7 Vol II.

a. Each year the units in SFA encounter problems in putting extra people on mission aircraft due to weight/fuel limitations. This causes a problem in compliance with USAFSSM 55-7 Vol II paragraph 6-6. At present the manual requires flight examiners to fly as an extra crewmember when conducting examinations. As stated above this causes problems which are beyond the unit's control. This matter will be discussed further at the 699th. The possibility of a waiver of paragraph 6-6 has been discussed at Det 2, however, a rewrite of the paragraph deleting the requirement for flight examiners to fly as extra may be the best solution.

b. Det 2 has on file a waiver of semi-annual Stan/Eval requirements for 13gt ADRE, David L. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Gordon W. [REDACTED]. This

[REDACTED]

waiver appears to have been granted by the squadron (ref 6994 msg 27024CE Apr 72  
00). This will be a subject for discussion with the HQ 6994th.

5. Mission Observations. All of the missions were flown with a great deal of professionalism. Even those missions that had students or crewmembers with limited experience were conducted in an outstanding manner. The Detachment is fortunate to have a number of personnel with vast experience in the ARDF program who have obviously passed on their knowledge to the newer personnel.

6. Awards and Decorations. Det 2 6994th is having considerable problems in obtaining Air Medals for presentation of the basic award to unit crewmembers. It also seems impossible to obtain award element folders in RVM. On 22 May 72 a message was forwarded to Hq USAFSS/DP requesting their assistance in this matter. As of 3 June 72 a reply had not been received from Hq USAFSS. These medals are well earned and they should be presented on a timely basis. It appears that timely presentation is not possible without headquarters assistance and the problem will be discussed with the Headquarters Awards and Decorations personnel.

7. Discussion Items at Det 2, 6994th. Two items contained in the unit crew information file (CIF) were considered worthy of discussion and inclusion in this report. These items are:

a. CIF 50-72, 30 May 72, Target Position Reporting Criteria. No authority given. Target position reporting criteria as applies to Det 2 6994th is as follows:

- (1) Log IOP if spread is less than six degrees.
  - (2) A CIF will have a 8-19.9 degree spread.
  - (3) A PIX at least 20 degrees spread, minimum 3 IOP's and at least six degrees between IOP's.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

(4) Any bearing spread less than three degrees will be considered as parallel and will not be used.

(5) A fix with less than thirty degrees spread will have a minimum radius of 800 meters.

b. CIP 49-72, 30 May 72, Number One needle on ID 250. No authority given. The CIP states that the number one needle on the ID 250 will be disconnected on all positions when dual GPS is implemented. Bravo Maint will accomplish this task. These items were considered for discussion only to determine the authority/reasons for the actions/procedures outlined. Both will be discussed at the 6924th.

6. Maintenance:

a. The Maintenance Forms 273 are printed front-to-back rather than top-to-bottom as they should be. The problem will be pointed out to DAPS at Hq to try and have the problem alleviated before any new forms are printed the same way.

b. Maintenance requires a non-COMINT portion of USAPSSM 55-7 so that it may be maintained in a non-SI area. We will discuss the problem with the appropriate personnel at Hq to see if the portion of the manual pertaining to ANTs can't be extracted and classified either straight SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL.

(M/R: prepared by Command Stan Eval team of SMS McCollough and TSgt Jameson)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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GENERAL NUMBER OF AVAILABLE  
GENERAL DIRECTION  
THE PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS  
THROUGH THE VARIOUS  
GENERAL OPERATIONS  
ESTIMATE OF INFILTRATION REPORTS  
TO THE VARIOUS FRONTS THAT  
THESE PROGRESS REPORTS HAVE BEEN NOTED  
FACILITIES AND THE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE FACILITIES  
SECURITY OF ALL INCOMING CODES SLAVES AS WELL AS  
A DEFINITE VOID CONCERNING THE REPORTS OF THE  
MOVEMENT OF THE TANKS INTO SOUTHERN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM  
AT NO TIME HAS ANY REFLECTION OF THIS PLANNED ACTIVITY BEEN  
NOTED ON ANY OF THE SUMMARIES AVAILABLE. THIS CONSIDERS  
HIGHLY UNUSUAL AS PROGRESS REPORTS OF ALL OTHER RESOURCES ARE  
USUALLY PASSED BACK TO THE HEADQUARTERS TO THE  
MILITARY REGION 559. IT IS A NO-DENY FACT THAT THE NORTH  
VIETNAMESE ARE AWARE OF OUR CAPABILITY TO GAIN ON THEIR  
COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES. THIS ENTIRE MOVEMENT OF THE  
TANKS AND THE LACK OF PROGRESS REPORTS APPEAR TO BE AN  
EFFORT TO MAINTAIN MAXIMUM SECURITY AND LIMIT OUR KNOWLEDGE  
OF THE ACTIVITY. THE INTERCEPTED TANK COMMUNICATIONS HAVE  
ALL BEEN OF A GUARDED AND CRYPTIC NATURE THUS LIMITING OUR  
ANALYTICAL EFFORT. BOTH THE ABOVE FACTORS HAVE GREATLY  
RESTRICTED OUR EFFORTS TO ACCURATELY DETERMINE THE TOTAL  
NUMBER OF TANKS AND VEHICLES INVOLVED IN THIS MOVEMENT SOUTH

