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
HISTORY OF
DETACHMENT 1, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON
1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1969
RCS: USS-D3



11 MARCH 1970



PHU CAT AIR BASE, VIETNAM



HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 1, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

1 July 1969 - 31 December 1969

RCS: USS-D3

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, USC, Section 793 and 794) the transmission or revelation of which, in any manner, to an unauthorized person, is prohibited by law.

Prepared by:

TSgt John W. James

TSgt Roger K. Gavit

Approved



MERLE J. VERNONE, Major, USAF
Commander

FORWARD

This historical study is a record of Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron, covering the period 1 July through 31 December 1969. All references to date are within this period unless otherwise indicated. All references to events and locations took place in the Republic of South Vietnam (RVN) unless otherwise stated.

The majority of the information contained herein was taken from the files and records maintained at this unit. Additional information was gained from personal interviews with members assigned to this unit.

All comments and suggestions are welcomed and should be directed to the Commander, Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron.

DEDICATION

This document is dedicated to Sgt Michael L. Stiglich and SSgt Elmore L. Hall who lost their lives while flying a combat mission over South Vietnam.

EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Current Commander
Major Marle J. Vernone

Date Assigned
6 July 1969

Former Commander
Lt Col Raymond H. Rade

Date Departed
7 July 1969

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Major Merle J. Vernone

Major Vernone was born in St. James, Minnesota, where he attended public schools and graduated from St. James High School in 1944.

He joined the U.S. Naval Reserve in March 1944 and was called to active duty 21 May 1944. He went to radio school at the University of Idaho and from there overseas to the Central Pacific as a radioman aboard the USS ATA 185. He also served as a radioman on the USS AP 17. He was discharged from the Navy in May 1946.


He entered Gustavus Adolphus College in St. Peter, Minnesota, in February 1947 and graduated in June 1950 with a major in History and minors in English, speech, social science, education, and religion.

Having entered the United States Air Force in August 1950 as a Private First Class, he was assigned to the USAF Security Service at Brooks AFB, Texas. He progressed to the rank of Chief Master Sergeant in March 1962 as an analysis and exploitation supervisor (20290). He had been commissioned a Reserve 2nd Lieutenant in 1953 but did not serve in a commissioned status on active duty until called up in December 1962 as a Captain. He was promoted to Major in July 1969. He has served continuously with the USAF Security Service in England, Okinawa, AFSCC, HQ USAFSS, and South Vietnam.

He is married to the former Anne Carle of San Antonio, Texas. They have three children: Michael - 8, Maryann - 6, and Mark - 5.



ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1969

Major Merle J. Vernone	COMMANDER
1st Lt Ray A. Pritz	Operations Officer
Capt Edward J. DeVries	Materiel Officer
SMSgt Harold V. Fitzgerald	NCOIC Operations
SMSgt George A. Humphrey	NCOIC Logistics
MSgt Alan R. Lehman	NCOIC Tactical Airborne Operations
MSgt J.C. Rogers	NCOIC Maintenance
MSgt David H. Winter	First Sergeant
TSgt Roger K. Gavit	NCOIC Mission Management
TSgt John W. James	Unit Training NCO
TSgt Philip D. Jolly	NCOIC Exploitation
TSgt Norman H. Kimball	NCOIC Administration
TSgt George C. McCarty	NCOIC Security Police
TSgt Frederick D. Moore	NCOIC Personnel
TSgt Mitchel L. Nelson	Disaster Preparedness NCO
TSgt Ronald L. Taylor	Awards & Decorations NCO
TSgt Asa F. Walker	NCOIC Communications
SSgt Dathel G. Lockhart	NCOIC SEFE

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Chapter I - Mission and Organization

[REDACTED] Mission: Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron, located at Phu Cat AB, Republic of Vietnam, RVN, continued as an element of the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) contingent tasked with Airborne Radio Detection Finding (ARDF) and airborne collection operations in Southeast Asia. The unit conducted acquisition of enemy radio transmitters through ARDF to support intelligence, tactical, and cryptologic requirements of commanders responsible for tactical operations. Airborne collection was an extension of the ground-based COMINT effort and provided intercept of enemy radio transmissions which could not be satisfactorily collected at ground-based stations. COMINT collection was based on requirements of the tactical commanders in consideration of the overall COMINT situation. Tasking emphasis was placed on low-level HF/VHF Voice/Morse communications associated with Military Regions 5, 6, 10 and subordinate units and spectrum search below 7.0 MHz.

[REDACTED] Organization: Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) provided operational control of all ARDF and COMINT collection resources in Southeast Asia (SEA) to support surface and air operations conducted in MACV's area of intelligence interest. The Commander 7th AF exercised command of ARDF and COMINT collection aircraft and flying crews assigned to the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW), Tan Son Nhut AB, through the Commander, 460th TRW. The 361st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS) provided flying crews and aircraft to support ARDF missions launching from Phu Cat AB and Nha Trang. The Commander, 7th AF, exercised operational control of

[REDACTED]

USAF ARDF and airborne COMINT collection personnel through the Commander, 6994th Security Squadron. The 6994th Security Squadron, Tan Son Nhut AB, provided operational guidance to Detachment 1 and all other airborne USAFSS ARDF elements throughout SEA.

The ARDF Coordinating Center (ACC), Tan Son Nhut AB, composed of members of the 509th Radio Research Group and the 6994th Security Squadron, provided coordinated management of the entire ARDF program in South Vietnam and other areas as directed by MACV.

The Collection Management Authority (CMA) located at 330th Radio Research Battalion, Fleiku AB, provided technical assistance to this unit on targets tasked by ACC for ARDF coverage. They also provided ACC with suggested target times for aircraft flying in their areas of concern. This unit was directly subordinate to the 6994th Security Squadron and provided aircrew personnel for operations of ARDF equipment on aircraft assigned to the 361st TEWS. The unit was also required to provide administrative, logistic, and technical operating support to meet the tasking requirements as levied by ACC. The command lines for Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron, were as follows:

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE

HEADQUARTERS, PACIFIC SECURITY REGION

HEADQUARTERS, 6922ND SECURITY WING

6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

DETACHMENT 1, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

[REDACTED]

Chapter II - Unit Relocation

[REDACTED] The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved the Nha Trang Proposal in principle on 26 February 1969. The relocation of Det 1, 6994th Security Squadron, from Nha Trang Air Base to Phu Cat Air Base was originally scheduled to be completed by 26 October 1969. ¹ The Commander, Phu Cat Air Base, tasked the 819th Civil Engineers Squadron (Red Horse) with the design and construction of the unit operations building in accordance with 7th AF Programmed Action Directive (PAD) 69-101. The 819th CES scheduled a pre-design conference to be held at Phu Cat AB on 30 April 1969, with key personnel from Det 1, 6994th Security Squadron. Facility requirements and design criteria were discussed. ² During May, June, and much of July, problem areas were being identified and solved (To be shown in the summary).

On 24 July, the Commander, 7th AF, determined that the relocation should be accelerated to 10 September. ³ There were no specific problems as of that time. However, there were areas of concern: the short time for completion of the operations building, the shortage of billets, the fact that the communications van must be in place by 1 September so the lines could be installed and the equipment checked out prior to 10 September. ⁴

The operations building was estimated to be completed by 10 September, with the Communications Center portion estimated for completion the same date. ⁵ The maintenance/supply function was to be housed in building 704. ⁶ The planned start of the move was to be 8 September and to be completed by 10 September.

[REDACTED]

The advance cadre, comprised of six personnel, was scheduled to arrive at Phu Cat AB between 20 August and 25 August. Building 704 was to be utilized as the interim operations and storage area until the Operations/Communications building was completed. ⁷ Personal effects, materiel, and equipment were shipped by sea and air. Sea shipments went out on 7 September and were scheduled to arrive at Phu Cat on 10 September. Air shipments went out on 9 September. Personnel were scheduled to travel as follows: in place at Phu Cat, 6; 1 291X0 on 1 September; 12 personnel on 4 September; 23 on 8 September; 49 on 10 September; and the remainder of the unit, headed by the Operations Officer, on 15 September. ⁸ Billets for Det 1 personnel were assigned as follows: Building 233 (for use by E-5s and below); Building 211 (to be shared with 361st TEWS' E-5s and below). E-6s through E-8s were to be integrated into vacancies as existed in the senior NCO billets. Officers were to be billeted in newly constructed, air conditioned BOQs in the 1000 area off Bordner Boulevard.

In general, the relocation was made with minimum problems due to the extra efforts expended by personnel of this unit and the cooperation received from personnel at Phu Cat. Following is a summary of the relocation, the problems experienced by this unit, and the recommendations for future moves by Security Service units.

MATERIEL

1. PROGRAMMED ACTION DIRECTIVES: Although 7th AF and USAFSS provided PADS to the unit, the former were of a general nature and the latter were received much too late to be of value (Received the USAFSS PADS on 18 August).

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

They were of little assistance because of their general nature, lack of detail, and the fact that Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) was not fully defined. Future PADS should include references to agencies that can be referred to for assistance in areas outside the unit's capability to resolve.

2. EXPERIENCED SUPPLY TECHNICIAN: Det 1 made its move without the benefit of a senior, experienced materiel specialist. Future moves should not be attempted without a qualified 64570/90 in the grade E-7 thru E-9 (extensive background knowledge in Security Service deemed absolutely necessary) who would be on board during all stages of the move - both the planning and the actual move.

3. ASSISTANCE IN ADVANCE PLANNING: Assistance in advance planning should have been provided by higher headquarters. There were certain areas that were completely overlooked such as storage facilities for document destroyers, the establishment of armories near or in the barracks areas, and other items listed in other functional areas.

4. PACKING AND CRATING: Professional services should be made available to the moving unit in this area. The local transportation office was not sufficiently manned or equipped to provide this service in the scope that was required. Future moves should not be attempted without the services of AFLC's Rapid Area Transportation Service (RATS) teams.

[REDACTED]

5. ACTUAL SHIPMENT: Martialling areas should be established near the transportation source at both the shipping location and the receiving location. These areas should be secure from weather, pilferage, and in the case of a combat area, as secure as possible from ground and/or mortar attack. Our experience with surface transportation in this country necessitates that we recommend that only Air transportation be utilized. Although we have no evidence of missing items during transit, pilferage was attempted in at least one instance by employees of the contracting transporter. No equipment or supplies that were shipped via air were received damaged. Virtually everything shipped by surface was either destroyed or extensively damaged.

6. SUPPLIES: Arrangements should be made by higher headquarters to transfer due-outs from the losing to the gaining base supplies. This was not accomplished during this move and a shortage of supplies and equipment still existed at the end of December. Advance contact with the gaining supply should be made to ensure that there is an adequate supply of general cleaning materials and other such housekeeping items necessary to establish livable and operational conditions at the new location.

7. HOST-TENANT AGREEMENT: The agreement should be made by specialists from Wing or Region with local assistance. They should come prepared with all waivers and documentations to support peculiar USAFSS requirements. For example, we did not know the documentary authority for the requirement to have back-up power, the percentage required, nor even the total amount of Kilovolts Alternating (KVA). Maintenance, Security, Communications,

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

and general services should be looked at closely to ensure adequate manning (to include SSIR clearances where necessary) and that the required spare parts are on hand when the unit arrives.

OPERATIONS

1. ADVANCE PARTY: A nucleus of experts should be placed TDY to the new location with essential working material to commence operations while maintaining operations at the area to be vacated. This unit was not able to do this because of the lack of facilities. This created many problems which were fortunately solved without detriment to the mission, but it is conceivable that problems could have been encountered that might have been unsolvable. Again, operations should have the benefit of any expert assistance available to the Command which would render the advance party as valuable as possible.
2. PREPARATION FOR AND SHIPMENT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL: Classified material should be carefully screened, and unnecessary duplicates should be destroyed in order to ensure that only the required items are shipped. All material must be adequately marked to ensure that it is only opened in a secure area. All material essential for continuity of operations should be clearly marked and, if possible, be shipped separately to preclude temporary mislocation.
3. PLANS: The Plans NCO should go with the advance party to write and coordinate interim Emergency Actions and Emergency Evacuation plans which would become effective with the arrival of the unit. This individual should be provided expert assistance from within the Command so that Command interests are adequately provided for. For example, he should not have to

[REDACTED]

research such documents as DOD Directive 5200 for guidance. All guidance should be specific and should be co-addressed to the local plans agency.

4. MISSION STAND-DOWN: If the necessary TDY assistance for complete continuity of operations can not be provided, then a mission stand-down is the only alternative. One significant problem that was encountered during this unit's relocation was the scheduling of the stand-down. The greatest workload will necessarily take place in final preparations during the final week prior to the move. This unit's stand-down was scheduled after the largest part of the work was completed: 6 Sep--0%, 7 Sep--50%, 8 Sep--75%, 9 Sep--100%, 10 Sep--75%, 11 Sep--50%, 12 Sep--resumed normal operations at Phu Cat. During the period of maximum stand-down, consequently, this unit experienced the minimum work load and vice versa. Recommend a 50% stand-down over a 10-day period.

COMMUNICATIONS

1. GFELIA SUPPORT: Far reaching planning is needed to provide on-site dismantling and reinstallation as required. Recommend staff communications at either Wing or Region level be made the action agency for these. No expert Command assistance was made available to this unit in this regard. Although programming assistance was provided by the 1883rd Comm Squadron, the availability of an experienced programmer from within local structure at both Nha Trang and Phu Cat would have proven invaluable. Complete schemes should be made available to the unit to ensure clarity in communication.

[REDACTED]

2. RECOMMENDATIONS: A turn-key type of operation on communications with Communications facility should be completely operational prior to relocation. If deemed necessary to utilize interim temporary arrangements, as was required by this unit, the minimum precautions of ironclad certification of complete operational status (to include air conditioning) of temporary facility; complete spare parts of all gear; complete technical orders and schemes; and that the vans be accompanied with qualified maintenance personnel with orders requiring that they stay until the local chief of maintenance certifies that he is completely capable of maintaining the entire facility is recommended. Of particular note was the fact that the local AFCS did not have maintenance personnel who were experienced with the equipment as installed in Comm Vans nor with that to be installed in the permanent facility. Only through prior coordination by staff communications at some point higher than this unit could this problem have been isolated and solved.

CIVIL ENGINEERING

Special Security, Tempest, and electrical wiring requirements should have been identified to the construction agency (the 819th Civil Engineering Squadron — the local Red Horse) as soon as building requirements were known. If new construction is part of the program, criteria and specifications should be prepared by specialists and engineers. Design criteria should be directly and personally coordinated with the construction agency on site - particularly if it is to be done by Red Horse civil engineers.

[REDACTED]

Plans should be final, for once they start, their pace is such that there will be no time to make any changes. Special engineering assistance in the form of a TDY from the nearest Security Service Civil Engineering Staff agency should be provided during initial planning and just prior to breaking ground (also see comments under Security). In order to be as realistic as possible, all work orders (AF Form 332) for the gaining Base Civil Engineer (to include those for self-help) should be identified as soon as practical, if possible, up to two or three months prior to the relocation. If this is done, action should be taken to have the relocating unit represented on the new base's facilities utilization board.

SECURITY

One of the strongest recommendations concerning Security must be the one dealing with the expert himself. It is deemed imperative that a Security Service indoctrinated and experienced Security Policeman be on board during the pre-planning through the post-move stages of any Security Service unit relocation. There are literally too many areas in which trouble can be experienced to move without a USAFSSM 205-7 specialist.

New construction for Security should have been a part of the package. Construction of a standardized incinerator with specifications that it be within the building or at least within the compound is recommended. At the end of December, barrel-type incinerator was being borrowed from the 1883rd Comm Squadron to destroy classified material generated by this unit.

[REDACTED]

This type incinerator is insufficient and not designed to destroy bulk waste. Local estimates from the Base Civil Engineers indicate an adequate incinerator will not be available for at least two or three months (programmed for sometime in March 70). Requirements concerning this item were made known about two weeks prior to the relocation.

In a high risk area such as Southeast Asia, standardized specifications for construction and storage of emergency destruction devices are deemed a necessity. This unit has a requirement for seven M-E emergency destruction kits as well as thermite grenades. They cannot be stored in the OPS/COMM building nor in the MAINT/SUPPLY facility. The use of conexes for this purpose is not authorized nor satisfactory, but may be necessary if proper approval can be received from 7th Air Force.

Gun rooms are needed for the storage of individual weapons and ammunition. Physical layout of Phu Cat Air Base makes the locating of weaponry unfeasible at either the OPS/COMM or MAINT/SUPPLY building.

Gate guardpost construction specifics should include specifications for minimum communications and panic hardware and intrusion alarm systems to include approved stock numbers.

So far as could be determined, no provisions were made for notifying organizations and agencies of our new change of address. A local contact with ARFCOS minimized this problem, but had this not been accomplished, considerable delay would have been experienced in receiving hard-copy classified documents.

[REDACTED]

PERSONNEL

The moving unit should not be encumbered with having any personnel TDY if at all possible. Every man is needed to make the relocation successful —not only for making sure his personal effects are moved safely, but for the manpower that is required at both ends of the move. This fact is even more critical when it is necessary to remain operational at the same time.

Areas which must function at both losing and gaining base during the period of the move should be looked at closely to identify these areas in which manning assistance may be needed —for example, Comm Centers where overlap is required.

