


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HISTORY
OF
DETACHMENT 2, 6994 SECURITY SQUADRON
1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1969
RCS: USS-D3




15 MARCH 1970



Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron, APO San Francisco 96295





HISTORY

OF

DETACHMENT 2, 6994 SECURITY SQUADRON

1 July - 31 December 1969

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794), the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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UNIT HISTORIAN


Kenton E Lammers
KENTON E LAMMERS, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer

Approved by:

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Commander



UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE



F O R E W O R D

This operational history of Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron is a narrative depicting the significant Detachment accomplishments from 1 July through 31 December 1969. The highest classification of the material contained in this history is [REDACTED].

This history was prepared by additional duty information personnel. All comments and suggestions are welcomed and should be directed to the Operations Officer, Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron.

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
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CHAPTER I**COMMAND****History**

 Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron was an element of the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) conducting Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and airborne communications intelligence (COMINT) collection in support of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and 7 Air Force (7AF) requirements.¹ Personnel of the 362 Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS) operated the assigned EC-47 mission aircraft while operational tasking and technical support was provided by the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC) and the appropriate Collection Management Authorities (CMAs). Two Army Security Agency (ASA) CMAs, the 8 Radio Research Field Station (RRFS) at Hue Phu-Bai, Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and the 350 Radio Research Company (RRC) at Engineer Hill, Pleiku, RVN, provided essential Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) mission support to this unit. The 1 Radio Battalion which supported the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), the military authority for I Corps, also provided technical assistance.²

Command Interest**Organization**

(U) The Detachment had an integral support element consisting of administration, personnel, supply, airborne equipment maintenance, communications, and security and law enforcement sections (Fig. 1-1).




Figure 1-1, Organizational Structure

(U) The Detachment located at Pleiku Air Base, RVN was subordinate to the Commander, 6994 Security Squadron, Tan Son Nhat Air Base, RVN. The command lines were as depicted in Figure 1-2.




Figure 1-2, Lines of Command

The Detachment provided the radio operators, linguists, and analysts for operational missions while the aircraft were provided by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and operated by the 362 TFS. The Detachment also provided logistical and maintenance support of USAFSS airborne and ground equipment. Limited personnel support was provided by the Detachment Orderly Room while personnel records were maintained at Headquarters, Pacific Security Region (Hq, Pac Secy Rgn), Wheeler AFB, Hawaii. Routine personnel and financial support was provided by the host base Consolidated Base Personnel Office (CBPO).

Change-of-Command

(U) During change-of-command ceremonies conducted 3 July 1969, Captain Brian D. Cornett³ assumed the duties of Commander vice Major Philip D. Carlson. Promoted to Major on 1 November, he continued in command through 31 December.⁴

(U) With the emergency reassignment in August of MSgt Rufus E Blair, First Sergeant duties were temporarily assumed by MSgt Gerald D Patterson, who continued in this position until his rotation in September. MSgt John R. Hertridge replaced Sergeant Patterson, serving as First Sergeant through 31 December.


(U) Other key personnel at the beginning and end of this historical period are reflected in Fig. 1-3.

1 July 1969		31 December 1969
Maj Philip D Carlson	Commander	Maj Brian D Cornett
Capt Kenton E Lammers	Operations Officer	Capt Kenton E Lammers
Capt Thomas G Wallace	Material Officer	Capt Thomas G Wallace
MSgt Rufus E Blair	First Sergeant	MSgt John R Hertridge
MSgt Alfred E Joers	NGOIC, Communications	MSgt Alfred E Joers
TSgt Joseph H Arcovitch	NGOIC, Administration	SSgt Floyd Daskins, Jr
MSgt Rufus E Blair	NGOIC, Personnel	SSgt Peter G Mayo
SSgt Douglas H Laurin	NGOIC, Security & Law Enforcement	SSgt Jackie C Vallion

Figure 1-3, Key Personnel Roster

IG Team Visit

A thorough inspection was conducted of the Detachment operations, support, and administrative functions 6 through 10 September by the USAFES Command Inspector General (IG) Team.⁴ The overall management effectiveness of the unit was rated satisfactory while the management and accomplishment of the primary mission by the local Operations Branch was deemed outstanding. Plans, Administration, Office Management, and




Security Police functions were considered below desired standards. The Commander had recognized the need for improvement in these areas, and established a management system which included priorities for correcting deficiencies.

(U) Relationship with the 362 TMS was excellent. Detachment personnel played an active role in planning for missions, scheduling of missions, and pre-mission briefings. Personnel were found to be motivated towards mission accomplishment. This motivation was evident in the high in-place extension rate enjoyed by the Detachment.

(U) Excellent progress had been made in general housekeeping within the Detachment offices since the last IG inspection in July 1968. Airmen dormitories were crowded to the point of making good housekeeping within the Bachelor Airman's Quarters (BAQ) all but impossible. Considerable attention by the Commander was given to living conditions within the unit dormitories and a program of progressively increasing standards was instituted. The senior NCO quarters were considered outstanding. Morale in the unit was high and personal appearance in spite of meager facilities was excellent.

Top Three Program

(U) Detachment reenlistment figures during the July - December 1969 period pointed out the need for an effective "Top Three" program.⁵ The unit's top three committee, consisting of Detachment senior NCOs, set about increasing the rather poor (4 percent) reenlistment rate of first term airmen by developing programs aimed at presenting the attractiveness of an Air Force career.



WAPS

(U) Weighted Airman Promotion System (WAPS) testing was initiated at this unit in November.⁶ Maximum participation of personnel in Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) 702 and 202 was realized as all eligible personnel were afforded the opportunity to compete. Testing of personnel in AFSC 292 was delayed due to lack of adequate base testing facilities.⁷

BAQ

(U) Increasingly crowded conditions in the BAQ caused by a large influx of new personnel resulted in the transfer to the Detachment of the lower floor of Building 222 on 15 December.⁸ This brought the total barracks authorization to three full buildings consisting of Buildings 220, 222, and 229; housing 178 personnel in grades E5 and below, all within close proximity.

Personnel and Administration

CEPO Relocation

(U) With the relocation of CEPO functions at Wheeler AFB, Hawaii, the responsibility and control of airman records was transferred from 6922 Security Wing, Clark AFB, Philippines to Hq Pac Scty Rgn on 1 July.⁹ Concurrent with this relocation, the CEPO converted to the Phase II Base Level Military Personnel System (BLMPS). Revised Detachment reporting instructions required up-to-date personnel status and other reports to be prepared in accordance with USAFSSM 35-1.

APR

(U) With the implementation of strict quality control procedures and a more realistic suspense system, Airman Performance Report (APR) discrepancies

were reduced to the absolute minimum.¹⁰ These measures considerably enhanced AFR quality and timeliness ratings of the Detachment, and contributed significantly to the decreased error rate enjoyed by the 6994 Security Squadron throughout this period.

Statistics

(U) Pertinent personnel statistics include the following. There were nine in-place extensions and 42 consecutive overseas tours approved; 481 military pay orders and 125 travel vouchers processed, and one Article 15 administered resulting in a suspended demotion and forfeiture of two months pay. The average turnover rate of personnel was 27 per month.¹¹

Footnotes

Chapter I

1. Hist., ODR, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69
2. Ibid.
3. For a biographical sketch of Maj Cornett, see attachment 1.
4. Hist., ODR, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69. IG Team consisted of Lt Col Kevin C Mulleney, Maj Cecil B Fulford, Maj Joseph W Riley, Capt Charles J Henicke, and Capt Elmer N Shropshire.
5. Ibid.
6. Msg, USAFSS, FMP 181701Z Aug 69 as quoted in msg, 6994 Soty Sq, 210840Z Aug 69 (Dec 1) and subsequent msg, 6994 Soty Sq, 211500Z Aug 69 (Dec 2).
7. This situation was rectified with the construction of a modular facility, and WAPS testing was completed in January 1970.
8. Hist., FSGT, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
9. Hist., PER/ADM, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.



CHAPTER II

Operations

Encapsulating all facets of mission accomplishment, the Operations branch was the focal point of the Detachment. Tasked with many myriad functions pertinent to organizational objectives (Fig. 2-1), the Operations elements directed, coordinated, and controlled aircraft, personnel, and mission equipment resources to maximize mission achievements.¹




Figure 2-1, Operations Systems

Organization

(U) Significant alteration of the Operations organizational structure occurred when the linguist section and the combined offices of scheduling and awards and decorations were incorporated into Airborne Operations on 25 October (Fig. 2-2). This realignment allowed greater flexibility within the flight scheduling function resulting in a more efficient utilization



of manpower resources while reducing last-minute schedule changes. In addition, scheduling and awards and decorations were moved from their location in H-1 van number one into the main Operations building. This move allowed more space in van one to accommodate voice transcription equipment.²




Figure 2-2, Operations Organizational Structure

1 July 1969		31 December 1969
Capt Kenton E Lammers	Operations Officer	Capt Kenton E Lammers
SMS Kenneth J Seals	NCOIC, Operations	SMS Kenneth J Seals
MSGT Gerald D Patterson	NCOIC, Airborne Operations	MSGT Joseph J Garrity
MSGT Donald H Ritter	NCOIC, Analysis	MSGT Donald H Ritter
TSgt James A McCoy	NCOIC, Training	TSgt William H Clark
SSgt Duane V Larkin	NCOIC, Plans	TSgt James A McCoy
SSgt Philip L Ehrhorn	NCOIC, Stand/Eval	SSgt Raymond E Cook
SSgt Donald R Davis	NCOIC, Operations Admin	SSgt Donald R Davis
SSgt Clayton C Cooper	NCOIC Mission Management	SSgt David A Highlands

Figure 2-3, Operations Key Personnel Roster



Scope of Operations

Airborne Operations

(U) The Airborne Operations Office consisted of the three operational flights and the scheduling, awards and decorations, and linguist functions. The office provided manning for all operational missions on a regularly scheduled basis and performed details necessary to support flying personnel; e.g., crew-van driver and duty flight commander and NCO.³

(U) Flight Commanders were responsible for scheduling crewmembers and conducting on-the-job training (OJT) of student operators through selected Instructor Radio Operators (IROs). The flight schedules were submitted to scheduling personnel who coordinated them with schedules from other Operations sections manned by flying personnel performing additional ground duties and then published the weekly flight schedule. Flight Commanders also monitored the in-station evaluations and took corrective actions in areas of substandard performance.

Mission Management

(U) Mission Management personnel provided Detachment representation at 362 TEWS and 633 Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (CAMS) weekly scheduling.⁴ These meetings determined aircraft scheduling requirements and were conducted to ensure optimal resource utilization. Because of the established professional reputation enjoyed by the Mission Management personnel, senior field grade officers sought and implemented their recommendations, resolving problems arising from schedule and aircraft changes.

 The section served as the focal point for mission and aircraft



related correspondence with the AOC at Tan Son Nhut, and higher-level echelons within the Command.⁵ A comparatively new program, the ARDF effort was faced with a lack of precedent in many areas of operations. As a result it fell to the Detachment to resolve numerous, challenging problems through coordination with AOC and the 6994 Security Squadron. This often required informal discussions via operations communications (Ops Comm) circuits and quick, sound decisions. In each situation pertinent data and background material provided by Mission Management personnel served as a basis for decision making and procedure implementation.

Analysis

Tasked with the immediate identification and reporting of ARDF target data intercepted by Combat Cougar aircraft, the Analysis Section conducted an intensive briefing program geared to thoroughly familiarizing aircrewmembers with mission objectives.⁶ Analysis personnel provided comprehensive briefings to Detachment operators as well as sanitized briefings to aircraft commanders and navigators. Effectively utilizing current charts, maps, and collateral intelligence, analysts were able to recommend platform positioning within the target area to best accomplish the desired mission objectives.

Supplying feedback data compiled from various intelligence sources, the section conducted an effective incentive program by recognizing outstanding crew accomplishments. Through this program operators were made aware of the tangible results of their efforts and became cognizant of their important role in the war effort.

Thus motivated, they continually achieved outstanding qualitative and quantitative results, contributing to the high degree of success enjoyed by the Detachment.

Standardization and Evaluation

(U) The Standardization and Evaluation (Stand/Eval) Section conducted comprehensive ground training for all newly assigned radio operators and provided initial, semi-annual, and no-notice check flights in accordance with USAFSSM 55-7 and USAFSSR 60-1 to ensure continued operator proficiency and correct adherence to operating procedures.⁷ Monitoring the efforts of the IROs, the section provided them with training aids and technical assistance. In addition, Stand/Eval Flight Examiners (SEFEs) maintained comprehensive Crew Information Letter (CIL) files designed to give wide dissemination of procedural changes to all operators.

(U) Among the many routine administrative duties attended to by Detachment SEFEs were those pertaining to preparation of monthly reports concerning the number of assigned personnel by AFSC and those failing to meet minimum proficiency requirements. This summary was forwarded to 6994 Security Squadron for the records of the Squadron SEFE. Central files were also maintained for individual crewmember flight records (AF Forms 846) in the Operations section and mission filmsies and checklists were updated.

Plans and Training

■ The Plans function entailed all aspects of plans management, control and emergency destruction procedures, and emergency action plans.⁸

[REDACTED]

In addition, the office became the focal point for all correspondence concerning the development of a Detachment movement plan to be implemented upon deactivation of Pleiku Air Base.

(U) The Operations Training office served the vital function of supervising the Detachment's up-grade training (UGT) programs in all AFSCs.⁹ Among the many myriad tasks associated with this responsibility was the briefing of personnel on the use of the Consolidated Operational Career Development Course (COODC), maintenance of all training records, and administration of Progress Review Exercises and End of Course examinations. In addition, training personnel monitored requests for classifications actions resulting from training, established procedures for conducting the training programs, and ensuring the supply of required training materials.

Airborne Operations

NKP Deployment

[REDACTED] In addition to conducting operations locally, the Detachment provided personnel for operational support to Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thailand Air Force Base (RTAFB), Nakhon Phanom (NKP), Thailand.¹⁰ Further personnel commitments to the airborne effort staged from NKP were made as a result of emergency ARDF requirements received from 509 Radio Research Group (ACG) on 1 July 1969, requesting one Combat Cougar aircraft with appropriate crew be deployed for a two-week period beginning 2 July to Udorn RTAFB, Thailand.¹¹ Subsequent instructions contained in a message transmitted at FLASH precedence directed the emergency deployment to NKP instead of Udorn.¹²

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Upon receipt of followup instructions, this unit immediately requested TDY orders and instructed an airborne Combat Cougar configured aircraft (tail number 43-48158) to recover at NKP following completion of its mission to fulfill the emergency requirements. The crew of this aircraft was not prepared for a prolonged TDY at NKP, and crewmembers were replaced on 2 July by a specially selected crew deployed for the two-week period.¹³ This crew augmented Detachment personnel already TDY at NKP since April 1969.

[REDACTED] On 6 July, three 292X1 personnel were released to Detachment 3 to relieve TDY personnel who had been at NKP since 10 April.¹⁴ This procedure continued on a 30 day rotational basis until 23 September except for one man who remained at NKP until 15 November.

[REDACTED] This Detachment submitted a modification to the NKP manning and deployment concept on 23 July¹⁵ with a follow-up on 11 August.¹⁶ This unit recommended that missions flown in the 901B area be staged from Pleiku every other day instead of every day. Under these proposals aircraft would remain overnight at NKP and fly the same mission on alternate days. This would enable the unit to obtain an additional hour of target time while reducing expenses by eliminating the necessity of deploying personnel TDY for 30 day periods. The 6994 Security Squadron informed the Detachment that this suggestion was being held in abeyance pending resolution with 7AF of aircraft maintenance support facilities and parking space problems at NKP.¹⁷

[REDACTED] The practice of remaining overnight (RON) at NKP on

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

alternate days was initiated on a regular basis on 5 October, and 30 day deployments of TDY personnel from this unit were terminated on 15 November.¹⁸ This policy remained in effect through 31 December and has been successful in maintaining excellent mission continuity.

Aircraft Incidents

(U) Aircraft 43-48959 (tail number) sustained major structural damage when it crashed on takeoff at Hue Phu-Bai Air Base, RVN on 30 September 1969.¹⁹


[REDACTED] Aircraft 43-48959 made a scheduled operational (OP) stop at Hue Phu-Bai after successful completion of mission 902AA. After refueling, the aircrew conducted normal pre-flight briefings and checks before starting engines. After a normal engine start, the aircraft was taxied to the engine run-up area for runway 27 where run-up and before takeoff checklists were completed. The aircraft tactical callsign was CAP 54.

[REDACTED] When CAP 54 was cleared to take the active the pilot taxied onto the runway and held. The lineup checklist was completed on the active runway. After a wait of approximately 30 seconds to a minute the tower cleared CAP 54 for takeoff (time 1507:30H) without traffic advisories.


[REDACTED] Just prior to the time CAP 54 started its takeoff roll, BLACK CAT 27, a UH-1 Army helicopter, was approaching the departure end of runway 27 on a course north of the runway and parallel to it. Prior to reaching a point abeam the EC-47, BLACK CAT 27 was cleared to land (time 1507:15H). He continued the approach, passing abeam of the EC-47 at an altitude of approximately 75 feet, descending to hovering


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
[REDACTED]




position on DELTA taxiway. Estimated lateral separation of the two aircraft was less than 150 feet.

 CAP 54 was cleared for takeoff (time 1507:30H). Aircraft control and acceleration was normal. Shortly after the 60 knot check, the pilot noted the helicopter (BLACK CAP 27) ahead and to the right, paralleling his course. At this point the aircraft started to turn to the right, and the pilot put in a correction to the left. The helicopter was noticed in a low hover to the right of the aircraft and turning to the right. After the initial correction to the left the aircraft veered sharply to the left with the left wing down.

 At the time CAP 54 was experiencing these directional control difficulties the helicopter was upwind and abeam the BU-47. Operating from this position, the helicopter created a severe hazard especially since a ten knot crosswind was moving the helicopter rotor wash across the active runway.

 Before CAP 54 could be leveled, the aircraft had proceeded off the narrow 72 foot runway and onto the asphalt runway base (30 feet wide) that adjoins and parallels the runway. The left wing struck the 2000 foot marker, damaging the wing and aileron control surface. The pilot, applying extreme pressure on the aileron control and left rudder, was able to bring the aircraft to an approximate wings level position but not before the right wing tip struck the ground. The aircraft was no longer flying at this point, and the retracting left wheel allowed the left wing to settle and caused the left prop to



[REDACTED]

separate from the engine. The left wing tip then contacted the sod adjacent to the asphalt runway base and the aircraft pivoted counter-clockwise about the wing tip, shearing the right landing gear. It then slid to a stop near taxiway number two, left of the runway. The right fuel tanks ruptured and the escaping fuel ignited as the aircraft came to rest.

(U) When the aircraft came to a stop and the crew realized that the aircraft was burning, the pilot pulled the mixture controls to idle cut-off and called for the immediate evacuation of the aircraft. One of the radio operators opened the main cargo door and all crewmembers evacuated the aircraft through this primary exit, following emergency procedures.

(U) Crewmembers sustained no major injuries.²⁰ The navigator had a slight contusion of the thigh believed to have been caused by striking the driftmeter during evacuation, and one radio operator suffered a superficial nose laceration.

[REDACTED] The 8 RRFS provided cleared personnel to guard the aircraft wreckage until the Detachment Commander and accompanying maintenance personnel arrived at Hue Phu-Bai to inspect the wreckage and effect removal of USAFSS mission equipment.²¹ After arrival of this party at Hue Phu-Bai on 2 October and subsequent accident investigation, the mission equipment was removed and returned to Pleiku Air Base, with the exception of the collection consoles.²²

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The 362 TEWS crewmembers of CAP 54 consisted of Lt Col John F. Vizzini, aircraft commander; 1st Lt Howard W. Hamilton, pilot; TSgt Thomas J. Berridge, flight mechanic; and Maj Ronald V. Villafraanco, navigator. Detachment personnel consisted of SSgt Curtis G. Simonson, Senior Radio Operator; Sgt Robert B. Batson, linguist; and Sgt Billy C. Robbins and Sgt Wayne E. Rostad, radio operators.

[REDACTED] Aircraft (tail numbers) 43-48402 and 43-30730 received minor shrapnel damage on 2 September when an enemy rocket exploded on impact in the ramp area.²³ Damage to aircraft 48402 consisted of a small hole in the airframe. A UHF antenna on aircraft 30730 was severed. Repairs to both aircraft were completed and no loss of mission capability was realized due to the complete cancellation of all missions that day because of severe weather warnings.

OP Stops

[REDACTED] Prior to the crash of CAP 54 on 30 September, mission aircraft made daily OP stops at Hue Phu-Bai to deliver tapes and traffic collected from mission area nine to the 8 RRFS. Runway conditions, helicopter traffic, and constant crosswinds had been a continuous source of complaints from crewmembers of both 362 TEWS and the Detachment.

[REDACTED] After the events of 30 September, OP stops were rescheduled to be made at DaNang Air Base. Collection results were released to the 138 Aviation Company for courier handling to the 8 RRFS. On 26 October, MACV J2 tasked NSA Representative, Vietnam (NRV) [REDACTED] with determining the necessity of continuing OP stops at DaNang by assessing

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

alternate procedures that could be utilized to meet MACV reporting requirements. NRV [REDACTED] recommended a test of electrical reporting of intelligence from the Detachment to 8 ERFS be conducted over a period of six weeks.²⁴

[REDACTED] Beginning 22 November, the Detachment implemented electrical forwarding of voice intercept obtained on missions flown in SEA area nine eliminating OP stops for this area completely. Tapes were transcribed by Detachment linguists to obtain digital traffic for immediate forwarding. The tapes were then sent by courier to 330 RRC for further transcription by native Vietnamese (DANCER) translators. The test continued throughout the remainder of the period. NRV [REDACTED] then called a conference of all test participants to be held in Saigon 9 and 10 January 1970.²⁵

Water Boy

[REDACTED] As a result of severe flood damage caused by a seasonal typhoon, the ground controlled intercept (GCI) facility at Dong Ha (Water Boy) ceased operations on 16 September. Directly affected were missions launched to areas 902A and 999; the latter frag line 12 miles east of the North Vietnamese coast between Tiger Island to the south and Dong Hoi to the north.²⁶ The nearest comparable facility was Panama at DaNang RVN; however, this facility could not provide radar control for aircraft not equipped with IFF/SIF transponders, nor could continuous radar coverage be provided for the northwest extremities of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) areas where positive radar control was a prerequisite.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Because of reduced safety factors in area 902A resulting from the loss of Water Boy, mission aircraft were limited to flying only the eastern half of the frag line. Due to the surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats which required positive radar control of all mission aircraft in area 999, that area was deleted from coverage pending resumed radar operations.

[REDACTED] Further mission restrictions were imposed on 20 October when the lack of positive radar control prevented coverage of areas 909M and 909L. As a result, the Detachment initiated recommendations to cancel these missions and that they be scheduled elsewhere.²⁷

[REDACTED] During the period of this history, no action to rebuild or resume ground controlled intercept facilities at Dong Ha was initiated. Missions to area 999 were no longer launched, and the area was eventually deleted permanently from tasking. Area 902A, which had been reduced in size 50 percent to allow coverage of the eastern portion of the original frag line, was reestablished 1 December when "PAMPER", a new ground controlled intercept facility at Quang Tri became operational.²⁸

[REDACTED] No major adverse effects on mission accomplishment were felt by deletion of mission area 999. Traditionally an area of little ARDF results due to the mandatory standoff range from the North Vietnamese coast, the platform was more productive in terms of collection. Cancellation of these sorties released aircraft resources for more effective utilization in other more productive mission areas.

Revised Flying Time Criteria

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In order to establish more realistic flying time requirements for the EC-47 N/P aircraft, missions where these aircraft were to be utilized were fringed for five hours total flying time instead of seven, effective 20 September.²⁹ This action eliminated the necessity for the EC-47 N/P aircraft to make refueling stops at various bases often at the expense of interrupted target time. As a result, the number of reduced missions due to lack of sufficient fuel decreased significantly, as did the number of sorties per mission caused by added stops for fuel.

[REDACTED] Optimal aircraft utilization was realized by scheduling the more powerful EC-47Q aircraft to those areas where longer periods of coverage were desired. By careful planning and coordination, mission effectiveness was enhanced by the revised criteria with no appreciable loss in accomplished target time.


Flight Scheduling

(U) A highly flexible function, the flight scheduling section was responsible for crewmember resource utilization. Compiling personnel input from three operational flights, the section prepared crew schedules to meet weekly tasking requirements. Because of the many dynamic variables affecting scheduling, the section was organized to facilitate frequent, last-minute tasking and personnel changes. In addition, the section provided centrally located schedules in the BAQ area for the convenience of crewmembers.


[REDACTED] Among the many problems encountered by the section was the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]




necessity of scheduling instructors and students together and Standardization and Evaluation check flights. Problems posed by unscheduled overnight recoveries at other bases and crew rest requirements were somewhat alleviated by changes in the length of fragged target time to provide more realistic flying hours for the EC-47 N/P aircraft³⁰ and implementation of the policy not to task more than seventy-five percent of the available, operational aircraft fleet per day.

 During this period 1936 sorties were scheduled for an average of 78.5 sorties per week.³¹ It is noteworthy that regardless of the problems mentioned above, crew manning requirements were met by flight scheduling in every instance.

Awards and Decorations

(U) Procedural changes were implemented within the Awards and Decorations section with the adoption of the WAPS to ensure prompt credit for Air Medal awardees.³² Previous procedure delayed recommendations for Air Medals and appropriate clusters until tour completion. With WAPS points assigned to the Air Medal it became imperative that recommendations be submitted upon meeting of the criteria for each award. This policy was initiated and copies of all special orders and citations were forwarded to CBPO, Pacific Security Region upon receipt.

(U) Statistics depicting submission, approval/disapproval, and awards pending of decorations are outlined in Figures 2-4.



Award	Submitted	Approved	Disapproved	Pending
Bronze Star Medal	7	2	0	5
Air Medal	331	205	0	126
AF Commendation Medal	31	12	2	17
Distinguished Flying Cross	33	0	0	33

Figure 2-4, Status of Awards

The fact that no action was taken on the Detachment's 33 recommendations for the awarding of the end-of-tour Distinguished Flying Cross was attributed to the lack of determining criteria established by 7AF review boards.

Linguist Branch

The period from 1 July to 31 December proved to be one of numerous changes for the linguist section.³³ Constantly plagued with manpower problems, the section not only managed to continue normal operations, but assumed increasing responsibilities due primarily to the discontinuance of OP stops in SEA area nine. The changes resulted in a considerable increase in the timeliness of reporting exploitable traffic.

During July the section relied on 203X1 MB linguists TDY from 6990 Security Squadron to alleviate a serious manpower shortage. These operators performed exceptionally well in view of their lack of training, but were unable to provide accurate handcopy to aid in the timely analysis of traffic. On 23 July the first of 8 20331 MBX linguists arrived from the 6990 Security Squadron. These linguists had attended a seven week course in basic Vietnamese, and were able to provide sufficient handcopy to enable analysts to readily identify

[REDACTED]

exploitable traffic. These linguists did much to aid the section in the accomplishment of its mission.

[REDACTED] In early August the squadron was tasked with the reporting of intelligence by means of the Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS). Although none of the voice operators had previous experience in preparing this report, the section was able to undertake necessary action with little difficulty.