AT VARIOUS TIMES THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF THE ACTIVITY  
THE CALLS NOTED BELOW HAVE MADE REFERENCE TO THE VEHICLE  
STRENGTH AND SOMETIMES THE VEHICLE TYPE ASSOCIATED WITH THE  
THE FOLLOWING IS THE DATE OF ACTIVITY, CALL SIGN, AND VEHICLE  
IDENTIFICATION  
THE 1915 VEHICLES CONTAINED IN TANKS  
THE 1915 VEHICLES CONTAINED IN TANKS

6 VEHICLES NOT IDENTIFIED  
 11 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 11 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 11 VEHICLES (NOT IDENTIFIED)  
 11 VEHICLES (NOT IDENTIFIED)  
 11 VEHICLES (NOT IDENTIFIED)  
 16 VEHICLES OF WHICH 7 WERE IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 11 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 11 VEHICLES (NOT IDENTIFIED)  
 11 VEHICLES (NOT IDENTIFIED)

TOTALS: 88 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 11 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 11 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 11 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 11 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 11 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 16 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 11 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 11 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 11 VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS

ON FEBRUARY 25, 1968, THE VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS  
 WERE INSPECTED AT THE SCENE TO DETERMINE A TOTAL  
 OF EIGHTY-ONE (81) POSSIBLE VEHICLES INVOLVED IN THE  
 COLLISION. THE TANKS AND UNIDENTIFIED TYPE  
 VEHICLES ASSOCIATED WITH NAME (9) OF THE COLLISION  
 WERE IDENTIFIED (9) AS OTHER COLLISION NOTED  
 IN THE REPORT MADE IN REFERENCE TO THE CR. VEHICLE TYPE (9) OF



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FM [REDACTED]  
TO [REDACTED]

CLASS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FINAL SECTION OF

INTERCEPT CALLED "54" REPORTED A STRENGTH OF ONE HUNDRED VEHICLES. HE WAS AGAIN NOTED AS BEING IN CONTACT WITH "50" WHO REPORTED A VEHICLE STRENGTH OF ONE HUNDRED VEHICLES IDENTIFIED AS TANKS. THIS IS AN INCREASE OF 2 VEHICLES OVER THE PREVIOUS INTERCEPT.

INTERCEPT "46" COMRADE "46" IS CONFIDENTIAL AND IS APPARENTLY UTILIZING A SONAR TYPE MOUNT WHICH IS EXPERIMENTAL IN INTERCEPT OF 15 MARCH WHICH HE REFERRED TO CROSSING THE BRIDGE AND SEEING OTHER VEHICLES CROSSING BELOW HIM AT THE TIME. THIS PROBABLY INDICATES THAT THE TANKS VEHICLES WERE TOO HEAVY FOR THE BRIDGE AND HAD TO CROSS AT A LOW POINT IN THE BRIDGE STRUCTURE.

ON THE FINAL DAY OF OUR INTERCEPT, ISHAR, CALLED "46" WAS NOTED IN CONTACT WITH "46" (NOT PREVIOUSLY NOTED). THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THEM INDICATED THAT "46" WAS IN PLACE AND THAT THE TANKS VEHICLES ARRIVING WOULD GOVE INTO THE AREA OF "46" TO "46". CALLED "46" ALSO WAS REFERRED TO "45" AND "49" BEING GOOD THERE" AND HAVING A TOTAL VEHICLE STRENGTH OF ONE HUNDRED (100) VEHICLES (NOT IDENTIFIED AS TO TYPE). THIS INDICATES THAT "45", "46" AND "49" HAD PRECEDED THE MOVEMENT OF THE CURRENT ACTIVITY INTO THE UNLOCATED PARKING / STAGING AREA.

3. THE LAST PRODUCTIVE MISSION ON 10 MAR LOST ITS ASSESS CAPABILITY AFTER INITIAL INTERCEPT OF THE SUBJECT ACTIVITY. DUE TO THIS, THE AIRCRAFT REMAINED ON TARGET FOR COLLECTION PURPOSES. THROUGHOUT THE INTERCEPT THE AIRCRAFT FILED VARIOUS PATTERNS TO DETERMINE BY AURAL SIGNAL STRENGTH THE APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF THE ACTIVITY. THE AREA LOCATED BY THIS METHOD WAS IN THE VICINITY OF YE 9037. THERE HAVE BEEN NO FURTHER REFLECTIONS OF THIS ACTIVITY SINCE THIS DATE. BELIEVE THIS IS FIRM INDICATION THAT THE TANKS VEHICLES HAVE REACHED A PREDETERMINED HOLDING / STAGING AREA. ALL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES TEND TO INDICATE AN IMPENDING ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN THE KONTUM AREA. THE SUSPECTED LOCATION OF THE HOLDING / STAGING AREA PRECLUDES A ONE DAY JOURNEY TO THIS AREA. IN VIEW OF THIS, EXPECT NO FURTHER REFLECTIONS.

WE EXPECT NO FURTHER SOVIET REFLECTIONS  
ON THE ACTIVITY UNTIL POSSIBLY 10-2 DAYS  
BEFORE THE ONSET OF HOSTILITIES. AT  
THIS TIME THE TANKS AND REQUIRED SUPPORT  
VEHICLES WILL PROBABLY MOVE TO ASSUME OFFENSIVE  
POSITIONS AGAINST KONTUM, IF THAT IS THE TARGET.  
BASED ON OUR INTERCEPT, TRANSCRIPTION AND  
ANALYSIS, THE CONCLUSIONS ABOVE ARE LIMITED IN  
SCOPE. REQUEST AMPLIFICATION, CONFIRMATION,  
AND/OR REEVAL OF CONCLUSIONS DRAWN. TRS.

END

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