An accurate and up-to-date personnel roster to include every man assigned to the unit should be established and maintained. It should be made in multiple copies and could be used for mass base clearances — one man armed with the list can clear the base for the entire unit.

In so far as possible, no personnel should arrive or depart PCS during the ten day period preceding the move and for at least ten days afterwards. All personnel scheduled to arrive or depart during this period should be re-scheduled to arrive or depart prior to or afterwards.

The limitation of personal goods to 100-pounds should be waived. Personal goods plus field and combat gear will total much more than this. Personnel are authorized to ship hold baggage from SEA on a PCS, and the same should apply for a unit relocation.

[REDACTED]

Early publication of PCS orders by the servicing CBPO should be effected. The majority of the PCS orders for this unit's relocation were not received until 22 September. This necessitated the local publication of in-country TDY orders which are obviously not designed for the purpose of a unit relocation.

SUMMATION

The major deficiency in the entire relocation exercise was the lack of direction from Command and Intermediate Staff Offices to provide detailed specifications, unique engineering requirements, and direction for building the new facility based upon the expertise and experience that should have been available from within the Command after opening many new facilities over the years.

In future moves, advance liaison is a must. Every function should have at least one key individual visit the new site. Approximately two to three weeks in advance, a liaison team should be deployed for coordination and make-ready actions. Communications between the "new site" party and the project staff at the losing site should be established on regular schedules on a minimum of once daily. Selection of the advance liaison team chief is critical. He should have all the attributes of a professional politician with the sincerity of a parson. He must be willing to work long, hard hours with no supervision.


[REDACTED]

The support received from units of Phu Cat Air Base should receive some comment. Within local resources, the support from the host base was outstanding. Consideration and hospitality actively created an atmosphere of helpfulness.

Due to the workloads of key personnel immediately following a unit relocation, it is recommended that the levy of a "Report of Summation" not be made until a month following the relocation. 9

LEGEND

- Bldg 476 - Operations = 1
- Bldg 704 - Maintenance = 2
- Bldg 233 - Barracks (AB-E5) = 3
- Bldg 211 - Barracks (AB-E5) = 4
- Upper Bay Only = 4
- Officer Billeting Area = 5
- Senior NCO Billeting Area = 6
- Bldg 490 - 361st TEMS Ops = 7



31st CIVIL ENGINEER CO. PHU CAT AB RVN
BASE PLAN

[REDACTED]

Chapter III - Operations

EXPLOITATION DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED] Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS): On 12 July, the 90 day SEATS test was concluded. The test was considered highly successful and formal implementation of the SEATS program was initiated within two weeks after the test had ended. Prior to the SEATS program, approximately 24% of the station's intercept was identified with questionable accuracy. By the time the SEATS test was concluded, 50% of the intercept was being identified with 90% accuracy. On 4 August, the Commander, USAF Security Service, forwarded a message to all 6994th Security Squadron elements commending them on the favorable results of the SEATS test:

Since the institution of the expanded identification program at the 6994th Security Squadron, Det 1, Det 2 and Det 3, the fix identification rate has shown a steady increase and has, as a result, provided our consumers with more meaningful information. Consider this dedication and perseverance on the part of the analysts and flying crews most commendable. Please insure that all responsible are informed of my appreciation. ¹

Additional comments of appreciation were sent to this unit from the Commander PACSCTYEGN and Commander 6994th Security Squadron. ²

[REDACTED] The move from Nha Trang AB to Phu Cat AB created no particular problems for the exploitation section. After the last mission flown out of Nha Trang had recovered on 9 September, all working aids and materials were packed for air shipment to Phu Cat. This shipment accompanied the main move of personnel on 10 September. The advance party sent to Phu Cat on 3 September was on hand to unpack and set up the exploitation shop in preparation for recovery of operational mission which resumed on 11 September.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Technical Data Base: Once the section was completely organized at Phu Cat, it continued to update and expand the unit data base. Due to the time difference between intercept and receipt of NSA Fixed Book and Basic Lists and the rapid, frequent changes in the VC communications structure, a card file of timely fixed/rota callsigns and basics were required to identify VC intercept accurately. CMA records, TEXTA, and SEA development messages were researched to verify and add to existing information. Each case notation and basic were checked for validity, cards were dated, and the source of the data was indicated. The use of liaison personnel at the Collection Management Authority (CMA) aided extensively in maintaining current data base information. Each time the CMA recovered a callsign or basic, it was immediately forwarded to this unit. As a result of the thorough compilation of a unit data base, identification accuracy increased to approximately 97%.

[REDACTED] Intelligence Briefings: In November the exploitation section began comprehensive intelligence briefings for all flight crews prior to the launch of each operational mission. The briefings informed all crew members of target activity and all available intelligence information pertaining to primary and alternate mission areas. Crews were also briefed on reaction to fix/cut results obtained on previous missions--artillery, air strikes, and ground operations. The briefings were well-received and improved the understanding of mission objectives. Realizing the mission was making an extremely important contribution to the war effort, crew morale increased significantly.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Exploitable Message Report: In December DIRNSA tasked the unit with the preparation of the Exploitable Message Report (EMR). Prior to its implementation, all exploitable traffic was passed informally to the CMA only. The EMR was sent to the CMA and DIRNSA in a specified format, and both agencies provided feedback to include code titles and message gists. Message gists were informative and stimulated operator motivation to search for and copy exploitable traffic.

[REDACTED] ARDF Recovery Report (ARR): Also in December ACC expanded the list of direct consumers for the ARR to include all major commands supported by ARDF missions from Phu Cat. The list included the HQ 173rd Airborne Brigade, HQ Americal Division, HQ 4th Infantry Division, 1st Field Force Vietnam (IFFV), and the 1st Radio Battalion FMF Vietnam, which supports Marine forces in the Danang area. All of those consumers were new, with the exception of IFFV, and this indicated an increasing demand for timely ARDF support and confidence in the accuracy of information produced by the aviation units.

COLLECTION DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED] Criteria for Allocated Minutes of Copy (AMOC): During early September, HQ USAFSS changed the criteria for AMOC for mission reporting. The unit previously reported AMOC as only that time allocated which was in the fraged area or time in areas to which the aircraft was diverted during the time frame originally fraged on target. Criteria for AMOC was changed to (a) reflect AMOC to begin/end when the mission aircraft entered/exited effective areas for all missions to include absolute

[REDACTED]

missions and (b) include all time the aircraft flew over target in primary or alternate areas regardless of the time frame the target time was achieved. This system caused a significant increase in reportable AMOC. While obtaining approximately the same actual copy time as before, the increase in AMOC lowered the overall percentage of copy time.

[REDACTED] CMA ARDF/Collection Areas of Responsibility: On 22 September, 7th Air Force deleted MACV areas and replaced them with Southeast Asia (SEA) areas. This change was brought about in order to provide a common base for stating requests for ARDF and airborne collection support. Areas were re-designated and in some cases altered. For this unit, the CMA ARDF/Airborne collection responsibility remained the same. Support for missions in the unit area of responsibility continued to come from the CMA located at Fleiku (USM-604/330th Radio Research Company).

MISSION DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED] Aircraft Fuel Requirements: Increased aircraft weight and fuel limitations were imposed on the 361st TEWS in June. Maximum weight allowed for single engine climb power on EC-47 aircraft made it necessary to decrease the fuel load. As a result, an increase in reduced missions attributed to fuel shortage was noted on EC-47 CCZ/Q configured aircraft. The aircraft could not complete the normal seven hours flying time per mission due to lack of fuel, and operational stops for refueling became necessary. In September, MACV reduced the flying requirement for missions flown with CCZ/Q aircraft from seven to five hours flight time.³ This change virtually eliminated reduced mission caused by fuel shortage.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Requirement for Airborne Mission Supervisor (AMS): In late July, the unit requested permission to fly Combat Cougar Zulu missions without the fifth man (AMS) on the aircraft as required by ACC Working Aids. Justification for this action was (a) small amount of intercept obtained on this unit's CCZ missions and (b) fuel problems on the aircraft--each additional person on the aircraft caused off-loading of 80 gallons of fuel which is governed by gross weight allowances. On 30 July, the 6994th Security Squadron provided formal guidance that a fifth man on this unit's CCZ missions was not required.⁴ In late September, a letter from the 6994th Security Squadron, "Manning of Zulu Configured Aircraft"⁵, provided guidance to the 460th TFW on the requirements for airborne analysts. The need for an analyst on collection missions would be determined by collection requirements, special emphasis requirements, and area development requirements in support of the MACV EEI contained in weekly tasking. The unit now determines when an airborne analyst is needed and in-turn notifies the 361st TFW that a fifth man will be flying on a designated mission.

[REDACTED] Dual Frequency System: In mid-July, ACC directed ARDF units to conduct an Air/Ground (A/G) - Ground/Air (G/A) communications test in Southern II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) to test the usage of the dual frequency concept (1 frequency for reporting--A/G and 1 frequency for tip-off--G/A). The test area for this unit was limited to MACV area eight. Only eight tip-offs were received by this unit in area eight during the test, and therefore the unit was unable to make a significant contribution

[REDACTED]

to the test results on that basis. On 1 December, ACC directed all ARDF units to implement the dual frequency system in II CTZ and Southern I CTZ. Two basic frequency configurations were established: Southern II CTZ used one set of frequencies and Northern II CTZ and Southern I CTZ another. One frequency (reporting) was allotted for passing fixes/cuts, technical data for diversions, and net entries/exits. The other was allotted for G/A-A/G tip-offs. An additional frequency was also established for each CMA to be used by its aircraft to pass exploitable traffic A/G. This system proved to be a tremendous improvement in the overall ARDF communications network. This system has expedited passing of perishable information, reduced delay in passing fixes and tip-offs, and provided a means of passing more timely diversion information.

Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS): A provisional draft of Volume XV, USAFSSM 200-4, was published in September which outlined standardized procedures for DURMIS reporting for ARDF units in SEA. All previous instructions were contained in a series of messages which had become voluminous and extremely difficult to work with. On 25 October, HQ USAFSS instructed ARDF units to begin reporting according to the new directive. Minor changes to the basic directive were made after implementation, but most of the problem areas were resolved by the end of the period. Within a short period after implementation, the improved quality of reporting was readily apparent. With one source directive to refer to, little was overlooked in the reporting process and discrepancies became almost non-existent by 31 December.

[REDACTED]

■ Daily Unit Resource Management Report (DURMR): The unit began publishing an in-station DURMR shortly after the move to Phu Cat in September. Volume XV, USAFSSM 200-4, was used as a guideline in preparation of this report. Supplemental information was added to the daily report as the requirement became apparent. By 31 December, procedures for inputs and preparation of the DURMR had been stabilized. The report proved to be an effective management tool, one that could readily identify deficiencies in various areas of operations and provided a daily recapitulation of mission accomplishment to all sections.

■ TECHINS 1043: NSA published Annex H-562, TECHINS 1043, in October. This unit received the document in November. This was the first time a formal directive had been published to provide specific reporting requirements for this unit. PACSCTYREGN directed the unit to issue Technical Weekly Recapitulation Reports (TECH WECAP) in mid-December. This report required the unit to report weekly any changes in reporting requirements as outlined in Annex H-562. Annex D-562, TECHINS 1043, which provides formal instructions for forwarding intercept traffic and magnetic tapes, had not been published as of 31 December. Instructions in that area are still contained in a series of messages and informal guidelines.

■ Operational Evaluation: The unit began publishing a formal operational evaluation 17 December. Each report covered a four-week tasking period and established trends in ARDF fix and collection performance and determined how well airborne operations were being performed. Significant deviations from established trends in fix and collection performance were

[REDACTED]

explained, if possible, and recommendations to improve areas of deficiency were made. Aircraft performance was evaluated to determine causes for lost mission time. If significant problems were noted, corrective action to the extent possible was taken. This data was also reported weekly in the DURMR so problem areas could be identified prior to publication of the formal evaluation.

SPECIAL TASKING

[REDACTED] Location of VC 5th Division: In early July, ACC requested special ARDF emphasis on elements of the VC 5th Division in MACV area eight (current SEA area four). This unit had not been heard in communications for some time and the location was of deep concern to IFFV commanders. Several of these elements were located by Det 1 on 13 July. Appreciation for unit efforts was expressed by the Commander 303rd Radio Research Battalion in a message received on 13 July:

Of possible greater significance are the fixes obtained on several VC 5th Div terminals on 13 July by Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq. These locations represent the latest intel on the disposition of this Div in as much as collateral has not reported any information on the Div since early July. IFFV commanders and their intelligence staffs are most appreciative of your efforts and are confident you will continue to provide timely intelligence. Keep up the good work. 6

[REDACTED] Location of NVA 66th and 28th Regiments: During July IFFV informed all units of a suspected major relocation of the HQ NVA 66th Regt and requested maximum effort be placed on confirming the location of that unit. Fixes obtained by Det 1 confirmed the IFFV theory that the 66th had moved. The 66th was one of the primary enemy units engaged in the prolonged VC/NVA

[REDACTED]

offensive against Ben Het and Dak To. The unit was previously located in the tre-border area and the last location had been provided on 24 June. On 14 August, three fixes were obtained by Det 1 on the 66th placing the regiment approximately 20 kilometers WSW of the Bu Prang CIDG camp. On 15 August, ACC further tasked the unit with special emphasis on the HQ NVA 28th Regiment which was also previously located in the tri-border area. On 19 August, the 28th was fixed approximately 20 kilometers west of the Bu Prang CIDG camp. That fix coupled with the location of the 66th Regt and the 40th Artillery Regt (fixed by the 6994th Scty Sq on 14 Aug) confirmed a major enemy buildup in the border area of MACV area eight (current SEA area four). In August a letter of commendation was forwarded to Det 1 from Colonel Louis A. Caraplis, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, IFFV commending this unit for support in locating both the 66th and 28th Regts:

As the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, I Field Force, Vietnam, I wish to commend Detachment 1, 6994 Security Squadron for your conscientious and determined efforts in helping to locate the Headquarters, North Vietnamese 66th Regiment and the Headquarters North Vietnamese 28th Regiment. These two enemy units recently conducted combined operations against CIDG camps and Allied fire support bases in the II Corps Tactical Zone. Since these two regiments had not been located for over two months, the threat of a surprise attack against Allied installations was increased greatly.

Through your research, study and analysis of these enemy units, technical data was available which resulted in both of these units being located. Your intensified efforts are greatly appreciated by this Headquarters and reflects credit upon Detachment 1 and the United States Air Force. 7

Colonel Duane E. Russell, Commander, 6994th Security Squadron also forwarded a letter in September citing Det 1 for "Outstanding Mission Accomplishment".

[REDACTED]

I would like to add my personal congratulations and appreciation to those expressed by General Stapleton and Colonel Hanley, for the outstanding mission accomplishment achieved by one of your crews on 14 August 1969.

The dedicated efforts and performance exhibited by this crew is highly commendable and indicated the high degree of professionalism maintained by your crew members. It is extremely gratifying to note such laudatory correspondence for members of the 6994th complex as was contained in Pac Scty Rgn CDR 040030Z Sep 69.

Again, please extend my personal thanks and appreciation to the crew members concerned. 8

Throughout the remainder of August and during the months of September and October, enemy strengths continued to build in the Bu Prang area. ARDF confirmation of this build-up enabled friendly forces to assemble for defense against a major enemy offensive. On 28 October, the enemy offensive against Bu Prang and Duc Lop CIDG camps began. During the period of that offensive Det 1 provided extensive ARDF support in maintaining locations of enemy forces. On 12 December, the 66th Regt evacuated the area and was confirmed through ARDF by this unit to be moving northward. Other elements (28th Regt, 40th Arty Regt, etc.) also began evacuation shortly thereafter. By 31 December, most of those elements were noted to be approaching the large enemy base camp in the tri-border area. The following data will show the scope of the fighting in the Bu Prang/Duc Lop offensive:

Friendly KIA	-	303
Enemy KIA	-	1460
Tactical Air Strikes	-	1048
Gunship Sorties	-	462
B-52 Strikes	-	327

MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT - 1 JULY THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1969

	<u>JULY</u>	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>%tile</u>
Missions Tasked	313	352	279	313	259	281	1797	
Missions Flown	306	336	272	275	215	275	1679	93.4%
Flight Hours Tasked	2338	2457	1925	2006	1813	1967	12506	
Flight Hours Flown	2125	2312	1803	1585	1512	1876	11213	89.7%
Hours Fregged TOT	1691	1788	1495	1452	1472	1647	9545	
Hours Flown TOT	1240	1466	1292	1099	1096	1396	7587	79.5%
AMCC	103374	114400	102474	89870	74915	95985	581018	
Actual Copy Time	18374	22343	13799	13982	10494	11433	90425	15.4%
Targets Worked	2124	2535	1948	1897	2301	2699	13504	
Targets Fixed	1650	1905	1509	1424	1732	2019	10239	75.8%
Targets Cut	186	283	205	223	245	331	1473	10.9%
Radli 250-1000M	837	933	702	648	736	910	4766	46.5%
Radli 1001-2000M	518	603	458	422	488	602	3091	30.2%
Ground/Air Tip-Offs Received	190	326	218	145	175	149	1203	
Ground/Air Tip-Offs Fixed	45	77	44	33	51	35	285	23.7%

[REDACTED]

OPERATIONAL TRAINING

■ Proficiency Training: Throughout most of the period, proficiency training was for the most part limited to Emergency Procedure tests and Standard Evaluation tests administered by the SEFE (Standardization Evaluation Flight Examiner) section. The tests were administered every 90-days.