[REDACTED] On 3 and 4 October, a General Directorate of Rear Services (GDRS) seminar was held in Saigon,³⁴ and was attended by one of this Detachment's most experienced linguists. The information provided by the conference gave the individual operators a clearer concept of action taken on voice collection. As a result, each operator became more aware of what type of traffic was most exploitable and more concentrated effort was made to obtain this traffic.

(CHVCCO) In the first part of October the section was informed that Detachment 1, 6994 Security Squadron had received the first of eight 203X1 MD personnel and that they had no experienced personnel or equipment available to conduct training. The student linguist were sent TDY to this unit for training purposes and to perform operational tasks. They were trained in an absolute minimum of time, filling the slots left vacant by the return of the MBX linguists to the 6990 Security Squadron.³⁵

[REDACTED] In early November the section was informed of a six week test in the transcription of exploitable messages. Because of the loss of

[REDACTED]

aircraft 43-48959 at Hue Phu-Bai, OP stops were no longer being made in SEA area nine. It was determined that the linguists at this unit would fully transcribe digital traffic, sending the results electrically in Exploitable Message Report (EMR) format to 8 RHFS.³⁶ Linguists would attempt to identify the traffic prior to transmitting it. Upon receipt of the EMR, 8 RHFS would analyze the traffic and send an EMR to DIRNSA. The test was initiated during a period of a large turnover of 203X1 personnel. Most of the new operators were forced to make the transition into the program while learning the basics of the job. In spite of the training problems and a lack of adequate transcription facilities, the section was able to perform all the requirements of the new procedure. During the test only four percent of these message had failed to meet MACV requirements, compared with 42.9 percent previously.³⁷

Mission Management

(U) Numerous changes involving both reporting criteria and administrative procedure occurred during this period within the Operations Mission Management Section.³⁸ For the first time, a comprehensive Job Continuity Folder was published, making available working aids and containing detailed instructions including job descriptions designed to enable a smooth turnover of section personnel with no loss of reporting quality.

■ A complete revamping of the section filing system was accomplished, reducing the amount of classified material to that sufficient to section needs. The Manual of United States SIGINT Operations

(MUSSO) library was reviewed and reorganized, with the elimination of all classified documents not pertinent to local operations requirements.

(U) Charts depicting mission status and recurring reports were reaccomplished. Job proficiency guides were developed and incorporated into the training records of all section personnel. Stressing areas of planning, coordination, and control, these guides contributed to increased proficiency and general knowledge of section personnel.³⁹

In-Station Evaluations

(U) With the initiation of the Operations In-Station Evaluation program on 26 July 1969,⁴⁰ the Mission Management office was transformed from strictly a reporting function into an integral part of the planning process. Time required to conduct statistical research was greatly reduced as productivity figures and mission effectiveness ratings were compiled on a daily basis and published in consolidated reports. These evaluations became effective management tools providing accurate data in easily understood format, allowing the forwarding within hours of precise statistical summaries of specific areas upon request from higher echelons, and enabling operations supervisory personnel to immediately determine and eliminate potential weak areas. They became the basis for initiation of tasking changes to further enhance mission effectiveness.

(U) With the incorporation of a quality control evaluation on 27 September 1969,⁴¹ and publication of a compilation of statistics from four tasking weeks, flight effectiveness ratings were given wide dissemination,

reaching all levels of supervision. With data provided him by Mission Management in these evaluations, the Flight Commander's awareness of performance standards enabled him to initiate timely action to correct areas of substandard performance. Before publication of the evaluations, action could only be taken considerably after the fact. These compilations also provided productivity norms as a basis for measuring trends and bringing to light significant deviations.

DURMIS

(U) Significant format changes were incorporated into the Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS) on 25 October 1969 with the implementation of USAFSSM 200-4, Vol XV.⁴² Transition from the previous format to the new encountered minor difficulties, but eventually the new method proved to be less cumbersome and considerably easier to use as a management tool.

Under the new directive, major DURMIS reporting sections were separated from each other. Combining of the VHF collection performance data into the same reporting section as the HF collection reduced the time spent to extract data as much as twenty-five percent. Standardization of abbreviations and definition of terms eliminated previous areas of confusion. Expansion of the remarks section provided a means of reporting areas related to but not directly connected with all facets of Detachment operations.

SEATS statistics were included in the DURMIS on 6 September.⁴³ SEATS provided a means of reporting the identification rate of target

intercept.

Reporting of post mission test (PMT) results were discontinued.⁴⁴

These reports gave results of calibration tests when DF equipment was launched against a transmitter whose coordinates were known.

(SHVCCO) Reporting of targets with a fix radius of zero to 500 meters and 500 to 1000 meters was incorporated in the remarks section on 25 December,⁴⁵ elaborating on the entry depicting fixes of zero to 1000 meters already required.

(U) With the adoption of stringent quality control measures within the section, DURMIS errors were reduced to the absolute minimum. Close coordination with the Detachment Communications Center contributed further to the elimination of format errors.

Position Status Reports


The Electronic Warfare Position Status Report (EWPSR) format was revised with the implementation of Techins 1056, Annex F on 8 September 1969.⁴⁶ This change incorporated machine format reporting into the EWPSR.

A total of 373 EWPSRs were issued by this unit during 1969; 210 during the period 1 July through 31 December.⁴⁷


AVN Report


The Aviation (AVN) Unit Daily ARDF Status Report underwent minor format changes on 22 December.⁴⁸ This report was used by ACC as a basis for determining sortie capability for scheduling purposes. In addition, it provided ARDF results for each mission area flown for each day.


TECH Wecaps

 This Detachment initiated Technical Weekly Recapitulation (TECH Wecap) reporting on 25 December.⁴⁹ TECH Wecaps provide for reporting of additions, changes, and deletions to Techins 1043, Annexes D and H.

Commando Forge Operations/Exploitation Summary

 On 19 December, the Mission Management Section compiled and transmitted the Detachment's first Commando Forge Operations/Exploitation Summary concerning mission performance in the Steel Tiger (Laos; from northwest of the DMZ (Area 912A) to the Cambodia/South Vietnam tri-border area). The report replaced the AFSSO NKP Commando Forge Daily Activity Report, and provided 6994 Security Squadron with information for forwarding to 7AF concerning ARDF operations in Laos.⁵⁰



Aircraft

Aircraft Assigned 1 July			Aircraft Assigned 31 December		
Aircraft	Type	Equipment	Aircraft	Type	Equipment
43-39771	EC47Q	ALR-38/Z1,Z1	43-39771	EC47Q	ALR-38/Z1,Z1
43-49208	EC47Q	ALR-38/Z1,Z1	43-49208	EC47Q	ALR-38/Z1,Z1
43-30730	EC47Q	ALR-38/Z1,Z1	43-30730	EC47Q	ALR-38/Z1,Z1
43-16029	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1	43-16029	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
43-49570	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1	43-49570	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
43-48959	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1	43-51131	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
43-51131	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1	42-93704	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
42-93704	EC47Q	ALR-35/Z1,Z1	45-00937	EC47NP	ALR-35
45-00937	EC47NP	ALR-35	43-48072	EC47NP	ALR-35
43-48072	EC47NP	ALR-35	43-23882	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
43-23882	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z1	44-77254	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z2
43-49013	EC47NP	ALR-34	43-48402	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z2
43-48158	EC47NP	ALR-34	43-48702	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
44-77254	EC47NP	ALR-34	-15133	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
43-48402	EC47NP	ALR-34/Z1,Z1	-24313	EC47NP	ALR-35/Z1,Z1
43-49703	EC47NP	ALR-34/Z1,Z2	43-49491	EC47NP	ALR-35
43-15979	EC47NP	ALR-34/Z1,Z2			
42-00665	EC47NP	ALR-34/Z1,Z2			
43-48702	EC47NP	ALR-34			

Figure 2-5, Aircraft Status

The total number of ARDR mission aircraft assigned to the 362 TEWS decreased from 19 on 1 July to 16 on 31 December (Fig 2-5).⁵¹ Numerous reconfigurations were undertaken resulting from periodic aircraft TDYs to Taiwan for inspection and repair as needed (IRAN) and to Kadana Air Base, Okinawa for corrosion control. These reconfigurations involved downloading of collection consoles (Z1 and Z2 positions) from aircraft departing TDY and subsequent uploading in operational aircraft having only DF and target acquisition (X and Y positions) capability.

Aircraft 00665 departed to Tan Son Nhut for modification to the ALR-35 system. It was then reassigned permanently to 360 TEWS. Aircraft 77254 was modified to the ALR-35 system at Tan Son Nhut 31 July through 8 August. Aircraft 48158 was reassigned permanently to 361 TEWS on 14 August. Aircraft 48702 was modified to the ALR-35 system at Tan Son Nhut 19 August through 10 September.

Aircraft 15133 was reassigned to this station permanently from the 361 TEWS on 21 August. Aircraft 49013 was reassigned PCS to the 361 TEWS on 23 August. Aircraft 24313 arrived PCS from the 360 TEWS on 3 September. Aircraft 15979 departed PCS to the 360 TEWS on 10 September. Aircraft 48959 crashed and burned on takeoff at Hue Phu-Bai on 30 September. On 2 October the aircraft was determined to be a total loss and was released for salvage.


(U) On 8 October all 362 TEWS aircraft began fuel cell modification on a rotational basis at Tan Son Nhut. This involved the installation of a highly absorbent, cellular foam designed to permit slow

burning of fuel in event of fuel tank rupture by tracer ammunition thereby lessening considerably the chances of losing a wing to fuel explosion. Aircraft were still undergoing modification through 31 December.

(U) An interesting study is the chronological events of aircraft 16029 which departed for corrosion control at Okinawa on 8 July. The aircraft finished corrosion control and departed Kadana on 13 August. It recovered at Taiwan where it was grounded while awaiting a fuel pump replacement. After replacement of the fuel pump, it departed Taiwan for Clark AFB, Philippines where it developed engine problems. It departed Clark AFB on 5 September for Pleiku, but was diverted to Phu Cat AB, Republic of Vietnam due to weather. It finally arrived at Pleiku on 6 September, underwent acceptance inspection, and was found to be internally corroded. The aircraft was then ferried to Tan Son Nhut for corrosion control on 15 September, returning to Pleiku on 8 October. This made a total of three months that this aircraft was not available for mission tasking due to corrosion control and assorted maintenance difficulties.

Mission Accomplishment

Criteria for determining whether a mission was accomplished, unaccomplished, or reduced varied among operational units and report consumers.⁵² MACV, 7AF, ACC, 460 Tactical Recon Wing (TRW) and the 362 TEWS all operated under the seven/five hour total flying time concept; i.e., if a mission launched and flew a total of seven/five





hours (based on engine model and configuration) it was an accomplished mission. USAFSS criteria, reflected in DURMIS reporting, was based on accomplishment of the full fragged target time as established in the weekly tasking schedule published by ACC.

Reduced missions were reported to Command echelons in the DURMIS when the mission failed to accomplish its full fragged target time. They were reported to ACC in the AVN Status Report when they did not complete seven/five hours total flying time. Among other problems, the varying criteria was a source of numerous conflicts between the Detachment and the 362 TEWS on proper procedures for executing mission diversions.

Adverse weather conditions during the monsoon season often prohibited successful accomplishment of scheduled missions in many areas. When a particular area was "weathered in", the aircraft could not fly its fragged mission. Normal procedure required Detachment crewmembers to contact the Direct Support Units (DSUs) for diversion instructions, however it was not unusual to find the entire northern section of South Vietnam weathered in to such an extent that the aircraft could not effectively fly any desired mission area. Further, in those instances when one area was clear, there was often a congestion of various Army and Air Force platforms within the area, providing both duplication of effort and increasing safety hazards.

In instances when no area could be flown, and no diversion instructions were available, there still remained the 362 TEWS requirement for seven/five hours of flying time to forego logging an






unaccomplished mission. The Detachment held that in instances when no effectiveness could be realized on a mission due to adverse weather, the mission should return to base.

Lack of standard abort criteria also resulted in the continuation of missions with no DF and/or collection capability. Numerous occasions arose when the mission equipment was turned off because of electrical (generator, inverter) problems, yet the aircraft remained airborne. When certain of the mission equipment became inoperable, questions arose as to the desirability of continuing on or returning to base for repairs; thereby sacrificing fragged target times. Determining criteria in these instances was drawn up to reflect the tasking on the fragged schedule; e.g., if the mission was "SPECIAL" (primary collection) and the DF equipment became inoperative after takeoff, the mission would continue. However, if the right side of the aircraft (collection positions) malfunctioned the aircraft would abort for repairs. Conversely, if the mission was primary DF and the X console or doppler became inoperative, the mission would abort.


(U) These situations pointed out the need for joint operating agreements between the "back-end" and flying units. To this end, the Detachment staff representative at the 6994 Security Squadron⁵³ began drafting and coordinating standard operating procedures to be agreed upon and adhered to by both the 6994 Security Squadron and 460 TRW units. These agreements were in the planning stage on 31 December.

Analysis





SEATS


SEATS processing and reporting procedures were implemented on 1 September 1969.⁵⁴ These procedures established that all Viet Cong (VC) voice and morse data would be processed and reported as outlined in TECHINS 2037 and subsequent electrical guidance from DIRNSA. The program had achieved prior success at the 6994 Security Squadron and Detachments 1 and 3, and was instrumental in effecting expanded target identification.



In order to facilitate SEATS processing, working aids obtained from DIRNSA and in-station data base records were revamped to assist in identifying North Vietnamese Army (NVA) target entities. As a result of these efforts, the Detachment achieved an average identification rate of 42 percent during the initial 1 September through 31 December period following SEATS implementation. The outstanding success of the SEATS program throughout the Squadron was cited on 1 August by the Commander, USAFSS.⁵⁵

ARDF Reporting

In an effort to provide 7AF with a target base for B52 "ARC LIGHT" missions and TAC air strikes, this unit was tasked with the timely reporting of ARDF fix data on the NVA base camp area 611. This area was located in Laos, surrounding position UTM Coordinates YC2099.⁵⁶ The reporting period involved Combat Cougar missions during the period 3 through 27 September 1969, and was accomplished immediately upon recovery via OPS COMM to 7AF DIGNA through the 6994 Security Squadron.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The unit's outstanding success in this effort provided 7AF Directorate of Operational Intelligence Warning Analysis (DIOWA) with 299 fixes and 88 cuts on the desired targets. In subsequent correspondence from AFSSO, 7AF, the Detachment was cited for providing fixes that "led to collateral collection efforts south of the original target area" specifically resulting in TAC air strikes against enemy military structures on 10 and 24 September, and B52 bombing missions on 30 September.⁵⁷

Area Redesignation

[REDACTED] J2, MACV deleted MACV area designations on 22 September and redesignated them as SEA areas.⁵⁸ Under the new system, MACV areas 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 became SEA areas 12, 11, 10 (former areas 1 and 2), 9, 8 and 7 respectively. These changes were undertaken to provide a common base among consumers for stating requests for ARDF and airborne collection support.⁵⁹

Communications Change

[REDACTED] A major communications change was reflected 1 October on internal NVN military and naval facilities, and external NVA forces and Laos communications.⁶⁰ This resulted in the declaration by DIRNSA of SIT II-VC,⁶¹ which was subsequently terminated 30 October.⁶² Identification became severely hampered as a result of the change which involved the realignment of callsign bases and books.

EMR

[REDACTED] Due to the increasing importance of EMRs, DIRNSA became

[REDACTED]

action addressee on 15 November.⁶³ Information in previous EMRs was relayed through the appropriate Collection Management Authority (CMA) (8 RRFS and/or 330 RRC) to DIRNSA, resulting in the delay of an average of 20 EMRs intercepted by Detachment Combat Cougar missions daily.

EMRs were prepared and forwarded immediately upon recovery of the aircraft at IMMEDIATE precedence. Detachment 3, 6994 Security Squadron was included as addressee on EMR data intercepted in SEA areas 10, 11 and 12.⁶⁴

Revised TECH Data

Arbitrary Radio Station Designators (Trigraphs) were replaced on 13 December by Reference Designators (RDs) on all technical data placed aboard mission aircraft.⁶⁵ This was accomplished to bring the airborne procedures more in line with tasking requirements by establishing the RDs as a primary means of identifying NVA target entities and to limit tech support material carried on the aircraft to the Category II level.⁶⁶

Conferences

The quarterly ARDF/Collection Conference sponsored by the 330 RRC convened at 0810 on 25 July 1969 at Nha Trang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam.⁶⁷

The quarterly CMA ARDF Conference, sponsored by the 8 RRFS was conducted 15 through 16 September.⁶⁸

Standardization and Evaluation

Accomplishments

(U) The section supervised the successful training of 98 students during the 1 July through 31 December period.⁶⁹ Detachment SEFES

performed 123 Category III and 36 Category IV check flights and administered 27 no-notice examinations. Sixteen operators failed to meet the stringent performance requirements designed to maintain maximum quality and were subsequently retrained and reexamined in accordance with 6994 Security Squadron Regulation 60-3.

(U) Numerous individual achievements were realized by Detachment SEFEs during this period.⁷⁰ Staff Sergeant Philip L. Ehrhorn, NCOIC, Stand/Eval and holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal with 13 clusters, flew his 300th combat mission launched from Fleiku on 4 October 1969. This feat was duplicated on 1 December by Staff Sergeant Fred J. Daring, Assistant NCOIC, Stand/Eval and also holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal with 13 clusters.

SEFE Conference

The 6994 Security Squadron hosted a SEFE conference on 6 October for the purpose of revising checklists and mission flimsies.⁷¹ Attended by representatives from SEFE sections of all Detachments and chaired by the Squadron SEFE, the conference standardized and incorporate into the checklists and test correct emergency procedures in accordance with Tech Orders 1C-47-1 and 1C-47(E) N-1.

Squadron SEFE Visit

(U) The Detachment SEFE section was visited on 8 November by the Squadron SEFE.⁷² At his suggestion, all airborne training course certificates were incorporated into the AF Form 846. All other facets of the local SEFE office were found to be satisfactory,

meeting desired standards of excellence.

Checklists

As a result of the SEFE conference and subsequent visit of the Squadron SEFE, a new checklist and mission flimsy were published on water soluble paper on 5 December 1969.⁷³ The use of this paper provided for complete, emergency destruction of the sensitive material within ten minutes.

Incorporated into the new checklist was a revised list of 25 BRAVO landing codes. This allowed for more specific air-to-ground communications concerning mission equipment outages, and enabled maintenance personnel to meet the returning aircraft sufficiently equipped to more rapidly effect repairs. Turn-around and relaunch time was reduced considerably due to the increased efficiency permitted by these codes, saving considerable target time and enhancing mission effectiveness.

Plans and Training

(U) By virtue of their limited manning strength and physical collocation with each other, the offices of Plans and Training constituted one major section, sharing H1 van number two with the Stand/Eval Section which, because of its scope, remained an individual function.

Movement Plan

(U) In preparation of the imminent deactivation of the 633 Special Operations Wing and relocation of tenant units, the Detachment was

tasked with preparing an annex to the Base Movement Plan.⁷⁴ The annex was designed to organize and define the actions required by this unit to respond quickly and efficiently on short notice to a unit PCS movement. Published on 15 November, the annex enabled the Detachment to maintain constant readiness capability to execute emergency and/or orderly redeployment when directed.⁷⁵

Plans Management

(U) A new Plans Management Directive in the form of a Detachment Operating Instruction (DOI) was established on 16 November.⁷⁶ Designed to fix responsibilities and outline procedures for maintaining, reviewing, and coordinating Detachment plans, the directive proved an effective management tool used to ensure continuous plan management and training.

Emergency Action Plan

Change One to Emergency Action Plan (EAP) 1-69 was published 20 November to reflect administrative amendments as recommended by Pacific Security Region Post Publication Review dated 19 August.⁷⁷ It established new destruction priorities and destruction time frames for Priority One, Two, and Three material. It also implemented instructions and procedures for using the M-3 incendiary document destroyers.

Control and Emergency Destruction Procedures

In order to provide a basis for devising procedures to effect the control and emergency destruction of classified material

and equipment on hand, a complete inventory of these items was conducted on 2 December.⁷⁸ In compliance with Hq USAFSS instructions,⁷⁹ the inventory accounted for all COMINT and COMINT related documents and equipment by name and the total volume of COMINT and COMINT related documents by cubic feet. Also included was the amount (cubic feet) of COMINT and COMINT related correspondence on hand. The inventory further provided a measurement of all collateral classified material on hand.

Training

UGT

AFSC	5-level	7-level
292X1	1	15
203X1	10	0
202X0	0	1
301X3	1	1
304X4	0	1
732X0	2	0

Figure 2-6, Personnel in UGT

(U) At the end of the 1 July through 31 December period, the Detachment had a total of 32 airmen in UGT (Fig 2-6), and a total of 14 enrolled in the mandatory COCDC program (5-29271; 1-20270; 1-30474; and 7-20351).⁸⁰ Of the 32 airmen in UGT only three were in periods of excessive training. These individuals were placed in remedial training status, and their duty schedules were adjusted to allow maximum time for study.

(U) Plagued with an extremely low (0.3 percent) passing rate in the COCDC, a study was conducted in November to determine the cause of so many failures. It was found that the major contributing factor to the excessive (99.7 percent) failure rate was the lack of recent Progress Review Exercises (PREs). Prior to 15 November the Detachment possessed only the "A" version of the PRE, obtaining the "C" version somewhat belatedly. Since receipt of the "C" version of the PRE, UGT trainees were placed on rigid training schedules in an effort to increase the quality of instruction and the COCDC passing rate.

Proposed Relocation

Speculation concerning the relocation of the Detachment to one of several rumored bases throughout the Republic of Vietnam and Thailand developed when word was received in early November concerning the deactivation of the 4 Special Operations Squadron scheduled for December 1969.⁸¹ The most popular rumors held that the unit would be moved to NKP, while less optimistic guesses ranged from DaNang to Phu Cat, with a few hard-core pessimists firmly convinced that the unit would be going to Hue Phu-Bai.

Following the trend of correspondence concerning the subject, it seemed assured that certain of the aircraft and crewmembers would be sent to DaNang with the remainder following at a later date. The question then became when rather than where. As early as 14 November communications were noted reflecting surveys being conducted of logistical capabilities available at DaNang for

providing support to a six aircraft operating location (OL).⁸²

Taking into consideration all the myriad problems associated with such a move, a conference was called for the purpose of establishing a program action directive (PAD) on 16 November.⁸³ This meeting was attended by the Detachment Commander.⁸⁴

In the meantime, concern for the defensive posture at Fleiku Air Base was becoming paramount.⁸⁵ During a period of gradual, large scale phase down of USAF personnel at the base, this unit was becoming hard pressed to provide personnel for duty as perimeter guards and augmentees. Further, a buildup of enemy troops in the vicinity pointed out the rather precarious position the Detachment was finding itself being drawn into.

Severe shortage of ramp space at DaNang caused by the influx of 100 aircraft scheduled for the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) soon made obvious the fact that any relocation of the Detachment to this base would not be immediate and, in fact, may be delayed until March 1970.⁸⁶ It was equally evident that lack of adequate knowledge of facilities at NKP would not permit consideration of any rapid relocation to Thailand. It was noted during these discussions that the 362 TEWS enlisted personnel required air conditioned quarters at DaNang while enlisted personnel at this unit had no such requirement.⁸⁷ Continuing surveys were conducted to determine requirements necessitated by the pending move.⁸⁸



(6994SS 031950Z Jan 70)(Doc 48). With this information rumors became less frequent and concern about the move less evident. Some question about the defensive situation at Pleiku Air Base remained, however it caused no great anxiety among Detachment personnel.

Footnotes

CHAPTER II

1. Hist., OPS, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
2. Ibid.
3. Hist., OPS-1, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
4. Hist., OPS-2, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
5. Ibid.
6. Hist., OPS-3, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
7. Hist., OPS-4, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
8. Hist., OPS-5, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
9. Ibid.
10. Hist., OPS-1, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
11. Msg, ACC, IAPC/ACC 9182-2488 011117Z Jul 69 (Dec 3).
12. Msg, ACC, IAPC/ACC 9182-2489 011457Z Jul 69 (Dec 4).
13. Msg, Det 2, OPS-2 020927Z Jul 69 (Dec 5).
14. Msg, Det 2, OPS-2 020725Z Jul 69 (Dec 6).
15. Msg, Det 2, OPS 231000Z Jul 69 (Dec 7).
16. Msg, Det 2, OPS 110605Z Aug 69 (Dec 8).
17. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS (TOR) 130040Z Aug 69 (Dec 9).
18. Hist., OPS-1, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
19. Hist., OPS-2, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
20. Interview by author with SSgt Curtis G. Simonsen, Senior Radio Operator, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 15 Oct 69.
21. Msg, Det 2, CDR 010020Z Oct 69 (Dec 10)
22. For a history of the collection consoles, see Chapter IV.

23. ARDF DURMIS, Det 2, OPS-2 020800Z Sep 69 (Doc 11).
24. Msg, NRV [REDACTED], F46-6621 310459Z Oct 69 as referenced in Msg, SSO MACV, MAC 1196 INTEL 260915Z Jan 70 (Doc 12).
25. Msg, NRV [REDACTED], F46-7433 260620Z Dec 69 (Doc 13). Test results showed that electrical forwarding had improved intelligence reporting timeliness by an average of 10 to 12 hours, and tests procedures were implemented permanently.
26. Msg, Det 2, OPS-2 161015Z Sep 69 (Doc 14).
27. Msg, Det 2, OPS 200615Z Sep 69 (Doc 15).
28. Interview by author with Capt Kenton E. Lammers, Operations Officer, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 5 Mar 70.
29. Msg, 460 TRW, DCOCE 161203Z Sep 69 as referenced in Msg, Det 2, OPS 161300Z Sep 69 (Doc 16).
30. Ibid.
31. Hist., OPS-1, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Resume of GDRS Seminar, 3-4 Oct 69, dated 15 Oct 69 (Doc 17). Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq representatives were SSgt Dee J. Bramley, Analysis; and SSgt John D. Price, linguist.
35. Msg, Det 2, OPS 190835Z Nov 69 (Doc 18).
36. Msg, NRV [REDACTED], F46-6621 310459Z Oct 69 as quoted in Msg, 6994 Soty Sq, OPS 010636Z Nov 69 (Doc 19).
37. A conference was held in Saigon on 9 and 10 January 1970 to discuss

[REDACTED]

the impact of the test (NRV [REDACTED] F463 7433 260620Z Dec 69). All representatives at the conference agreed that the test was a success and recommended that the new procedure be continued. The test had resulted in improved timeliness, reduced handling, and valuable feedback for Detachment operators while demonstrating the necessity for closer coordination between collection and processing units (NRV [REDACTED] 131150Z Jan 70). Also during the test tapes had been forwarded to 33ORRC for transcription of the plaintext traffic by Vietnamese translators. This proved highly successful to the extent that tapes were no longer required to be forwarded to 8 RRFS for transcription.