■ Ground Training: Instructor Radio Operators (IROs) conducted and instructed new operators in emergency procedures as well as practical application of Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) duties. This proved to be extremely time-consuming for the IROs, and the new operators were not always receiving the same basic standard training--depending on the proficiency and knowledge of the IRO. In addition, the IROs were expected to teach all aspects of ARDF while maintaining a high performance level. This proved impractical, since in some mission areas the IRO was so busy performing operator duties that he had very little time to instruct the student. In December, Operations Training section suggested and received approval of a new procedure to conduct training classes on the ground between the time a new operator arrived and the time his aeronautical orders were published. These classes were to cover equipment operation, emergency procedures, maintenance of logs, and copying code. It was therefore necessary to assign two of the most highly qualified IROs to the training section to assist in setting up lesson plans and acquiring course material (current tape recordings of target signals, locally prepared tests, and revised ground training manual). This would eliminate

[REDACTED]

much of the workload which the IROs were tasked with, and it would give all the new operators a standard orientation. The new ground training procedures were programmed to be implemented shortly after 1 Jan 1970. The training section elected to ride a pre-SEFE checkride with all operators who came under the new training concept to ensure that all material had been thoroughly understood.

COMBAT LOSS

[REDACTED] EC-47 Number 43-49100 took off in the early afternoon of 8 October, but returned to base because of malfunctioning auxiliary equipment. It was repaired and subsequently relaunched at approximately 0840Z. Local weather was overcast with moderate to heavy showers. Weather in the mission area was also found to be unsatisfactory and the Aircraft Commander elected to return to base (RTB).⁹

At 1120Z, the unit Operations Control Center (OCC) received an air-to-ground call from PRONG 33 (aircraft tactical callsign) stating that an in-flight emergency was being experienced--an inverter fire. The fire had been extinguished but the Aircraft Commander still intended to RTB as an emergency. The Radio Operator (RO) reported an estimated time of arrival at Phu Cat AB of 1140Z at that time and signed out. At 1125Z, PRONG 33 called again but contact was immediately broken off and never resumed.¹⁰

The 361st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS) Supervisor of Flying immediately thereafter informed the OCC Supervisor that voice contact and radar monitor of the aircraft had been lost and the aircraft was assumed down.¹¹

[REDACTED]

The OCC Supervisor immediately notified the Detachment Commander, the First Sergeant, and the NCOIC of OCC and informed them of the situation. ¹² Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq AIR NUMBER ONE was issued at FLASH precedence at 1229Z to HQ USAFSS, Pac Scty Rgn, and 6922nd Scty Wg, with information to NSA Pac Rep Vietnam, reflecting an aircraft overdue and assumed crashed in the vicinity of coordinates 13-43N, 109-10E. The Detachment Commander released FOLLOW-UP NUMBER ONE at 1248Z listing all classified material on board the aircraft. ¹³ Local weather remained overcast with moderate to heavy showers. By 1500Z, the unit received an eyewitness report from members of the 184th Ordinance Battalion located at Phu Tai stating an in-air explosion was seen over hostile territory in the vicinity of the last known location of the aircraft. Search and rescue operations had by then been initiated. ¹⁴

There continued to be some ray of hope for survivors. Volunteer search and rescue teams from this unit and the 361st TEWS were in abundance, but due to inclement weather and the fact that the suspected crash site was in hostile territory, search and rescue efforts were hampered severely. The 184th Ordinance Battalion reported friendly artillery was not active in the crash area--by then reported as approximately 13-43N, 109-09E. Weather and darkness continued to hinder complete confirmation of all circumstances surrounding the incident. ¹⁵

The Aircraft Investigation Team arrived at Phu Cat at 0445Z of the following day (9 October). Ground search and rescue operations continued, but adverse weather continued to restrict recovery operation. ¹⁶ By 0500Z,

[REDACTED]

rescue helicopters from Det 13, 38th Airborne Rescue & Recovery Squadron (ARPS) reported sighting parts of the wreckage at coordinates 13-37N, 109-11E and 13-38N, 109-10E. The helicopters were unable to land as the site was in hostile territory. Qui Nhon operations reported gunships were being sent into the area to assist the rescue helicopters in identifying the aircraft and confirming the crash site location. ¹⁷ Ground and air search operations were still being hampered by heavy rain and fog which continued until nightfall. The search was then discontinued and was to be resumed at first light of the following day. ¹⁸ At 1115Z, the tactical field commander in the area ordered the American ground forces to pull back. A unit of ROK (Republic of Korea) forces remained in the area but reported to be making very slow progress due to hostile fire and adverse weather. ¹⁹ Throughout the remainder of 9 October and all of 10 and 11 October, virtually no new developments were reported since extremely bad weather continued to exist in the area of the crash site. Total rainfall for the month thus far had been 13.68-inches with 7.17-inches having fallen since the crash. ²⁰

By 0125Z of 12 October, weather appeared to be breaking and CH-3 (Jolly Green Giant) helicopters and photo-recon planes were launched into the recovery area. The ground search party had not yet reached the scene. ²¹ At 0545Z, a pararescue team reached the crash site and reported no survivors. The team confirmed the position of the aircraft at coordinates 13-41N, 109-08E, and identified it by the tail number. It was located

[REDACTED]

near the top of a peak. The closest point for reaching the site by air would be to land on top of the peak, if possible, and then walking downhill about 400 or 500 meters. The closest point from the base of the peak was approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles up mountainous terrain. Jungle undergrowth necessitated extreme caution by the ground team and inhibited their reaching the area sooner. ²² There was no evidence of anyone having tampered with the wreckage. ²³ Search and rescue efforts were terminated as of 0545Z. At 0800Z, the tactical field commander in the area dispatched a U.S. Infantry Unit to secure the area. ²⁴ At 2230Z, the accident investigation team departed Phu Cat AB for the crash site but was unable to get into the area. Total rainfall by then was estimated at 11 inches in the vicinity of the crash site. ²⁵

At 0137Z on 13 October, the 6994th Security Squadron instructed the unit to discontinue reporting on the missing aircraft since duplicate reporting was being accomplished by the 37th Combat Support Group at Phu Cat AB. ²⁶

The Commander sent the unit maintenance officer, Lt Artman, in with the investigation team to obtain, if possible, serial numbers of any AIR-34 equipment components that may have survived the impact. ²⁷ The rain and fog delayed the investigation team from reaching the area until 0200Z 14 October. The team searched the area for classified equipment and papers. The only papers found were pages 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, and 18 of the correction bearing tables and fragments of two burned pages of the same table. Due to fire and force of impact, no components of any evidence

[REDACTED]

were salvageable, and all were totally destroyed on the spot by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team. Considering condition of the wreckage, fire, force of impact and terrain and jungle undergrowth in the area, compromise of any equipment, crypto system, or other classified matter was considered highly improbable. 28

In the search for this aircraft, two other aircraft in the same general vicinity were located which accounted for the varied positions reported in the initial stages of the search operation. 29

The unit submitted SSgt Elmore L. Hall and Sgt Michael L. Stiglich, Det 1 crew members on board the aircraft, for the Distinguished Flying Cross.

[REDACTED]

Chapter IV - Communications

Between 1 July and 10 September, the unit's communications facility operated at Camp McDermott, Nha Trang. Co-located with the 313th Radio Research Company, who handled all CRITICOMM traffic, the unit Communications Center operated two OPS/COM circuits with no major difficulty.

After the relocation to Phu Cat AB, The Detachment Communications Center operated the two OPS/COM circuits out of an H-1 COM Van and handled all CRITICOMM traffic in addition to all OPS/COM traffic. Technical Control (U.S. Army), located two blocks from the unit Operations/Communications building, performed all testing.

Achievements: The unit relocation involved the removal and shipment of all COMSEC equipment and documents. On 10 September, the Communications Center deactivated circuits DDNC 1H56 and DDNC 1J46 at Nha Trang and activated circuits DDNC 1H54 and DDNC 1J54 at Phu Cat. The unit accomplished the move of all COMSEC equipment, deactivation, and reactivation of the two circuits with no damage to equipment or loss of circuit time.

Maintenance: The 1883rd AFCS provided maintenance for all equipment on on-call basis. The unit communications personnel performed all patching of equipment and changeovers.

Equipment: The unit returned two each KY-8, FB4C61, to Det 4, AFCD per AFCD DMCC message 172105Z November 69.



■ In-Station CRITIC Test:

<u>ON LINE</u>	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER</u>	<u>AVERAGE TIME</u>
	October	12	2 minutes
	November	11	1 minute
	December	12	2 minutes

■ Problem Areas: The unit had no emergency back-up AC power installed by 31 December. During November and December, two power failures occurred --one for 20 minutes due to base power generator problems and one for one hour and 40 minutes due to enemy initiated action. A work order was submitted in September for emergency power. As of 31 December, the host-base Civil Engineers were in the process of installing a generator for temporary use until a hard stand and permanent base could be completed. That installation is scheduled to be completed during the first part of January 1970.

■ Future Projects: GEEIA is scheduled to install the new Communications Center in 3QFY70 under SCHEME 0028AOKO. Also included in that SCHEME is an AUTOSEVCOM wideband terminal and modification of all teletype and CRYPTO equipment for low-level keying. A complete patch and test facility is scheduled during the same time under SCHEME 0068AOKO. Work orders have been submitted through the Base Civil Engineers to have emergency power installed, present building grounding system changed, and an incinerator constructed.





■ Summary: The unit operated out of an H-1 COMM Van for over three months. Although problems were experienced with AC/DC power, teletype equipment, CRYPTO equipment, air conditioner, and only one operator per shift, a 95% circuit reliability was maintained for that period with no delay in message handling.



[REDACTED]

Chapter V - Materiel

■ Aircraft Support: The unit was programmed for fifteen aircraft during 1/2QFY70: 12 Combat Cougar (ARDF) and 3 Combat Cougar Zulu (ARDF/Collection). A minimum of eighteen aircraft was assigned throughout that period. The coverage of aircraft and positions were required to support operations at Nakhon Phanom AB, Thailand (Det 3, 6994th Security Squadron). This unit accounted for and maintained four of the aircraft authorized at NKP due to the limited maintenance capability at that base. When air-frame or equipment problems occurred beyond the limitations of organizational maintenance, the aircraft were returned to Phu Cat for repair. Due to the accountability of 18 vice 15 aircraft, the bench stock level for spare equipment was increased. Although maintenance was pressed for time from a manpower factor, they supported maintenance on all aircraft with no decrease in efficiency. Rotation of aircraft and maintenance support to NKP will continue until adequate facilities become installed at that location.

■ Ground Calibration Equipment: The ground calibration set for the unit, installed at Cam Rahn Bay, proved unreliable for use at all times due to the climatic conditions in that area. Installation at Phu Cat was also unpractical for the same reason. A Sanders team was scheduled to come to South Vietnam to survey the possible relocation of calibration sites for all 6994th Security Squadron elements. The unit forwarded a recommendation to delete the accountability of ground calibration

equipment at detachment level, that it could be more appropriately coordinated for all units at squadron level. The 6994th Security Squadron deferred a decision on the matter until the final resolution is made on the distribution of calibration sites.

■ Post Mission Flight Testing: When the wet weather began in late October around the Phu Cat area, the ground HF antenna used for transmitting the beacon for Post Mission Testing (PMT) began grounding out. Installation of a new 60 foot HF antenna was initiated and completed in December and the antenna problem was solved; however, it was still a rare occasion when PMTs could be completed locally, as adverse weather prevailed throughout December. Most testing during December was conducted in the Fleiku area using the test beacon assigned to Det 2. When the weather conditions become more favorable in the Phu Cat area, PMTs will no longer be a problem.

■ Equipment Status for Corrosion Control: During December, Pac Scty Rgn gave approval to leave the "X" and "Y" consoles installed on the mission aircraft when scheduled to return to Kadena AB, Okinawa, for Corrosion Control. This procedure saved the maintenance section a great deal of manhours previously expended in on-loading and off-loading consoles. Maintenance also requested permission to leave those consoles on the aircraft when they are undergoing IRAN; however, approval of that request had not been received as of 31 December.

■ Budget: Due to an unexpected high consumption of electronic supplies during December, the unit was running approximately \$6000 over the assigned target of \$30,000 for 2QFY70 budget. To correct the problem, we requested an adjusted target of \$35,000 for the 3QFY70 and \$25,000 for 4QFY70. Original amounts were \$20,000 for each quarter.

Chapter VI - Support

MANNING

■ Material: Until December, manning in the maintenance branch was excellent. During December, manning fell to an all-time low of 17 technicians (68% of authorized strength). Due to the extreme decrease in manpower, maintenance reverted to frozen twelve-hour shifts to provide the coverage required to maintain assigned equipment. As a result of mission requirements, maintenance logged a total of 662.5 hours overtime in December. Based on forecasted gains/losses, the unit anticipated the problem to continue until at least March 1970. Captain DeVries arrived on 27 November to replace Lt Artman as the unit Material Officer. His security clearance had still not arrived as of 31 December. This seriously hampered Captain DeVries in the performance of his duties and many functions normally requiring the personal attention of the material officer had to be delegated to other personnel.

■ Operations: The Operations Section continued to experience a shortage of A203X1MD personnel. None of the eight authorized were assigned until 15 October when seven arrived direct from initial technical training schools. Due to the transfer of all Zulu configured aircraft and positions to other units and the lack of adequate training available locally, all seven of the linguists were sent TDY to Det 2 for training and use by that unit until required at Det 1. Operations does not anticipate a need for linguists until Zulu configured aircraft and positions are returned to this station.

During August, 292X1 manning became critical. Assigned strength was approximately 87% of authorized strengths and the number personnel available for flying was extremely low due to TDYs and a high DNIF rate. The unit was also flying more missions during that month than ever before (82 missions per week). Fourteen 292X1s exceeded 125-hours flying time in August to support mission requirements. Manning and mission tasking returned to normal after the move to Phu Cat and remained relatively constant until the end of the year. The unit anticipat~~es~~ no problems in the 292X1 manning for the future if mission tasking remains the same.

■ Communications: The Communications Section required manning assistance for 291X0s during the move to Phu Cat as communications facilities were established at both Nha Trang and Phu Cat in early September. The 6922nd Security Wing provided assistance, and no loss in effectiveness occurred.

■ Security Police: Security Police Unit Detail Listing (UDL) authorizations increased from one to five shortly after the move to Phu Cat. While stationed at Nha Trang, the unit operations was co-located with the 313th Radio Research Battalion and the Army provided security of the compound area. Upon arrival at Phu Cat, the unit became responsible for guarding the operations area, and increase manning for Security Police was required. By December, Security police manning was 100% of the authorized strength.

■ General: Throughout the period, the unit experienced problems with personnel arriving without a security clearance, and, for those assigned flying duties, no glasses if required, and medical records which reflected them to be unqualified to fly. A great deal of man-days for flying duties were lost for personnel awaiting receipt of aeronautical orders before being allowed to fly operational missions. Approximately nine days for each new man assigned were lost from flying duties until aeronautical orders were received. The unit brought these problems to the attention of higher echelons on several occasions and all but the problem of aeronautical orders were resolved by the end of December.

TRAINING

■ The number of personnel in formal up-grade training varied between seventeen and twelve with all AFSCs included. The Training Section processed Classification Action Requests (AF Form 1098) through Pac Secty Rgn to up-grade 3-FA30173s, 5-FA30153s, 2-RA29271s, and 1-R70270. By the end of December, thirteen personnel remained in training: 4-29271s, 2-20270s, 3-30173s, 2-70270s, 1-30153 and 1-30474. One 29271 was in excessive training. The training section submitted an AF Form 1098 requesting an entry date adjustment and placed the NCO in remedial training. One 20270 was in excessive training. The individual failed the EOC test twice and was recommended for award of the 7-level in accordance with AFM 35-1, para 37a(3).

WAPS TESTING

■ The unit administered Promotion Fitness Exams to 85 airmen—25-airmen refused to test as they all anticipated leaving the military within a short period. The WAPS program progressed smoothly due to the outstanding service furnished by the host CBPO and their Test Control Officer.

PROMOTIONS

■ Seventeen personnel were selected for promotion during this period: 6 to Sgt, 5 to SSgt, 4 to TSgt, 1 to MSgt, and 1 to SMSgt.

INITIAL DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

■ The unit continued to experience difficulty in obtaining initial duty assignment AF Form 1098 on personnel. Some of the personnel were here several months without receiving their initial duty assignments. The Personnel Section discussed the problem with personnel at the CBPO but little improvement was realized.

SECURITY

■ The Security Section established two detachment armories in October: one in building 233 (barracks) for all personnel in grades AB through SSgt, the second in building 476 (Operations) for all personnel in grades TSgt through SMSgt. Security was still in the process of completing all required actions to meet Base Security Police criteria for armory installation and maintenance by the end of December (for example: combination locks, chains and locks for each gun rack, special inventory schedules). However, the anticipated date for completion was 15 January 1970. The

Security Section also made extra weapons available in building 704 (Material) and building 476 (Operations) for personnel on duty in the event of an attack on the base.

PLANS

■ The unit revised, updated, and republished Emergency Action Plan 1-69 and Emergency Evacuation Plan 65-69 to coincide with the host base Disaster Preparedness Plans after relocation from Nha Trang to Phu Cat. The unit made the Unit PCS Movement Plan an annex to the 37th TFW PCS Movement Plan and also added external and internal security measures to Detachment Emergency Action Plan to ensure assistance from the 37th Security Police Squadron when needed. Intense coordination with base facilities concerned ensured that all aspects of both plans were adequate and included details of anticipated actions should these plans be implemented. After coordination with the host base and the 6994th Security Squadron, both plans were approved for publication on 10 December. As of 31 December, these plans were in publication channels with a final distribution date of January 1970.

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

■ The following statistics are provided on awards submitted from this unit during the period 1 July 1969 thru 31 December 1969.

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>SUBMITTED</u>	<u>APPROVED</u>	<u>DISAPPROVED</u>	<u>PENDING</u>
DFC	32	0	0	32
AM	203	109	0	94
AFCM	18	16	2	0
BSM	4	1	1	2

[REDACTED]


AUTHORIZED/ASSIGNED GRADES

31 December 1969

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Major	1	1
Captain	2	1
1st Lt	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
	3	4
SM Sgt	2	2
MSgt	8	3
TSgt	13	19
SSgt	59	42
Sgt	70	54
A1C	0	15
	<u>152</u>	<u>135</u>

AUTHORIZED/ASSIGNED AFSC

<u>AFSC</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
3234C	1	1
3231C	0	1
8035	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
	3	4
202X0	18	16
203X1MD	8	7
291X0	6	6
292X1	80	75
301X3	19	15
304X4	6	2
645X0	4	4
702X0	4	4
732X0	2	2
811X0	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>
	152	135



GLOSSARY

A

AB Air Base

A-C Alternating Current

ACC ARDF Coordinating Center

AF Air Force

AFCM Air Force Commendation Medal

AFCS Air Force Communication System

AFLC Air Force Logistics Command

AIR Airborne Incident Report

AM Air Medal

AMOC Allocated Minutes of Coverage

ARDF Airborne Radio Direction Finding

ARFCOS Armed Forces Courier Service

AER Airborne Recovery Report

ARTY Artillery

ASST Assistant

AUTOSEVCOM Automatic Secure Voice Communications

B

BOQ Bachelor Officers' Quarters

BSM Bronze Star Medal

C

CBPO Consolidated Base Personnel Office
CES Civil Engineers Squadron
CIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CMA Collection Management Authority
COMMEN Communications Center
COMINT Communications Intelligence
COMSEC Communications Security
COMVAN Communications Van

D

D-C Direct Current
DET Detachment
DFC Distinguished Flying Cross
DIRNSA Director National Security Agency
DNIF Duty Not to Include Flying
DURMIS Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary
DURMR Daily Unit Resource Management Report

E

EI Essential Elements of Information
EMR Exploitable Message Report
EOD Explosive Ordinance Disposal

G

G-A/A-G Ground-to-air/Air-to-ground
GEEIA Ground Electronic Equipment Installation Agency

H

HF High Frequency
HQ Headquarters

I

IFFV First Field Force Vietnam
INFO Information
IRAN Inspect and Repair as Necessary

J

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

K

KVA Kilovolts Alternating

M

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Maint Maintenance
MHz Megahertz

N

NCO Noncommissioned Officer
NCOIC Noncommissioned Officer in Charge

NKP Nakhon Phanom, Thailand
NSAPACREP National Security Agency Pacific Representative
NVA Army of North Vietnam

Q

OCC Operations Control Center
OJT On the Job Training
OP Operational
OFR Office of Primary Responsibility
OFS Operations
OFS/COM Operations Communications

P

PACSCTYRGN Pacific Security Region
PADS Programmed Action Directives
PMT Post Mission Test

R

RATS Rapid Area Transportation Service
REGT Regiment
RGN Region
RO Radio Operator
ROK Republic of Korea
RTB Return to Base
RVN Republic of Vietnam

S

SEA Southeast Asia
SEATS Southeast Asia Technical Summary
SEFE Standardization Evaluation Flight Examiner
SOF Supervisor of Flying
SSIR Special Security Investigation Report

T

TDY Temporary Duty
TEWS Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron
TEXTA Technical Extracts of Traffic Analysis
TRW Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

U

UDL Unit Detail Listing
UGT Up Grade Training
USAFSS United States Air Force Security Service

V

VC Viet Cong
VHF Very High Frequency

W

WAPS Weighted Airman Promotion System

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I


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
Chapter II

1. 6994th Security Squadron message F220900Z Apr 69: Subject: Relocation of Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq.
2. Det 1, 6994th Security Squadron Letter dated 5 May 69: Subject: Pre-design conference.
3. 6994th Scty Sq message 290920Z July 69: Subject: 7th Air Force PAD 69-101.
4. Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq message 260740Z July 69: Subject: 7th Air Force PAD 69-101.
5. 6994th Scty Sq message 280800Z July 69.
6. 37th Tactical Fighter Wing message P160910Z Aug 69.
7. Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq message 180900Z Aug 69: Subject: Advance Party.
8. Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq message 290750Z Aug 69: Subject: Progress Report.
9. Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq message F260630Z Sep 69: Subject: Summary of Relocation.
10. USAFSS Movement Order 22, dated 10 July 1969.

Chapter III

1. Pac Scty Rgn message R041930Z Aug 69: Subject: Identification Effectiveness.
2. Commander, 6994th Scty Sq letter dated 8 August 1969: Subject: Letter of Appreciation.
3. 6994th Scty Sq message OPS 200120Z Sep 69: Subject: Reduced Frags.
4. 6994th Scty Sq message OPS 300457Z Jul 69: Subject: Manning Fifth Man Position on "Z" Missions.

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5. 6994th Scty Sq (CDR) letter, dated 19 Sept 69: Subject: Manning of Zulu Configured Aircraft.
 6. 6994th Scty Sq message CDR 180702Z Jul 69: Subject: ARDF Results.
 7. HQ IFFV (AVFA-GB) letter dated 22 August 1969: Subject: Letter of Commendation.
 8. 6994th Scty Sq letter, (CDR), dated 13 Sep 1969: Subject: Outstanding Mission Accomplishment.
 9. Article in COMBAT SAFETY - 7AFRP 127-1, Vol 4, No II, Nov 69: Title - EC47 (not included)
 10. Statement made by Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq, OCC Supervisor.
 11. Ibid.
 12. Ibid.
 13. Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq, Air Nr One, Follow-up Nr One, DTG 081248Z Oct 69.
 14. Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq message 081505Z Oct 69: Subject: Eyewitness Report of In-air explosion.
 15. Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq, Air Nr One, Follow-up Nr 4, DTG 081725Z Oct 69.
 16. Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq, Air Nr One, Follow-up Nr 5, DTG 090450Z Oct 69.
 17. Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq, Air Nr One, Follow-up Nr 6, DTG 090500Z Oct 69.
 18. 37CMBTSPTGP message 091000Z Oct 69: Subject: Casualty Report. Initial Search Report.
 19. Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq, Air Nr One, Follow-up Nr 7, DTG 091255Z Oct 69.
 20. Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq, Air Nr One, Follow-up Nr 10, DTG 110200Z Oct 69.
 21. Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq, Air Nr One, Follow-up Nr 12, DTG 120125Z Oct 69.



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CDR

5 May 1969

④

Pre-Design Conference

6994 Scty Sq (CDR)

Forwarded for your review and disposition are three copies of the actions and results of the Pre-Design Conference held on 30 April 1969 at Phu Cat AB, RVN. Copies of the attachments were provided the 37 CES and 819 CES (Red Horse), Phu Cat at the time of the conference. This report represents the current status of the project to date.

RAYMOND H. RADE, Lt Col, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Report (S) (3 cys)

210 100000

[REDACTED]

Det 1, 6994 Security Squadron (USAFSS) Relocation from Nha Trang Air Base to Phu Cat Air Base, Republic of Vietnam.

A meeting was held at Phu Cat AB on 30 April to discuss facility requirements and design criteria for the relocation of Det 1, 6994th and 361st TMS from Nha Trang AB to Phu Cat AB.

ATTENDING FROM DET 1:

Lt Col Wade, Commander
Capt Balan, Operations Officer
Lt Yahnke, Communications Officer, 6994 Scty Sq
SMgt Stephens, NCOE Supply

PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVES FROM PHU CAT AB:

Capt Glass, 819 C&S (Red Horse) Engineering Officer, 2947
Capt Swann, 819 C&S, Design Project Officer, 2947
Capt Rowers, 37 C&S, Base Civil Engineers, Program Officer, 2336
TSgt Gruen, 1883 Comm Sq (Plans), 2038/2007/3200

THE FOLLOWING WAS DISCUSSED:

1. The Phu Cat representatives have sited the Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq and 361st TMS complex closer to the base area immediately adjacent to the ramp approximately 1000 feet west of Base Operations.

2. The 819 C&S (Red Horse) received from 7AF the approval for a 4000 sq ft Ops Operations building and a 1500 sq ft Comm/Maintenance building. The question arose as to which organization 7AF had programmed the 1500 sq ft building since 361st TMS had submitted a requirement for that size building and Security Service had not. A call to 7AF determined that the 1500 sq ft building designated "Comm/Maintenance" had been programmed for Security Service.

3. Det 1, 6994 stated that they had a requirement for an additional 800 sq ft for the Operations building (total 4800 sq ft) and a requirement for a Maintenance/Supply building (3200 sq ft). It was decided by the Phu Cat representatives to submit the requirements for the entire 3200 sq ft building for Security Service rather than attempt to request and justify an additional 1700 sq ft to the 1500 sq ft building already programmed for Security Service. This way, the 1500 sq ft building for 361st TMS would also be satisfied.

4. Det 1 met separately with Capt Rowers, 37 C&S, Program Officer, to justify total space requirements. He is sending a letter to 7AF with the justification submitted by Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq for an additional 800 sq ft on the Ops building (Ops building is an X item). The justification was that the building would have a Comm Center and inside incinerator in addition to the Operations/Adm offices. For the Maintenance/Supply building (OSM Project), Capt Rowers completed a DA Form 1391 (specifications) for 7AF. Capt Rowers was given a copy of the proposed lay-out for this building and was provided the air conditioning,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

electrical, low pressure outlet, and power shed requirements. Justification for the building was to test and maintain AM/ALM-24/35 systems, and storage of a special F17030 Account equipment and on pallets which cannot be integrated with the Base Supply system. Capt Namore was also given the desired building relationship to each other and the flight line and the security fence requirements for the Ops building. Capt Namore was advised that the office space in both buildings was based on criteria outlined in USAFSS Manual 86-1.

5. Det 1 met separately with Capt Swann, Project Engineer, who is going to design the building interior. He was given the interior office design drawn by Det 1 and the special requirements for each building (The design was based on PBR's criteria). Capt Swann indicated that he would start design on 1 May based on the Det 1 input. He expects to complete design by 1 June. He will also coordinate with the OMEIA representative at Phu Cat for any special Comm requirements. He indicated he will require the specifications for the incinerator and incinerator room. Red Horse is planning to build two wood frame structures with outside laterite facing.

6. During the general meeting, Red Horse stated that they expected to start the Security Service Operation's building in the May/June time frame. They felt they could complete the entire complex for Det 1 and the 361st by the October date if the project receives early approval. Red Horse indicated that they had received a classified message that the Nha Trang proposal was the "hottest thing going" and that only the concrete aircraft revtments had a higher priority.

7. Communications Details:

Representatives: Maj Coleart, 1883 Comm Sq Commander, and T Sgt Grason of XP (plans). Contact man for the project is Sgt Grason phone 2038/2007/3200 Phu Cat AB.

Communications requirements for Det 1 at Phu Cat will be the same as those at Nha Trang, and as follows:

1. Three teletype positions, full duplex, KM-26 secured. One of these circuits will be going to Det 2, 6994 AB at Flocru AB, RVN. The other will provide link with ACC located in the JUS compound with the 509 HHC in Saigon, RVN. The remaining position along with KM-26 will provide a spare position. A tape preparation position is also required for the TTY communications. A patch bay is required for the interchange of TTY/KM-26 equipments on the line. In conjunction with the move to Phu Cat, USAFSS/PACOM/USMC scheme 10748ND should be reassigned from Nha Trang to Phu Cat. This scheme calls for the following:

- a. installation of a permanent tech control facility
- b. modification for low level keying
- c. installation of urgent traffic detectors
- d. installation of digit test board
- e. separate the patch board from the KM-26 equipment to meet T&E/ST criteria



Apparently this will cover all the equipments identified by FVN in their CSAPSES 86-1 study.

2. AUTOSWOCOM terminal equipment has been programmed for both the 361st TEWS and Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq at Phu Cat. Programming action was taken by 1883 Comm Sq, Sgt Grusen. Sgt Grusen pointed out that they do not have the present two AUTOSWOCOM terminals at Phu Cat operational. He and MSGT Hendry of 7AF Directorate of Communications strongly doubt that the present programming action will have EO-13 and NY-2 equipment available for us until long after the move to Phu Cat programmed for October 69. There is an AUTOSWOCOM terminal for our interim use at the base communications center, approximately 1/4 mile from our proposed location. Again it is pointed out that this terminal is not yet operational.

3. The GIC-27 will provide NY-8 secured air-to-ground communications. Present installation of antennas at Nha Trang is a pair of ASA 1077's approximately eight feet above the ground. There should be no problem with a similar installation at Phu Cat.

4. A NY-3 secured point-to-point circuit should be installed between Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq Operations and Maintenance, and between Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq Operations and 361st TEWS Operations.

An area that should be resolved within the communications consideration, is just how we will move from Nha Trang. Present planning calls for the relocation of communications equipment from Nha Trang to Phu Cat. This would present an unacceptable time delay or excessive communications down time. Estimates of down time run from thirty to ninety days. An attempt should be made to have all possible equipment installed at Phu Cat using USFVS resources from outside the RVN and replace these resources with those from Nha Trang when they are removed.

Action is being taken by the 1883 Comm Sq to have certain key maintenance people receive security clearances so that they will be able to work on CSAPSES equipment within the secured area without escort.

CRITICOM service for Det 1, 6994 SB will have to be provided via OYSCOM circuits to Det 2, 6994, or to ACO. There is not CRITICOM circuit at Phu Cat, and there is none programmed.

1883 Comm Sq anticipated no problems in providing good telephone service.

Raymond H. Kane
RAYMOND H. KANE, Lt Col, USAF
Commander

3. items
1. Requirements
2. Area Diagram
3. Building Floor Plans

I. Requirements:

a. Facilities:

(1) **Communications/Operations Building:** The requirements for the building are:

(a) Building size: 40 ft wide by 120 ft long. (Atech 3)

(b) The building is to be air conditioned for the protection of communications equipment and for the health and welfare of personnel who work on a seven day week, twenty-four hours per day.

(c) Fluorescent lighting to be adequate for office work throughout the building with the exception of the latrine. Also, exit and entrance lights should be at all outside doors.

(d) The Communications Center to be completely secured. The door to the room must be constructed of strong, opaque material (preferable metal). The door should be fitted with a group one combination lock that cannot be removed from the outside.

(e) The building should have a latrine, with one wash basin, one mop sink, two urinals, two commodes, and a shower with at least two shower heads.

(f) The building to be wired for 60 cycle 110/115 volts with adequate outlets in all rooms.

(g) Incinerator: An incinerator of high efficiency will be built within the Communications/Operations building with specifications provided by N. USAFSS.

(h) The Operations building requires a perimeter fence (Atech 2). The fence should be seven feet high, constructed of number eleven gauge or heavier mesh wire, with mesh openings no longer than two inches, with a top guard or overhang consisting of four strands of barbed wire facing outward and set at a 45 degree angle. The fence is to be fastened to metal posts set in concrete and stretched taut with one combination vehicle and foot traffic gate. The fence is to be set within two inches above a hard surface or in soft surface it will reach below the surface to sufficiently compensate for shifting of soil. Where culverts, troughs or other openings are larger than 96 square inches, they will be protected by chain link mesh, iron grills or barriers to prevent entry without impeding drainage. The fence will surround the Operations building and should be located no closer than fifty feet or farther than one hundred feet from the building. The perimeter fence will be well lighted, with the lights mounted on poles facing outward, allowing a clear view of the outside area.

(2) **Security Guard Building:** It will be a 50 sq ft building constructed inside the perimeter fence line, at the vehicle and pedestrian entrance to the area. The building should be constructed to provide clear vision in all directions, and have one door.

Attachment 1

[REDACTED]

(3) Maintenance Supply Buildings: The requirements are:

(a) Building size: 40 ft by 80 ft (Atch 3)

(b) The building is to be air conditioned for protection of electronic test equipment and work-ups.

(c) The building to have adequate fluorescent lighting for office and shop work.

(d) The maintenance shop area, 1400 sq ft to be wired with over head multi-voltage bus bar outlets for 3 phase 400 cycle 115 VAC, 1 phase 60 cycle 115 VAC and +28 VDC. All other rooms should have adequate 60 cycle 110/115 VAC outlets.

(e) The building should consist of an attached outside power shed 4 ft by 6 ft for accommodation of the +28 VDC and 400 cycle generators.

(f) The building to have a latrine with one wash basin, one mop sink, one commode and one urinal.

(g) A double door about six feet wide, to be constructed at the rear of the building, centered between Supply and Maintenance, to accommodate large items of supplies and maintenance equipment.