38. Hist., OPS-2, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
 39. Ibid.
 40. Ibid.
 41. Ibid.
 42. Msg, USAFSS, FMA 171855Z Oct 69 (Dec 20).
 43. Hist., OPS-2, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
 44. Hist., MAT, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
 45. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS-2 240321Z Dec 69 (Dec 21).
 46. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS-2 080848Z Sep 69 (Dec 22).
 47. Hist., OPS-2, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
 48. Msg, USM-704, IAPV/ACC 220011Z Dec 69 (Dec 23).
 49. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS-2 090608Z Dec 69 (Dec 24).
 50. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS-2 130900Z Dec 69 (Dec 25).
 51. Hist., OPS-2, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
 52. Ibid.
- [REDACTED]

53. TSgt Kenneth B. Smith.
54. Msg, DIRNSA, B6-222 122122Z Aug 69 as referenced in Msg, USA-561, OPS-2 160855Z Aug 69 (Doc 26).
55. Msg, USAFSS, CCG 012110Z Aug 69 as quoted in Msg, PACSCYRGN, CDR 041930Z Aug 69 (Doc 27).
56. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS-2 010910Z Sep 69 (Doc 28).
57. Msg, AFSSO 7AF, DIOW 030915Z Oct 69 (Doc 29).
58. Msg, MAC 12238, INTEL 190318Z Sep 69 as quoted in Msg, USM-704, IAPVACC 250330Z Sep 69 (Doc 30).
59. Ibid.
60. Hist., OPS-3, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
61. Msg, DIRNSA, B64-3919 012032Z Oct 69 (Doc 31).
62. Msg, DIRNSA, B64-3955 032128Z Oct 69 (Doc 32).
63. Msg, DIRNSA, B65-2618 150043Z Nov 69 (Doc 33).
64. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS 070438Z Nov 69 (Doc 34).
65. Msg, DIRNSA, ADF-654 051910Z Dec 69 as quoted in Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, OPS 060906Z Dec 69 (Doc 35).
66. Ibid.
67. Report of quarterly ARDF/Collection Conference dated 26 July 1969 (Doc 36). Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq representative was MSgt Donald H. Ritter, NCOIC, Analysis.
68. Report on ARDF Conference, 15-16 Sep 69 dated 25 Sep 69 (Doc 37). Det 2, 6994 Security Squadron representatives were MSgt Donald H Ritter, and SSgt Daniel W. Bright, Analysis.
69. Hist., OPS-4, Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.

70. Ibid.
71. Minutes of the SEFE Conference dated 7 Oct 69. Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq representative was SSgt Philip L. Ehrhorn, NCOIC, Stand/Eval (Doc 38).
72. SSgt James T. Lamont.
73. Hist., OPS-4, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
74. Ltr, Unit PCS Movement Plan dated 3 Nov 69 (Doc 39).
75. Annex GG, 633 Sp Ops Wg Movement Plan 400-1 dated 15 Nov 69 (Doc 40).
76. Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq DOI 28-1 dated 16 Nov 69.
77. Hist., OPS-5, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
78. Msg, Det 2, OPS 020615Z Dec 69 (Doc 41).
79. Msg, USAFSS, CSP-S 042046Z Dec 69 (Doc 42).
80. Hist., OPS-5, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69.
81. Interview by author with Capt Kanton E. Lammers, Operations Officer, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 5 Mar 70.
82. Msg, 7AF, CS 121041Z Nov 69 as quoted in Msg, 6994 Soty Sq, SSL0 140230Z Nov 69 (Doc 43).
83. Msg, 6924 Soty Sq, CDR 150537Z Nov 69 (Doc 44).
84. Major Brian D. Cornett.
85. Msg, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, CDR 160635Z Nov 69 (Doc 45).
86. Msg, 6994 Soty Sq, SSL0 160900Z Nov 69 (Doc 46).
87. Msg, 366 TFW, CDR 190301Z Nov 69 as quoted in Msg, 6924 Soty Sq, CDR 190638Z Nov 69 (Doc 47)
88. As the complexity of the problems involved became increasingly apparent, word was received delaying the move until June 1970 "to provide 7AF adequate time to study the most suitable location for the unit",



CHAPTER III


MATERIAL

(U) The Material Section provided logistical support for the Detachment. Integrated within the function was BRAVO maintenance, which had responsibility for testing, installation, repair, and upkeep of USAFSS mission equipment.¹

Manning

(U) Section manpower improved steadily throughout the 1 July - 31 December period, reaching approximately 100 percent of the authorized strength. A significant contributing factor to this manning was the high rate of in-place extensions. Over 20 percent of Material Section personnel including Supply and Maintenance had extended their one year tours for an additional six months.² As a result, a depth of experience and continuity rare in Vietnam was enjoyed by the section.

ALR-38 Systems

 The principle subject of interest during the first two months of this period was the capability of the ALR-38 mini-mod system to perform the assigned VEF ARDF mission. Maintained by civilian contractor personnel and supported directly by Sanders Associates through Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD), Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio and Warner-Robins AFB Air Materiel Area, Georgia, the mini-mod system had been continually plagued with "erratic" and "weak" write-ups. To resolve the question of the system's effectiveness, an in-country test was scheduled for September.³

The ALR-38 maxi-mod system was originally due in-country during the latter part of this period with a portion of the 2235 modification to be performed locally. The entire project was rescheduled for the third and fourth quarters, fiscal year 1970.⁴

By August, the entire fleet of EC-47 aircraft was computerized with either the ALR-35 or ALR-38 mini-mod system. This facilitated the streamlining of maintenance procedures, OJT, and supply functions.⁵

Recovery of Consoles

After the crash of aircraft 48959,⁶ a party of Detachment personnel traveled to Hue Phu-Bai and effected removal of all equipment possible, commensurate with the weight requirement to return it to Pleiku AB.⁷

Only the empty consoles were left with the understanding that Da Nang or Pleiku host base would see to their removal and return. Unfortunately, as soon as the security guards assigned to the aircraft were released, unidentified Army elements surreptitiously removed the Z and Y consoles.⁸

After a number of messages between the Detachment, Tan Son Nhut, and Hue Phu-Bai, the Army Criminal Investigations Division (CID) was asked to investigate, and the consoles were eventually found on the perimeter in Army bunkers.⁹ One apparently made a rather suitable, if small, closet. Both consoles were retrieved by maintenance personnel.¹⁰ The majority of the removed equipment was made serviceable locally and returned to stock; the rest was sent to Depot for overhaul.¹¹

Maintenance

Mini Mod Tests

The mini-mod tests were originally scheduled for July 1969, but due to various problems including aircraft availability and NCRS conditions

for the 16K computer, the test did not begin until 13 September. Four flying days were involved with the "least successful aircraft at that time" chosen as the test aircraft.¹² A complete transmitting ground station was set up utilizing a spare FM 622 asset in the HRAVO maintenance shop and several frequencies were allotted by MASV for the VHF frequency range.¹³ Specific areas to be tested included:¹⁴

a. Sensitivity: This portion was to specifically compare the sensitivity of the Z1 collection position to the sensitivity of the ALR-38 mini-mod ARDF position.

b. Accuracy: This part of the test was designed to test the mini-mod's effectiveness against VHF signals flying different ARDF patterns under varying weather conditions.

The test results were compiled by the Materiel Officer with the technical assistance of the Sanders Technical Representative.¹⁵ Generally, the tests indicated that the mini-mod was comparable to the ALR-34/35 systems and its sensitivity was nearly as high as the Z1 position. As an example, the mini-mod was capable of fixing a two watt transmitter as far as 58 nautical miles (NM) standoff with good accuracy. In comparison, the Z1 position against the same transmitter signal lost its capability to understand the VHF voice at 62 NM.

The accuracy of the mini-mod system was also acceptable and comparable to the ALR-34/35 systems. The APN-179 doppler and C-12 compass were also discussed in regards to accuracy. A series of recommendations for improved operation concluded the test results.¹⁶

ALR-35 System Reliability

The reliability of the ALR-35 system appeared to level off at about



[REDACTED]

75 percent overall with occasional ups and downs from this figure.¹⁷

This was still low, but includes between 25 to 33 percent of all maintenance actions being declared "can not duplicate" (CND). Only a very small portion of these writeups signed off CND ever repeated. The causes for this high CND rate varied, but the more significant include:

a. Sensitivity of the ALR-35: The computerized ARDF system is highly sensitive to power fluctuations or transient voltages. This can cause random malfunctions which do not recur, particularly in the computer electronics/digital interfacing rather than the receiver sections.

b. Breakdown of the navigator's converter power supply due to overheating which partially corrects itself after cooling.¹⁸


c. Some operator/navigator errors, although this area has vastly improved in the past six months.

d. Some CNDs which are probably caused by dirty contacts in circuitry cards, relays, and connector pins. These can be very random and often were corrected without realizing it.

Phase

[REDACTED] A new concept was introduced 21 September concerning phase maintenance. Until this time, the aircraft phase for Security Service equipment was merely a "clean and secure" type. Realizing that the equipment was being rapidly turned around and flying nearly every day, and that at some point a thorough, power-on, equipment-on inspection should be performed, shift personnel developed the principles and criteria for the present 100 hour (approximately every 20 days) Phase Inspection. Along with the routine cleaning, a two pronged "power-on" approach was conducted which included both the left side equipment (ARDF system) and also the right (Y and Z consoles, including G equipment and cabling).


[REDACTED]


 a. The left side phase included an internal Input Simulator Test to verify X console operation, bearing accuracy and system alignment. The flight line diagnostic tape was used to verify the computer timing and display functions.

b. The right side phase was built around using the 606 Signal Generator as an input signal to the cables from the antennas to the receivers as well as a direct input to the receivers. Initially, some losses in the cables and at the connectors of the various audio lines were found. Additionally, the standard for the G-133s and G-175s was increased to close to shop standards by use of the 606 on the flight line. Manhour documentation increased tremendously on the G-133s initially, but has dropped back significantly as the period drew to a close.¹⁹

Logistics

Computers

 The problems previously reported in prior Operations histories with the NDC 1060 computers were partially alleviated during this period. Tighter quality control by the manufacturers and several small modifications appeared to help their reliability. For a short period of time, the manufacturer charged that the causes of computer failures reported through the Air Force Deficiency Program were due to field abuse and/or shipping damage. The former charge was strongly challenged by the field, and this issue seems to have resolved itself for the moment. Material personnel began extensive inspections on computers being received as well as shipped to include photos.²⁰ Our spares level on computers increased greatly, precluding a high cannibalization rate while improving individual reliability.





Test Equipment

The problem of getting proper test equipment issued to improve over-²¹ all maintenance plagued the section throughout this period. One specific example was the request for two each Frequency Counters, FEN 6625-999-5364. These were required to properly align and check out the ARDF modules at a very low signal strength input. These counters were originally ordered as early as December 1968, but due to the problems in the host Base Supply during the transition to the Univac 1050-II computer, they were reordered in May 1969. The section was still without these counters at the end of this period and has had to borrow a frequency counter from other base functions on a hit and miss basis to keep the quality of maintenance up.

Asset Control

(U) The reconciliation of all Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) assets into Host Base Control was culminated at the end of this period when the maintenance shop was designated as Host Base Supply Warehouse 13 for rapid turnaround items. This made all the high consumption assets readily available but also ensured proper consumption and demand data as well as Document in for Maintenance (DIFM) control. By ensuring that all these assets were under Univac 1050-II control, lateral assistance requests were more expeditiously filled and total asset control was improved. This was most opportune as Command began using the normal PACAF procedures for lateral assistance in December.²²



Footnotes

CHAPTER III

1. Hist., MAF Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69
2. Ibid. Extentees included Capt Thomas G Wallace, TSgt Thomas F Gebro, TSgt Howard S Poyas, SSgt Ronald G Hodgins, Sgt Raymond M Beauregard, and ATO Philip M Cook.
3. A narrative concerning the results of this test is contained in the section dealing with Maintenance.
4. Hist., MAF, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69
5. Ibid.
6. For a narrative depicting the crash, see CHAPTER II.
7. Capt Brian D Cornett, SSgt Robert W Just, and ATO Philip M Cook.
8. Msg, Det 2, MAF 160800Z Oct 69 (Doc 49)
9. Msg, Det 2, MAF 250630Z Oct 69 (Doc 50) and subsequent msg, Det 2, MAF 060615Z Nov 69 (Doc 51).
10. Msg, Det 2, MAF 100455Z Nov 69 (Doc 52)
11. Msg, WRAMA Robins AFB, Ga, WRMF 212005Z Oct 69 (Doc 53)
12. Msg, Det 2, MAF 280145Z Jul 69 (Doc 54)
13. Msg, BSO MACV, MAC 11956 INTEL 120953Z Sep 69 (Doc 55) and subsequent msg, Det 2, OPS 140830Z Sep 69 (Doc 56)
14. Msg, Det 2, MAF 210841Z Jul 69 (Doc 57)
15. Capt Thomas G Wallace; Mr Gene Carlson
16. Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq Report, Mini-Mod tests, 13-19 September 1969.
17. Reliability is defined as the percent of missions without a malfunction of any kind for the system rated.
18. Msg, Det 2, MAF 270720Z Oct 69 (Doc 58)


19. Msg, PACSOFYRGN, LOG-MPA 310022Z Dec 69 (Dec 59) and subsequent msg, Det 2, MAT 120620Z Jan 70 (Dec 60).
20. Msg, PACSOFYRGN, LOG-MPA 190126Z Nov 69 (Dec 61) and subsequent msg, 6994 Soty Sq ODR 040822Z Dec 69 (Dec 62)
21. Hist, MAT, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69
22. Msg, PACSOFYRGN, LOG-L 040127Z Dec 69 (Dec 63)



CHAPTER IV

Communications

(U) The Detachment Communications (COMM) Center directed the flow of all classified and non-classified mission-related correspondence to and from this unit.¹ COMM Center personnel prepared, transmitted, and receipted for all electrical messages, maintained daily read-files, and served as cryptological custodians.

 In addition to manning communications equipment within the Detachment Operations building, the COMM Center provided three personnel to operate a "pony" circuit between this unit and the 330 HRC.² The circuit served as a critical communications (ORIFIGOMM) outlet and as an Ops Comm link (Fig. 4-1).





Figure 4-1, Circuit Profile

AUTOSEVOCOMM

 On 30 August 1969, the Detachment COMM Center was tasked by PACSOTYRCM to provide the 6924 Security Squadron, Da Nang AB, RVN with two KY-3 systems.³ These systems were to be removed from the Detachment and 362 TMS circuit upon implementation of the Automatic Secure Voice Communications



[REDACTED]

(AUFOSSEVOCCOM) System. The KY-3s, spare boards, and keying material were transferred to the 6924 Security Squadron on 16 September.

[REDACTED] The Detachment AUFOSSEVOCCOM terminal became operational on 1 September. This circuit is linked to the Secure Cordboard (SECORD) 24 (Fig. 4-1), operated by Company A, 43 Signal Battalion, United States Army. The Detachment drop number was 16.

AIR/GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

[REDACTED] Information received on 26 November indicated the decision by Hq USAFSS to remove the Air/Ground/Air Communications system from the Detachment Operations building.⁴ The Communications Electronics (CE) Scheme O33AOKO-FWCZ-R-9447, which would have provided secure voice capability, was cancelled by PACSOTYRCN.⁵ Disposition instructions were received from the Air Force Cryptologic Depot (AFCD) on 17 November for the two KY-8s that would have been installed under this scheme.⁶ Two KY-8s were transferred to Detachment 4, AFCD on 4 December. On 31 December, the Detachment was still awaiting disposition instructions for the GRC-27.

ASRs

[REDACTED] Requirements of the Commando Mercury Support Program in December dictated that PACSOTYRCN task the Detachment with providing the 6918 Security Squadron, Hakata, Japan with two automatic send-receive (ASR) teletype systems.⁷ This equipment would have been removed from the Detachment/Engineering Hill circuit.⁸

IG Visit

[REDACTED] During the USAFSS IG Team inspection 6 through 10 September, one minor discrepancy was noted. The priorities contained in the unit Cryptographic Emergency Plan were not in accordance with those listed in KAG-1D. This

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

was corrected on 15 September. There were no physical or cryptographic violations charged to this Detachment throughout 1969.⁹

Statistics

COM Center traffic volume and circuit efficiency ratings for the 1 July - 31 December period are depicted in Figure 4-2.

	<u>Circuit</u>	<u>Groups Sent</u>	<u>Circuit Reliability</u>	<u>Groups Received</u>	<u>Circuit Reliability</u>
July	509RRGp	177,097	97%	253,987	97%
	Det 1	300,297	98%	85,604	98%
	33ORRC	<u>201,314</u>	100%	<u>467,046</u>	100%
	Total	678,708		806,637	
August	509RRGp	186,288	94%	250,537	97%
	Det 1	127,069	100%	140,269	99%
	33ORRC	<u>154,535</u>	100%	<u>447,423</u>	100%
	Total	467,892		738,229	
September	509RRGp	335,519	100%	250,029	100%
	Det 1	96,900	97%	51,660	97%
	33ORRC	<u>292,830</u>	100%	<u>402,810</u>	100%
	Total	725,249		704,499	
October	509RRGp	339,007	99%	285,890	99%
	Det 1	100,572	99%	32,586	99%
	33ORRC	<u>273,389</u>	100%	<u>399,497</u>	100%
	Total	712,968		717,973	
November	509RRGp	402,168	99%	326,654	99%
	Det 1	81,886	98%	25,124	98%
	33ORRC	<u>280,980</u>	100%	<u>396,810</u>	100%
	Total	765,034		748,588	
December	509RRGp	442,360	99%	337,031	99%
	Det 1	71,343	99%	32,670	99%
	33ORRC	<u>385,392</u>	100%	<u>438,681</u>	100%
	Total	899,095		808,382	

Figure 4-2, Traffic Volume and Circuit Efficiency

Footnotes

CHAPTER IV

1. Hist., COMB, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69
2. Ibid.
3. Msg, PACSOTYRGN, COM-S 300140Z Aug 69 (Dec 64)
4. Msg, PACSOTYRGN, OBR 261758Z Nov 69 (Dec 65)
5. Msg, PACSOTYRGN, COM-S 219018Z Nov 69 (Dec 66)
6. Msg, AFID, DMCC 172105Z Nov 69 (Dec 67)
7. Msg PACSOTYRGN, COM-S 292326Z Dec 69 (Dec 68)
8. It was later determined by Army Security Agency, Pacific (ASAPAC)(Msg, CUSASAPAC, IAPSIG 021840Z Jan 70 (Dec 69) that they had sufficient equipment to satisfy the two terminals they required, and Detachment equipment was no longer needed.
9. Hist., COMB, Det 2, 6994 Soty Sq, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 69
10. Ibid.


GLOSSARY**A**


AB	Air Base
ACC	ARDF Coordination Center
ADMIN	Administration
AF	Air Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFCD	Air Force Cryptologic Depot
AFIC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSSO	Air Force Special Security Officer
AFR	Airman Performance Report
ARDF	Airborne Radio Direction Finding
ASA	Army Security Agency
ASAPAC	Army Security Agency, Pacific
ASD	Aeronautical Systems Division
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AVN	Aviation

B

BAQ	Bachelor Airman's Quarters
BLMPS	Base Level Military Personnel System

C

CAMS	Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron
CBPO	Consolidated Base Personnel Office
CE	Communications Electronics
CID	Criminal Investigations Division



CIL	Crew Information Letter
CMA	Communications Management Authority
CND	Can Not Duplicate
COCDC	Consolidated Operational Career Development Course
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMM	Communications
CRIFCOMM	Critical Communications
<u>D</u>	
DF	Direction Finding
DIFM	Document In for Maintenance
DIOWA	Directorate, Intelligence Operations Warning Analysis
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOI	Detachment Operational Instructions
DSU	Direct Support Unit
DURMIS	Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary
<u>E</u>	
EAP	Emergency Actions Plan
EMR	Exploitable Message Report
EWPSR	Electronic Warfare Position Status Report
<u>F</u>	
FM	Frequency Modulation
<u>G</u>	
GDRS	General Directorate of Rear Services
<u>H</u>	
HF	High Frequency

HQ **Headquarters**

I
IG **Inspector General**
IRAN **Inspect and Repair As Needed**
IRO **Instructor Radio Operator**



J
J2 **Intelligence Section**

M
MAC **Military Assistance Command**
MACV **Military Assistance Command, Vietnam**
MAF **Marine Amphibious Force**
MUSSO **Manual of United States SIGINT Operations**

N
NGO **Noncommissioned Officer**
NGOIC **Noncommissioned Officer In Charge**
NKP **Nakhon Phanom**
NORS **Non-Operationally Ready, Supply**
NRV **NSA Representative, Vietnam**
NSA **National Security Agency**
NVA **North Vietnamese Army**

O
OJT **On-the-Job Training**
OP **Operational**
OPSCOMM **Operations Communications**

P
PAD **Program Action Directive**

		
PMT		Post Mission Test
PRE		Progress Review Exercise
	<u>R</u>	
RD		Reference Designators
RRC		Radio Research Company
RRFS		Radio Research Field Station
RRG		Radio Research Group
RTAFB		Royal Thai Air Force Base
RVN		Republic of Vietnam
	<u>S</u>	
SAM		Surface to Air Missile
SEA		Southeast Asia
SEATS		Southeast Asia Technical Summary
SECORD		Secure Cordboard
SEFE		Stand/Eval Flight Examiner
SIGINT		Signals Intelligence
SIT		Situation
STAND/EVAL		Standardization and Evaluation
	<u>T</u>	
TDY		Temporary Duty
TECH		Technical
TECHINS		Technical Instructions
TECH WEOAP		Technical Weekly Recapitulation
TEWS		Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron
TRW		Tactical Recon Wing
		

U

UGF Upgrade Training

UHF Ultra High Frequency

USAFSS United States Air Force Security Service

USAFSSM United States Air Force Security Service Manual

USAFSSR United States Air Force Security Service Regulation

V

VC Viet Cong

VEF Very High Frequency

VOL Volume

W

WAPS Weighted Airman's Promotion System

X

XRAY (DF position)

Y

YANKER (Target acquisition position)

Z

ZULU (Collection position)

Z1 ZULU ONE (VHF/HF configured collection position)

Z2 ZULU TWO (HF/HF configured collection position)

Attachment I

Commander: A Biographical Sketch

Major Brian D Cornett was born in Muskegon, Michigan on 23 March 1933. He attended public schools there until 1950 when he moved to Grand Rapids, Michigan, graduating from Grand Rapids Central High School in 1951.

Major Cornett entered active military service as an enlisted man in February 1952. He was assigned to USAFSS in May 1952 and attended the Cryptanalysis Training Course at Brooks AFB, Texas. His first overseas assignment was the 3 Radio Squadron Mobile, Alaska, where he served from January 1953 to December 1955, when he separated from the service.

Major Cornett reenlisted in April 1957, and was assigned to March AFB, California as an instructor at the USAFSS school. He was accepted for Officer Candidate School in September 1958 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in March 1959. After completion of the Communications Intelligence Officer's Course at Goodfellow AFB, Texas in December 1960, he was assigned to USAFSS units in England and subsequently in Germany, and was reassigned to Hq, USAFSS, Kelly AFB, Texas in August 1964. Since that time he has served in AFSCC, as a member of the USAFSS IC Team, and in the Directorate of Plans and Programs office. He assumed command of Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron in July 1969, and achieved his current rank on 1 November 1969.

Major Cornett is a holder of the Air Force Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Army Good Conduct Medal, and various service and campaign medals. He is married to the former Marilyn Ann Wynn of Shelby, Michigan. They have two daughters, Tracie, 10, and Shelley, 6.

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UNCLAS E F T O
THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO AND/OR ACTION.
P 181701Z
FM USAFSS
TO AIG 7374/CBPO/PER.
ZEN/6960SPTGP/CBPO/
ZEN/DL 1 EURSCTYRGN/CBPO
ZEM

18 June 69

UNCLAS E F T O PVP
THIS MSG IN FIVE PARTS.
SUBJ: WAPS READINESS SURVEY
PART I. THIS IS AN AIR FORCE DIRECTED SURVEY. REQUEST EACH ADDRESSEE OF THIS MSG DETERMINE WHETHER YOU ARE PREPARED TO EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENT AND MANAGE THE WEIGHTED AIRMAN PROMOTION SYSTEM (WAPS), WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS IN THE AREAS OF:

- A. STUDY REFERENCE MATERIAL (ALL UNITS),
 - B. PROMOTION TESTING (ALL UNITS), AND DATA COLLECTING/REPORTING (CBPOS).
- PART II. AVAILABILITY OF GUIDANCE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL AS SHOWN BELOW:
- A. USAFSS MSG PMP-3 032401Z JUN 69 TO ALL UNITS (AIG 7374), ON REQUIREMENT OF ECI MATERIALS FOR SUPPORT OF WAPS, MSG REQUIRED AGGRESSIVE ACTION AT ALL LEVELS TO RECOVER ECI MATERIAL FROM INDIVIDUALS BEING RELEASED FROM ACTIVE DUTY, OR FOR ANY OTHER REASON HAVING NO FUTURE REQUIREMENT FOR THE MATERIAL. RECEIVED MATERIAL TO SUPPLEMENT THAT ORDERED/SHIPPED FROM ECI.
 - B. HQ USAF (AFDPW) LTR, 20 JUN 69, FORWARDED TO ALL USAFSS UNITS BY OUR LTR, PMP-3, 30 JUN 69 SAME SUBJECT. LTR DISSEMINATED A LISTING OF SKTS TO BE ADMINISTERED DURING SEP 69, IN SUPPORT OF WAPS.
 - C. ALL TOC LTR 69-2, 10 JUN 69 FROM AFHRL, LACKLAND AFB. INCLUDED SKTS AND PFES AUTHORIZED FOR USE DURING SEP 69.
 - D. USAFMPG (AFPMOCA) LTR, 15 JUL 69, STUDY REFERENCE

SAME SUBJECT. ESTABLISHED PROC CONTROL AND MANAGE-
OF WAPS STUDY MATERIAL, AND GUIDANCE FOR THE FIRST WAPS
PROMOTION/TESTING CYCLE.

E. USAF (AFPOPMC) MSG #/21/69 221924Z JUL 69, TO ALL OSPOS
ON TEST ADMINISTRATORS AND TEST ADMINISTRATION. ESTABLISHED
GRADE/ASS REQUIREMENTS FOR TEST EXAMINERS AND PROCTORS,
PROVIDED FD A SPECIAL TEST CONTROL OFFICER FOR GSUS AND
PROVIDES FOR OFF-SCHEDULED TESTING IN ADVANCE OF AUTHORIZED
TESTING PERIOD.

F. USAFMPC (AFPMDCOO) MSG B/111/69, 222135Z JUL 69, TO ALL
OSPOS, ON ACCURACY OF DATA COLLECTION FOR THE WEIGHTED AIRMAN
PROMOTION SYSTEM (WAPS). IDENTIFIED SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN
DATA COLLECTION FOR WAPS AND PROVIDED GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING
THE DATA COLLECTION PHASE.

G. PUBLICATIONS BULLETIN NO 309)25 JUL 69 WHICH ADVISED THAT
AF FORV 1566, JUL 69, TEST VERIFICATION, WAS AVAILABLE FOR
ORDERING. SEE ALSO OUR MSG, PMPAEN 311822Z JUL 69 TO ALL UNITS
(AIG 7374).

H. TEST DISTRIBUTION BOOKLET, AFPT 249.

I. CHAPTER 7, VIL II, AFM 30-3. THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE
AVAILABLE AT BASE DA:

(1) BASE LEVEL PROGRAMS A45263 OR NONSTANDARD"

(2) PART RR, VOL IV, AFM 171-13.

PART III. REF PART I ABOVE. GSUS WILL REVIEW, SURVEY, AND
ASSESS THEIR STATUS AND STATE OF READINESS AND REPORT THEIR
ASSESSMENT TO INCLUDE CURRENT OR FORESEEN PROBLEMS TO THEIR
OSPO BY 21 AUG 69.

PART IV. OSPOS WILL AFTER RECEIPT OF INPUT FROM THEIR GSUS,
REPORT THEIR ASSESSMENT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS (PMP) TO ARRIVE
MLT 25 AUG 69.