(h) Low pressure air lines to be installed.

b. Emergency Power Requirements: The Communications/Operations and Maintenance/Supply buildings will require emergency 60 cycle 110/115 VAC back-up power.

c. Communications Requirements:

(1) Telephones:

(a) Eleven lines will be required with twenty-eight instruments. The telephone system should be able to double for an intercom system (AI system).

(b) A secure voice system between Lot 1, 6994 30th Sq Operations and Maintenance and Lot 1, 6994 30th Sq Operations and 301st T&S.

(2) The communications equipment to be installed in the Communications Center within the Communications/Operations building will be installed in accordance with GCA Circular 300-175-1, "ICA Red/Black Engineering-Installation Criteria." Equipment to be installed is: Three each E-26 rack with Red/Black; one each EOC-121; one each GCA-15 Black Patch Panels; one each GCA-15 Red Patch Panels; Three positions of Benz. switches; two each KI-7 (off-line); one test bay with IIF, battery PAC, rectifier charger and fuse box and 2 each NY-3.

(3) Cryptic (Critical) Service: This service is required. The Cat has no Critical circuit and none is programmed.

[REDACTED]

(4) AUTOSEVOCOM not required:

(5) Maintain 25 KY-8's:

d. Billets: Billets will be required for three officers and one-hundred and fifty enlisted men. There will be about eighty-two NCO's, grades E-5 through E-8.

e. Personnel: The manning will need to be increased to support the Security Police requirement for securing the Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron operations complex. The suggested increase is one SSGT S1190, one Sgt S1190 and three each A1C S1190.

f. Support: Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron will require the normal support provided through an AFM 11-4 agreement. The following are areas in which support will be required. An (*) indicates that additional or specific support will be required in that area.

- (1) Accounting and Finance
 - (2) Administrative Services
 - (3) Chaplain
 - (4) Civil Engineering
 - (5) Counsel
 - (6) Communications
 - (7) Data System and Statistics
 - (8) Explosive Ordnance Disposal
 - (9) Information Service
 - (10) Intelligence
 - (11) Judge Advocate
 - (12) Maintenance Field
 - (13) Maintenance Org
 - (14) Medical Service
 - (15) Military Personnel
 - (16) Mortuary Service
 - (17) Personnel Services
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(18) Procurement & Protection

(19) Safety

(20) Security and Law Enforcement

(21) Supply (2500 additional sq ft for support of Sub 1.)


(22) Transportation Service

(23) Vehicles, motor (two each truck, 6 Ford 3/4 ton and four
each truck 1/2 ton.)

[REDACTED]

ATTACHMENT 1, 6974TH SECURITY SQUADRON


OPERATIONS AREA
(PROPOSED)



Attachment

U-30077

Supply/Maintenance Bldg



Attachment

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial data. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses and income. The text suggests that a systematic approach to record-keeping is essential for identifying trends and making informed decisions.

Next, the document addresses the issue of budgeting. It explains that a well-defined budget is a critical tool for managing resources and controlling costs. By setting clear financial goals and allocating funds accordingly, individuals and organizations can avoid overspending and ensure that their financial needs are met. The text provides practical advice on how to create a budget that is both realistic and flexible, allowing for adjustments as circumstances change.

The third section focuses on the importance of regular financial reviews. It argues that periodic assessments of financial performance are necessary to stay on track and identify areas for improvement. This involves comparing actual results against budgeted figures and analyzing the reasons for any variances. The document encourages a proactive approach to financial management, where potential issues are identified and addressed before they become major problems.

Finally, the document discusses the role of technology in modern financial management. It highlights how digital tools and software can streamline processes, reduce errors, and provide real-time insights into financial data. From automated bookkeeping to advanced analytics, technology offers a wide range of solutions to enhance financial efficiency and accuracy. The text concludes by emphasizing that while technology is a valuable asset, it should be used in conjunction with sound financial principles and professional judgment.

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CHAPTER II
FOOTNOTES 4

CDR

LOAD85
//ROUTINE//
SSN559
R 250740Z
FM DET 1 6994 SCTYSO
TO 6994 SCTYSO

CDR. FOR MAJOR HOLMES.
REF 7AF/VC 241200Z JULY 69.
SUBJ: 7AF PAD 69-181

THERE ARE NO SPECIFIC PROBLEMS BEING ENCOUNTERED AT THIS TIME. A VISIT BY SMSGT STEPHENS, PROJECT NCO AND MSGT ROGERS, NODIC MAINT AND MSGT PINTERS NODIC OPERATIONS WAS MADE TO PHU CAT 22 THRU 25 JULY 69. THERE ARE AREAS OF CONCERN: 1. THE SHORT TIME FOR COMPLETION OF THE AFSS OPERATIONS BLDG. 2. THE SHORTAGE OF BILLETTS - PHU CAT WAS NOT SURE IF ENOUGH BILLETTS SPACE WOULD BE AVAILABLE. IF SPACE IS AVAILABLE THEY WILL NEED TO RESHUFFLE ALL PERSONNEL AND TEAR OUT PARTITIONS IN THE BARRACKS. EXAMPLE: A BARRACKS WAS BUILT TO HOUSE 72 PEOPLE, HOWEVER, PARTITIONS HAVE BEEN BUILT IN THE BARRACKS AND NOW IT WILL ACCOMMODATE ONLY 64 PEOPLE. THIS WILL HURT MORALE OF PERSONNEL PRESENTLY STATIONED AT PHU CAT. 3. WHEN THE ABOVE PERSONNEL LEFT PHU CAT - THE SUPPLY/MAINT FUNCTION WAS TEMPORARY PLANNED FOR BUILDING 704. THIS BUILDING IS BETTER SUITED FOR OUR NEEDS THAN THE 3200 SQ FT IN THE 17000 SF A AND E BUILDING. 4. THE COMMUNICATION VAN MUST BE IN PLACE BY 1 SEPT 69, SO THAT LINES CAN BE INSTALLED AND EQUIPMENT CHECKED OUT BEFORE 10 SEP 69. 5. THE MOVEMENT OF OUR COMM EQUIPMENT FROM THIS BASE. 6. PCS-MOVEMENT ORDERS FOR ALL PERSONNEL.

NOTE, WE ARE IN RECEIPT OF UNIT MOVEMENT ORDERS, BUT NEED THE INDIVIDUAL ORDERS NLT 25 SEP 69.


7. THIS MESSAGE IS TO ASSIST YOU IN MAKING YOUR COMMENTS TO 7AF. REF ABOVE MESSAGE. ALL OF THE ABOVE AREAS WAS DISCUSSED WITH LT COL RUSSELL. GP-1.


38#



B

NNNN





JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMUNICATION CENTER

GROUP II
ROUTINE ?

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

DTG

180900Z

FROM: DET 1 6994SCTYSQ NHA TRANG AB RVN

TO: 37TACTTRNG/COM/PHU CAT AB RVN

INFO: 6994SCTYSQ/COM/TAN SON HUT AB RVN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

CDR

YOUR JCM 160910L AUG 69 REFERS. SUBJ: ADVANCE PARTY.

MSGT DAVID H. WINTERS, [REDACTED] WILL ARRIVE PHU CAT
20 AUG 69. HE WILL BE FOLLOWED BY ADVANCE PARTY OF AT LEAST
SEVEN PERSONS ON 25 AUG 69. BUILDING 704 WILL BE UTILIZED
AS INTERNAL OPERATION AND STORAGE AREA UNTIL OPS/COMM BUILDING
IS COMPLETE. CF-4

DATE	18	TIME	1400
MONTH	AUG	YEAR	1969
PAGE		NO OF PAGES	

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

4922

DAVID L. BUSH, MSGT
FIRST SERGEANT

SIGNATURE

MARLE J. VERNON, MAJOR
COMMANDER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DD FORM 173

ALL PAGES EDITION 11 MAY 68 AND 4 MAY 69 USE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 78-1566 200-007

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

CHAPTER II
FOURTH E

SECURITY

TYPE MSG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

ROUTINE

INFO

DTG 2 0 07 30.2 AUG 1969

FROM:

DET1 6994SCTYSQ NHA TRANG AB RVN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO:

6994SCTYSQ/CDB/TAN SON NHUT AB RVN

██████████ CDR

SUBJ: NHA TRANG PROPOSAL/USAFSS PAD 69-8. FOLLOWING IS

PROGRESS REPORT ON PAD 69-08:

ITEM A10.

1.A. NORMAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS ARE DETERMINED TO BE ADEQUATE

FOR AIR TRANSPORT FOR PERSONNEL TO PHU CAT. NO USAFSS PER-
SONNEL WILL BE TRAVELING BY CONVOY.

B. ITEM A11. INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND CONTROLS
ESTABLISHED FOR CONTROL OF CLASSIFIED AND SI MATERIAL TRANSIT.

C. ITEM A12. REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL SECURITY SURVEY WILL BE
SUBMITTED TO LOCAL OSI DET AFTER ARRIVAL AT PHU CAT.

D. ITEM C3. ALB-34 PECULIAR SPARE PARTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED
AND SHIPMENT HAS BEGUN.

E. ITEM C11. NOTED AND BEING COMPLIED WITH.

F. ITEM E3. QUESTION IF THIS ITEM IS RESPONSIBILITY OF DET 1

G. ITEM E4. THIS ITEM WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED 5 SEP. FACILITIES

TO STORE AIRFOCUS MATERIAL NOT AVAIL UNTIL THIS DATE.

DATE TIME

MONTH 29 YEAR

PAGE NO. 1

PAGES 3

D
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A
F
T
E
R

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

4822

DAVID L. BUSH, MSCT
FIRST SERG ANT

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

REGARDING COMMANDER(S)

PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY	
ACTION ROUTINE		MAJ VERNONE		[REDACTED]	
INFO					

2. FOLLOWING IS PROGRESS REPORT ON 7AF PAD 69-101 (REVISED):

ITEM DM-147/DM 148. ALL REQUIREMENTS SUBMITTED TO TNO LESS AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS FOR COMM GEAR SKED TO BE REMOVED APPROX 15 SEP.

3. FOLLOWING ITEMS CONSTITUTE PROBLEM AREAS WHICH REQUIRE YOUR ASSISTANCE:

A. INDIVIDUAL PCS ORDERS. STILL NOT RECEIVED.

B. CRITICOM ENTRY POINT. DET 2 AND 313 RR BN BOTH STATE THAT ENTRY INTO CRITICOM CHANNELS THROUGH DET 2 IS UNDESIRABLE AND CUMBERSOME. REQUEST YOU INITIATE ACTION TO GAIN ENTRY AT ACC IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

4. GENERAL. ALL WORK PROGRESSING SMOOTHLY. OPS/COMM FACILITY AT PHU CAT WAS 55 PERCENT COMPLETE ON 24 AUG. ROOF ON, POWER MAINS IN, CONDUIT INSTALLED AND INTERIOR WALLS ARE GOING UP. WATER AND SEWAGE WAS SKED TO BE PUT IN THIS WEEK. BUILDING 704 UNDERGOING REHAB. BARRACKS ARE ALSO UNDERGOING REHAB. COOPERATION AT PHU CAT OUTSTANDING. RECOMMEND LETTER OF APPRECIATION TO COL TRIMBLE & STAFF FOR THEIR SUPPORT. PACKING AND CRATING UNDERWAY HERE. DO NOT FORESEE ANY INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEMS. SEA SHIPMENT DUE OUT ON 7 SEP TO ARRIVE PHU CAT 10 SEP. AIR SHIPMENT ON 9 SEP. PERSONNEL WILL TRAVEL AS FOLLOWS: IN PLACE PHU CAT - 6; 1 COMM MAN ON 1 SEP; 12

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	3		[Signature]
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY C	[REDACTED]

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
ACTION ROUTINE	MAJ VERNONE	
INFO		

PERSONNEL ON 4 SEP; 23 ON 8 SEP; 49 ON 10 SEP AND
REMAINDER OF UNIT (6) HEADED BY CAPT BALAN AND AS
SOON AS COMM GEAR IS PACKED WILL DEPART PROBABLY ON 15
SEP. I PLAN TO COURIER CRYPTO SAFE AND MATERIAL ON AIRLIFT
9 SEP. REALIZE THAT AFSS PAD PROGRESS REPORTS ARE DUE 10TH
OF MONTH, BUT IN LIGHT OF MOVE ON THAT DATE, WILL CONTINUE
TO PROVIDE YOU WITH UP-TO-DATE PERIODIC REPORTS AND FORGO
REPORT ON 10TH. VERNONE SENDS. GP-4.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	3		VA
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASS	

DD FORM 173-1
1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED.

LDAB25
//PRIORITY//
SSN REP
P 2670630
FM DET 1 6994 TH SCTYSQ
TO ZEN/USAFSS (LLP/OPD)
INFO ZEN/PACSCOTYRGN (LOG-L/MAT)
ZEN/6922ND SCTYNG/MAT)
6994TH SCTYSQ (COMDR)
ZEN

CHAPTER II
FOOTNOTE 9

UNCLAS E F T D COMDR SECTION ONE OF THREE.
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF RELOCATION.

REFERENCE PACSCOTYRGN LOG-L 200216Z SEPT 69 (NOTAL TO USAFSS)
REGARDING ONE TIME REPORT SUMMARIZING RELOCATION OF DETACHMENT 1,
6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON TO PHU CAT AIR BASE, RVN. THIS REPORT IS
BROKEN DOWN ACCORDING TO FUNCTIONAL AREAS IN ORDER TO RENDER IT
THE MOST USEABLE.

THIS MESSAGE IS IN VIII PARTS
PART I

IN GENERAL, THE MOVE WAS MADE WITH A MINIMUM OF PROBLEMS DUE
TO THE EXTRA EFFORT EXPENDED BY PERSONNEL OF THIS ORGANIZATION AND
THE COOPERATION RECEIVED BY PERSONNEL AT PHU CAT AIR BASE.

PART II

MATERIAL.

1. PROGRAMMED ACTION DIRECTIVES. ALTHOUGH WE WERE PROVIDED PADS
BY BOTH 7TH AIR FORCE AND USAFSS, THE FORMER WAS OF A GENERAL
NATURE AND THE LATTER WAS RECEIVED MUCH TOO LATE TO BE OF VALUE (WE
RECEIVED THE USAFSS PAD ON 18 AUGUST) AND IT TOO WOULD HAVE BEEN OF
LITTLE ASSISTANCE BECAUSE OF ITS GENERAL NATURE, LACK OF DETAIL
AND THE FACT THAT OPR'S WERE NOT FULLY DEFINED. WE RECOMMEND THAT
FUTURE PAD'S INCLUDE REFERENCES TO AGENCIES THAT SHOULD BE RE-
FERRED TO FOR ASSISTANCE IN AREAS OUTSIDE THE UNIT'S CAPABILITY
TO RESOLVE.

2. EXPERIENCED SUPPLY TECHNICIAN.

WE OF DET 1 MADE OUR MOVE TO PHU CAT WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF
A SENIOR EXPERIENCED MATERIEL SPECIALIST. FUTURE MOVES SHOULD
NOT BE ATTEMPTED WITHOUT A QUALIFIED 64570/99 IN THE GRADES OF
E-7 THRU E-9 (EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND IN SECURITY SERVICE DEEMED
ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY) WHO WOULD BE ON BOARD DURING ALL STAGES
(PLANNING, ACTUAL AND POST MOVE) OF THE MOVE.

★ 3. MORE ASSISTANCE IN ADVANCE PLANNING.

MORE ASSISTANCE IN ADVANCE PLANNING SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED
BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. THERE WERE CERTAIN AREAS THAT WERE
COMPLETELY OVERLOOKED SUCH AS STORAGE FACILITIES FOR DOCUMENT
DESTROYERS, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ARMORIES NEAR OR IN THE BARRACK
AREAS AND OTHER ITEMS LISTED IN OTHER FUNCTIONAL AREAS.

4. PACKING AND CRATING. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES SHOULD BE MADE
AVAILABLE TO THE MOVING UNIT IN THIS AREA. THE LOCAL TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY MANNED OR EQUIPPED TO PROVIDE THIS
SERVICE IN THE SCOPE THAT WAS REQUIRED. FUTURE MOVES SHOULD NOT
RELY ON THE SERVICES OF ALC'S "RATS" TEAMS.

5. ACTUAL SHIPMENT: MARTIALING AREAS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED NEAR THE TRANSPORTATION SOURCE AT BOTH THE SHIPPING LOCATION AND THE RECEIVING LOCATION. THESE AREAS SHOULD BE SECURE FROM WEATHER, PILFERAGE AND IN THE CASE OF A COMBAT AREA, AS SECURE AS POSSIBLE FROM GROUND AND/OR MORTAR. OUR EXPERIENCE WITH SURFACE TRANSPORTATION IN THIS COUNTRY NECESSITATES THAT WE RECOMMEND THAT ONLY AGR TRANSPORTATION BE UTILIZED. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF MISSING ITEMS DURING TRANSIT, PILFERAGE WAS ATTEMPTED IN AT LEAST ONE INSTANCE BY EMPLOYEES OF THE CONTRACTING TRANSPORTER. NO EQUIPMENT OR SUPPLIES THAT WERE SHIPPED VIA AIR WERE RECEIVED DAMAGED. VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING SHIPPED BY SURFACE WAS EITHER/EXTENSIVELY DAMAGED OR DESTROYED.