PART V. EACH OSPO WILL DESIGNATE A WAPS PROJECT OFFICER AND
FURNISH HIS NAME, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE NUMBER TO THIS
HEADQUARTERS (PMP). EXTENSION TO SUSPENSE CANNOT BE GRANTED
AS OUR REPORT DUE USAFMPC ON SAME DATE. UNQUOTE.

702

NNNN

DOCUMENT 2

*TWC. Acc
21/16203
(14)*

CCW: 745

21 Aug 69

NA3014
OR 320
//PRIORITY//
SSN 699
211502Z
FM 6994 SCTYSO
TO DET 1 6994 SCTYSO/CDR
DET 2 6994 SCTYSO/CDR
DET 3 6994 SCTYSO/CDR
ZFM

UNCLAS E F T O PER AUG 69
SUBJ: WAPS PROGRAM.

- 1. REF USAFSS MSG PMP 181721Z AUG 69, SUBJ: WAPS READINESS SURVEY.
- 2. REF PACSOTYRGN MSG CBPO-OJT/111/69, 220239Z AUG 69, SUBJ: CDD MATERIAL.

BOTH REFERENCED MSGS HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED TO YOUR UNIT. SIRMIT DATA REQUIRED BY PART III OF USAFSS MSG 181721Z AUG 69 DIRECT TO PACSOTYRGN CBPO-OJT WITH INFO THIS UNIT. PSR HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT YOUR UNIT WAS NOT AN ORIGINAL ADDRESSEE OF USAFSS MSG PMP 181091Z AUG 69, AND THAT YOU WOULD RESPOND DIRECTLY TO THEM. SHORT SUSPENSE IMPOSED MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THIS MATTER BE ACTED UPON WITH UTMOST DISPATCH.


- FOR DET 1: INCLUDE ANY PROBLEMS RELATED TO YOU FORTHCOMING MOVE.
- FOR DET 2: INCLUDE ANY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY RETIREMENT OF MSGT BLAIR
- FOR DET 3: INCLUDE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY LATE RECEIPT OF YOUR PFE STUDY REFERENCE MATERIAL.


FOR ALL ADDRESSEES: IF APPLICABLE, INCLUDE:

- 1. DISADVANTAGE YOUR PERSONNEL MAY BE AT AS A RESULT OF LONG WORK HOURS, ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH SELF STUDY MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED, ETC.
- 2. SHORTAGES OF CDDC STUDY MATERIAL AND/OR PFE DIRECTIVES.
- 3. LACK OF TEST BOOKLETS AT YOUR HOST CBPO.

215

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Document 5

140000Z FEB 69

TO VJLAKZ VIZADI YWADK
OF WJDDJH EC 1230054
FM VJLAKZ DE WJL DE
R 0000007
FM DET 3 600TH SGTY SQ
TO 257/600TH SGTY SQ OPS
INFO 600TH SGTY SQ OPS-11
RACSTY300/OPS-1
RACSTY/THA/THA
BT

Test Area
02-100157
(14)

OPS-2 JUL 69

1. EMERGENCY DEPLOYMENT OF OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT.

2. (A) JARV/ACC 9180 0480 (CHANGE TO TASKING)

3. JARV/ACC 9180 0483 (DEPLOYMENT OF ACFT AND CREW)

4. JARV/ACC 9180 0489 (CORRECTION TO REF B)

5. REF "A" REPLACED MISSION 002 FOR THE REST OF THE TASKING PERIOD TO FLY THREE SORTIES IN NORTHEAST LAOS IN RESPONSE TO CAS VIENTIANE REQUIREMENTS. THIS REF ALSO CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE TO UDORN, THAILAND.

6. REF "B" STATED THAT 2AF WOULD TAKE NECESSARY ACTION TO PROVIDE ONE CO-ACFT AND CREW FOR DEPLOYMENT TO UDORN, THAILAND FOR A TWO WEEK PERIOD EFFECTIVE 20 JUL 69.

7. REF "C" STATED THAT REF "B" WAS IN ERROR AND THAT ACFT AND CREW WOULD BE DEPLOYED TO NAKHON PHANOM, THAILAND W/CO UDORN, THAILAND.

8. ACFT 43243153, A COMBAT COUGAR CONFIGURED ACFT, DEPARTED AT 0457Z ON 21 JUL 69 FOR DEPLOYMENT TO NAKHON PHANOM, THAILAND. THE CREW ON ACFT 43243153 WAS NOT NOTIFIED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO BE DEPLOYED UNTIL AFTER THEY WERE ABOARD THE ACFT DUE TO NON-AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION. DUE TO THE CREW NOT BEING PREPARED FOR A LENGTHY DEPLOYMENT ANOTHER THREE MAN CREW WILL FLY MISSION 002 ON 03 JUL AND MAKE AN OPS STOP AT NAKHON PHANOM AND RELIEVE THE CREW WHICH IS PRESENTLY THERE. THE CREW PRESENTLY AT NAKHON PHANOM WILL FLY MISSION 002 ON ITS RETURN TO BLEIKO.

9. TRY ORDERS WILL BE PROVIDED FOR ALL PERSONNEL CONCERNED. THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL WILL BE TRY TO DET 3, 600TH FOR THE TWO WEEK DEPLOYMENT PERIOD:

1. SGT COOLEY, HIRSH L., SSAN 429-44-6700


2. SGT BOETTCHER, JOHN A., SSAN 208-44-3700

3. SGT LEWELLICH, JOHN, SSAN 173-49-6700

BT



Document



NNNNH3023
//PRIORITY//
SSN 50
020725Z
FM DET 2 6994 SGTY SQ
TO 6994 SGTY SQ
ZFM

Taylor
02/01/69
(1)

GPS 2 JULY 69.


SUBJ: TDY ORDERS

1. REQUEST TDY ORDERS BE PUBLISHED ON THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS:
 - (A) SSGT COOLEY, HIRAM L., [REDACTED]
 - (B) SGT BOETTCHER, JOHN A., [REDACTED]
 - (C) SGT LEVKULIGH, JOHN, [REDACTED]
2. THEY WILL BE GOING TO MKP ON TDY STATUS FOR APPROX. 15 DAYS.
3. IF TSN CAN HAVE THE ORDERS READY, SGT VAC COLLOUGH COULD PICK THEM UP ON HIS MECCA-RUN. EFFECTIVE ON OR ABOUT 3 JUL 69.

110



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TOT
23/1/20
⑥

SAK
2/2


IPAZ17
//ROUTINE//
SSN 591
231200Z
FM USA-552
TO USA-551



OPS JUL 69

SUBJ: ROM NKP CONCEPT

1. WE HAVE PERFORMED A DETAILED STUDY OF OUR TASKING/FRAGGED TOT, AND ACTUAL TOT. A COMPARISON OF THE ACCOMPLISHED TOT IN AREA 2012 WHEN THIS MISSION ROM'S AT NKP AND STAGES OUT OF THERE THE FOLLOWING DAY, AND WHEN THE MISSION STAGES OUT OF PKU REFLECTS HIGHLY FAVORABLY UPON STAGING OUT OF NKP. SPECIFICALLY, THE AVERAGE TIME TO AND FROM TOT AREA WITH ROM AT NKP IS 2 HRS 11 MINS. AVERAGE TIME TO AND FROM TOT AREA WITHOUT ROM AT NKP IS 4 HRS 7 MINS. A GAIN OF ONE HOUR TARGET TIME EACH MISSION COULD BE ACHIEVED IF WE ROM AT NKP.
2. RECOMMEND THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO ROM NKP EVERY OTHER DAY, RETURNING TO PKU OPPOSITE DAYS FOR ALL 9015 MISSIONS. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT TECH DATA, REPORTING, ETC WOULD BE ANY PROBLEM.
3. PLEASE ADVISE.



SECRET

July

Document 8

705 11/06077

any

IRAC14
//R UTINE//
SSN 2 5
113685Z
FM DET 2 6 094SOTYSO
TO 6 094SOTYSO
ZEM
UNCLAS E F T O PS AUG 69
SU BJ: R W NKP
REF UR PS 231300Z JUL 69. PLEASE REPLY.
123

WWW

51

*July Reed
Tel*



Document 9

*Aug
SABW*

*TOR
11/0047
①
PCN 11/26*



NR772
OR4732
CR4000
//ROUTINE//
SSN 399
FM 6994 SS
TO DET 2 6994 SS
INFO DET 2 6994 SS
ZNY

[REDACTED] OPS AUG 69.

SUBJ: RON NKP
REF YOUR 231800Z
YOUR 110600Z

1. FORMALIZATION OF NKP CONCEPT OUTLINED IN REF BEING HELD IN OBEY-
ANCE PENDING RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM AREA WITH ZAF.
2. PROBLEM AREAS CURRENTLY BEING ENCOUNTERED AT NKP ARE (1) AIR-
CRAFT MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FACILITIES AND (2) PARKING SPACE LIMITATION
IMPOSED BY PASS.
3. REALIZE NKP RON IS CURRENTLY NOW BEING ACCOMPLISHED TO SOME EX-
TENT. THIS HAS CAUSED CURRENT PROBLEM BETWEEN DET 2, 469TWO AND
NKP BASE ACTIVITIES. WILL ADVISE OF ANY FAVORABLE RESULTS.

111



ARMY

*SABW
JAN*

6.

DOCUMENT 10



X

01/00202

IMMEDIATE

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

USAFSS/TMP/TMA/TED/RED

INFO: PACSOTYRCH/CDR

.6922SCTYWG/CDR

6994SCTYSQ/CDR


[REDACTED] /CDR OCT 69.

1. FOLLOWUP REPORT NUMBER ONE TO DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ AIR 3-69 (OUR CDR 30/0822Z SEP 69).
2. WE HAVE VERIFIED THAT ONLY ONE USAFSS CREWMEMBER RECEIVED MINOR INJURIES, A CUT NOSE. MEMBER WAS SGT ROSTAD, WAYNE E., [REDACTED]
3. ALL CLASSIFIED MISSION MATERIAL WAS REMOVED FROM THE AIRCRAFT BY CLEARED CREWMEMBERS AND IS STORED IN A SECURE AREA.
4. USM-803 IS PROVIDING SI CLEARED PERSONNEL TO GUARD THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE UNTIL A PARTY OF DET 2 ^{COMMANDER AND MAINTENANCE} PERSONNEL CAN GET TO HFB TO INVESTIGATE DAMAGE AND SUBSEQUENT REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED EQUIPMENT. DET 2 PERSONNEL ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART

1 0820L
 Oct 69
 1 2

3291

SMS Scals
 NCOIC, Operations



[Signature]
 BRIAN D CORNETT, Capt, USAF
 Commander



PLEIKU AT 0100Z (0900L) THIS DATE. IF THE INVESTIGATION TEAM
WILL RELEASE THE EQUIPMENT, IT WILL BE REMOVED AND RETURNED
TO PLEIKU THIS DATE.

5. ALL CREWMEMBERS WERE EVACUATED TO DANANG SEVERAL HOURS
AFTER THE ACCIDENT AND WILL REMAIN THERE PENDING INTERVIEW
BY THE INVESTIGATION TEAM.

6. NO FURTHER INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME. NEXT
FOLLOWUP REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED AS SOON AS INFO BECOMES
AVAILABLE.



PP YHLAKZ YMZADL YWQADK YWQALY
 CE YWRDIH 645 2450310
 ZKZK PP NFL DE
 P 02000Z
 FM DET 2 6994SCTYSO
 TO ZEN/6994SCTYSO
 INFO USAFSS/TMA/TMD
 PACSCTYRGM/OPS-A
 6922SCTYWG/OPS-M
 6940SCTYWG
 ZEN




OPS-2 SEP 69


SUBJ: DURMIS DET 2, 6994SCTYSO
 DATE: 02000


021 09 00 00 304 000 020 00 00 00 00
 021 02 02 00 00 00 00 02
 032 12 02 00 00 02 00 00
 035 03 00 00 00 00 00 20

021 MSN 9043M CANX WX-1 5.1 HRS
 021 MSN 902AM CANX WX-1 4.3 HRS
 021 MSN 907AM CANX WX-1 4.5 HRS
 021 MSN 902DV CANX WX-1 4.3 HRS
 021 MSN 9996M CANX WX-1 4.0 HRS
 021 MSN 902AA CANX WX-1 4.3 HRS
 021 MSN 902LA CANX WX-1 4.3 HRS
 021 MSN 902KA CANX WX-1 4.3 HRS
 021 MSN 902DA CANX WX-1 4.3 HRS


031 ACFT 43702 TDY TSN, VIETNAM FOR MODIFICATION
 031 ACFT 15977 TDY NKP, THAILAND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
 031 ACFT 16029 A/M (ENG VAL, CLARK AB, PHILIPPINES)
 032 ACFT 15133 A/M (ENG CHANGE)
 03X ACFT 43072 AWAITING FOF
 03X ACFT 51131 OR
 03X ACFT 43050 A/M (ENG CHANGE)
 03X ACFT 23372 OR
 03X ACFT 49491 OR
 03X ACFT 93704 OR
 03X ACFT 43402 OR
 03X ACFT 30730 OR
 03X ACFT 77204 OR
 03X ACFT 39771 OR
 03X ACFT 43228 OR
 03X ACFT 00937 OR
 03X ACFT 40570 OR
 03X ACFT 48402 AND 30730 RECEIVED MAJOR
 SHRAPNEL DAMAGE IN POCKET ATTACK THIS
 DATE. REPAIRS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.







Document 14



PRIORITY

161015Z/SEP 69

USA-563

USM-808



CHANNELS OPS-2

REF YOUR 16083Z

1. WATER BOY OUTAGE HAS EFFECTED THE WESTERN PORTION OF AREA TWO (ALPHA). PANAMA CAN NOT PAINT OUR ACFT AT THIS DISTANCE. IN VIEW OF THIS, SAFETY IS THE MAIN CONCERN.

2. PANAMA CAN ONLY PICK UP IFF/SIF FROM OUR ACFT IN AREAS TWO (ALPHA) AND 999. THIS MEANS THEY ARE UNABLE TO PAINT ANY OTHER ACFT IN THE VICINITY; THUS SAFETY IS JEOPARDIZED.

3. IF THE FACILITY CONTINUES TO BE NON-OPERATIONAL, THE EFFECT ON THE TWO (ALPHA) MISSION WILL CONTINUE, PLUS SAFETY FACTORS. IT IS FELT IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES, THAT THESE TWO MISSION AREAS BE REFRAGGED UNTIL WATER BOY BECOMES OPERATIONAL.

16
SEP 69
01 01

3291

RAYMOND R. MILLER, SSGT., USAF.


OPS-2

Raymond R. Miller

KENTON E. LAMMERS, CAPT., USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER



CP
216
Document 15
C



20/0615Z

PRIORITY

DET 2, 69943CTYSQ

69943CTYSQ

Handle
Via
Comint
Channels
Only

CHANNELS ops

SUBJ: FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS/MISSION COVERAGE

1. THE 362D TFWAS HAS JUST ADVISED US THAT THEY ARE RESTRICTED FROM FLYING OVERLAND ABOVE 16-40N LATITUDE WITHOUT POSITIVE RADAR CONTROL. PRESENT RADAR COVERAGE BY PANAMA COMS APPROX 17 MI WEST OF QUANG TRI.
2. THIS RESTRICTION WILL PREVENT COVERAGE OF AREAS 909 MIKE AND 909 LIMA.
3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, RECOMMEND THESE AREAS BE CANCELLED AND WE BE REFRACED ELSEWHERE.

20	1400L
Oct	69
1	1


3291

SER Seale, HCOIC, Ops



JLH
ERIKSON E LARSEN, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer





File
Document 128

ROUTINE

Capt Lammers

3291

FROM: DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

16/1300Z

TO: 6994SCTYSQ/OPS


 CHANNELS/OPS SEP 69.

SUBJ: REDUCED FRAGS FOR EC47 N/P ACFT


REF: 460 DCOOE MSG 16/1203Z SEP 69.

1. ABOVE REF STATED THAT EFFECTIVE 20 SEP ALL EC-47 N/P AIRCRAFT CONFIGURED CCZ/Q WILL BE FRAGGED FOR ONLY FIVE HOUR MISSIONS.

2. WISHED TO ENSURE THAT YOU WERE AWARE OF ABOVE POLICY CHANGES. QUERY WHETHER THE Q-MODEL ACFT WILL BE FRAGGED SEPARATELY NOW OR WHETHER IT WILL BE LEFT TO LOCAL UNITS TO ^{CIDE} ~~DETERMINE~~ WHICH AREAS TO FLY LARGE ENGINE ACFT.



CPS
File
9



Document 17

CSA-3/241-5

15 Oct 69

Records of GPRS Seminar, 3-4 Oct 69

File
GPR

1. The seminar convened at 0830 hours, 3 October with a greeting from Lt Col General, DOMMETERIE, who was the seminar monitor. The seminar was designed to gather all collectors, processing, and reporting agencies concerned with the problem of the General Directorate of Rear Services (GDRS), North Vietnam, to discuss the GPRS problem, to clarify present operating procedures, and to resolve any difficulties presently being encountered.

2. GPR is one of the most important things determining the political outcome of the war. The highest officials in Washington, including the President, are briefed on GPRS events. The SIGINT effort against GPRS provides a much more complete view of what the enemy is doing.

3. From the SIGINT view, the GPRS problem has been around a long time. A General Directorate of Rear Services was established in 1954 during the French-Indochina War. In 1966 it was rediscovered in COMINT, but the activity was very obscure due to NSA's inability to decrypt the codes being used at that time. In February, 1968, the breakthrough came when a readable crypt system began to be used. Since that time, the history of GPRS was pieced together from all the traffic that had been intercepted.

4. At present, NSA is trying to enter all GPRS data into computer banks. They have determined that the voice collign and frequency RFI's are repeating, and with further analysis hope to be able to predict RFI's. The GPRS reporting format was implemented to facilitate their usage of a data bank. In addition, all translations issued by USI-100 and USI-90 are being entered into a computer. "Pipeline Postscripts", a message of technical information issued by DIA/SA, was reviewed mainly to minimize intercept. It was noted by DIA/SA representatives that only 25% of message contents was being obtained, i.e., colligns and phrases.

5. DIA/SA has noted that the translations issued by USI-908 and USI-10 had improved greatly in quality. Their main concern was the difference noted between field translations and NSA translations. One big problem is the differences noted by field stations and NSA.

6. We located [redacted] of North Vietnamese [redacted] and of kilometer [redacted]



6. TACREPS were discussed at length. It was noted that the use of TACREPS on COMINT information could be used only if a position, an activity, and a time (in the future) were mentioned in the traffic.

7. ARG-LITE targeting was discussed in length. ARG-LITEs were begun in 1965. Each strike (consisting of 6 B-52s) costs \$250,000. 10 strikes are made each day. Thus a target must be selected that will yield the most as far as damage inflicted. All sources of intelligence are used to develop ARG-LITE targets. COMINT plays a big part in determining how much material is stored where, thus aiding in determining the worth of the target. It was noted that ARDF fixes in Laos are not used for immediate targeting. It has been determined that the transmitting terminal in actuality is quite a distance from the HQ's elements, units, etc., and that these terminals usually move quite often. Another problem is that 80% of terminals fixed in Laos are unidentified. It was stressed that all information is put together to try to determine the best targets for ARG-LITE missions.

8. Acquisition of Tactical targets. Reconnaissance by Acoustics was discussed at length. Sensors are used to a great extent in the Steel Tiger area of Laos in acquiring Tactical targets. This program was implemented at NRP in 1967. Sensors are dropped by F-4's into an area believed to active with truck movement. Either an Acoustic or a seismic sensor is used. The seismic sensor detects tremors. It is activated whenever a certain level of movement is reached. One of its drawbacks is the fact that overlying planes and even rainfall can activate it. The Acoustic sensor detects sounds. It is quite effective in determining exactly what activity is going on. The sensors are read by orbiting RB-127's, and this data is relayed digitally to Task Force Alpha. Sophisticated equipment is used to break out the data and to determine the best place for a Tactical strike.

9. COMINT information is also used for acquiring Tactical targets. The position in traffic of vehicles on a certain road at a certain time can lead to a Tactical strike. A sanitized listing of ARDF fixes is provided to Forward Air Controllers on a daily basis, and in some cases has resulted in the sighting of a target by a FAC.

10. As the rainy season draws to an end in Laos, DIRNSA expects large-scale preparations to begin for the movement of troops and material south. This is expected to begin about the 20th of October. Almost a complete reconstruction of the road systems will be necessary, as the rains have almost completely destroyed existing roads.

11. Thus an increase in COMINT is foreseen. But DIRNSA is concerned about the possibilities of the North Vietnamese using land lines. The Communists almost certainly will attempt to establish complete land lines, and if they succeed, COMINT will be almost non-existent in Laos. For that reason, efforts will be made to interdict landlines as they are built.

12. A briefing was given on the configurations of all aircraft being utilized in the GURS problem. Personnel from the 6990SS were lucky of the altitude Combat Group aircraft fly. Most personnel from other units had no conception of the actual mission of the 6990th.

13. The main specifics concerning the 6994th:

a. One of the things discussed was the role the Mini-mod would play in the GURS problem. DIRM officials hope it will play a big part in the coming months in locating major elements of the GURS organization. For example, at the present time, Binh Trun 41 is unlocated, although it is believed to be in the general area of Ban Bang, Laos. By locating such major elements, it would aid in developing a timeline of a later date. It was noted that at the present time no Mini-mods were flying a routine orbit. Steps were taken to immediately correct that situation.

b. USA-503 complimented USA-505 for the quality of their recordings, saying they were of the highest quality of any other of the intercept platforms. They were concerned, however, with the time it takes to deliver tapes to them, even when Ops Steps are made. They realize it would be very difficult to pass all traffic air-to-ground. It was noted that much of the Combat Group traffic is used to clarify or correct translations already issued. USA-505 would receive much more credit if their traffic were sent to USA-503 on a more timely basis.

c. The 6990SS Form 0-10 (GURS Handlog) was endorsed by all, and its use was encouraged. It was decided that all intercept operators should note on the handlog whether the handlog is completely perfect or whether groups, callouts, or other items are missing. Operators should attempt to correct handlogs by replaying tapes, providing no intercept is lost. If a perfect handlog is obtained, the letters IP (hand transcribed) should be entered on the handlog and on the tape jacket.

14. The seminar was very helpful in realizing the problems each unit has, from the collector to the reporter. It reassured me as to the contribution Det 2 is making, and in the ways in which we can contribute further. It has aided the producers and reporters in understanding our problems. Each piece of information aids in solving the GURS problem; each operator should be aware of this, and should realize the great importance of GURS.

DAVE J. FRANKLY, SSgt, USAF

JOHN D. PRICH, SSgt, USAF



Document 18

OPS
Bill
C.

Na

19/0835z

ROUTINE

DET 2, 6994SCTYSA

6994SCTYSQ/OPS



OPS NOV 69.

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF VE121 GRADUATES.

REF: A. USAFSS MSG 102115Z NOV 69, B. UR OPS 120905Z NOV 69,
C. OUR OPS 2710430 AUG 69.

1. EIGHT AIRMEN (SGT'S CARLTON, COX, GRIJALVA, JOHNSON, PECK, SNYDER, TEITZEL AND WILLIAMS) WERE GRADUATES OF COURSE VE121 AND WERE ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT TDY FOR 90 DAYS. THEY RETURNED TO 6990 SCTY SQ O/A 1 NOV 69.


2. FEEL THAT THE QUESTIONS ASKED IN USAFSS MSG 102115Z NOV 69 CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ANSWERED IN A COLLECTIVE VERSUS AN INDIVIDUAL MANNER. AN EVALUATION WAS PROVIDED PREVIOUSLY IN REF C. FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE OFFERED IN ADDITION. SUBJECT AIRMEN WERE TASKED AT THIS UNIT WITH THE INTERCEPT OF GDRS AND TACTICAL VOICE COMMS. THEY WERE NOT REQUIRED TO PERFORM TRANSCRIPTION DUTIES. THE VE 121 TRAINING EN- ABLED ALL THE SUBJECT AIRMEN TO PERFORM VIETNAMESE COLLECTION IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER. DUE TO THE FACT THAT COMBAT COUGAR ZULT-

19
NOV 1969
1

K.E. LAMERS, CAPT, USAF
Operations Officer



KEL
KENTON E. LAMERS, CAPT, USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER



ROUTINE

K.E. LAMMERS, CAPT, USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER

K.E. LAMMERS, CAPT, USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER

CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT HAVE ONLY ONE VOICE INTERCEPT POSITION, THESE PERSONNEL PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES IN A RELATIVELY UNSUPERVISED MANNER. IN ALL CASES, THEY HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN DISTINGUISHING NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMS FROM SOUTH VIETNAMESE. THE HANDCOPY ABILITIES OF THESE PERSONNEL VARIED WITH THE INDIVIDUAL. SGT JOHNSON'S HANDCOPY OF DIGITAL TRAFFIC WAS COMPARABLE TO THAT OF A LONG COURSE GRADUATE. SGTS COX, GRIJALVA, SNYDER, AND TEITZEL PRODUCED ACCEPTABLE HANDCOPIES. HANDCOPIES OF SGTS CARTON, PECK AND WILLIAMS WERE OFTEN INCOMPLETE. FEEL THAT ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT TRAINING IN VE121 WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. OF COURSE ADDITIONAL TRAINING WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IF THE LINGUIST WOULD IMMEDIATELY BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM TRANSCRIPTION DUTIES. THE VE121 GRADUATES WERE CERTAINLY ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTES FOR LONG COURSE GRADUATES TO PERFORM OUR BASIC COLLECTION MISSION WHERE MANNING SHORTAGES OCCURRED.

Feb

ORA 015
//ROUTINE//
SSN 17
010636Z
FM 6994SS
TO DET 2 6994SS
ZEM



Document 19 C
Zib

SECTION ONE OF TWO OPS NOV 69.

SUBJ: COURIER STOPS AT DANANG.
1. FLWG MSG IS QUOTED FYA: QUOTE.
P 310459Z
FM NSAPACREP VIETNAM
TO SSO MACV
INFO AFSSO 7TH AF
CD 529TH RRGP

TOP
01/08047
66-000

F46-6621
CO 509TH HOLD AND PASS TO ACC; AFSSO 7AF FOR DOCR; SSO MACV
FOR J211-4

COURIER-STPOS AT DA NANG BY EC-47S

1. AS REQUESTED, HAVE EXAMINED IN CONJUNCTION WITH 7TH AF, 6994TH SGTY SQ, AND 509TH RRGP, THE FEASIBILITY OF DISCONTINUING THE EC-47 COURIER-STPOS AT DA NANG. THIS EXAMINATION WAS MADE WITH THE GROUND RULE THAT NO ACTIONS WOULD BE RECOMMENDED OR TAKEN WHICH WOULD ADVERSLY AFFECT THE DISSEMINATION OF TIME-SENSITIVE INFORMATION TO FIELD COMMANDERS. ADDITIONALLY, IT WAS DECIDED THAT NO PROPOSAL WOULD BE OFFERED THAT COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

2. TO KEEP MATTER IN PERSPECTIVE, WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT ONLY THOSE EC-47 MISSIONS TASKED BY USM-308'S MISSION CONTROL DIRECTIVE TO COURIER-STPO AT DA NANG WERE CONSIDERED; THEREFORE ANY RECOMMENDATION, UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED, APPLIES SOLELY TO THOSE MISSIONS. THE FOLLOWING FACTORS ARE GERMANE:

- A. BASING: THESE MISSIONS ALL STAGE OUT OF PLEIKU.
- B. SEA AREA: MISSIONS ARE FRAGGED IN SAE AREA 9 OR SOMETIMES 11.
- C. AVERAGE NUMBER OF SORTIES FRAGGED: 22 PER WEEK OR BETWEEN 3 AND 4 PER DAY.
- D. COLLECTION TASKING: TACTICAL COMMS ONLY, NO GORS
- E. AVERAGE INTERCEPT PER DAY, IN MINUTES: 340 MANUAL MORSE AND 99 VOICE.
- F. AVERAGE INTERCEPT PER SORTIE, IN MINUTES: 105 MANUAL MORSE AND 30 VOICE.
- G. AVERAGE FLIGHT TIME, MSN AREA TO DA NANG: 30 - 45 MINUTES.
- H. AVERAGE TIME OF GROUND AT DA NANG: 30 MINUTES
- I. AVERAGE FLIGHT TIME, DA NANG TO PLEIKU: 1 HR 05 MINUTES
- J. AVERAGE TOTAL EPAPSED TIME FOR G, H, AND I: 2 HOURS 25 MINUTES - 2 HOURS 40 MINUTES
- K. AVERAGE FLIGHT TIME, MSN AREA TO PLEIKU: 1 HOUR 15 MINUTES.
- L. AVERAGE TIME DELAY FROM TIME OF COUREIR STOP AT DA NANG TO DELIEVEY AT PHU BAI: 5 HOURS.

3. RECALLING THE GROUND RULE ESTABLISHED AT THE BEGINNING THAT THE TIMELY DELIVERY OF PERISHABLE INFORMATION MUST NOT BE JEPPARDIZED, IT IS APPARENT, FROM A PURELY CRYPTOLOGIC OUTLOOK, THAT THE BEST SIGINT SOLUTION WOULD BE COLLOCATION OF THE AVIATION UNIT WITH THE CMA. UNFORTUNATELY, RECALLING THE



SEC STIPULATION THAT...
THEREFORE, THE BEST ALTERNATIVE
WOULD BE THE ELECTRICAL FORWARD
CMA IMMEDIATELY UPON RECOVERY AT PLEIKU PROVIDED THE TIMELI-
NESS OF THE DELIVERY TO USM-808 WAS AT LEAST AS GOOD AS THAT
PROVIDED BY COURIER. THE TIMES REFLECTED IN PARA 2 INDICATE
THAT ELECTRICAL FORWARDING TO USM-808 COULD BEGIN APPROXIMATELY
1 HOUR AND 15 MINUTES AFTER DEPARTURE FROM THE MISSION AREA IF
THE MISSION AIRCRAFT RETURNED DIRECTLY TO PLEIKU INSTEAD OF
STOPPING AT DA NANG. THIS IS IN COMPARISON WITH THE AVERAGE OF
5 HOURS AND 30 MINUTES TO 5 HOURS AND 45 MINUTES FOR THE COURIER
MATERIAL TO REACH PHU BAI.

4. THERE IS MUCH TO RECOMMEND THIS APPROACH, NOT JUST AS AN
ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE COURIER-STOP, BUT, FOR THE LONG
TERM, AS AN EVEN BETTER OPTION THAN THE COURIER-STOP. TO
ILLUSTRATE:

660

NNNN

OSL
NAB011

ORA 016
//ROUTINE//
SSN 18
010636Z
FM 6994SS
TO DET 2 6994SS
ZEM


[REDACTED] FINAL SECTION OF TWO OPS NOV 69

- A. WHILE THE COURIER TIME FROM DA NANG TO PHU BAI HAS IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY IN RECENT WEEKS, IT IS STILL AN UNSTABLE SITUATION THAT CAN AND OFTEN DOES, FLUCTUATE DRASTICALLY FROM DAY TO DAY. IT IS ESPECIALLY AGGRAVATED DURING BAD WEATHER SUCH AS EXISTS NOW IN NORTHERN I CTZ. ELECTRICAL FORWARDING, OVER THE LONG RUN, WILL BE STATISTICALLY MORE REALIZABLE. FURTHER, ELECTRICAL FORWARDING SHOULD, BASED ON THE TIME FACTORS PREVIOUSLY SHOWN, DELIVER THE MATERIAL NOT ONLY FASTER TO USM -808 BUT ALSO IN AN IMMEDIATELY USEABLE CONDITION, AS TRANSCRIPTION WILL HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE.
- B. FOR SOME TIME NOW, AVIATION UNITS HAVE BEEN PREPARING AND FORWARDING TO NSA AND THE CMA, THE SOUTH EAST ASIA TECHNICAL SUMMARY (SEATS) WHICH PROVIDES TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON THE COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY OF ASSIGNED TARGETS. THIS HAS RESULTED IN IMPROVING THE TIMELINESS OF TECH INFO FROM THE AVIATION UNITS TO THE CMA AND TO NSA; IN INCREASING THE INITIAL IDENT RATE OF ARDF FIXES; IN RAISING THE PERCENTAGE OF FIXES CONTAINING CALLSIGNS; AND IN INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF INTERCEPT. THIS CONFIRMS THE VIEW THAT WHEN IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO COLLOCATE THE AVIATION UNIT WITH THE CMA, THAT PERFORMANCE EFFECTIVENESS IMPROVES WHEN TRAFFIC IDENTIFICATION AND DATA PREPARATION IS DONE BY THE COLLECTOR.
5. IF THE COURIER STOPS OF THESE AIRCRAFT AT DA NANG WERE DISCONTINUED, COMPLETE ELECTRICAL FORWARDING OF REQUIRED DATA WOULD HAVE TO BE IMPLEMENTED AS FOLLOWS:
- ELECTRICAL FORWARDING, IMMEDIATELY AFTER RECOVERY, OF ALL MATERIAL NOT PREVIOUSLY PASSED AIR-TO-GROUND.
 - TRANSCRIPTION OF ALL TAPES, IMMEDIATELY UPON RECOVERY, AND ELECTRICAL FORWARDING OF ALL POSSIBLE EXPLOITABLE TRAFFIC.
 - CONTINUED PREPARATION AND FORWARDING OF SEATS ON ALL INTERCEPT.
6. BELIEVE THESE PROCEDURES NOT ONLY WOULD OBIVIATE THE REQUIREMENT FOR A COURIER-STPO AT DA NANG BUT WOULD ALSO SPEED THE DELIVERY OF EXPLOITABLE TRAFFIC TO USM 808; THEREBY ENHANCING OVERALL RESPONSIVENESS TO THE TIME-SENSITIVE REQUIREMENTS OF MACV.
7. ASSUMING USA-563'S CAPABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH ELECTRICAL FORWARDING AS DEFINED ABOVE, AND DEPENDENT ON ITS IMPLEMENTATION, RECOMMEND COURIER-STOPS OF EC-47S AT DA NANG BE DISCONTINUED

CONCERNED, WILL EVALUATE THE
ELECTRICAL FORWARDING VIS-A-VIS THE
APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS. IF YOU CONCUR WITH THIS APPROACH,
RECOMMEND 6994TH ADVISE EARLIEST DATE ELECTRICAL FORWARDING AT
PLEIKU COULD BE STARTED.
680

NNNN

Document 20



IHE 009
 ZORDA 666
 RR YARD IH
 DE YWADK 51 2902100
 ZKZK 33 RNI DE
 R-171855Z
 FM USAFSS
 TO CHIEF USAFSS/FM
 EURSOTYRGM/OCDE/
 P/CSOTYRGM/OPS/
 6921SCTY/G/OPS/
 DET 1 6921SCTY/G/OPS/
 6922SCTY/G/OPS/
 DET 4 6922SCTY/G/OPS/
 6924SCTY/G/OPS/
 DET 1 6924SCTY/G/OPS/
 DET 2 6924SCTY/G/OPS/
 AFSSO WWP/OPS/
 ZFM

TOP
 0530Z
 3
 CEN 604



CHANNELS TWA

AFSSO WWP: PASS TO DET 3, 69455.

1. MAKE FOLLOWING PEN AND INK CHANGES TO USAFSS-200-4, VOLUME (PROVISIONAL DRAFT), 29 JUL 69:

A. PAGE 7, LINE 22:

AFTER "MISSION FUNCTION" INSERT THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: "AT LEAST ONE LINE ENTRY WILL BE REPORTED FOR EACH MANNED POSITION."

B. PAGE 7, LINE 22:

AFTER "(X) POSITIONS" INSERT: "UNLESS THAT POSITION IS USED STRICTLY FOR COLLECTION."

C. PAGE 8, LINES 16, 17, AND 18:

DELETE AND INSERT: "ZZ" COLLECTION ONLY - USED ONLY WHEN NO DATA IS PERFORMED DURING THE MISSION."

D. PAGE 12, LINES 25 AND 26:

DELETE ALL AFTER "EDFX00" AND INSERT THE FOLLOWING:

(4)
 "360 340 10/08/08 04/07 02/02 06/02"

(5) (6) (7-8-9) (10-11) (12-13) (14-15)

E. PAGE 11, LINE 2:

ON THE NEXT LINE INSERT: "(5) 360 - FRAGGED TOT IN MINUTES (PHI DASH IN THIS FIELD FOR 012 ENTRIES)."

F. PAGE 11, LINES 3 THROUGH 10:

RENUMBER SUBPARAGRAPHS 1-UP.

G. PAGE 11, LINE 7:

CHANGE "TARGETS" TO READ "FIXES/OUTS"

H. PAGE 11, LINE 8:

CHANGE "TARGETS" TO READ "FIXES/OUTS"

I. PAGE 12, LINE 19:

ON NEXT LINE INSERT: "003 SPECIAL MISSION SUMMARY."

J. PAGE 12, LINE 13:

AFTER "002" INSERT: "/003"

K. PAGE 12, LINE 14:

DELETE "IN THIS ENTRY" AND INSERT: "IN ENTRIES 001 AND 002."

L. PAGE 12, LINE 15:

DELETE "WILL NOT BE INCLUDED" AND INSERT: "AND SPECIAL MISSION"



DELETED
M. PAGE 12, LINE 25:
DELETE "MISSIONS SCHEDULED" AND
"SCHEDULED FOR THAT DAY AS SPACED"

N. PAGE 12, LINES 21 AND 22:

DELETE ENTIRE EXPLANATION AND INSERT: "NUMBER OF THOSE MISSIONS
REPORTED IN (2) ABOVE ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISHED, EITHER IN FULL OR IN
PART, IF THE MISSION AIRCRAFT FAILS TO REACH EITHER ITS PRIMARY OR
ALTERNATE MISSION AREA (AS DEFINED IN ATTACHMENT 1 OF THIS MANUAL)
PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF THE FRAGGED TIME OVER TGT, IT WILL NOT
INCLUDED IN THIS TOTAL."

O. PAGE 12, LINE 27:

AFTER "(TOT)" INSERT: "AS SPECIFIED IN ACC WEEKLY TASKING MESSAGES."

P. PAGE 12, LINE 28:

DELETE "ACTUAL TIME FLOW OVER TARGET" AND INSERT: "THAT PORTION
THE FRAGGED TOT REPORTED IN (5) ABOVE THAT WAS ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISHED.
TIME SPENT IN AN ALTERNATE AREA DURING THE FRAGGED TOT WILL BE INCLUDED IN
THIS ENTRY, AND AMPLIFYING REMARKS MADE IN SECTION 321, 322, 323."

Q. PAGE 21, LINE 12:

BETWEEN LINES 12 AND 13 INSERT THE FOLLOWING ENTRY:

"5. FRAGGED TOT 26-23 360
29. BLANK"

R. PAGE 21, LINES 13 THROUGH 31:

RENUMBER ENTRY NUMBERS 1-UP AND RENUMBER FIELDING POSITIONS 4-UP.

S. PAGE 22, LINE 21:

AFTER "021/022" AFD "023"

T. PAGE 27, LINE 15:

BETWEEN LINES 17 AND 19 INSERT: "ALTERNATE MISSION AREA, ANY MISSION
AREA TO WHICH A MISSION AIRCRAFT IS DIVERTED BY FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS
FROM EITHER ACC OR THE APPROPRIATE
CMA."

U. PAGES 46 AND 47:

DELETE ALL ENTRIES.

2. REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN USAFSSM 203-4, VOLUME XV (PROVIS-
IONAL DRAFT), 29 JUL 59, INCLUDING THE AFOREMENTIONED CHANGES, BEING
IMPLEMENTED EFFECTIVE WITH THE AJDF DUKMIS FOR 25 OCT 59. FNA

EDITIONS OF VOLUME XV WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE NEXT 60 TO 90
DAYS.
656

ANN

Document 21

NAE 002
OR 006
//ROUTINE//
SSN 750
FM 6994SCTYSO
TO DET 1 6994SCTYSO
DET 2 6994SCTYSO
DET 3 6994SCTYSO
R 240301Z
FM 6994SCTYSO
TO ZEN/DET 1 6994SCTYSO
ZEN/DET 2 6994SCTYSO
ZEN/DET 3 6994SCTYSO
INFO USAFSS (TMA/TAG)
PACSCYRON (OPS-A)
6994SCTYWG (OPS-V)
754

TOR
24/0452Z

9
CCN: /000

CHANNELS ONLY OPS-2 DEC 69
SUBJ: AROF DIRMIS REPORTING
REQUEST THE FOLLOWING INFO BE INCLUDED DAILY IN THE RE-
MARKS SECTION OF DIRMIS: FIX RADIUS 2-0500M/0501-1000M.
THESE FIGURES WILL EQUAL TOTAL IN FIELD 15 OF 012 ENTRIES.
EXAMPLE:
901 FIX RADIUS 17/10
REQUEST THIS IMPLEMENTED IN DIRMIS FOR 251269. THIS
WILL BE A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED
-70




Document 7

8/1008

ELN: 263

147213
071004
//231021TY//
SSN 004



R 020117
FM 020117
TO DTG 1 020117
DTG 2 020117
DTG 3 020117
ZNY




CHANNEL 0000000000
PUBLIC POSITION STATUS REPORT, FOR: USA
REQUEST YOU IMPLEMENT MEASURES TO TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT, C1 TO
REF. 00 AND APPLICABLE USARP SUPPLEMENT FOR REPAIRING
SUBJECT REPORT FROM SCRIPT OF THIS MESSAGE. FOLLOWING
IS AN EXAMPLE OF
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

YK00
FM: USA (1) ADV. POINT (000-000)
TO: CA (1) (TE (01) REF: 017/0000000000-000 YK0100
PAGE 01 000 2 YK0110 PAGE 02 000 2 YK0100 PAGE 03
000 10 YK0100 PAGE 04 000 10 00-000001
OO: USA: 01007 (000000)
OO: USA: IS OPERATIONAL (0000)
YK00
OO: FOR USA REFERS
OO: IS WILL BE FORWARDED AT ROUTINE PRECEDENCE TO USA-50
(OPSM) FOR ACTION AND INFO DIRNSA (OP: ILH) USARP (TMA/
L20), PACSOTYROM (OPSP), USA-251 (SOO-0) USA-561 (OPS-0)
AND APPROPRIATE DST WHEN APPLICABLE.
105



6.102



Document 24

TOP

09/06/372

CCN 342

09/06/372
//OUTLINE//
09/06/372
09/06/372
TO: DST 1, 09/06/372
DET: 09/06/372

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR ACTION: [REDACTED]


TO: 09/06/372
DET: 09/06/372
DET: 09/06/372
DET: 09/06/372

[REDACTED] 09/06/372
[REDACTED] 09/06/372
[REDACTED] 09/06/372

1. YOUR RECEIPT OF A TECH REPORT FROM THE [REDACTED] HOTEL...
THIS DOCUMENT AND [REDACTED] ALL RIGHTS TO [REDACTED]
TECHNICAL MATERIAL DISTRIBUTION ARE [REDACTED]
ELECTRONICALLY, ON THURSDAY OF EACH WEEK, THIS [REDACTED]
REPORT OF ALL CHANGES TO OUR [REDACTED] TECHNICAL MATERIAL
DISTRIBUTION. WE WILL FORWARD THIS CONSOLIDATED [REDACTED]
TECHNICAL REPORT TO YOU [REDACTED] ON [REDACTED] OF EACH WEEK TO [REDACTED]
YOUR [REDACTED] NEGATIVE TECH REPORTS [REDACTED] FOR [REDACTED]
SUBMIT THIS REPORT TO [REDACTED] IN A [REDACTED] REPORT.
FOR THE [REDACTED] YEAR, THIS [REDACTED] TECH REPORT
NUMBER OF THE [REDACTED] YEAR [REDACTED] THE
PREVIOUS YEAR, TO [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THAT THEIR [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] BEING
REVISED AND [REDACTED] FOR [REDACTED] REPORT
OF THE [REDACTED], THE [REDACTED] TECH REPORT IN THE [REDACTED]

2. YOUR RECEIPT OF A TECH REPORT FROM [REDACTED]...
THAT [REDACTED] ONLY TO YOUR [REDACTED] A [REDACTED] LIST
[REDACTED] FOR ALL [REDACTED] TO YOUR [REDACTED]
3. REQUEST ALL [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] UNTIL
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
4. YOUR [REDACTED] OF THE [REDACTED] TECH REPORT AT
YOUR [REDACTED] YOU [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IF NOT [REDACTED]
THIS [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

08
ORA 016
//ROUTINE//
SSN 405
150900Z
FM 6994SS
TO DET 2 6994SS
DET 3 6994SS
ZEM



CN-5

OPS-2 DEC 69.

SUBJ: COMMANDO FORGE OPERATIONS/EXPLOITATION SUMMARY.

1. STARTING 22 DEC 69 THIS OFFICE IS TASKED WITH PROVIDING 7AF WITH INFO CONCERNING ARDF AND ACRP OPERATIONS IN LAOS. THIS IS DUE TO THE ELIMINATION OF THE AFSSO NKP COMMANDO FORGE DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT. IN ORDER TO FULFILL REQUIREMENTS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WILL BE REQUIRED AS SOON AFTER THE END OF THE TASKING WEEK, BUT NOT LATER THAN 0600Z SUNDAY.

2. FOR DET 2 (STEEL TIGER ONLY)

- A. NUMBER OF MISSION TO STEEL TIGER:
- B. TOTAL TIME FRAGGED:
- C. TOTAL TIME FLOWN:
- D. TOT FRAGGED:
- E. TOT FLOWN
- F. NUMBER OF FIXES:
- G. PERCENT IDENTIFIED:
- H. PASSED AIR-TO-GROUND:
- I. MORSE COLLECTED (MINUTES):
- J. VOICE COLLECTED (MINUTES):
- K. NUMBER OF EXPLOITABLE MESSAGES:

3. FOR DET 3 (BARREL ROLL AND STEEL TIGER):

- A. TOTAL TIME FRAGGED:
- B. NUMBER OF EXPLOITABLE MESSAGES:
 - (1) NUMBER EXPLOITED BY DET 3:
 - (2) NUMBER OF MESSAGES FROM DET 2 ACFT EXPLOITED BY DET 3:
- C. ACRP OPERATIONS:
 - (1) NUMBER OF TACREP'S RECEIVED A/G BY DET 3:
 - (1) FROM COMBAT APPLE:
 - (2) FROM COMMANDO LANCE:
 - (3) FROM COMFY ECHO:
 - D. SUPPORT PROVIDED TO 7/13AF AND CAS:
 - (1) NUMBER OF FIXES PROVIDED:
 - (A) FIXES 0-1000M:
 - (B) FIXES 1000-2000M:
 - (C) FIXES OVER 2000M:
 - (2) NUMBER OF TACREPS:
 - (3) NUMBER OF EC-47 EXPLOITABLE MESSAGES:
 - E. SUPPORT PROVIDED TO TFA AND 7AF:
 - (1) NUMBER OF FIXES PROVIDED:
 - (A) FIXES 0-1000M:
 - (B) FIXES 1000-2000M:
 - (C) FIXES OVER 2000M:
 - (2) NUMBER OF TACREP'S
 - (3) NUMBER OF EXPLOITABLE MESSAGES:

4. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE THIS OFFICE WITH STIMATED MAN-HOURS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THIS INFO. FIRST REPORT WILL ARRIVE THIS OFFICE NOT LATER THAN 0600Z 21 DEC 69.

222



IFB 23
RR YMRDIH
DE YMRDOR 19 228055Z
ZKZK RR ARL SCA DE
R 150755Z
FM USA561
TO USA-563
INFO DIRNSA/B 6-222
USAFSS/TED
PACSCYRGN/OPS-A
USA-57
USM-508
ZEM

Handwritten:
16/23
CCN: 585

██████████ CHANNELS OPS-2 AUG 69.

PART 1: FOLLOWING PACSCYRGN OPS-A 151856Z AUG 69 QUOTED FOR UR INFO: QUOTE.
SUBJ: SEATS

REFS: A. DIRNSA/B 6-222 122122Z AUG 69.
B. USAFSS/TED 141930Z AUG 69.


1. REF B QUOTED REF A (PASSED 6922SM BY SSLO 142515Z AUG 69) AND REQUESTS IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEATS PROGRAM AT DET 2, 6994SS. REQUEST 6922SM/6994SS TAKE ACTION TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. INITIALLY IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO TDY SUFFICIENT 202'S FROM DET 1 TO ACCOMPLISH SEATS TASK UNTIL DET 2 PERSONNEL DEVELOP THIS CAPABILITY.
2. TED INFORMS THAT DET 1, IS SKED TO HAVE 16 202'S BY END OF AUG AND MASTER PROGRAM/UDL CHANGES FOR 6994SS/DETS ARE IN FINAL COORDINATION. CHANGES WILL REALIGN SEVERAL FUNCTIONS AND PERMIT EXPANDED ANALYTICAL EFFORT THROUGHOUT 6994SS COMPLEX. UNQUOTE.

PART II. INITIATE ACTION TO IMPLEMENT SEATS ASAP. ADVISE ALL ADDRES OF SKED IMPLEMENTATION DATE. REF UR OPS 150755Z AUG 69: CONTINUE OPSTOP AT PHU BAI TO DROP OFF TRAFFIC AND TAPES. FOR FORWARDING. IF ALL CYS OF TRAFFIC ARE NEEDED ONLY FOR CASE-NOTING, SUGGEST USM-508 MAY BE ABLE TO DO THIS BASED ON UR SEATS, OR DROP OFF TAPES AND RETAIN TRAFFIC FOR DIRECT FADING AFTER CASING. COORDINATE WITH USM-503 AND ADVISE. REF UR OPS 142530Z AUG 69. A1C SHORT WILL RETURN THIS UNIT AT EXPIRATION OF TDY. PLS ADVISE IF ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED BEFORE OR AFTER HIS RETURN.

██████████
██████████
NNNN

001
NY 1 216
DE YHLAKZ Z 2161932
R 041937Z ZFD
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 6994SCTYSQ/CDR
INFO DET 1, 6994SCTYSQ
DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ
AFSSO NKP
6922SCTYWG/OPS
ZEN


SUS



JR Hill
7/12/27
Document 27
cc: 221

CHANNELS CDR
AFSSO NKP PASS TO DET 3, 6994SS
SUBJ: IDENTIFICATION EFFECTIVENESS
REF: USAFSS/CCS 012110Z AUG 69.
1. REF MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO. QUOTE:
A 012110Z
FM USAFSS
TO PACSCTYRGN
ZEN

CHANNELS CDR
SUBJECT: IDENTIFICATION EFFECTIVENESS
SINCE THE INSTITUTION OF THE EXPANDED IDENTIFICATION
PROGRAM AT THE 6994SS, DET 1, DET 2 AND DET 3, THE FIX
IDENTIFICATION RATE HAS SHOWN A STEADY INCREASE AND HAS,
AS A RESULT, PROVIDED OUR CONSUMERS WITH MORE MEANINGFUL
INFORMATION. CONSIDER THIS DEDICATION AND PERSEVERANCE ON
THE PART OF THE ANALYSTS AND FLYING CREWS MOST COMMENDABLE.
PLEASE INSURE THAT ALL RESPONSIBLE ARE INFORMED OF MY
APPRECIATION.
UNQUOTE.
2. WISH TO ADD OUR APPRECIATION TO THAT OF GEN STAPLETON.
CONGRATULATIONS ON A JOB WELL DONE AND KEEP UP THE GOOD WORK.
277



FA



NNNN



00N:0017

SPK

01/09/69

N18612
CR4824
//ROUTINE//
SSM 23
0189102
FM 6994 SS
TO DET 2 6994 SS
ZEN/6994 SS COMM
INFO ZEN/6994 SS SSLO
ZEM



CHANNELS OPS-2 SEP 69.


SUBJ: SPECIAL REPORTING


1. 7AF HAS REQUESTED SPECIAL REPORTING BY EC-47 MSNS FLOWN IN AREAS 611.
2. FOLLOWING EACH ACFT RECOVERY FROM AN AREA 611 MSN, PASS VIA OPS-COMM AT IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE TO 7AF(DIOWA) SPECIAL REPORTS LISTING ALL FIX LOCATIONS, GEPS, AND KNOWN IDENTIFICATIONS.
3. THIS INFO IS REQUIRED TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 7AF TASKING AND OBTAIN TIMELY TARGETING INFORMATION. IF THIS INFO APPEARS LUCRATIVE, UR UNIT MAY BE TASKED WITH AIR/GROUND REPORTING AND IMMEDIATE RELAY TO 7AF.
4. FLAG ALL REPORTS "SPECIAL REPORT AREA 611." FOR 6994 COMM: PASS ALL REPORTS SO FLAGGED TO 7AF(DIOWA) IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIFIED PRECEDENCE.
5. THIS TASKING IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT AND UNTIL SUPERSEDED OR RESCINDED.


155





SPK



















Document 34

B

NABORR

ORA 022

//PRIORITY//

SSN 249

P 070457Z

FM 6994SCTYSO

TO DET 2 6994SCTYSO

INFO DET 3, 6994SCTYSO

ZFM

 OPS NOV 69

EFFECTIVE 17 NOV 69, ADD DET 3, 6994SS AS AN ADDRESSEE TO ALL
EXPLITABLE MSG REPORTS (EMR) RESULTING FROM INTERCEPT ORIGINATING
IN THE STEEL TIGER AREA.


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


END

TOP
07/09/69

CCN-229





IAPV313-S3

26 July 1969

SUBJECT: Report of Quarterly ARDF/Collection Conference

and stated his objective to have battalion units strive for such improvements.