6. SUPPLIES. ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS TO TRANSFER DUE-OUTS FROM THE LOSING TO THE GAINING BASE SUPPLIES. THIS HAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED DURING THIS MOVE AND THERE WILL BE A SHORTAGE OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT FOR MONTHS TO COME. ADVANCE CONTACT WITH THE GAINING SUPPLY SHOULD BE MADE TO INSURE THAT THERE IS AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF GENERAL GLEANING MATERIALS AND OTHER SUCH HOUSEKEEPING ITEMS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH LIVERABLE AND OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS AT THE NEW LOCATION.

7. HOST TENANT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE MADE BY SPECIALISTS FROM THE OR REGION WITH LOCAL ASSISTANCE. THEY SHOULD COME PREPARED WITH ALL WAIVERS AND DOCUMENTATION TO SUPPORT PECULIAR USAFSS REQUIREMENTS. E. G., WE STILL DO NOT KNOW THE DOCUMENTARY AUTHORITY FOR THE REQUIREMENT TO HAVE BACK UP POWER, THE PERCENTAGE REQUIRED. NOR EVEN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF KVA MAINTENANCE, SECURITY, COMMUNICATIONS, AND GENERAL SERVICES SHOULD BE LOOKED AT CLOSELY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE MANNING (TO INCLUDE SSIR CLEARANCES WHERE NECESSARY) AND THAT THE REQUIRED SPARE PARTS ARE ON HAND WHEN THE UNIT ARRIVES.

IV. OPERATIONS:

1. ADVANCE PARTY. A NUCLEUS OF EXPERTS SHOULD BE PLACED TOY TO THE NEW LOCATION WITH ESSENTIAL WORKING MATERIAL TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS WHILE MAINTAINING OPERATIONS AT THE AREA TO BE VACATED. IN OUR SITUATION, WE WERE NOT ABLE TO DO THIS BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF FACILITY. THIS CREATED MANY PROBLEMS WHICH WERE FORTUNATELY SOLVED WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO THE MISSION BUT IT IS QUITE CONCEIVABLE THAT PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN UNSOLVABLE. AGAIN, OPERATIONS SHOULD HAVE THE BENEFIT OF ANY EXPERT ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE TO THE COMMAND WHICH WOULD RENDER THE ADVANCE PARTY AS VALUABLE AS POSSIBLE.

2. PREPARATION FOR AND SHIPMENT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL. CLASSIFIED MATERIAL SHOULD BE CAREFULLY SCREENED AND UNNECESSARY DUPLICATES SHOULD BE DESTROYED IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT ONLY THE REQUIRED ITEMS ARE SHIPPED. ALL MATERIAL MUST BE ADEQUATELY MARKED TO INSURE THAT OPENING OCCURS IN A SECURE AREA. ALL MATERIAL ESSENTIAL FOR CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CLEARLY MARKED AND IF POSSIBLE, BE SHIPPED SEPARATE TO PRECLUDE TEMPORARY MISLOCATION.

3. PLANS. THE PLANS NCO SHOULD GO WITH THE ADVANCE PARTY TO WRITE AND COORDINATE INTERIM EMERGENCY ACTIONS AND EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLANS WHICH WOULD BECOME EFFECTIVE WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE UNIT. THIS INDIVIDUAL SHOULD BE PROVIDED EXPERT ASSISTANCE FROM WITHIN COMMAND SO THAT OUR INTERESTS ARE ADEQUATELY PROVIDED FOR. E. G., HE SHOULD NOT HAVE TO RESEARCH SUCH DOCUMENTS AND DOD DIRECTIVE 5200 FOR GUIDANCE. ALL GUIDANCE SHOULD BE SPECIFIC AND SHOULD BE CO-ADDRESSED TO THE LOCAL PLANS AGENCY.

4. MISSION STANDDOWN. IF THE NECESSARY TDY ASSISTANCE FOR COMPLETE CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS CANNOT BE PROVIDED, THEN A MISSION STANDDOWN IS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE. ONE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM THAT WAS ENCOUNTERED DURING OUR MOVE WAS THE SCHEDULING OF THE STANDDOWN. THE GREATEST WORKLOAD NECESSARILY WILL TAKE PLACE IN FINAL PREPARATIONS DURING THE FINAL WEEK PRIOR TO THE MOVE. OUR STANDDOWN WAS SCHEDULED AFTER THE LARGEST PART OF THIS WORK WAS COMPLETED. DURING THE PERIOD OF THE MAXIMUM STANDDOWN, CONSEQUENTLY, WE HAD THE MINIMUM WORKLOAD, AND VICE VERSA. RECOMMEND A 50 PERCENT STANDDOWN OVER A TEN-DAY PERIOD.

NNNN

LOAD 29

//PRIORITY//

SSN 441

P 2678638

FM DET 1 6994 TH SOTYSQ
TO ZEN/USAFSS (LLP/OPD)
INFO ZEN/PAGSCTYRGN (LOG-L/MAT)
ZEN/6922ND SOTYNG/MAT)
6994TH SOTYSQ (COMDR)
ZEN

NOT ASSIGNED

UNCLAS E F T O COMDR SECTION TWO OF THREE.
PART IV. COMMUNICATIONS.

1. RECOMMEND A TURN-KEY TYPE OF OPERATION ON COMMUNICATIONS WITH COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY COMPLETELY OPERATIONAL PRIOR TO RELOCATION. IF DEEMED NECESSARY TO UTILIZE INTERIM TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS AS WE HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO DO, RECOMMEND THE MINIMUM PRECAUTION OF IRONCLAD CERTIFICATION OF COMPLETE OPERATIONAL STATUS (TO INCLUDE AIR CONDITIONING) OF TEMPORARY FACILITY; COMPLETE SPARE PARTS FOR ALL GEAR; COMPLETE TECHNICAL ORDERS AND SCHEMATICS; AND THAT THE VANS BE ACCOMPANIED WITH QUALIFIED MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WITH ORDERS REQUIRING THAT THEY STAY UNTIL THE LOCAL CHIEF OF MAINTENANCE CERTIFIES THAT HE IS COMPLETELY CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING THE ENTIRE FACILITY. OF PARTICULAR NOTE IN OUR SITUATION WAS THE FACT THAT THE LOCAL AFCS DID NOT HAVE MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WHO WERE EXPERIENCED IN THE EQUIPMENT AS INSTALLED IN THE COMMUNICATIONS VAN NOR THAT TO BE INSTALLED IN THE PERMANENT FACILITY. ONLY THROUGH PRIOR COORDINATION BY STAFF COMMUNICATIONS AT SOME POINT HIGHER THAN THIS UNIT COULD THIS PROBLEM HAVE BEEN ISOLATED AND SOLVED.

2. CEEIA SUPPORT. FAR REACHING PLANNING IS NEEDED TO PROVIDE ON-SITE DISMANTLING AND REINSTALLATION AS REQUIRED. RECOMMEND STAFF COMMUNICATIONS AT EITHER WING OR REGION LEVEL BE MADE THE ATTENTION AGENCY FOR THESE. NO EXPERT COMMAND ASSISTANCE WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO THIS UNIT IN THIS REGARD. ALTHOUGH WE DID RECEIVE PROGRAMMING ASSISTANCE FROM THE 1883RD COMM SQUADRON, THE AVAILABILITY OF AN EXPERIENCED PROGRAMMER FROM OUR OWN STRUCTURE AT BOTH NHA TRANG AND PHU CAT WOULD HAVE PROVEN INVALUABLE. COMPLETE SCHEMATIC(S) SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE UNIT TO ENSURE CLARITY IN COMMUNICATION.

PART V. CIVIL ENGINEERING.

1. SPECIAL SECURITY, TEMPEST, AND ELECTRICAL WIRING REQUIREMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED TO THE CONSTRUCTION AGENCY (THE 819TH CIVIL ENGINEERING SQUADRON--THE LOCAL RED HORSE). AS SOON AS BUILDING REQUIREMENTS WERE KNOWN.

2. IF NEW CONSTRUCTION IS PART OF THE PROGRAM, CRITERIA AND SPECIFICATIONS SHOULD BE PREPARED BY SPECIALISTS AND ENGINEERS. DESIGN CRITERIA SHOULD BE DIRECTLY AND PERSONALLY COORDINATED WITH THE CONSTRUCTION AGENCY ON SITE--PARTICULARLY IF IT IS TO BE DONE BY NEW CIVIL ENGINEERS. PLANS SHOULD BE FINAL, FOR ONCE THEY START, THERE WILL BE NO TIME TO MAKE ANY CHANGES. SPECIAL ENGINEERING ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF A TDY ENGINEER OR CIVIL ENGINEER FROM THE CIVIL ENGINEERING STAFF AGENCY SHOULD BE REQUESTED DURING INITIAL PLANNING AND JUST PRIOR TO CONSTRUCTION (SPECIAL SECURITY AND TEMPEST). (SPECIAL SECURITY)

3. BOE WORK ORDERS. IN ORDER TO BE AS REALISTIC AS POSSIBLE, ALL WORK ORDERS (AF FORM 332) FOR THE GAINING BASE CIVIL ENGINEER (TO INCLUDE THOSE FOR SELF-HELP) SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS SOON AS PRACTICAL AND IF POSSIBLE UPWARDS TO TWO OR THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE RELOCATION. IF THIS IS DONE, ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO HAVE THE RELOCATING UNIT REPRESENTED ON THE NEW BASE'S FACILITIES UTILIZATION BOARD.

PART VI. SECURITY.

1. ONE OF THE MOST PARAMOUNT RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING SECURITY MUST BE THE ONE DEALING WITH THE EXPERT HIMSELF. IT IS DEEMED IMPERATIVE THAT A SECURITY SERVICE INDOCTRINATED AND EXPERIENCED SECURITY POLICEMAN BE ON BOARD DURING THE PRE-PLANNING THROUGH THE POST-MOVE STAGES OF ANY SECURITY SERVICE MOVE. THERE ARE LITERALLY TOO MANY AREAS IN WHICH TROUBLE CAN BE EXPERIENCED TO MOVE WITHOUT A USAFSSM 205-7 SPECIALIST.

2. NEW CONSTRUCTION FOR SECURITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN A PART OF THE PACKAGE;

A. CONSTRUCTION OF A STANDARDIZED INCINERATOR WITH SPECIFICATIONS THAT IT IS TO BE WITHIN THE BUILDING OR WITHIN THE COMPOUND. CURRENTLY, WE ARE "BORROWING" A BARREL-TYPE INCINERATOR WHICH, OF COURSE, IS NOT DESIGNED TO DESTROY THE AMOUNT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL WE GENERATE FROM THE 1883RD COMM SQUADRON. LOCAL ESTIMATES FROM THE LOCAL BASE CIVIL ENGINEER INDICATES WE WILL NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE INCINERATOR OF OUR OWN FOR ANOTHER MONTH OR TWO. OUR REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING THIS ITEM WERE MADE KNOWN ABOUT TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO THE MOVE.

B. IN A "HIGH RISK" AREA (SEA), STANDARDIZED SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND STORAGE OF EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION DEVICES ARE DEEMED NECESSARY. (WE HAVE A REQUIREMENT FOR SEVEN M-E EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION KITS AS WELL AS THERMITE GRENADES. THEY CANNOT BE STORED IN THE OPS/COMM BUILDING OR THE MAINT/SUPPLY FACILITY.

USE OF CONEXES FOR THIS PURPOSE IS NOT AUTHORIZED NOR SATISFACTORY, BUT MAY BE NECESSARY IF PROPER APPROVAL CAN BE RECEIVED FROM THE 7TH A&R FORCE.)

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NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED EFTD

UNCLASSIFIED EMI

NKAB34

//PRIORITY//

SSN 443

P 2670630

FM DET 1 6994 TH SCTYSQ

TO ZEN/USAFSS (LLP/OPD)

INFO ZEN/PACSCITYRGN (LOG-L/MAT)

ZEN/6922ND SCTYNG/MAT)

6994TH SCTYSQ (COMDR)

ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O COMDR FINAL SECTION OF THREE

1. GUN ROOMS ARE NEEDED FOR THE STORAGE OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION. PHYSICAL LAYOUT OF PHU CAT AIR BASE MAKES THE LOCATIONING OF WEAPONRY UNFEASIBLE AT EITHER THE OPS/COMM OR MAINT/SUPPLY BUILDINGS.

2. GATE GUARD POST CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICS TO INCLUDE SPECIFICATIONS FOR MINIMUM COMMUNICATIONS AND PANIC HARDWARE AND INTRUSION ALARM SYSTEMS TO INCLUDE APPROVED STOCK NUMBERS.

3. NO ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR SSIR CLEARED SECURITY POLICE FOR GUARDING THE NEW OPS/COMM BUILDING. THIS ASSISTANCE WILL NOT BE PROVIDED UNTIL DURING NOVEMBER.

4. SO FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE NO PROVISIONS WERE MADE FOR NOTIFYING OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND AGENCIES OF OUR NEW CHANGE OF ADDRESS. A LOCAL CONTACT WITH ARFCOS MINIMIZED THIS PROBLEM, BUT HAD THIS NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, CONSIDERABLE DELAY WOULD HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCED IN RECEIVING HARD-COPY CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS.

PART VII. PERSONNEL

1. THE MOVING UNIT SHOULD NOT BE ENCUMBERED WITH HAVING ANY PERSONNEL TDY IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. EVERY MAN IS GOING TO BE NEEDED TO MAKE THE MOVE--NOT ONLY FOR MAKING SURE HIS PERSONAL EFFECTS GET MOVED SAFELY, BUT FOR THE MANPOWER THAT IS REQUIRED AT BOTH ENDS OF THE MOVE. THIS IS EVEN MORE CRITICAL IF YOU MUST REMAIN OPERATIONAL AT THE SAME TIME.

2. MANNING ASSISTANCE. AREAS WHICH MUST FUNCTION AT BOTH LOSING AND GAINING BASE DURING THE PERIOD OF THE MOVE SHOULD BE LOOKED AT CLOSELY TO IDENTIFY THOSE AREAS IN WHICH MANNING ASSISTANCE MAY BE NEEDED, E.G., COMMUNICATIONS CENTERS WHERE OVER LAP IS REQUIRED.

3. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN AN ACCURATE AND UP TO DATE PERSONNEL ROSTER OF EVERY MAN ASSIGNED TO THE UNIT. MAKE IT IN MULTIPLE COPIES AND USE IT FOR MASS BASE CLEARANCES--ONE MAN ARMED WITH THE LIST CLEARANCE FOR THE UNIT.

4. IN SO FAR AS POSSIBLE NO PERSONNEL SHOULD ARRIVE OR DEPART PCS DURING THE TEN-DAY PERIOD PRECEDING THE MOVE AND FOR AT LEAST TEN DAYS AFTERWARDS. ALL PERSONNEL WHO WERE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE DURING THIS PERIOD SHOULD BE RESCHEDULED TO ARRIVE BEFORE THIS PERIOD AND SIMILARLY, THOSE SCHEDULED TO DEPART SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL AFTERWARDS.

12/18/78

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5. THE LIMITATION OF PERSONAL GOODS TO 100 POUNDS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. PERSONAL GOODS PLUS FIELD AND COMBAT GEAR WILL TOTAL MUCH MORE THAN THIS. PERSONNEL ARE AUTHORIZED TO SHIP HOLD BAGGAGE FROM SEA ON A PCS AND THE SAME SHOULD APPLY FOR A UNIT RELOCATION.

6. THE EARLY PUBLICATION OF PCS ORDERS BY THE SERVICING CSPO SHOULD BE AFFECTED. IN OUR SITUATION, MOST OF THE PCS ORDERS WERE NOT RECEIVED UNTIL THE 22ND OF SEPTEMBER. THIS NECESSITATED THE LOCAL PUBLICATION OF IN-COUNTRY TOY ORDERS WHICH OBVIOUSLY ARE NOT DESIGNED FOR THE PURPOSE OF A UNIT RELOCATION.

PART VIII. SUMMATION.

1. WE FEEL THE MAJOR DEFICIENCY IN ENTIRE RELOCATION EXERCISE WAS THE LACK OF DIRECTION FROM SECURITY SERVICE AND INTERMEDIATE STAFF OFFICES TO PROVIDE DETAILED SPECIFICATIONS, UNIQUE ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS AND DIRECTION FOR BUILDING THE NEW FACILITY BASED UPON THE EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE FROM WITHIN THE COMMAND AFTER BEING MANY NEW FACILITIES OVER THE YEARS.

2. IN FUTURE MOVES, ADVANCE LIAISON IS A MUST. EVERY FUNCTION SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST ONE KEY INDIVIDUAL VISIT THE NEW SITE. APPROXIMATELY TWO TO THREE WEEKS IN ADVANCE A LIAISON TEAM SHOULD BE DEPLOYED FOR COORDINATION AND MAKE-READY ACTIONS. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE "NEW SITE" PARTY AND THE PROJECT STAFF AT THE LOSING SITE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED ON REGULAR SCHEDULES ON A MINIMUM OF ONCE DAILY. SELECTION OF THE ADVANCE LIAISON TEAM CHIEF IS CRITICAL. HE MUST HAVE ALL THE ATTRIBUTES OF A PROFESSIONAL POLITICIAN WITH THE SINCERITY OF A PARSON, AND ONE WHO WILL WORK LONG HARD HOURS WITH NO SUPERVISION.

3. THE SUPPORT WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM UNITS OF PHU CAT AIR BASE SHOULD RECEIVE SOME COMMENT. WITHIN THEIR RESOURCES, THE SUPPORT FROM THE HOST BASE HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING. THEY HAVE BEEN BOTH CONSIDERATE AND HOSPITABLE AND HAVE ACTIVELY CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE OF HELPFULNESS.

4. DUE TO THE WORKLOADS OF KEY PERSONNEL IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A UNIT RELOCATION, RECOMMEND THE LEVY OF A "REPORT OF SUMMATION" NOT BE MADE UNTIL AT LEAST A MONTH FOLLOWING THE RELOCATION.

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
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12

CHAPTER III
FOOTNOTE 1


RR TMMLO
DE YKAKZ 3 216193Z
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FM PACSCTYRGN
TO 699ASCTYSQ/ODR
INFO DET 1, 699ASCTYSQ
DET 2, 699ASCTYSQ
AFSSO HQ
699ASCTYSQ/OPS
ZEM

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
AFSSO HQ PASS TO DET 3, 699ASS
SUBJ: IDENTIFICATION EFFECTIVENESS
REF: USAFSS/DCS 012110Z AUG 69.
1. REF MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO. QUOTE:
R 012110Z
FM USAFSS
TO PACSCTYRGN

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: IDENTIFICATION EFFECTIVENESS
SINCE THE INSTITUTION OF THE EXPANDED IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM AT THE 699ASS, DET 1, DET 2 AND DET 3, THE FIX IDENTIFICATION RATE HAS SHOWN A STEADY INCREASE AND HAS, AS A RESULT, PROVIDED OUR CONSUMERS WITH MORE MEANINGFUL INFORMATION. CONSIDER THIS DEDICATION AND PERSEVERENCE ON THE PART OF THE ANALYSTS AND FLYING CREWS MOST COMMENDABLE. PLEASE INSURE THAT ALL RESPONSIBLE ARE INFORMED OF MY APPRECIATION.

2. WISH TO ADD OUR APPRECIATION TO THAT OF GEN STAPLETON. CONGRATULATIONS ON A JOB WELL DONE AND KEEP UP THE GOOD WORK.

BT



RECEIVED THE COMMANDER'S OFFICE

[Redacted]

FORM 3

ORCE

6994 SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



AS
AMW
e

8 AUG 1969

[Handwritten signature]

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: CDR

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq

1. The Commander Pacific Security Region has forwarded the following personal message from General Stapleton. Quote:

"Since the institution of the expanded identification program at the 6994SS, Det 1, Det 2 and Det 3, the fix identification rate has shown a steady increase and has, as a result, provided our consumers with more meaningful information. Consider this dedication and perseverance on the part of the analysts and flying crews most commendable. Please insure that all responsible are informed of my appreciation." Unquote.

2. Col Hanley added his appreciation and congratulations for the outstanding work.

3. It is always a great source of pride to receive such praise as this. I am well aware of the effort expended by all personnel and also that the praise is well earned. I can only add my own congratulations and appreciation for a very fine effort.

[Handwritten signature]

DUANE E RUSSELL, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

[Handwritten mark]

[Redacted]

NAC010
ORA006
//ROUTINE//
SSN 790
200120Z
FM 6994SS
TO DET 1 6994SS
DET 2 6994SS
DET 3 6994SS

[REDACTED]

54

[REDACTED]

0240Z
Ad

SUBJ: REDUCED FRAGS. REF DET 2 180140Z SEP (NOTAL).
1. 460TRW MSG DCOCE 161203Z, TRANSMITTED TO EACH TEWS AND DET 2,
460TRW OUTLINES A MACV APPROVED CHANGE IN FRAG TIMES FOR CCZ/Q
EC-47N/P MODEL AIRCRAFT. THE FRAG TIME FOR THE ZULU/Q CONFIGURED
EC-47 N/P ACFT WILL BE FIVE HOURS. EC-47Q ZULU CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT
AND EC-47-N/P CC CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT WILL CONTINUE TO BE FRAGGED
FOR SEVEN HOURS.
2. FOR DET 2, 6994SS: 460TRW WILL FORECASE EC-47Q ACFT SEPERATELY.
ACC TASKING WILL REFLECT EC-47Q VERSE EC-47 N/P ZULU ACFT BY
DIFFERENCE IN TOT ONLY

131

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NNNN



NAC 005

OS

CHAPTER 117
PAGE 1

30/05/69

TRACED
//ROUTINE//
SSN 925
R 300457Z
FM 6904 SOTYSC
TO DET 1 6904 SOTYSC

██████████ OPS JUL 69.
SUBJ: MANNING FIFTH MAN POSITION ON "Z" MISSIONS.
AGREE THAT YOU DO NOT HAVE REQUIREMENT AT THIS TIME FOR FIFTH
MAN ON COLLECTION MISSION. CONCUR IN YOUR ACTION TO FLY WITH
ONLY FOUR MEN.

[Handwritten signature]

WADLE V.A. SCHEIDT

A3 U

████████████████████ FORM 3

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
6994th SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



19 SEP 1969

5

CDR

Manning of Zulu Configured Aircraft

460 TRW

1. [] The 6994th Security Squadron has recently studied the requirement to provide an airborne analyst on each Zulu aircraft flown by the 460th TRW/6994th Security Squadron Units. The conclusions of this study relative to airborne analyst manning requirements were:

- a. The airborne analyst is not required on each Zulu aircraft flown.
- b. Determination as to when airborne analysts are required must be based upon collection requirements, special emphasis requirements and area development requirements in support of MACV EEI contained in weekly tasking.
- c. The requirement for an airborne analyst cannot be made solely on basis of geographic area of flight but must be made on basis of analytic requirements outlined in para 1b. These requirements must be reviewed on a continuous basis.

2. [] Based on the study results, the 6994th Security Squadron will, effective with 20 September tasking cycle, provide an airborne analyst on Zulu missions on an as required basis only. The prerogative of manning the fifth position with an airborne analyst must remain solely with the 6994th Security Squadron. The provision of working space, interphone and KY-8/Radio System access must be retained for the airborne analyst.

3. [] Notification as to when an airborne analyst will fly on specific Zulu configured aircraft will be provided through normal scheduling procedures.

4. (U) The 6994th Security Squadron Detachments are being advised of this policy change through other communications. Request you provide the appropriate 460 TRW elements with notification of this change.

5. (U) For Det 3, 6994th Security Squadron: This does not affect your current operating procedures.

DUANE E. RUSSELL, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

Cy to: Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq (OPS)
Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq (OPS)
Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq (OPS)

████████████████████

████████████████████
████████████████████


01-591

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry, no matter how small, should be recorded to ensure the integrity of the financial data. This includes not only sales and purchases but also expenses and income. The text explains that proper record-keeping is essential for identifying trends, managing cash flow, and preparing for tax obligations.

Next, the document addresses the issue of budgeting. It suggests that creating a realistic budget is a key strategy for controlling costs and maximizing profits. The budget should be based on historical data and current market conditions. Regularly comparing actual performance against the budget allows for timely adjustments and helps in staying on track throughout the year.

The third section focuses on the importance of regular financial reviews. It advises that business owners should conduct monthly or quarterly reviews of their financial statements. This practice helps in spotting potential problems early, such as declining sales or increasing expenses, and allows for proactive decision-making. It also provides a clear picture of the overall financial health of the business.

Finally, the document discusses the role of professional advisors. It recommends consulting with accountants, lawyers, and other experts to ensure compliance with regulations and to optimize the business's financial strategy. These professionals can provide valuable insights and help in navigating complex financial and legal issues, ultimately contributing to the long-term success of the business.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
6994 SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

FOOTNOTES



A-
8

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: CDR

13 SEP 1969

SUBJECT: Outstanding Mission Accomplishment

TO: Det 1, 6994 Security Squadron (CDF)

I would like to add my personal congratulations and appreciation to those expressed by General Stapleton and Colonel Hanley, for the outstanding mission accomplishment achieved by one of your crews on 14 August 1969.

The dedicated efforts and performance exhibited by this crew is highly commendable and indicates the high degree of professionalism maintained by your crewmembers. It is extremely gratifying to note such laudatory correspondence for members of the 6994th complex as was contained in Pac Scty Rgn CLR 040032Z Sep 69.

Again, please extend my personal thanks and appreciation to the crewmembers concerned.

DUANE E RUSSELL, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

SSgt REYNOLDS
Sgt BOCK

*Outstanding, - We do daily
Impossible, - We do regularly.*

STATEMENT OF DET-1, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON OPERATIONS CONTROL
CENTER DUTY NCO CONCERNING LAST COMMUNICATION WITH AIRCRAFT
43-49100

On 8 October 1969 at approximately 1920L (1120Z), I was on duty in the Operations Control Center and received an Air/Ground call from PRONG 33 who stated they were having an in-flight emergency--an inverter in the back-end of the aircraft was on fire. They then said the fire was out but they were still coming in as an emergency. The operator said their estimated time of arrival at Phu Cat was 1940L at that time and signed out.

At approximately 1925L, PRONG 33 called GULLIBLE again (Operations Control Center callsign). I answered him but he never came back up. Immediately after, the 361st TEWS called and said they had lost voice contact and radar monitor of the aircraft and suspected the aircraft was down. I informed them of the last call I had received from PRONG 33. I immediately contacted the Squadron Commander, the 1st Sergeant, and the NCOIC of the Operations Control Center. The Squadron Commander informed me he would contact the Operations Officer.

Ray B. Ivey Jr.

RAY B. IVEY JR., SSgt, USAF

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
PRECEDENCE FLASH			
ACTION			
INFO			

DTG 481248Z

FROM: DET 1, 6994CTTQ
 TO: HQ USAFSS (TUS-1)
 PACCTYGH (CDR)
 6922CTTQ (CDR)
 690794CTTQ (CDR)
 INFO: NSA PAC REP VIETNAM

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. FOLLOW-UP NUMBER 1 TO DET 1, 6994CTTQ AIR NUMBER ONE.
2. CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ABOVE
 - A. HRTIA PARS 0770 [REDACTED] RPT [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] RPT [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 - B. KYK-3. (1107) [REDACTED]
 - C. KYK-5. [REDACTED]
 - D. DSW CALL SIGN SHEET. (0007 [REDACTED])
 - E. CHECKLIST NR 13 [REDACTED]
 - F. CHERRY SHEET. [REDACTED]
 - G. OPERATOR LOG AND DERRIER. ([REDACTED])
 - H. BURN BAG. ([REDACTED])
 - I. TRAFFIC. [REDACTED]
 - J. MAP OF DSW LOCATIONS. ([REDACTED])

DATE	TIME
02	2045
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	69
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE WALTER J. VANDER, MAJOR, USAF OPERATOR		
SECURITY	[REDACTED]		

PRECEDENCE JMT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
ACTION		
INFO		

K. THREE PAGES OF DIVERTED MISSION PROCEDURES [REDACTED].

L. JAMMING REPORTING PROCEDURES [REDACTED].

3. AT THIS TIME THE RESCUE CHOPPER HAS NOT BEEN REPORTED DEPARTING QUINNON. A GROUND SEARCH PARTY IS REPORTED LEAVING QUI MERON FOR THE CRASH AREA AND A JEEP IN THE AREA OF THE CRASH IS CONDUCTING A SEARCH. DUSTOFF IS STILL IN THE AREA. WX [REDACTED] LOCAL WX IS OVERCAST WITH MODERATE TO HEAVY SHOWERS [REDACTED]. GP-4

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2	AIR NR 2	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS		

CRYPTO

TYPE MSG	
PRECEDENCE	
ACTION PRIORITY	
INFO	

DTG

FROM: DET 1 6994SCTYSR 081505Z

TO: DIRNSA (S13)

INFO AFCD (DMOS)

HQ USAFSS (TTO)

PACSCTYRGN (COM-T)

NSAPAC REP VIETNAM

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

PRI:
SOA

PARA 5302,

THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED IAW/CHAPTER 5, KAS-1D

1. KYB-6 SR NR 5135

KYK-3 SR NR 1167, KEYED WITH AKAK-8065 EXTRACT (08OCT69)

KYK-5 SR NR 1289

HESTIA PAD:

KAP-CP-15487 - PAGES AD THRU AZ

KAP-CP-15770 - PAGES EV THRU FZ

KAP-CP-15771 - PAGES HB THRU HR

KAP-CP-15772 - PAGES GA THRU GZ

2. REMARKS: AT APPROX 081125Z, AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN HOSTILE TERRITORY. EYE WITNESS REPORTS OF AN IN-AIR EXPLOSION OVER AN ACTIVE ARTILLERY AREA. SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN INITIATED.

GP-1

DATE 8	TIME 1440Z
MONTH OCT	YEAR 69
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 1

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE SAME	R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE <i>Asa F. Walker</i>
			TYPED NAME AND TITLE ASA F. WALKER, TSGT NCOIC COMM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	CONTROLLING INSTRUCTIONS
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DD FORM 173

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

Chapter III
Part 15

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
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PRECEDENCE

ACTION: **FLASH**
INFO:

DTG **081725Z**

FROM: DET 1 6994SCTY SQ
TO: HQ USAFSS(TMR-1)
PACSCTYRGN (CDR)
6922SCTYWG (CDR)
6994SCTYSQ (CDR)
INFO: NSAPAC REP VIETNAM

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FOLLOW-UP NUMBER FOUR TO DET 1 ~~6994SCTYSQ~~ 6994SCTYSQ AIR NUMBER ONE. ADDITIONAL INFO RECEIVED INDICATES THAT ARTILLERY AREA, PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AS ACTIVE, WAS NOT ACTIVE RPT WAS NOT ACTIVE. THE 184TH ORD BN LOCATED AT PHU TAI (OFF HIGHWAY ONE TO THE EAST OF THE CRASH AREA) REPORTED SEEING A FLASH ^{IN THE SKY} ~~IN THE VICINITY~~ OF THE CRASH AREA NOW REPORT AS CRO03161 RPT CRO03161. WEATHER AND DARKNESS CONTINUES TO HAMPER COMPLETE CONFIRMATION OF ALL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THIS INCIDENT. GP-L

DATE	TIME
081710Z	
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	69
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

OR A F T E R	PREP NAME AND TITLE	R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE
	DAVID L. BUSH, MSGT, USAF		<i>M. J. Vernon</i>
			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
			MERLE J. VERNONE, MAJOR, USAF COMMANDER
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	

DD FORM 173

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE MSG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

IMMEDIATE

INFO

DYK

690450

FOOTNOTE 16

FROM: DET 1 6994SCTYSQ

TO: HQ USAFSS (TMR-1)

PACSCITYRCH (CDR)

6922SCTYWG (CDR)

6994SCTYSQ (CDR)

INFO: NSAPAC REP VIETNAM

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[REDACTED]

SCTY

FOLLOW-UP NUMBER FIVE TO DET 1 6994SQ AIR NUMBER ONE.
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATING TEAM HAS ARRIVED PHU CAT AIR BASE.
GROUND SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS CONTINUE BUT TO BEST OF OUR
KNOWLEDGE HAVE NOT AS YET REACHED CRASH SITE. WEATHER CONTINUES
OVERCAST WITH MODERATE TO HEAVY SHOWERS RESTRICTING RECOVERY OPERATION.

DATE	TIME
MO 8 TH	1245
PAGE 001	OF 01 PAGES

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	R E L E A S E	SIGNATURE
CLASSIFICATION			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	

DD FORM 173

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
TYPE MSG
PRECEDENCE
ACTION
INFO IMMEDIATE

DTG *090500Z*

FROM: DET 1 6994TH SCTY SQ

TO: HQ USAFSS (TMR-1)
 PACSCTYRGN (CDR)
 6922SCTYWG (CDR)
 6994SCTY SQ (CDR)

INFO: NSAPAC REP VIETNAM

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS


[REDACTED] OCT 69.

FOLLOW-UP NUMBER SIX TO DET 1 6994SCTY SQ AIR NUMBER ONE.

QUI NHON OPERATIONS REPORTS ONE HELICOPTER SIGHTED WING WRECKAGE OF C-47 IN VICINITY OF CRO306. ANOTHER HELICOPTER SIGHTED FUSILAGE WRECKAGE OF C-47 IN AREA OF CRO207. BOTH CHOPPERS UNABLE TO LAND DUE TO HOSTILE AREA. QUI NHON OPS SENDING GUNSHIP AND CHOPPER TO AREA TO MAKE CONFIRMATION. 460 TEW (ROC) LAUNCHING RF-101 TO CRASH AREA AND WILL RECOVER ACFT AT PHU CAT. GP-1.

DATE	TIME
09	1300Z
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	69
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	DAVID L. RUSH, MSGT, USAF NCOIC OCC		<i>Merle J. Vernone</i> MERLE J. VERNONE, MAJOR, USAF
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		REGISTRATION INSTRUCTIONS	



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
[REDACTED]			
TYPE MSG	ROUT	MULTI	SINGLE
PRIORITY			
IMMEDIATE			

412552

FROM: DET 1 6994SCTYSQ

TO: HQ USAFSS (TMR-1)
 PACSCTYRGN (CDR)
 6923SCTYWG (CDR)
 6994SCTYSQ (ODR)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

INFO: NSAPAC REP VIETNAM

[REDACTED] OCT 69.