3. Cpt Marquis, Operations Officer of the 33rd RR Co, made the opening statement on behalf of the Collection Management Authority. Cpt Marquis explained that the conference would be an informal discussion. The objective of the conference would be to surface problem areas for discussion and obtain solutions on them either during the conference or if the problems could not be solved by this headquarters or members of this conference, they would be forwarded to higher headquarters.
4. Sp5 Jonathan Miller from the 33rd RRC, spoke on ARDF Tasking and generation of technical data by the CMA to the aviation units. He pointed out that the "Cherry Sheets" reflected terminals that have at least a 33 1/3% probability of making their respective schedules, however, the tactical situation will frequently require terminals to be reflected on the "Cherry Sheets" that have less than 33 1/3% probability of being heard. Additionally new tech data is added to the "Cherry Sheets" based on a daily review of intercept. A new schedule is considered a valid schedule if met three times. If a terminal remains active on a schedule five out of twelve days, the resulting tech data will be reflected continuously on the "Cherry Sheets". Sp5 Miller also mentioned the tech data should be received by all aviation units 24-36 hours prior to the respective mission. If a aviation unit is not in receipt by this time they should call the CMA by phone and ask for immediate retransmission of the data.
5. Sp5 Miller reviewed the ground to air and air to ground tip off procedure. Regarding ground to air procedures, tip offs should be passed in the blind, if no contact can be made. The frequency should always be given first, IAW current AGC Working Aids. From air to ground the information should also be passed in the blind if contact can not be made. The Army aircraft and ground stations are to remain in cipher at all times. The Air Force will make initial callups in plain text then remain in cipher. This is a current problem area for ground monitor stations which is expected to be resolved by the modified KY-8 cypto gear. Trigraph utilization is also a current problem area. A decision will be made by CMA as to the possible elimination of Trigraphs in the tip off procedure. It was brought to the attention of the members of the conference that all priority one targets will be tipped off from ground to air if the station is active. Cpt Parris and Major Dorffi will establish whether CMA special emphasis targets take precedence over the J2/MACV designated priority targets. Both Air Force and Army aviation units desire a change in the format of the Cherry Sheets. They request the time, UTM, and priority be the first three entries for operational ease of completing the mission. CMA agrees and will implement this change in the Cherry Sheets. A question

[REDACTED]

IAPV313-S3

26 July 1969

SUBJECT: Report of Quarterly ARDF/Collection Conference

arose as to what action should be taken by the aircraft personnel if more than one priority one target is scheduled to be fixed at the same time. The decision reached was that the priority one target which has the largest nil heard time will take precedence over the other. Discussions arose as to whether traffic copied in the air, to include plain text, readable and perishable intelligence, should be passed to the ground during the mission. The conclusion reached was collection missions are for collection and unless the intelligence value is extremely critical and perishable, copy or collection would not be sacrificed for time spent on transmission of the traffic to the ground.

6. Sp4 Manning reviewed receive reports and daily fix reports, their use and format. Sp5 Miller pointed out that special emphasis should be placed on accuracy of these reports, i.e. frequency and time, for wide band extraction.

7. The tasking cycle was covered by Sp5 Miller. The CMA for Southern I Corp and all of II Corp is responsible for; requesting ARDF/ABN collection aircraft for analytical areas of responsibility, providing aviation units with tech data when missions are allocated, and for reporting and evaluating results of the tasked missions. The mission requests are based on pattern analysis composed of clusters of enemy terminals. Special requests from DSU's and CMA are forwarded to HQ 509th RR Gp for a review at MACV on Tuesday prior to the tasking period. The allocations of frag points and aircraft are then sent to the CMA which then provides the required TOT's in the form of mission control directives. The time over targets and frag points are based on the productivity of the area, targets most reliable sked times, aircraft availability and weather. The TOT information is forwarded to J2 MACV and the weekly tasking message is then prepared. Techsupport is prepared by the CMA analysts for the MACV tasking. The most timely action on changes of frag points and reviewing TOT effectiveness will be taken by sending requests to CMA direct. It was recommended that all stations with opscom use this means to discuss problems in detail. These discussions will be followed by a formal exchange resolving the problem. There will be times when aircraft will be forced out of the tasked area due weather, artillery, etc. The aircraft will contact the CMA or DSU in frag area and notify the unit of the request for re-fragging. The CMA will notify ACC of the diversion request. In most cases the pilot or navigators suggestions in regards to diverts will be a major factor in the CMA decision for the new frag point. There are inherent difficulties in re-fragging. All productive areas already have missions. The CMA can not always be reached by aircraft in II Corp and Southern I Corp. Additionally the CMA is not aware of the overall weather situation or the artillery being fired. The generation of additional tech data is beyond the current CMA capabilities. It was suggested that the pilots be given pre-flight briefings on concentrations of enemy terminals in their area and the location

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IAPV313-53

26 July 1969

SUBJECT: Report of Quarterly ARDF/Collection Conference


of other ARDF frag points and sorties. Generally, if another frag point cannot be found, effective coverage for search and development will be directed. The aircraft must contact homebase, CMA, or the DSU in their area so that ACC will be aware of locations of all aircraft. A great amount of progress was made in clarifying ACC directives and in reducing the number of interpretations to the various directives. The next ARDF/Collection Conference is expected to be held in October 1969.



ANDREW E. LITTLE
LTC, SigC
Commanding

4








DISTRIBUTION:

509TH RRGF	3 Cys
6994TH SCTY SQ	2 Cys
USF-794	2 Cys
224TH AVN BN	2 Cys
138TH AVN Co.	1 Cy
Det 2, 6994TH SCTY SQ	2 Cys
Det 3, 6994TH SCTY SQ	2 Cys
265TH RR Co.	1 Cy
407TH RR Det	1 Cy
1ST PLT, 138TH AVN Co.	1 Cy
HQ, 1ST MAR Radio BN	2 Cys
Sub-unit One, 1ST MAR Radio BN	1 Cy
<u>INTERNAL</u>	<u>10 Cys</u>
TOTAL	30 Cys



[REDACTED]

REPORT ON THE CMA ARDF CONFERENCE 15-16 SEPT 1969

1. The CMA working level ARDF Conference, sponsored by the Airborne Systems Management Section, 8th Radio Research Field Station, was convened at 0900 hours, 15 September 1969, at the 8th Radio Research Field Station, Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam. Personnel listed below participated in the conference:

Mr. Hugh F. Ferry, GS-13, DODSPECREP
Major Richard W. Mock, 509th RRGP
Major Thomas F. Stokes, 224th Avn Bn (RR)
Major Edward E. Groff, MACV J211-4
Major William E. Dorffl, 509th RRGP (ACC)
Major Edward C. Brinkley, 1st Marine Radio Bn
Major Levi Goldfarb, DODSPECREP
Captain Frank M. Perrin, 509th RRGP (ACC)
Captain Michael Brennan, 138th Avn Co. (RR)
CWO John F. Holterman, 8th RRFS
CWO Donald C. Lanson, 1st Marine Radio Bn
WO1 Alvin L. Long, 138th Avn Co. (RR)
MSG Donald H. Ritter, Det 2, 699th Scty Sq
SFC Jay C. Clay, 8th RRFS
SSG Randolph S. Mitchell, 1st Marine Radio Bn
SSG Daniel W. Bright, Det 2, 699th Scty Sq
SSG George Stallard, 138th Avn Co. (RR)
SP4 Martin D. Jenkins, 265th RRC
SP4 Jesse Temple, 407th RR Det
SP4 Paul Ayars, (Recorder) 8th RRFS

2. LTC Kenneth F. Coykendall, Commanding Officer, 8th RRFS, opened the conference and welcomed the Conferees. He stressed the importance of ARDF to the tactical commander and expressed the hope that the conference would result in an improved ARDF product.

3. Major Joseph F. Short, Operations Officer, 8th RRFS, greeted the delegates and assured them that the full facilities of the field station were at their disposal. He also stated that his office was prepared to cooperate in every way possible to insure the success of the Airborne Systems program in I Corps.

4. CWO John F. Holterman, OIC, Airborne Systems Section, stated that although previous conferences had been devoted solely to ARDF, due to the growing interrelationship of ARDF and Airborne Collection, several subjects pertaining to collection had been placed on the agenda. He then introduced SFC Jay C. Clay, the moderator of the conference.

5. To begin a comprehensive survey of all aspects of tip-offs, SFC Clay reviewed tip-off procedures from the moment of intercept on the ground to the passing of the fix by the aircraft via A/G radio. In the ensuing discussion CPT Brennan pointed out that the present ARDF frequency in I Corps area is overloaded.

[REDACTED]

It was pointed out by SFC Clay that the technical tasking by individual aircraft, as supplied by USM-808, was in strict accordance with ACC directives and was considered the most effective method of tasking yet devised. Major Dorffi raised the question of diverts. He suggested a broad area cherry sheet be produced to cover areas not normally tasked but to which diverted aircraft are often sent. SFC Clay explained that the amount of man-hours which would be expended in compiling and forwarding the additional tech data would be out of proportion to the expected returns, as it would seldom be used. Major Brinkley asked why Radio Designators (RD's) were not used on cherry sheets instead of trigraphs. He maintained this would simplify work in the aircraft as some RD's have several, or even many, trigraphs. Major Dorffi reminded the gathering that DITNSA would not approve the carrying of RD's in the aircraft. SFC Clay observed that the analysts work with RD's, only using the trigraphs for ARDF tasking purposes. He cited one RD as having 19 trigraphs. CPT Perrin said that ACC would approach DITNSA on the question once again. CW4 Holterman brought up the question of the value of cherry sheets, observing that USM-808's cherry sheets are 75-80% accurate, yet returns averaged only about 10%. Several reasons were advanced to explain this situation and CPT Perrin stated that many unidentified fixes may well be targets on the cherry sheets but since no call signs or other identifying factors were copied the identification cannot be substantiated. It was the consensus of opinion that cherry sheets are being used and are of real value. SFC Clay suggested that targets not heard for thirty days be dropped from tasking. Most of the delegates agreed with this proposal and CPT Perrin said he would consult MACV and advise all participants as to the results. Major Stokes observed that one of the best ways to increase the effectiveness of ARDF would be to streamline tip-off procedures and rely on tip-offs solely and do away with cherry sheets. CPT Perrin advanced the opinion that slow adjustment to the tip-off program prohibits that step at this time and that emphasis should be placed on having the air crew pay more attention to tip-offs. Major Stokes said that efforts are being made to simplify cockpit procedures, allowing greater capacity to receive tip-offs.

10. As regards the proper utilization of frequencies on the ARDF net, SFC Clay cautioned that the net was to be used only for the passing of tip-offs O/A and return of fix A/G; that the net should not be tied up with chatter and extraneous transmission. Major Stokes added that tip-offs should take precedence over A/G returns. MSG Ritter asked how four figure exploitable traffic was to be passed A/G. SFC Clay suggested that the Laffing Eagle frequency be used and CPT Perrin and Major Dorffi concurred in this, saying they would coordinate with USM-704 S3/Coll.

11. Recovery Reports. CPT Perrin reported to the conference that forthcoming changes to the Daily Fix Report would require the coded reporting of diverts, the reasons therefore, cuts, tip-offs, etc., in the Recovery Report. CPT Brennan expressed concern over the added workload on the aviation unit that this would entail.

now to improve the tip-off program and not the purpose of the program on the aviation units. In regards to collection tech data, SFC Clay observed that as long as the statistical totals at the bottom were valid, a Recovery Report giving only those totals would be sufficient for reporting purposes.

12. MSG Ritter requested that tasking for low level tactical and VHF targets be more specific. It was agreed generally that a description of low level tactical traffic is difficult to formulate. SFC Clay suggested an exchange of operators between the Air Force aviation units and the CMA and/or Army aviation units so that the more experienced operators might share their knowledge of that type of traffic with others. All agreed this proposal should be implemented. It was also suggested that the search band be narrowed to 2.5-3.5 MHz vico the present 3-6 MHz. Major Mock said that anything in this range is likely to be low level tactical material and very valuable. SFC Clay also suggested that the CMA provide "negative tasking" in the form of lists of targets not to copy in order to avoid duplicate copy.

13. The second day's session opened with a discussion of fix timeliness vs accuracy. It was stated that accuracy on fixes passed A/G is imperative because the tactical commanders react rapidly to ARDF information and when the information is not valid there is a terrific waste of both personnel and material resources. Major Dorffi said navigators at the 460th TRW stated that recent inaccuracies were due to new navigators and the fact that one bad LOP in a series of shots can cause error as the computer cannot differentiate as to the quality of the LOP. WO Long added that replotting on the ground is standard procedure with the Army before releasing recovery report, although it was noted that the problems arise from inaccurate fixes passed A/G. Major Brinkley asked how it was possible for the same target to be fixed at two locations 10-20 kms apart on the same day. Major Dorffi replied that the ACC checks situations such as these through its quality control program and queries the reporting CMA. The question of reporting single LOP's (line bearings) arose and MSG Ritter said that they are reported in the comments section of the Recovery Report along with the position of the aircraft. He added that a compilation of LOP's may be valuable in pattern analysis. CPT Perrin noted that care must be taken so that inexperienced personnel do not misinterpret this information. Pursuing the problem of failing to fix Priority One targets when they have been reported as observed in communications, Major Goldfarb offered several explanations. He said there might not be aircraft in the air at the time, the aircraft may be unable to hear the target, or the use of vague terminology may be part of the problem. He explained that to say a target was up in communications does not specify whether the target was actually transmitting or only receiving traffic.

[REDACTED]

14. On the topic of collection quantity and quality SSG Bright again mentioned the lack of specific guidelines on what to copy. MSG Ritter said operator guides are in the process of being prepared by the Air Force aviation unit in an effort to systemize the collection effort. He also stated that having a traffic identifier on board the aircraft would be very useful, but that currently the weight problem is prohibitive. Major Dorffi and CPT Perrin said that allotted TOT's are being reduced to make the actual TOT more realistic. CPT Perrin went on to say that, hopefully, the ACC will soon be sending quality control feedback on Recovery Reports, cherry sheets, and DFR's to the applicable unit, with no requirement for response unless the receiving unit considers a reply would be useful.

15. CW4 Holterman requested the participants to offer any comments they desired before the conference adjourned. The following comments were forthcoming. Major Groff announced that MACV planned to change the existing eleven MACV areas to eighteen SEA areas which would include Laos. MSG Ritter asked him why some targets last heard in 1968 are still carried on MACV EEI listings. Major Groff explained that MACV J211-4 manages the requirements for the listings but does not itself have the authority to make deletions; that requests for additions and deletions must originate with the CMA. Mr. Ferry commented that NRV has requested that a "Last Heard In Communications" date be included on the listing but that no reply had been received. Major Groff added that an effort must be made to reduce the number of Priority One targets. He said that originally ten per cent of the listed targets were Priority One but that the number had tripled. CPT Perrin stated the CMA should take care to request deletions on unheard targets to aid in updating the listing. As a final comment Major Dorffi announced that ACC would hold an ARDF Conference in Saigon on or about 20 Oct. 69. He said ACC hopes to hold conferences every six months and that he thought the CMA's should continue their quarterly conferences. CW4 Holterman and SFC Clay suggested that quarterly was too often and requested CMA conferences be held semi-annually. Major Dorffi said perhaps the frequency could be reduced and that he would look into the matter. He cited the need for more specific directives concerning the conferences.

16. CW4 Holterman gave a brief wrap up of the topics discussed by the conference and adjourned the meeting after thanking all concerned for their participation and assistance in making the conference a success.

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
699th SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



Document 38
7 October 1969

OPS-2 (SEFE)

Minutes of the SEFE Conference

OIC Mission Management

1. On 6 October 1969 the 699th Security Squadron SEFE conference convened with the following personnel in attendance:

Sgt James T. Lambert	Squadron SEFE	699th Scty Sq
Sgt George B. Montague	Local SEFE	699th Scty Sq
SSgt Donald Payne	Local SEFE	699th Scty Sq, Det 1
SSgt Phil Shzborne	Local SEFE	699th Scty Sq, Det 2
Sgt Donald L. Whitman	Local SEFE	699th Scty Sq, Det 3

2. The first subject discussed pertained to the standardization of the mission checklists:

a. Each unit will use the abbreviated checklist as published in accordance with the C-47-1. This will consist of a separate checklist for each position (X,Y,Z1,Z2) along with a standardized emergency checklist.

b. In addition to a standardized checklist, each unit will make up a flimsy to supplement the abbreviated checklist as required by their particular unit. Flimsies should contain such items as Market Time/Zone Warden (where needed), inflight maintenance, communication procedures, etc.

c. It was decided that the Squadron SEFE would obtain, from the 360 TENS, the published abbreviated checklists and forward copies to the Detachments.

3. Stan/Eval and Emergency Procedures examinations:

a. The Stan/Eval exam was reviewed and changed accordingly to make a standardized 80 question test. An exception was Det 3 who will have only 76 standardized questions due to operating procedures. Each unit will still be required to add 20 optional questions to make a 100 question exam. (Det 3 will require 24 questions)

b. The Emergency Procedures exam was reviewed and found to be adequate except for one question which was changed during the conference.

4. Appointing of IRO's:

a. A review of the IRO narrative exam was made and found to be inadequate and not needed. It was determined to delete the narrative exam and to chose prospective IRO's from the highest qualified Cat III operators. The prospective IRO must obtain a 95% or higher on the Stan/Eval exam, meet a SEFE board consisting of the appropriate SEFE and two (2) qualified IRO's, and pass a Stan/Board checkride while instructing a student.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. 202/203 SEFE's:

a. A review was made to determine the need for local 202/203 SEFE's for the Squadron and Detachments. The Squadron, Det 1, and Det 2 will not require a 202 SEFE due to the small number of 202's presently on airborne status. Det 3 will require a 202 SEFE due to their large number of 202's in airborne slots.

b. The Squadron and Det 2 presently have a local 203 SEFE and Det 3 is in the process of appointing one. There is no requirement for a 203 SEFE at Det 1 due to the fact there are no 203's assigned.

c. It was agreed that the 202 SEFE can administer a Stan/Eval check flight on 202's and 203's when required. This check flight can only cover emergency procedures, airborne and equipment procedures, etc while the ground training section will have to check on career field qualifications.

6. Form 74's:

a. It was agreed to put more emphasis on adding comments in the remarks section. In the past this section has been greatly ignored.

b. It was standardized to have entered in the position block those positions that the student was evaluated on.

7. It was decided that more emphasis is needed in having a better coordination between the Squadron and Detachment SEFE's. All changes and suggestions to the Standardization program will be directly coordinated with the Squadron SEFE before any action is taken.

8. The conference was adjourned at 1600 hours 7 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER

James T. Lamont

JAMES T. LAMONT, SSgt, USAF
Squadron SEFE

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
6994th SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96397



1st Ind to 6994 Security Squadron SEFE Letter, Minutes of the SEFE Conf
7 Oct 1969.

16 OCT 1969

OPS-2


TO: OPS *70*


1. Ref para 2b. These films must contain minimum information required to perform the mission in the fringed area. Appropriate guidance is contained in USAFSSM 205-2, chapter 4, and the forthcoming squadron regulation on Airborne Mission Security.
2. Ref para 4a. The revised squadron regulation 50-1, Aircrew Categorization and Proficiency Training, specifies selection criteria for Instructor Radio Operators and Instructor Maintenance Technicians.
3. Although a 292 SEFE may be fully qualified to perform a Stand/Eval check on an Airborne Analyst (292 or 202) if he is personally qualified as an Airborne Analyst, I do not believe that a 292 SEFE can adequately checkout a 203 Radio Operator. A critical part of evaluating any airborne operator is the judgment by the SEFE of the operator's ability to hear, recognize and copy the targets while in the airborne environment. The ground training section can only estimate a linguist's capability, it cannot evaluate his ability to handle all facets of operating an airborne position under actual conditions. If possible, I would prefer to see a 203 appointed as a squadron SEFE. He need not necessarily be assigned Tan Son Nhut, nor would he be considered as part of the squadron SEFE section. The same rationale applies also to the A301X3's assigned to the units.
4. Ref para 7. The need for closer coordination between all units in relation to the Stand/Eval program was recognized when the governing regulation was rewritten. The SEFE conference which this letter summarizes is a direct result of the revised program concepts. Such meetings are now a quarterly requirement at the local and squadron levels.


Richard T. Osborne


RICHARD T OSBORNE, Capt, USAF
OIC Mission Management


Cy to: 6994 Scty Sq (OPS-3)
Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq (OPS)
Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq (OPS)
Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq (OPS)
















Document 41

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020615Z DEC 69

ROUTINE

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

USAFSS/CSP

INFO: PACSCTYRGN

6922SCTYWG/OPS

6994SCTYSQ/OPS




/OPS DEC 69. SECTION I OF II SECTIONS

SUBJ: CONTROL PROCEDURES/EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION PLANS.

REF: A. CSP MSG 131535Z OCT 69

B. CSP 101537Z NOV 69



1. INFORMATION LISTED BELOW SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

REF A, PARA 4.

A. COMINT AND COMINT-RELATED MATERIAL BY DOCUMENT:

NAME	NO OF COPIES	PORTIONS MAINTAINED
INTRODUCTION TO NUSSO	1	ALL
TECHINS 1001	1	ALL
TECHINS 1002	1	ALL
TECHINS 1003	1	ALL
TECHINS 1042	1	ALL

Dec 69
1 4

2189

TSgt McCoy
Training





KH

KENTON E LAMMERS, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer






TECHINS 1043	1	ALL
TECHINS 1056	1	ALL
TECHINS 2020	1	ALL
TECHINS 2037	2	ALL
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TECHINS 9001	1	ALL
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TECHINS 9010	1	ALL
TECHINS 9810	1	ALL
ACC WORKING AID 01-69	2	ALL
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ACC WORKING AID 05-69	2	ALL
ACC WORKING AID 06-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA B61INFORMAL TECH NOTES 18-69	1	ALL
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DIRNSA TECH SIGINT REPORT 12-69	1	ALL
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DIRNSA TECH SIGINT REPORT 17-69	1	ALL



DIRNSA TECH SIGINT REPORT 19-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA TECH SIGINT REPORT 21-69	1	ALL
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DIRNSA WORKING AID 08-67	1	ALL
DIRNSA WORKING AID 13-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA WORKING AID 17-69	1	ALL
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DIRNSA WORKING AID ND-37-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B62 CER 25-67	1	ALL
DIRNSA B62 WORKING AID 24-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 001/38-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 005-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 006-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 007-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 007-69	3	SORT FX
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 007-69	3	SORT TX
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 007-69	3	CASE
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 016-69	1	ALL
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DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 018-69	1	ALL
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 046-69	1	SORT 1
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 046-69	1	SORT 2
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 046-69	1	SORT 4
DIRNSA B64 TECH SIGINT REPORT 046-69	1	SORT 7
DIRNSA B64 WORKING AID 04-69	2	ALL
DIRNSA B64 WORKING AID 05-69	2	ALL
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ROUTINE

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
DET 2, 699ASCTYSQ

USAFSS/CRP

INFO: 2/ASCTYRMT

6922SCTYRNG/CPS

699ASCTYSQ/CPS



[REDACTED] /CPS DEC 69, SECTION II OF II SECTIONS

NAME	NO OF COPIES	PORTIONS MAINTAINED
DIRNSA 222 TECHNICAL SUP	2	VOL III
DIRNSA 222 TECHNICAL SUP	1	VOL II
DIRNSA B5 DICTIONARY	1	ALL
VIETNAMESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (A-M)	2	ALL
VIETNAMESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (N-Y)	2	ALL
VIETNAMESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (GLOSSARY)	2	ALL
VIETNAMESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (ABREVI)	2	ALL
DIRNSA CIRCULAR 92-1	2	ALL
DIRNSA CIRCULAR 92-11	1	ALL
DIRNSA CCL-102	1	ALL
DIA CONSOLIDATED SOC ADDRESS BOOK	1	ALL

DEC 69

21 5


Sgt McCoy
Plans



RENTON B LATTES, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer



DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.17	1	ALL
DOD DIRECTIVE S-5200.17	1	ALL
USAF INTEL 201-1	1	ALL
USAF INTEL 201-6 & USAFSS Sup 1	1	ALL
INTERNAL SECURITY INDOCTRINATION BROADCASTS	1	ALL
COMMUNICATIONS INTEL INDOCTRINATION	1	ALL
AFM 101-5/USAFSS SUP 2	1	ALL
USAFSSM 9-1	1	VOL III
USAFSSM 26-1	2	VOL III
USAFSSM 50-1	1	ALL
USAFSSM 55-7	2	ALL
USAFSSM 100-1	1	VOL III
USAFSSM 200-4	1	VOL I
USAFSSM 200-4	1	VOL VI
USAFSSM 200-4	1	VOL VII
USAFSSM 200-4	1	VOL IX
USAFSSM 200-4	3	VOL XV
USAFSSM 205-1	1	ALL
USAFSSM 205-2	1	ALL
USAFSSM 205-7	1	ALL
USAFSS MIG NUMBER 7	2	ALL



USAFSEP 178-1-2	1	ALL
USAFSEP 200-3		ALL
USAFSEP 11-6	1	ALL
USAFSEP 55-18 AND 699430TYSQ SUP 1	1	ALL
USAFSEP 55-35	1	ALL
USAFSEP 60-1	1	ALL
USAFSS CCDC STUDY VOLUMES	1	VOL 1-7
USAFSS CCDC STUDY GUIDES	68	ALL
USAFSS CCDC PRE 381-23	82	ALL
PROCEMTRON ODCR 100-69	1	ALL
PROCEMTRON REG 50-1	1	ALL
PROCEMTRON REG 55-6	1	ALL
PROCEMTRON SUMMARY	1	ALL
PROCEMTRON WEP 4-60	1	ALL
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699430TYSQ HISTORY (1 JUL-31 DEC 66)	1	ALL
699430TYSQ HISTORY (1 JAN-30 JUN 67)	1	ALL
699430TYSQ HISTORY (1 JUL-31 DEC 67)	1	ALL
699430TYSQ HISTORY (1 JAN-30 JUN 68)	1	ALL
699430TYSQ HISTORY (1 JUL-31 DEC 68)	1	ALL
699430TYSQ REG 50-1 (TRAINING PROCEDURES FOR ADF AIRCREW MEMBERS)	1	ALL

6994SCOTYSQ RFG 55-1 (ARDF RECOVERY 1 ALL
 REPORTING)
 6994SCOTYSQ^{REG} 55-3 (AIRCREW DUTIES) 1 ALL
 6994SCOTYSQ^{REG} 55-4 (FLIGHT MISSION FOLDERS) 1 ALL
 6994SCOTYSQ^{REG} 55-15 (ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 ALL
 POSITION STATUS REPORT)
 DUTY 2, 6994SCOTYSQ OOI 50-4 (VOICE RADIO 1 ALL
 EFFICIENCY TRAINING)
 DUTY 2, 6994SCOTYSQ OOI 55-1 (ELECTRONIC 1 ALL
 CONTACT POSITION STATUS REPORT)
 DUTY 2, 6994SCOTYSQ^{REG COL} 55-2 (SERVICER RADIO 1 ALL
 OPERATOR)
 DUTY 2, 6994SCOTYSQ^{REG COL} 55-3 (AIRBORNE 1 ALL
 COLLECTION GUIDELINES)
 DUTY 2, 6994SCOTYSQ^{COL} 55-7 (HANDLING CRITICAL 1 ALL
 EMERGENCY)
 DUTY 2, 6994SCOTYSQ^{COL} 55-13 (TRAFFIC AND 1 ALL
 MANTLED TAP DISTRIBUTION)
 DUTY 2, 6994SCOTYSQ^{COL} 55-14 (TECHNICAL AND 1 ALL
 EVALUATION SUPPORT)
 DUTY 2, 6994SCOTYSQ^{COL} 55-26 (ANALYSIS AND 1 ALL
 REPORTING)

[REDACTED]

DET 2, 6994SGTYSQ, ^{OOI}200-2 (IN-STATION 1 ALL
EVALUATION PROGRAM)

DET 2, 6994SGTYSQ OOI 200-4 (CONTROL OF 1 ALL
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL CARRIED ON ARDP MISSION AIRCRAFT)

B. TOTAL NUMBER OF CUBIC FEET OF COMINT ⁹ AND COMINT
RELATED DOCUMENTS ON HAND: 28 CU FT.

C. TOTAL NUMBER OF CUBIC FEET OF COMINT AND COMINT RE-
LATED CORRESPONDENCE ON HAND: 39.6 CU FT

D. TOTAL NUMBER OF CUBIC FEET OF COLLATERAL MATERIAL
ON HAND: 14 CU FT.

E. THIS UNIT HAS NO CLASSIFIED EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN THAT
WHICH IS REPORTED UNDER THE CRYPTO INVENTORY. HOWEVER, IN THE
EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION SITUATION, ALL TEST EQUIPMENT
WILL BE DESTROYED BY MUTILATION.

F. SUFFICIENT DOCUMENT DESTROYERS/EQUIPMENT ARE ON HAND TO
ACCOMPLISH EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION WITHIN TIME GOALS ESTABLISHED
BY REF A, PARA 3B(6).

Document 402

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20 1923
11

MMNNZZ OFJAGGA
RTTEZYUW RUMTEJA 0334 5382205-EEEE--RUALJFA.

ZNY EEEEE
R 040000Z DEC 69

FM USDPSS
TO DET 2 6904 SCTYSG SP PLEIKU AB VIETNAM

BT
UNCLAS E F T O CSP-5
REF TO MSG #20619Z DEC 69. REQUEST YOU FORWARD FOLLOWING
INFORMATION:

- A. NUMBER AND TYPE OF CLASSIFIED CRYPTO EQUIPMENT ON HAND.
- B. NUMBER AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT DESTROYERS ON HAND.

BT
0334

(1) FLIGHT LINE MAINTENANCE

(2) COMMUNICATIONS
AIR TO GROUND LINE/IF
HOT LINE TO HQC

(3) TRANSPORT
FLIGHT LINE MAINTENANCE VEHICLE
CREW TRANSPORT
COMMANDER'S VEHICLE


(4) NORMAL 11-4 SUPPORT
E. 4994 SS

(1) PERSONNEL: 2 OFFICERS, 82 ENLISTED, 1 CIVILIAN
(2) 2423 SF OPS/COM FACILITY (IN SECURE AREA)
(3) 1208 SF MAINTENANCE/SUPPLY FACILITY
(4) COMMUNICATIONS

NORMAL TELEPHONE
KY22 TELEPHONE LINES
(5) TRANSPORTATION
4 VEHICLES

(6) NORMAL 11-4 SUPPORT
2. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MEETING REQUIREMENTS
TO BE FORWARDED TO 7AF OPL BY COB 27 NOV 60. CONSTRUCTION OF NEW
FACILITIES WILL BE ADDRESSED. DIRECT CONTACT WITH 4994 SS
E. 4994 SS IS AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED.

SIMONS, OPLG, 3920. GP-4
END QUOTE
DPLG





Document 44

145214
ZCZC00A780RDC300
PP YW01H
DE YW021 47 3190548
P 152500Z
FM 6994SS
TO PACSOTYRGN/OPS
6994SCTYWG/OPS
6994SCTYSC/COM/OPS
DET 2 6994SCTYSC
ZNY

3.

TOR
1135Z
3

Nov

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CON
0544

██████████ CHANNELS COR

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.


REF A. 6994SS/OPS 152126Z

B. 6994SS/SSLC 140220Z


SUBJ: DET 2 6994 SS RELOCATION.

WAS CALLED BY 746 TFW PLANS PEOPLE FOR AN INVITATION TO ATTEND A
PAD MEETING ON SUBJECT ON 16 NOV, 1500 HOURS LOCAL. I ACCEPTED AND
INFORMED THAT THE COR OF DET 2, 6994-SS AND TPS OFFICER, 6994-SS
WOULD ALSO BE PRESENT AT THAT TIME. INITIAL CONTACTS WITH BASE OF
SUBJECT PORTENDS AN ATTITUDE OF HOW THEY CAN BEST SATISFY THE RE-
QUIREMENT RATHER THAN A NEGATIVE, "CANNOT DO" APPROACH. THE FACT
THAT THEY INTEND TO ESTABLISH A PAD IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THIS AT-
TITUDE. THEY DO HOWEVER HAVE A NUMBER OF OBSTACLES TO OVER COME,
NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH ARE VEHICLES, BILLETING SPACE, REVETER
RAMP SPACE AND FLIGHT LINE MAINTENANCE AREAS.

230



NNNN



Document 43

Spoke 16/07/52

14015
// 2011 //
SSA 220
1 123456
FM DET 2 0004 SGTY 30
TO 0004 SGTY 30/000
ZNY



CHANNELS: OCS, NOV 50.

SUBJECT: CURRENT SECURITY POSTURE OF PLEIKU AB.

1. FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF INFORMATION GATHERED AT A MEETING OF THE PLEIKU AB BASE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 15 NOV 50. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THERE WILL BE A LARGE SCALE PHASE DOWN OF USAF PERSONNEL AT PLEIKU BEGINNING IN OR ABOUT 1 DEC 50 AND CONTINUING UNTIL THE BASE IS TURNED OVER TO THE VNAF IN JULY 51. MOST UNITS ARE TAKING OUTS IN ASSIGNED STRENGTH AT THIS TIME. FOR EXAMPLE, THE 670000 WILL BE REDUCED BY 200 PEOPLE BETWEEN NOW AND 15 DEC 50. AS THE UNITS ARE DIMINISHED IT BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO PROVIDE AUGMENTEES FOR BASE SECURITY FORCES DURING HIGH THREAT PERIODS. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED UNOFFICIALLY TO PROVIDE PERIMETER DEFENSE TEAMS AND I HAVE REFUSED BUT IT IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT, SINCE WE ARE THE THIRD LARGEST UNIT ON BASE, WE WILL BE TASKED WITH SUPPORT BASE DEFENSE.
2. IN ADDITION TO THE USAF REDUCTIONS THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT ARVN FORCES CHARGED WITH SECURITY DEFENSE AROUND PLEIKU PROPER HAVE BEEN OR WILL BE EITHER SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED OR WITHDRAWN. THE THIRD ARVN BANNER UNIT HAS ALREADY BEEN TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER AREA. THEY HAD FORMERLY BEEN TASKED WITH THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTHEASTERN SECTION OF THE PLEIKU DISTRICT.
3. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES HAVE INDICATED A VERY LARGE BUILDUP OF NVA/VN FORCES WITHIN A 50 KILOMETER RADIUS OF PLEIKU AB. BESIDES THE THREAT OF ROCKET/METAR ATTACKS THERE IS NOW AN INCREASED THREAT OF SAPPER ACTIVITY OR EVEN OF ATTACKS BY LARGER FORCES. LOCAL SECURITY ESTIMATES ARE THAT BASE DEFENSE CAPABILITY IS NOW AT THE LOWEST LEVEL SINCE 1950 WHILE THE IMMEDIATE THREAT IS AT ITS HIGHEST LEVEL.
4. WE ARE NOW SUPPORTING BASE SECURITY FORCES WITH ASSISTANCE IN INCLUDING PERIMETER DEFENSE POSITIONS. WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT PROVIDE AUGMENTEES FOR PERIMETER GUARDS.
5. IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT THERE IS VERY LITTLE IN WRITING CONCERNING REDUCTIONS, MOVEMENTS, ETC. ALMOST ALL OF THIS INFORMATION IS WORD-OF-MOUTH BUT FROM RELIABLE SOURCES I.E., CHIEF OF SECURITY POLICE; OCS; SCS; OAVR; ETC.



CAV/K

MAR 877



TOP PRIORITY/
SSN 377
4620007
FM 4901SCOTYSO (SSLO)
TO 75V/PACSCOTYRCV/OPSA/OC
INFO 75M/6000SS
75M/6004SS
DET 1 6004SS
75M/DET 2, 6004SS

5
17/06582
for Document 46
CCW 0595

75M

CHANNELS HARASS PRIVACY SSLO NOV 69.

DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOUR
COURT RELOCATION OF DET TWO
REF YOUR 130187 PARAGRAPH THREE

1. THE PLANS ACTION OFFICER INFORMS THAT NOTHING FIRM CAN BE PLANNED UNTIL DANANG BASE AUTHORITIES DETERMINE THEIR CAPABILITIES TO ACCEPT EC-48S. THIS IS TO BE RECEIVED 20 NOV. THEREAFTER SEVENTH AIR FORCE WILL HOLD A SERIES OF PLANNING MEETINGS. THIS NOTHING, EVEN TENTATIVE CAN BE FORTOLD UNTIL THE END OF THIS MONTH AT THE EARLIEST. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN DANANG RECEIVE EC-48S UNTIL THE EC-48S LEAVE (15 DECEMBER). HOWEVER, NEED TO PREPARE DANANG TO ACCEPT EC-48S PLUS 467/6008 CONSIDERATIONS MAY WELL SLIP THE MOVE UNTIL MARCH 1970.

2. A SEVENTH AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE DIRECTS DANANG TO PREPARE FOR A NUMBER (BELIEVE THIRTEEN) OF PLANS EXPECTED FROM THE 71 BY THE LATTER PART OF NEXT YEAR. INFORMALLY, HAVE LEARNED THE VNAF ALSO WISH TO MOVE A WING THERE. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THIS WILL FORCE DANANG COMMANDER TO REPORT HE CANNOT SUPPORT ANY EC-48S UNLESS ACTIONS ARE TAKEN TO REDUCE OTHER KINDS OF AIRCRAFT OR TO CONSTRUCT RAMP SPACE, ETC. SEVENTH AIR FORCE DOES NOT VIEW CONSTRUCTION FAVORABLE AT THIS TIME EVEN THOUGH AUTHORIZED UNDER CURRENT MACV RULES.

3. PLANNERS WERE RECOGNIZE THAT MOVING SIX AIRCRAFT SOON FROM PLEIKU TO DANANG, THEN LATER CLOSING PLEIKU AND MOVING RESIDUAL TO PHU CAT, AND THEN STILL LATER TRANSFERRING SOME RESOURCES FROM PHU CAT TO DANANG TO BUILD UP THE SUE OPERATION LOCATION INTO A 1500 UNIT INVITES CONFUSION, HARASSES LOCAL MANAGEMENT AND MAY LEAD TO REDUCED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. THEREFORE, THE SEVENTH PLANNING ACTION OFFICER STATES HE WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY ON A PLAN WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE NUMBER OF MOVES AND LESSEN THE CHANCES AND



THE KEY TO SUCH A MOVE IS TO DELAY THE MOVE TO THE
CLOSES, THUS ALLOWING ONLY ONE PERIOD OF MOVEMENT IN WHICH PLETHOR
RESOURCES COULD BE SPLIT AMONG OR BETWEEN A COMBINATION OF DANANG,
PHU CAT AND NAKHON PHANOM.

4. OF CONCERN TO INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONS AND PLANS DIRECTORS IS THE
LACK OF A MACV STATED FORMAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE FUTURE. INCREASINGLY
THE COMMAND SECTION IS QUESTIONING THIS POINT. MACV PLANS TO CALL
A GROUP TOGETHER SHORTLY TO LOOK THREE YEARS OUT FOR THE FUTURE AND,
HOPEFULLY, FORMULATE A REQUIREMENTS STATEMENT. (SSO MACV 1500367
ONLY TO PACOTYSON REFERS) USARP DESIRES IN THIS TIMEFRAME
SHOULD BE KNOWN BY SEVENTH AIR FORCE PRIOR TO THIS MEETING.

5. UNKNOWN HERE ARE MACV'S INTENTIONS REGARDING MWR, UDORN AND
NORTH LAOS. WITH RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL ALB-24 AGE, SIX MORE F-4E's
(ALB-72), AND AN INCREASING NUMBER OF 747's AIRCRAFT (THROUGH
FIELD MODIFICATION) MACV MAY WELL ALTER EMPHASIS IN SEVENTH AIR
FORCE ADF TASKING.


6. SEVENTH PLANS OFFICER STATED THAT IT WOULD APPEAR MOST LOGICAL
FOR ALL PLANNING TO WAIT UNTIL THE FOLLOWING ARE KNOWN:

1. DANANG CAPABILITY.
2. MACV STATED THREE YEAR REQUIREMENTS.
3. AIR FORCE/PACAF/SEVENTH AIR FORCE DESIRES FOR MWR AND COMMANDO
FORCE. FOR INSTANCE, IS IT AIR FORCE POLICY TO FREEZE ARMY ADF
OUT OF LAOS?
4. MWR CAPABILITY (INCLUDING THAI GOVERNMENT AND MAOTHAJ
CONSTRAINTS).
5. B-57/69/40 CAPABILITY TO OPERATE IN VARIOUS POSTURES FROM VARIOUS
AREAS IN FUTURE TIMEFRAMES WITH RESOURCES/AGE THEY HOLD.
6. EXPECTED TEMPE OF PHU CAT AND ITS CAPABILITY UNTIL THEN.
7. IMPACT OF PAR REDUCTIONS ON BOTH FRONT AND BACK END CAPABILITY.
8. ONLY WHEN PARA SIX QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED OFFICIALLY TO SEVENTH
BY PACAF AND OTHERS CAN THE PLANNERS GIVE US ANYTHING BUT
TEMPORARY MAKE-SHIFT SUPPORT IN THEIR OPINION.

9. REALIZE THE ABOVE ASKS MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT ANSWERS, BUT
SEVENTH'S BIGGEST PROBLEM IS THAT PACAF AND MACV APPEAR TO BE
PLANNING INDEPENDENTLY WITH AN UNKNOWN SEA POSTURE AS A FINAL
GOAL. WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS THINGS CLARIFY AND WOULD APPRECIATE
ANY ADVANCED INFO YOU CAN SUPPLY.

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Document 4

19 Nov

IHE3077
 33 Y 301H
 32 Y 302I
 301 Y 301D SVO 301/302 302 1000 20X
 32 Y 302I 92 3020639
 1 1200002
 FM 390430TYSO
 TO PACSCTYRSM/OPS/LOG
 390430TYR3/OPS/AT
 390430TYSO/ODR/SSLO
 DT 2 3904 30TYSO/ODR
 30V

TOR 224373

CCN 6715

██████████ CHANNELS ODR

REF BY ODR 120400Z NOV

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG FM 3904TYR ODR TO 3904 IS QUOTED.

QUOTE

190811Z

390430TY

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SUBJECT: 362 TEAS OPERATING LOCATION (U).

1. REFERENCE YOUR MSG 191011Z NOV 60, SAME SUBJECT.

2. COMMENTS ARE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTION:

A. THE 430S AND 1090S WILL LEAVE CANADA PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF THE 362 TEAS AND 3904SS.

B. THAT AIR CONDITIONED QUARTERS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR THE ENLISTED PERSONNEL OF 3904 SS, BUT ARE REQUIRED FOR 10 ENLISTED PERSONNEL OF THE 362 TEAS. THE 30 OFFICERS OF THE 362 TEAS WILL USE THEIR AIR CONDITIONED QUARTERS.

C. IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO ILLT THE 30 ENLISTED PERSONNEL OF THE WEST SIDE OF CANADA AS.

3. COMMENTS:

A. PERSONNEL QUARTERS ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE COMBINED 42 OFFICERS, 137 ENLISTED AND 1 CIVILIAN.

B. TRANSPORTATION. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 1 M2-4, AIRCRAFT TOWING TRACTOR, NO ASSETS ARE AVAILABLE CANADA AS TO FILL THE TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE 2 UNITS.

C. CIVIL ENGINEERING.

(D) REVENUE AVAILABLE FOR 3 AIRCRAFT.



SECURITY SERVICE... ONLY. NEW CONSTRUCTION WILL BE REQUIRED. POSSIBILITY OF USING MINI-GYMS OR QUONSETS IF AVAILABLE. 2 QUONSETS MAY BE AVAILABLE DURING AS FOR RELOCATION.

(2) REMAINING FACILITY REQUIREMENTS CAN BE MET BY RELOCATING PRESENT UNIT DOWN.

C. COMMUNICATIONS.

(1) REFERENCE 2A (4).

(A) WHAT EQUIPMENT FOR UHF/HF REQUIREMENT WILL BE FURNISHED BY THE 362 TENS?

(B) WHERE IS THE RCG LOCATED?

(C) REFERENCE 2E (4). WILL THE 362 TENS PROVIDE THE RYR?

(3) UPON REPLY TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS, 362 TENS (2E) WILL DETERMINE AND FORWARD CAPABILITY TO MEET ACQUIRED SERVICE. (3A) INCLUDE

DURING MEETING ON

2. WSO NOT COORDINATED WITH THIS UNIT. / 362 TENS, 2. 362 TENS, 3. 1. 362 TENS PROPOSED SOLVING THE BILLETING PROBLEM BY EXPANDING EXISTING UTILIZATION OF OUR TWO MODULUX BARRACKS TO INCLUDE THE OTHER 362 TENS. THE OTHER 362 TENS TO BE BILLETED ON EAST SIDE OF BASE.

3. PARA 20(2) ABOVE WSO. THE STOP CAP CAPABILITY THEY REFER TO IS OUR 362 TENS QUONSET. MINI-GYMS ARE THE MODULUX TYPE STRUCTURES. TWO QUONSETS THEY REFER TO ARE PRESENTLY IN USE AT CAMP. BY INFORMATION OFFICE AND JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL. THESE FUNCTIONS WILL SOON BE MOVED TO PRESENT CAMP. NO OTHER WSO. NO BLEG. COMPLETE APPROX 10 SEC.

4. ABOVE WSO RESPONDS ONLY TO THE G/O 101401Z FOR SIX AOST LEVEL. THEY OF COURSE DO NOT HAVE ANY IDEA OF CONTENTS OF PSR OR 101402Z OR OF ANY OTHER PLANS FOR DAMAGE/PLEIN/PHU CAT.





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SUBJECT: RELOCATION OF 360 TONS/SET-2, 0000 00000
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TO 000000/000/000
INFO: 0000 00000/000
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SUBJECT: RELOCATION OF 360 TONS (U)
IN 00000 000000 000 00
SOME HAS OCCURRED IN DELAY TO MOVE OF 360 TONS FROM FYZ/00
(00000) TO FYZ/00 (JUNT) TO PROVIDE THE ADEQUATE TIME TO STUDY THE
MOST SUITABLE LOCATION FOR THE UNIT. UNQUOTE.
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*Encl. 3-2
and*

*16/0800 Z
Document 49*

PRIORITY
PRIORITY

DET 2, 699ASCFISS

USAFSS/LSO/ME/EDA/TED/TAD

INFO: PACSOTYRGN/LOG

69225COTYRQ/ME/OPS

6994SOTYSS/ME/OPS

[REDACTED] MAT Oct 69

Ref LOG-IP 141105 Oct 69 and Det CDR 050625Z Oct 69 and Det 2 MAT
090855Z Oct 69. 635nd Host Base arranged for Base C-47 to go to
Hue/Phu Bai to remove additional aircraft parts and Det 2 MAT sent
a technician along to assist in recovery of consoles. However, our
technician found two of the consoles missing (1 ea Z console S/N 31
and 1 ea Y console S/N 53). The other Z console S/N 13 and the X
console were still in the aircraft although it was evident that un-
identified personnel had tried to move them and had taken several
inverters and a power supply from the consoles. However, the
recording racks and internal mount plates from the missing consoles
were left on the aircraft. In similar fashion, a large part of the
aircraft electronic systems had been removed as well as some of the

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THOMAS G. WALLACE, Capt, USAF
MARRIAGE OFFICER

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instruments, etc. We have sent a message to the 600th requesting their assistance in locating the missing consoles but have not yet discovered their whereabouts. We have also queried the 460th to see if they had removed any equipment without advising us with negative results. It appears that shortly after the guards were withdrawn, the Army entered the wreckage and removed anything of even remote use. Of the consoles recovered, the X console has been returned to Sanders for overhaul and the Z console is still on station but needs an overhaul. A line filter has been cannibalized from Z console S/N 13 to fill our NORS 21-69 request.

Part II: All items of AIR-35 equipment initially recovered have been repaired and made serviceable with the exception of the antenna preamps which were NRES. The serviceable assets with the exception of the cable harness were turned into Supply. Some of the G equipment was made serviceable but 3 ea G155's, 2 ea G175's, 2 ea G176's, 1 ea G124E and 1 ea G186S were returned to TEMCO for overhaul.

Part III: We will continue to try and recover the consoles but the chances seem slim. It is apparent that no other agency took

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action in response to our CDR message of the 3rd nor were we notified that action was not going to be taken as recommended.

Part IV: Additionally, we have 1 ea Z1 and 1 ea Z2 console, considerable for installation in ACFT 402 upon its return from Commission Control.

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*Document 50
25/10/69*

ROUTINE
ROUTINE

DET 2, 6994TH SGTYSO

6994SGTYSO/IAAT

UNCLASS E F T O OCT 69 IAAT FOR CAPT REESE

SUBJECT: Missing Consoles from Aoft 959

For your information, my discussions with Major Pessin, Officer
In Charge of the 808th at Phu Bai indicates that the Army CID
is investigating the missing consoles. Additionally, we have
sent unclassified pictures of the Y and Z consoles for the CID's
information.

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THOMAS G. WALLACE, Capt, USAF
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Document 51

ROUTINE
ROUTINE

DET 2, 6994SCTYSO

USAFSS/LIA

INFO: PACSCTYRCM/100-1P/WHEELER AFB, HAWAII
6922SCTYNG/MAT/CLARK AFB, PI
6994SCTYSO/MAT

[REDACTED]

MAT Nov 69

SUBJECT: Missing Z and Y Console on Acft 959

We are advised by the 8 RR, FS, at Phu Bai that the Army CID personnel have found the "Y" and "Z" consoles, three of the five "backend" chairs and the Nav table/console. The 362nd and 635rd have been advised and they are trying to have the base C-47 pick up the equipment. The 8 RR, FS is presently storing this equipment. Condition unknown at this time. GP-4

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THOMAS G. WALLACE, Capt, USAF
MATERIAL OFFICER

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ROUTINE
ROUTINE

10/0455Z

DEP 2, 699430FYSD/PLEIKT AB, RVN

USAFSS/L30

INFO: 2AG30FYSD/10G-LB/WHEELER AFB, HAWAII
692230FYSD/MAE/CLARK AB, FI
699430FYSD/MAE/MAIN SON BINH AB, RVN
HAGTIR/MSINA, KH

[REDACTED]

MAE Nov 69

SUBJECT: Missing Consoles on Aft 959

Both the "Z" and "Y" consoles have been recovered. Both are in rather bad shape as they were apparently converted to storage lockers by person or persons unknown. We will ship all consoles back to the Sanders. The Key Console/Table was also recovered and will return this also. Ple advise if you desire other action.

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Nov 69

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
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THOMAS C. WALLACE, Capt, USAF
INSPECTOR

THOMAS

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██████████ MAT

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SUBJECT: Mini Mod Test

Ref my MAT 210841Z July 69, NORS msg 210738Z, PSR msg 161815Z and my MAT 150830Z Jul 69. We still have one Mini Mod out of commission in a NORS status for a 16K computer and, as of 26 July 69, for a Bull T as well. We had previously been down two (2) Mini Mods but have received one computer, SN 101, since that time. However, with both a Bull-T and a computer back ordered NORS, it will not, repeat not, be possible to meet 1 August test date with three Mini Mods in commission. One Mini Mod will be out of commission for at least three weeks. Therefore, recommend that start date for Mini Mod Test be delayed until 1 September 69. It is extremely unlikely we will have all three Mini Mods in commission prior to that time. Pls advise, also coordination with 6922 will be necessary if date is delayed.

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Capt Wallace

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THOMAS G. WALLACE, Capt, USAF
Material Officer

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
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
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
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//R OUTLINE//
SSA 428
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FM DET 2 63 MSC TYSO
TO 63 MSC TYSO/OPS
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


*for Document 56
14/09/10*



OPS SEP 69

SUBJ: MINI-MID TEST.
REF SS ADV MAC 1136 INTER DTG: 12/3 953Z
WE RECEIVED ADDITIONAL ALLOCATED TEST FREQUENCIES AND
USED 45.15MHZ EXTENSIVELY IN TEST FLWNING SEP 69. HOWEVER, WISH TO
POINT OUT THAT FREQ OF 57.45MHZ IS OF LITTLE USE FOR TEST PURPOSES
SINCE WE CANNOT DO ABOVE 30MHZ ANYWAY. DO NOT FEEL IT IS
NECESSARY TO PURCHURE REPLACEMENT FREQ AS TWO (35.95MHZ AND 45.15MHZ)
SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR TEST PURPOSES.
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Document 57

PRIORITY

DET 2, 6994 SGTISQ/PLEIKU AB, VIETNAM

6994 SGTISQ/MAR/TAN SON NHOT AB, VIETNAM

INFO: PACSCTYRGE/OPS-LOG/WHEELER AFB, HAWAII

6922 SGTYSW/MAR/CLARK AFB, HI

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SUBJECT: Mini-Mod Test

Ref my msg MAT 150830Z Jul 69 and PACSCTYRGE msg 161815Z Jul 69.

A Mini Mod Test will be performed by Det 2, 6994th Soty Sq in coordination with the 362nd TMS. The start date for the test will be 1 August 69, providing that there are three (3) Mini Mod aircraft available; two (2) to satisfy MACV tasking requirements and one (1) for the test itself. It is understood that our tasking will be reduced by one (1) Mini Mod during the test period.

1. Objective: To determine the DF capability of the Mini Mod in the VHF band. The following specific factors will be checked:

a. Maximum standoff range against transmitted signals varying from 50m to one watt.

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THOMAS G. WALLACE, Capt, USAF
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- b. Sensitivity of DF system compared to G-175J receivers in the "Z" positions.
- c. Effects of weather at various ranges and output power settings.
- d. Minimum length of time required for a signal to be acquired and fixed.
2. Test Equipment: One Mini Mod aircraft and a locally controlled ground station transmitting on 35.95 MHz. The ground station includes:
- FM 622 receiver/transmitter with a variable power output from one to ten (10) watts.
 - A vertically polarized antenna.
3. Procedures: One Mini Mod aircraft will be defragged for a period of five (5) days commencing 1 Aug 69. The test may be completed prior to the end of this period but weather factors must be taken into consideration. The test aircraft will be thoroughly checked out by Sanders Tech Reps prior to each day's test. The crew will be thoroughly briefed prior to each day's test. Secure communication air/ground/air will be used through Hostia Pad as required. The following basic flight procedure will

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be utilized:

(a. The aircraft will fly a straight line pattern at approximately 9500 ft altitude, starting and finishing at 25 NM at standoff from the ground station. When the ground site is directly off the wing, the standoff range will be 5 NM. A minimum of 12 LCPS, approximately 10 degrees apart, will be taken. The following specific tests will be performed using the above pattern.

(1) The aircraft will make one or more DF runs with the ground site putting out one (1), five (5) and ten (10) watts. This basic test will be attempted in both good and poor weather conditions as determined locally.

(2) Purpose is to check accuracy and capability of the Mini Mod on various signal strengths (i.e. power output). Effects of weather may also be calculated somewhat.

b. The aircraft will lock onto the signal at approximately six miles standoff using the straight line pattern and the time required to fix the target from lock on will be determined.

(1) Purpose is to determine length of time to lock on and fix a given signal (A thirty degree spread is required

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for a fix).

c. With an output of one (1) watt, the aircraft will fly a straight line DF pattern beginning at 5 NM and continuing away from the ground site until the DF system becomes erratic.

(1) DF cuts will be taken every zero-point-five (0.5) NMs and the maximum distance at which the system is capable will be recorded.

(2) The aircraft will continue to fly away from the transmitter until the signal becomes unreadable on the Z1/Z2 positions.

(3) This procedure will be reversed with the aircraft flying back toward the station.

(4) Purpose is to determine "Z" position sensitivity versus the DF system.

4. Data requirements for each test will include, but not be limited to:

- a. Ground station output
- b. Location of Doppler Zero Point (DZP)
- c. Doppler correction after each phase of a test.
- d. Weather conditions

3. *As shown?*

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c. Acft altitude.

5. Request that knowledgeable individual from 6922nd be sent TDY to observe test and assist in our analysis. Data derived from the tests will be analyzed after each flight, recorded and forwarded after the completion of the test to 6994th Soty Sq for complete analysis and distribution.

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Document 58

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27 OCT 1969

DET 2, 6994SCFYSO/PLEIKU AB, VIETNAM

WRAMA/WRIGHT/ROBBINS AFB, GA

INFO: USAFSS/LSM

USAF DIRECTOR OF AEROSPACE SAFETY (AFD1-AS2),

NORTON AFB, CALIF

AFLC/AFTN: MCM/WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB, OHIO

PACSCFYRGN /LOG M/WHEELER AFB, HAWAII

6922SCFYWG/MAT/CLARK AFB, FI

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MAT/TAN SON NHUT AB, VIETNAM

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SUBJECT: EUR

The following EUR is submitted IAW T.O. 00-35D-54

- A. M-Mission Failure
- B. EC47E/H/O, Nav Converter, 016-22-DOOOPWR Supply
- C. FJ
- D. A
- E. 001-Spares 2 001-GAP 20
- 003 - Spares 1 MFC01 GAP 12.

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Oct 69

TSgt Czibbet

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WALLACE, CAPT, USAF
OFFICER

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aircraft. The power Supply assembly had overheated and in a bench check of the unit had an excessive ripple on all voltage outputs.

b. Unit failed on 17 Oct 69, SN MRC03-12

Symptoms: The navigational inputs of aircraft position, heading, roll were being displayed erratically. The case of the converter was extremely hot. The power supply assembly was checked and the +5 volt output was 0 volts. The assembly had been extremely hot and had caused CR-17 to open.

c. Unit failed on 21 Oct 69, SN 007-GAP-17

Symptoms: A sensor fault message appeared whenever main function was initiated. The case of the converter was extremely hot. During a bench check of the converter, the power supply assembly +5 volt DC supply was 4.802 volts with 1.5 volts ripple. The +15VDC and -15VDC supplies also had 1.5 volts of ripple.

d. Unit fail on 22 Oct 69, SN 025-30

Symptoms: Improper erratic conversion of all navigational inputs (max roll was a constant 90 degree). The case of the converter was extremely hot. On a bench check the output of the +5VDC supply read +5.138V with 520mV of ripple; the +15V supply read +15.09V with 520mV of ripple; the -15V supply read -14.88V with 520mV of

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ripple. Tolerance on the +5VDC is 200 M/V maximum. Tolerance on the +15VDC is 50 M/V maximum. Tolerance on the -15VDC is 50 M/V maximum.

e. Unit failed on 24 oct 69, SN 001- Spares 2

Symptoms: After 30 minutes of flight the along course co-ordinate of the doppler, printer and displayed, began to disagree with the doppler dials and caused large across course corrections during Nav up dates. On bench check the power supply assy +5VDC read +4.97 volts with 400 M/V of ripple, the +15VDC read +16.86 volts with 1000 M/V of ripple, the -15VDC read -15.02 volts with 350 M/V of ripple.


f. Unit failed 25 Oct 69, SN 003-Spares 1

Symptoms: After 30 minutes of flight the aircraft position data of along course and across course began to fluctuate and not follow the doppler dials. The case of the converter was extremely hot. On bench check the +5VDC read +4.971V with 320 M/V of ripple; the +15VDC read +15VDC with 300 M/V of ripple and the -15VDC read -15.02VDC with 300 M/V of ripple. The conformative coating of both the A12 and A13 cards had turned a dark brown and the solder runs of A12, AR6 and B19 had melted from extreme heat.

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V. Recommendations: 1. A cooling fan be installed and holes drilled in the case of the converter to provide adequate cooling of the power supply assembly in the converter along with increased filtering to eliminate the ripple. 2. complete isolation via a separate power supply with sufficient cooling to prevent recurrence.



W. Units AMP no exhibit required.

X. Myron S. Gibbet, TSgt, Det 2, 6994 Stry Sq. Duty Phone - 3738, barracks phone - 3967.

Y. Validation: Chief of Maintenance, Indications are that continued usage over a period of time causes power supply to break down. More failures can be expected with a commensurate problem in Supply keeping pace with our consumption.

Z. Items not under warranty.

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ROUTINE

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RTTSZYUW RUHWHA6584 3650047-SSSS--RUMJFA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 310022Z DEC 69
FM PACSCTYRGN WHEELER AFB HAW
TO RUSQNSA/6994SCTYSQ MAT TSN AFLD PWDITCOM
INFO RUMJGA/DET 1 6994SCTYSQ MAT PHU CAT RVN 699435
RUMJFA/DET 2 6994SCTYSQ MAT PLEIKU AB RVN
RUMTEJA/USAFS LMM
RUMWTA/6922SPT SQ MAT M CLARK AB PI
BT

LOG-MPA

SUBJECT: G-133 RECEIVER MAINTENANCE. AN ANALYSIS ON THE G-133 RECEIVER, USING REPORT 5, HAS BEEN PERFORMED AND THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS EXTRACTED:

1. IN THE 6994 SCTY SQ COMPLEX A STEADY INCREASE FROM 162.2 MANHOURS IN JULY TO 592.5 MANHOURS IN OCT WAS NOTED. DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ ACCOUNTED FOR MOST OF THIS INCREASE. 58.9 HOURS IN JULY TO 415.0 HOURS IN OCT.
2. BASED ON THE ABOVE, AN ANALYSIS OF THIS RECEIVER AT THE 6994TH COMPLEX WAS PERFORMED REVEALING THE FOLLOWING: DET 2 ACCOUNTED FOR 42.9PCT OF THE TOTAL G-133 MAINTENANCE PERFORMED IN THE RGN. IN ADDITION THEY ACCOUNTED FOR 46.6PCT


PAGE 2 RUHWHA6584

- OF REMOVE AND REPLACE ACTIONS, 45.8PCT OF BENCH CHECK AND REPAIRED, 35.2PCT OF ACTIONS WITH HOW MALFUNCTION CODE "NO DEFECT," AND 80.6PCT OF ACTIONS WITH HOW MALFUNCTIONS "NO OUTPUT."
3. OUR RECORDS DO NOT SHOW THAT DET 2 HAS ANY MORE G-133 RECEIVERS THAN ANY OTHER TO MAKE THIS GREAT AMOUNT OF DIFFERENCE. THEY CONSUME ALMOST TWICE AS MANY MANHOURS PER UNIT OF EQUIPMENT AND PER MISSION AS THE OTHER UNITS.
4. OF MAJOR CONCERN IS THAT DET 2, WITH 26.5PCT OF THE RGN G-133 INVENTORY, DOCUMENTED 46.6PCT OF ALL REMOVE AND REPLACE ACTIONS.
5. BASED ON DATA EXTRACTED, WE CANNOT DETERMINE WHY DET 2 IS EXPENDING SO MANY MANHOURS ON THIS RECEIVER. PERHAPS ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WILL IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM(S).
 - A. SINCE THIS UNIT HAS ALL OF THE EC-47Q TYPE A/C, COULD CABLING, POWER, ETC CAUSE REPETITIVE FAILURES?
 - B. ARE CERTAIN TRENDS ESTABLISHED ON PARTS BEING REPLACED THAT MAY REQUIRE ENGINEERING STUDY?
 - C. ARE TECHNICIANS ADEQUATELY TRAINED ON THE MAINTENANCE

PAGE 3 RUHWHA6584

- OF THIS EQUIPMENT?
- D. ARE SUPERVISORS PERFORMING REQUIRED PRODUCTION INSPECTIONS?
- E. IS TRAVEL TIME TO AND FROM THE JOB INCLUDED IN THE MANHOURS DOCUMENTED AGAINST THE G-133? IF SO, WHAT IS THE AVERAGE MANHOURS PER ACTION FOR TRAVEL TIME?

MAT 69-496



File: 12

12/06/2008

Document 60

ROUTINE

DET 2 6994 SCTY SQ/MAT

6994 SCTY SQ/MAT



Ref PSR LOG-MPA 310022Z DEC 69. Subject G-133 Receiver Maintenance.
The following information is submitted to assist you in analyzing the G-133 maintenance at Det 2.

1. In late August and throughout September and October we were experimenting with a new 100 hour phase procedure on the EC-47 aircraft. This entailed a right side Z and Y console power-on phase as well as a power-on phase of the X console. After some experimentation, the basic approach was to use a signal generator (606) to input a signal into the HF and VHF cables and record actual values at the receivers, then input the 606 directly into the receiver. The purpose was to not only check the actual performance of the receiver but also to verify the cabling, etc on the right side. A good many minor (slightly less than specifications) malfunctions were noted during September and October with both the cables and receivers, hence the large increase in "Off Equipment" and "On

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Captain Wallace

THOMAS G. WALLACE, Captain, USAF
Materiel Officer



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ROUTINE

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Equipment, Fail" in September and October. This has dwindled in November and December as can be noted from the Report #5 as the aircraft were brought up to a higher standard of performance.

2. The reports also show a large increase in manhours for "Off Equipment, Non Fail" in October and November which is attributable to the fact that as our technicians became more experienced using the signal generator and realizing that their "ear" was not as good a standard as the 606, they began removing and replacing G-133's and running them through the shop instead of just using CND on the flight line when dealing with audio type problems. It should be noted that the 606 signal generator is too bulky and sensitive to use as a flightline piece of test equipment for routine writeups. A high portion of these receivers were in fact satisfactory during the shop checkout and hence the high "Off Equipment, Non Fail" rate.

3. As the entire fleet was brought up to the higher standard, our "weak" and "audio" writeups were reduced and a signal generator not necessary, as reflected by the drop in these categories on December's Report #5.

4. We fully realize that it would be preferable to use some type of signal generator on the flightline rather than the, at times, needless R&R actions noted during November and December, however the 606 is unsuitable as noted above. We are presently exploring the possibilities of a unit the size of a model 200CD with sufficient frequency coverage for our needs.

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ROUTINE

Captain Wallace

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3738

5. The large increases in C-133 manhour consumption are therefore primarily due to an attempt to raise the flightline standard of our 133's to what is really a shop standard.

6. As to the "How Malf" codes, we do routinely have a high number of "No defect" actions which do not recur. As to the "No Output, Incorrect Output" code, this is an internal problem and will be remedied as it appears the technicians are not describing the malfunctions as fully as they should, but rather generally using "255" on any type of audio writeup.

7. The following specific answers are provided to your referenced questions:

- a. No.
- b. No.
- c. Extremely well qualified.
- d. Yes.
- e. Yes, approximately twenty minutes on a work order for travel

both ways.

8. Greatly appreciate your interest and concern.

GP-1.

MAT 70-20

[REDACTED]

NNNNZCFJA543
RTT SZ YUV RUHHWA4061 3230155-SSSS--RUMIJFA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 19012Z NOV 69
FM PACSCTYRGN WHEELER AFB HAWAII
TO RUSQNSA/6994SCTYSQ MAT TSN AB RVN
RUMIJFA/DET 2 6994SCTYSQ MAT FLEIKU AB RVN
INFO RUMWTA/6922STPSQ MAT CLARK AB PI

19/0832
17/015
File: 51
946
Document 61
#4211
ROUTINE

BT
[REDACTED] LOG MPA

SUBJ: ALR-35 COMPUTERS

THE COMBAT COUGAR PROGRAM IS STILL EXPERIENCING NUMEROUS FAILURES IN THE COMPUTER AND THE MISSION IS BEING IMPAIRED. INFORMATION FROM SANDERS AND NOTRONICS INDICATES HARD FAILURES OF THE COMPUTER ARE RANDOM IN NATURE. DURING THE PERIOD MAY THROUGH AUGUST (16) COMPUTERS WERE RETURNED FROM SEA. 9 OF THESE COMPUTER FAILURES WAS DUE TO PHYSICAL HANDLING. AFTER STUDYING THE INDIVIDUAL REPORTS FOR THE (16) COMPUTERS THAT WERE RETURNED DURING THE MAY-AUG TIME FRAME THE FOLLOWING IS APPARENT. THE COMPUTERS ARE BEING MISHANDLED, DIRTY, AND SOME EVEN HAD BRAVEL INSIDE. ASD RECOMMENDS THAT A FILED REPRESENTATIVE FROM NOTRONICS BE

ACTION

INFO

PAGE 2 RUHHWA4061 [REDACTED]
SENT TO SEA TO ASSIST IN FIELD OPERATIONS AND COLLECT INFORMATION. THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY NOTRONICS TO PROVIDE PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT.

- A. PROVIDE A THERMAL AND VIBRATION BURN-IN CYCLE ON ALL NEW AND REPAIRED COMPUTERS.
- B. MODIFIED POWER SUPPLY WIRING TO REDUCE NOISE PICK-UP.
- C. CHANGED POWER SUPPLY SWITCHING TRANSISTORS.
- D. DEVELOPED MORE STRINGENT TEST PROCEDURES IN THE FINAL TEST AREA. MAXIMUM SUPPORT IN THE CARE AND HANDLING, AREA WILL IMPROVE THE ALR-35 COMPUTER PROBLEMS. REQUEST YOU TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES TO INSURE COMPUTERS ARE PROPERLY HANDLED AND PREPARED FOR SHIPMENT. GP-1

BT

4061

MAT 69-414

16 NNNN

77-1-59-292

PRIORITY



File
W

NNNN

CZCFJA927
PTTSZYUW RUSQSN0876 3381044-SSSS--RUMJFA.
ZNY SSSSS
P 040822Z DEC 69
FM 6994SCTYSO TSN AB RVN
TO RUHHWA/PAGSCTYRGN/LOG WHEELER AFB HAW
RUMJFA/DET 2 6994SCTYSO/MAT/CDR FLEIKU AB RVN
INFO RUMWTA/6922SPTSQ/MAT CLARK AB PI
BT

16
0799
BR
Document 62

CDR DEC 69
(DELIVER DURING FIRST DUTY HOURS) SUBJ: COMPUTERS.
REF: A. WRNT 281515Z NOV 69
B. WRNT 281516Z NOV 69
C. WRNT 282056Z NOV 69
D. WRNT 282057Z NOV 69
E. DET 2 6994SS CDR 030723Z DEC 69 (NOTAL)

ACTION | 6994
INFO |

1100-4561

WE ARE CONDUCTING A THROUGH EXAMINATION OF COMPUTER DAMAGE TO ITEMS SHIPPED FROM DET 2. FLEIKU IS IN A DUSTY/DIRTY AREA AND EQUIPMENT INSTALLED ON AIRCRAFT WILL NATURALLY BECOME DIRTY AND GRIMY DURING THE COURSE OF OPERATION. THERE ARE SEVERAL HOLES IN THE COMPUTER WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR COOLING. IF DUST AND DIRT ARE CAUSING DAMAGE, SUGGEST DESIGN CHANGES/PLASTIC CASES BE ENGINEERED TO PRECLUDE THIS. WE HAVE NO FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR

MAT 69-455

PAGE 2 RUSQSN0876
REMOVING ALL DIRT FROM COMPUTERS. BROKEN SEALS CAN HARDLY BE GLASSED AS DAMAGE AS THEY MUST BE BROKEN TO EXCHANGE MODULES DURING COURSE OF NORMAL REPAIR. ANY EQUIPMENT EXCHANGED INHSP AIRCRAFT WITH ANY REGULEMITY AS COMPUTERS ARE WILL BE SUBJECT TO SOME SCRATCHES AND NICKS AND THIS WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ELIMINATE ENTIRELY. WE HAVE DIRECTED THAT PROPER HANDLING AND PACKING BE STRESSED BY ALL CONCERNED WITH THE MAINT/SUPPLY OIC/NOIC INSPECTING EACH COMPUTER PRIOR TO PACKING FOR ANY DAMAGE OR DIRT. IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL OF THIS SQUADRON WOULD MISHANDLE ANY TYPE OF ELECTRONIC GEAR. THE COMPUTERS ARE BEING REPACKED AND SHIPPED IN ORIGINAL CONTAINERS. FOR DET 2 THE MAINTENANCE OFFICERS OF THIS SQUADRON WILL INSPECT EACH INCOMING COMPUTER FOR DAMAGE AND REPORT IT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS. PHOTOGRAPHS OF DAMAGE WILL ACCOMPANY THIS REPORT. IN ADDITION, REQUEST SANDERS TECH REP BE PRESENT DURING OPENING/

BT
0876



AD...
11/11/69
11/11/69

NOZOFJAS73

EZYU RUMHHA 1244 3380323-EEEE--RUMJFA.
EEEE.

A 000127Z DEC 69
FM PACSOTYRGN WHEELER AFB HAWAII
TO AIG 3310
BT

ROUTINE

Document 63

UNCLAS E F T O LOG-L

SUBJ: LATERAL ASSISTANCE FOR NORS ITEMS.

1. PSR SUP 1 TO USAFSSR 67-11 IS BEING RESCINDED AND NEW PROCEDURES WILL BE DISTRIBUTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IN THE INTERIM THE FOLG PROCEDURES WILL APPLY: UNITS WILL REQUEST MOST SMO NORS CONTROL SECTION TO COMPLY WITH PACAFR 67-2 IN OBTAINING LATERAL ASSISTANCE, USING PACAF SNOD LISTING TO FULLEST EXTENT. LATERAL ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORT OF "G" EQUIP WILL BE REQUESTED ONLY FR UNITS WITH FX ACCOUNTS. ITEM 12 OF NORS MSG WILL INCLUDE LATERAL ASSIST ACTION TAKEN. FOR 6988/6987SOTYGP SMO. USE PACAF SNOD LISTING TO DETERMINE LATERAL ASSIST CONTACTS AND INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN IN ITEM 12 OF NORS MSG.

*Sgt Hargrove
Handwritten
to PSR
6 Dec 69
RM*

2. REQUEST EA UNIT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT NLT 11 DEC 69.
BT

418


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Received FROM Host SUPPL

CCN: 1080

Department 64

3/09037




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RR YMRD IH
DE YHLAKZ 23 242030Z
R 300140Z
FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 6924 SCTYSQ (COM)
DET 2, 6994 SECTYSQ (COM)
USAFSS (TTP)
INFO YMZAOLC/6922 SPTSQ
6994 SCTYSQ (COM)
DET 1, 6921 SCTYWG (COM)
AFCD (DMCP/DMCC)
YADAOLC/6989 SPTSQ (COM)
ZEM



COM-S
SUBJ: SECURE VOICE HOTLINE 6924SS/DET 10
REF: A. USAFSS TTP 142127Z AUG 69. (NOTAL).
B. PSR COM-S 230006Z AUG 69 (NOTAL).
C. USAFSS TTP 281835Z AUG 69 (NOTAL).

FOR DET 2 6994 SVTYSQ. REQUEST YOU SHIP TWO EACH KY-3S VIA ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE TO THE 6924 SCTYSQ, COMSEC ACCOUNT 616277. AUTHORITY FOR SHIPMENT IS REF. "C" SHIPPING DIRECTIVE 69-3 FDDDDU-94/2-24-101 APPLIES. ADVISE ABOVE ADDRES OF SHIPPING INFO. FOR 6924 SCTYSQ. ADVISE RECEIPT OF THE ABOVE EQUIPMENT. ISSUE ON OF THE KY-3'S TO DET 10, 100TH SRW ON A HAND RECEIPT. INFORMATION AVAILABLE HEREHIS THAT THE 1972 COMM SQ HAS ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THIS EQUIP. ADVISE OF ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN SECURING SUBJ HOT LINE. FOR USAFSS: SHIPPING DIRECTIVE ASSIGNED IN REF "A" WAS USED FOR SHIPMENT. SHIPPING UNIT DESIGNATOR WAS CHANGED TO COMPLY WITH NEW INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REF "C"

243



NNNN

#1

ROUTINE

NNNN CZCFJA 272
 FTTSZYUW RUMHWA 4763 3250033-SSSS--RUMLJFA.
 ZNY SSSSS
 R 210018Z NOV 69
 FM PACSCTYRGN WHEELER AFB HAWAII
 TO ZEN/PACGFEIARGN GEPOI WHEELER AFB HAWAII
 ZEN/PACCOMAREA XP WHEELER AFB HAWAII
 RUMTEJA/AFCD DCSP
 RUSOSNA/7AF DE TSN AB RVN
 RUMTEJA/USAFSS TTP
 RUSOSNA/6994SCTYSO COM TSN AB RVN
 RUMLJFA/DET 1 6994 SCTYSO COM PHU CAT AB RVN
 RUMLJFA/DET 2 6994 SCTYSO COM PLEIKU AB RVN
 RUMWIA/6922 SPTSQ COM CLARK AB PI
 BT

Handwritten:
 2/1/69
 14/ 6994
 Document 667
 6994
 INFO 7009118

SUBJECT: REMOVAL OF KY-8/GRC-27 A/G/A FACILITIES AT 6994SS,
 DET 1, 6994SS AND DET 2 6994SS.

1. HQ USAFSS HAS MADE A DECISION TO DEACTIVATE AND REMOVE THE
 SECURE VOICE A/G/A FACILITIES AT 6994SS AND DETS 1 AND 2. DIS-
 POSITION INSTRUCTIONS FOR KY-8'S WERE PROVIDED BY AFCD IN THEIR
 MSG DFCC 172105Z NOV 69 (NOTAL. PACCOMAREA WILL PROVIDE
 DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS TO THE LOCAL AFCS SQUADRON FOR AN/GRC-


PAGE 2 RUMHWA 4763
 27 RADIO EQUIPMENT.

2. IN VIEW OF USAFSS DECISION, THE SCFEL FE4CG1(C) PACKAGES
 PROGRAMMED UNDER AF FORM 524 COM: USO-69-0229 ARE NO LONGER
 REQUIRED AND ARE TO BE DELETED FROM THE AF FORM 524 AND C-E
 SCHEME 0028AOKO-ZYZZ-9292 USING THIS MSG AS AUTHORITY.
3. FOR 6994 SS: REFUR. COMM 150240Z NOV 69. THE SUBMISSION OF
 AFTO FORM 89 FOR C-E SCHEME 0028AOKO WILL ACCOMPLISH THE NECESS-
 ARY NOT BE REQUIREMENT FOR DET 1 TO SUBMIT AN AF FORM 1146
 SINCE THE FACILITIES ARE TO BE REMOVED.
4. FOR DET 1 6994SS: REQUEST YOU DISCONTINUE WEEKLY IN-
 STALLATION PROGRESS REPORTING ON SCHEME 0028AOKO AND, IF YOU
 HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, SUBMIT "USER INSTALLED" AFTO FOR
 89 DIRECTLY TO PAC GERIA RGN ON THIS SCHEME. IN ADDITION, EXECUTE
 AFTO FORM 89 WITHOUT THE 1903 COMM SQ ASSISTANCE AND DISTRIBUTE
 ACCORDING TO T O 31-1-2. ABOVE ACTIONS ARE TO PURGE SCHEME FROM
 GERIA SYSTEM ONLY. GP-1.

BT
 4763

Handwritten: MAT 69-424

Handwritten: ADM 69-301






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107 30/0247 7

THE 69920200A3900
FM YFRLIH
TO USAFSS/TTP
ASAPAC/IAFSIG
INFO 529RAG
6994 SOTYSO
DET 1 6994 SOTYSO
DET 2 6994 SOTYSO
6918 SOTYSO
USAFSS HAKATA
ZNY

Document 68

COM-3
SUBJ: COMMANDO MERCURY SUPPORT
ASAPAC HAS ADVISED THEY CAN FURNISH KSR'S AND CRYPTO EQUIP-
MENT TO SATISFY THE TERMINAL REQUIREMENT AT HAKATA, BUT ARE
UNABLE TO PROVIDE ASSETS. WE PROPOSE TO IMMEDIATELY INACTIVATE
OCT ENGINEER HILL FLT LINE AT PLEIKU, SINCE PLEIKU IS SCHEDULED
FOR CLOSURE APPROXIMATELY FY99. CRITICOMM TRAFFIC TO/FROM
2 CAN BE PASSED VIA 529RAG UNTIL ACTIVATION OF DET 1, 6994/CRS
MHA TRNG CRT SCHEDULED FOR 1 APR 99. DET 2 CRITICOMM TRAFFIC
CAN THEN BE PASSED FROM DET 2 TO DET 1 FOR TRANSMISSION TO
CRS MHA TRNG FOR CRITICOMM ENTRY. ASAPAC HAS ALSO REQUESTED
WE FURNISH KITS TO LOW-LEVEL TTY EQUIPMENT. HAKATA REHAB IS
AT WORK STORAGE AND STATION WILL OPERATE HI LEVEL UNTIL REHAB
IS COMPLETED.
FOR USAFSS: SUBJECT TO ASAPAC CONCURRENCE TO HANDLE DET 2,
6994SS CRITICOMM TRAFFIC AT 529RAG FOR PERIOD MENTIONED ABOVE.
REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE TO REMOVE AM SHIP PLEIKU ASSETS TO
HAKATA. SHIPPING DIRECTIVE REQUIRED. EXCESS KSR AT HAK WILL
AM FLT LINE FACILITY SHOULD REMAIN AT PLEIKU UNTIL REQUIRE-
D OTHERWISE OR FINAL DETERMINATION IS MADE CONCERNING PLEIKU.
WE HAVE EXTRA TTY OPER LOW-LEVEL KITS HERE AT PSR.
FM ASAPAC. REQUEST CONCURRENCE FOR DET 2, 6994 TO PROCESS
CRITICOMM TRAFFIC VIA 529RAG UNTIL DET 1, 6994/CRS MHA TRNG
CRT IS ACTIVATED. WITH USAFSS CONCURRENCE WE WILL USE PLEIKU
ASSETS AT HAKATA. REQUEST YOU ARRANGE FOR PAYBACK OF THIS EQUIP.
FOR USAFSS/ASAPAC: SINCE TIME FRAME TO ACTIVATE HAKATA CRT
IS EXTREMELY SHORT, AN EXPEDITIOUS REPLY WILL BE SINICELY

APPRECIATED.
OP/AM
ZNY



REF ID: A66203
RE: YAKUTIA
YAKUTIA 1988



10472
0087

TO: SAC, SUTY
FROM: SAC, NORTH SUTY SC
SUBJECT: NORTH SUTY SC
1910TH SUTY SC

RE: [REDACTED] CHANNEL

FOR 001-5 AND SIGG
SUBJECT: MERCURY SUPPORT (U)
THIS IS IN TWO PARTS. PART ONE FOR PACSUTY SC.
1. THIS HAS ACQUIRED SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TO SATISFY REQUIRE-
MENTS. ACCORDINGLY,
NON-CORRUPT IMMEDIATE DEACTIVATION OF OBT
ENGINEER FILL/FET LINE PLEASE. OBT SHOULD REMAIN
ACTIVE UNTIL ACTIVATION OF SET 1 0000TH/00S 100 1000
OBT. NO FURTHER ASSIST REQUIRED.
2. THIS HAS WILL SHIP TWO 1000'S YOUR NO TO FILL FILL
YOU REQUIRE. SHIPPING DATA WILL BE FURNISHED
AVAILABLE.