FOLLOW-UP NUMBER SEVEN TO DET 1 6994SCTY SQ AIR NUMBER ONE.
 37 TFC COMMAND POST ADVISED AT 090540Z THE 46OROC RP-101 WAS
 UNABLE TO LAUNCH INTO THE AREA BECAUSE OF WX. AT 091115Z THE
 AMERICAN FORCES IN THE CRASH AREA WERE REPORTED PULLING BACK.
 A UNIT OF ROK FORCES ARE STILL IN THE AREA, BUT WERE REPORTED
 TO BE MAKING VERY SLOW PROGRESS DUE TO HOSTILE FIRE AND ADVERSE
 WX CONDITIONS. GP-1.

DATE	TIME
08	0845L
PAGE NO.	PAGES
1	1

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE
	DAVID L. RUSH, MSGT, USAF NFOIC OCC	

R E L E A S E D	SIGNATURE
	<i>Douglas G. Balan</i>
	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
	DOUGLAS G. BALAN, CAPT. USAF OPERATIONS OFFICER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION


REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

D FORM 173

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

Chapter III
Footnote 20

SEC



TYPE MSG

BOOK MULTIPLE SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE

110200Z

FROM:

~~██████████~~ DET 1 6994SCTY SQ

TO:

HQ USAFSS (CDR)

PACSCITYRGN (CDR)

6922SCTYWG (CDR)

6994SCTY SQ (CDR)

INFO: NSAPAC REP ~~██████████~~

~~██████████~~ OCT 69.

FOLLOW-UP NUMBER TEN TO DET 1 6994SCTY SQ AIR NUMBER ONE.

AS OF THIS DTG THERE ARE NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS TO REPORT. THE 361ST TEWS HAS PLACED A LIASION AT QUI NHON OPERATIONS WHO IS RELAYING ALL DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH THE 361TEWS TO THIS UNIT.

ADVERSE WX CONTINUES TO HAMPER RESCUE OPERATIONS. TWELVE HOUR WEATHER FORCAST FROM 110100Z IS CONTINUOUS RAIN WITH CEILING ONE TO THREE THOUSAND AND VISIBILITY ONE TO FIVE MILES. TOTAL RAIN FALL FOR MONTH HAS BEEN 13.68 INCHES WITH 7.16 INCHES HAVING FALLEN SINCE THE AIRCRAFT CRASH. GP-1

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DATE	TIME
MONTH	OCT 69
PAGE NO.	1
PAGES	1

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	RELEASER	SIGNATURE
	DAVID L. BUSH, MGT, USAF NCCIC OCC			<i>Douglas G. Balan</i>
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			DOUGLAS G. BALAN, CAPT, USAF	
			REGISTRATION OFFICER	

DD FORM 173

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

Chapter 111
Article 21

SECURITY



TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

IMMEDIATE

INFO

DTG

2125Z

FROM: DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ

TO: HQ USAFSS (TAD/TED)

PACSCTYRGN (OPS)

6922ND SCTY WG (OPS)

6994TH SCTY WG (OPS)

INFO: NSAPAC REP

12 OCT 69

FOLLOW-UP NUMBER TWELVE TO DET 1 6994 SCTY SQ AIR NUMBER ONE.
WEATHER APPEARS TO BE BREAKING. JOLLY GREENS AND PHOTO
RECCE PREPARING TO LAUNCH TO RECONOITER CRASH AREA.
GROUND SEARCH PARTY HAS NOT AS YET REACHED SCENE. NOTHING
FURTHER AT THIS TIME. GP-1

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DATE	TIME
12	
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	1969
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE
	DATHEL G. LOCKHART, SSGT, USAF	2845		DOUGLAS G. BALAN, CAPT, USAF OIC OPERATIONS
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS		

DD FORM 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

Chapter III
Paragraph 28 & 29

SEC [REDACTED]			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION ROUTINE			
INFO			

DTG

1000Z 17 OCT 69

FROM: DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ
TO: 6994 SCTY SQ (CMDR/OPS)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[REDACTED] CMDR

THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED FOR YOUR INFO, BUT WAS NOT CONSIDERED SUBSTANTIAL ENOUGH FOR A FOLLOW-UP TO OUR AIR.

AS STATED IN THE 37TH CSG CASUALTY PROGRESS REPORT THE INVESTIGATING TEAM DID NOT REACH THE CRASH SCENE YESTERDAY. THEY DID MANAGE TO APPROACH TO WITHIN APPROX 70 TO 100 FEET BY HELICOPTER AND TOOK PHOTOS FROM OVER THE TOP OF THE AREA. I HAVE SEEN THESE PICTURES AND TALKED WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP. THE AREA OF THE CRASH SCENE IS ABOUT 100 FEET BY 100 FEET IN VERY HEAVY TROPICAL UNDERGROWTH. IT IS ALMOST INVISIBLE UNLESS YOU ARE RIGHT OVER IT. THE AIRCRAFT HIT IN WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ALMOST A ^{OVER}ING/POSITION STRAIGHT INTO THE STEEP SLOPING WALL OF A RAVINE. IT IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE HAD ABOUT 500 GALLONS OF GAS, WHICH WHICH IGNITED AND BURNED WITH APPARENT SEVERE INTENSITY. WHAT REMAINS OF THE FUSELAGE AND TAIL SECTION LOOKS LIKE METAL ASH. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT SOME FRAGMENTS MAY HAVE BEEN TORN LOOSE UPON IMPACT HOWEVER THE PICTURES WERE SO GRAINY UNDER A 9 POWER GLASS IT

DATE	TIME
14	
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	69
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE
	2842

SIGNATURE
<i>Merle J. Vernone</i>
TYPED NAME AND TITLE
MERLE J. VERNONE, MAJOR, USAF COMMANDER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
[REDACTED]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

PRELIMINARY JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY		PHONE	
ACTION ROUTINE							
INFO							
<p>WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE CONCLUSIVELY. I HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR LT ARTMAN, DET 1 MAINTENANCE OFFICER, TO GO WITH THE PARTY TODAY IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO REACH THE SCENE. THE CRASH SITE IS LOCATED NEAR THE TOP OF A PEAK. THE CLOSEST POINT FOR REACHING THE SITE WOULD BE LANDING ON THE TOP OF THAT PEAK IF POSSIBLE AND THEN WALKING DOWNHILL ABOUT 400 TO 500 METERS. THE CLOSEST POINT FROM THE BOTTOM IS ABOUT ONE TO ONE AND ONE HALF MILES, I AM TOLD. PURPOSE IN SENDING LT ARTMAN WAS TO OBTAIN-IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, SERIAL NUMBERS OF ANY COMPONENTS THAT MAY HAVE SURVIVED THE IMPACT. THE TERRAIN AND JUNGLE UNDERGROWTH ARE SUCH THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO CARRY OUT SALVAGEABLE MATERIAL APPEARS TOTALLY IMPRACTICAL. TRYING TO HOIST SALVAGE OUT BY HELICOPTER DOES NOT APPEAR PRACTICAL. THE SURROUNDING TREES HAVE BEEN WEAKENED BY THE FIRE. THE ROTORWASH COULD VERY LIKELY CAUSE ONE OR MORE TO FALL ON PEOPLE BELOW. IN FACT THE PJ WHO WENT IN TWO DAYS AGO WAS NARROWLY MISSED BY A FALLING TREE THE DAY HE WENT IN. THE WEATHER TODAY DOES NOT LOOK PROMISING EITHER WITH LOW CEILING, RAIN ET AL. IN THE SEARCH FOR THIS AIRCRAFT THEY LOCATED TWO OTHERS IN THIS SAME GENERAL VICINITY-WHICH ACCOUNTS FOR THE VARIED POSITIONS REPORTED EARLY IN THE SEARCH OPERATIONS. CP-1,</p>							
CONTROL NO.		TOR/TOD		PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES	
				2		2	
MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION				INITIALS			
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			

DD FORM 173-1
1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 63 WHICH MAY BE USED.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMBAT CAUTION CENTER

Signal 112
Priority 23

TYPE MSG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION **IMMEDIATE**

INFO

DTG **12/0740Z/OCT69**

FROM: DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: HQ USAFSS (TAD/TED)
PACSCTYRGN (OPS)
6922ND SCTY WG (OPS)
6994TH SCTY WG (OPS)

INFO: NSAPAC REP

13 OCT 69

FOLLOW-UP NUMBER THIRTEEN TO DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ AIR NUMBER ONE. PARA RESCUE TEAM REACHED CRASH SITE THIS AFTERNOON APPROXIMATELY 0545ZULU HOURS. NEGATIVE SURVIVORS. POSITION OF CRASHSITE IS UTM GRID COORDINATES BR 983145 REPEAT BR 983145. WRECKAGE CONFIRMED BY TAIL NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT. WRECKAGE PARTIALLY BURNED. NO EVIDENCE OF ANYONE TAMPERING WITH WRECKAGE. HELICOPTER WITH AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATING TEAM PLUS TWO DET ONE 6994TH PERSONNEL EXPECT TO VISIT CRASH SCENE TOMORROW MORNING. DET ONE REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE: 1ST LT JOHN A ARTMAN, [REDACTED] FV, MAINT [REDACTED] OFFICER

TSGT WILLIAM E LEWIS, FR [REDACTED] MAINT TECHNICIAN.

DATE	TIME
12	
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	69
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

DRAFTER
TYPED NAME AND TITLE
SGT PEYTON B NORTHERN, USAF
PHONE
2845

RELEASE
SIGNATURE
[Signature]
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
FOR: DOUGLAS G. BALAN, CAPT, USAF
OPERATIONS OFFICER

SECURITY CLASS [REDACTED]

REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS

MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET



PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION IMMEDIATE		SGT P B NORTHERN	2845
INFO			

DET ONE PERSONNEL ARE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED ON CONTENTS OF
MISSION BAG PLUS ALL BRAVO EQUIPMENT. WILL SALVAGE ALL
POSSIBLE. EOD MAN EXPECTED TO ACCOMPANY TEAM TO CARRY
OUT ANY DEM LITON REQUIRED.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO 2	NO OF PAGES 2	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
REGRADEING INSTRUCTIONS				[REDACTED]	

the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are aged 65 and over has increased from 10.5 million to 13.5 million (19.5% of the population).

There are a number of reasons why the number of people aged 65 and over is increasing. One of the main reasons is that people are living longer. The life expectancy at birth in the UK is now 77 years for men and 81 years for women (ONS 2002).

Another reason is that people are having children later in life. This means that there are more people in the 65-74 age group than there were in the 1970s.

The increase in the number of people aged 65 and over has led to a number of changes in the way that society is organised. One of the most important changes is that there are now more people who are retired.

There are a number of reasons why the number of people who are retired is increasing. One of the main reasons is that people are retiring earlier in life. The average age at which people retire in the UK is now 64 years (ONS 2002).

Another reason is that people are spending more of their lives in retirement. This means that there are more people who are retired than there were in the 1970s.

The increase in the number of people who are retired has led to a number of changes in the way that society is organised. One of the most important changes is that there are now more people who are dependent on the state for their income.

There are a number of reasons why the number of people who are dependent on the state for their income is increasing. One of the main reasons is that people are living longer. This means that there are more people who are dependent on the state for their income than there were in the 1970s.

Another reason is that people are spending more of their lives in retirement. This means that there are more people who are dependent on the state for their income than there were in the 1970s.

The increase in the number of people who are dependent on the state for their income has led to a number of changes in the way that society is organised. One of the most important changes is that there are now more people who are dependent on the state for their income than there were in the 1970s.

There are a number of reasons why the number of people who are dependent on the state for their income is increasing. One of the main reasons is that people are living longer. This means that there are more people who are dependent on the state for their income than there were in the 1970s.

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The increase in the number of people who are dependent on the state for their income has led to a number of changes in the way that society is organised. One of the most important changes is that there are now more people who are dependent on the state for their income than there were in the 1970s.

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Another reason is that people are spending more of their lives in retirement. This means that there are more people who are dependent on the state for their income than there were in the 1970s.

The increase in the number of people who are dependent on the state for their income has led to a number of changes in the way that society is organised. One of the most important changes is that there are now more people who are dependent on the state for their income than there were in the 1970s.

There are a number of reasons why the number of people who are dependent on the state for their income is increasing. One of the main reasons is that people are living longer. This means that there are more people who are dependent on the state for their income than there were in the 1970s.

[The main body of the page is a large, solid black rectangle, indicating that the content has been redacted.]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

October 21
Recklate 25

SECURITY CLASSIF [REDACTED]

TYPE MSG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION IMMEDIATE

INFO

DTG

130300Z

FROM: DET 1, 6996 SCTY SQDN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: HQ USAFSS (TAD/TED)
PACSCTYRGN (OPS)
6922ND SCTY SQDN (OPS)
6994TH SCTY SQDN (OPS)

NSA PAC
INFO: ~~DDO~~ ~~SPES~~ REP

[REDACTED] OCT 69

FOLLOW-UP NUMBER FIFTEEN AND FINAL TO DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQDN

AIR NUMBER ONE. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM DEPARTED PHU
CAT AB AT ¹²2230Z ⁰¹ FOR CRASH SCENE.

REF 6994 MSG 130137Z OCT 69. THIS WILL BE FINAL REPORT,
UNLESS SOMETHING SIGNIFICANT OCCURS, IN THIS SERIES.

37TH COMBAT SPT GP IS REPORTING ON THIS INCIDENT. ALL
ADDRESSEES ARE ON DISTRIBUTION FOR THEIR REPORT. GP-1

DATE	TIME
13	1045
MONTH	YEAR
OCT.	69
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

D R A P T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	DOUGLAS G. BALAN CAPT USAF OPERATIONS OFFICER		<i>Douglas G. Balan</i>
			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
			DOUGLAS G. BALAN, CAPT, USAF OPERATIONS OFFICER
	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
	[REDACTED]		GP-1

[REDACTED]

53
19/0145

Chapter III
Footnote 26

THIS
USAFSS
5-1

CSL X CSL
MACJ99
ZFA770
//PRIORITY//
SSN 499
130137Z
FM 600495
TO DET 1 600495

[REDACTED] OPS OCT 60.
REPORTING ON THE AIRCRAFT MISSING IN FLIGHT IS BEING ACCOMPLISHED BY
32 COMBT SPT GP AT PHU CAT AB RVN. SINCE THIS INFO IS HIGHLY
DUPLICATIVE OF THE USAFSS FOLLOW UP REPORTING AND THE
SITUATION IS FAST CHANGING WE ARE DIRECTING DET 1 TO DISCONTINUE
REPORTING BY FOLLOW UPS UNLESS UNUSALLY SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCUR.
FOR DET 1 REQUEST YOU ADVISE 3700 16AT SUPPORT GP THAT SYMBOL FOR
USAFSS ADRES IS TAD/TEO AND TO ADD DCO SPEC REP MACV SAIGON VIETNAM.

194

[REDACTED]

SECURITY

TYPE MSG

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

IMMEDIATE

INFO

IMMEDIATE

DTG

FROM: DET 1,699th SECURITY SQUADRON

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

HQ USAFSS (TAD/TED)
TO: PACSCTYRGN (OPS)
6922ND SCTY ICGN (OPS)
6994th SCTY SQ (OPS)

INFO: NSA PAC R&P

OCT 69

FOLLOWUP NUMBER SIXTEEN AND FINAL TO DET 1,699thSS AIR NUMBER ONE,
CRASH SCENE WAS VISITED BY 1ST LT JOHN A. ARTMAN,
MAINTENANCE OFFICER DET 1, 699th, BETWEEN HOURS 0200Z and 0600 ZULU.
14 OCTOBER 69.
VISIT WAS MADE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ACCIDENT INVESTIGATING TEAM.
AIRCRAFT APPARENTLY IMPACTED WITH GREAT FORCE AND BURST INTO FLAME.
INTENSITY OF ^{FIRE} FORCE MUST HAVE BEEN VERY GREAT AS EVIDENCED BY
TWISTED AND MOLDEN METAL.
AREA WAS SEARCHED FOR CLASSIFIED EQUIPMENT AND PAPERS. ONLY
PAPERS FOUND WERE PAGES NINE, TEN, FIFTEEN, SIXTEEN, SEVENTEEN AND
EIGHTEEN OF THE CONNECTION BEARING TABLES AND FRAGMENTS OF TWO
BURNED PAGES OF SAME TABLE. DUE TO FIRE AND FORCE OF IMPACT NO
COMPONENTS OF ANY EQUIPMENT WERE SALVAGEABLE AND WERE TOTALLY
DESTROYED ON THE SPOT BY EOD TEAM.
NO EVIDENCE OR INDICATION OF ANYONE HAVING VISITED THE CRASH SITE

DATE	TIME
12 Oct	
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	69
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE

RELEASE

SIGNATURE

MERLE VEENONE
MAJOR USAF
COMMANDER

MERLE VEENONE, MAJ, USAF
COMMANDER

SECURITY

REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

EP-1

DD FORM 173 NOV 61

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960 O 1000 200-04



PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION INFO			

OTHER THAN THE SEARCH PARTY. CONSIDERING CONDITION OF THE WRECKAGE, FIRE, FORCE OF IMPACT, THE TERRAIN, AND JUNGLE UNDERGROWTH COMPROMISE OF ANY EQUIPMENT, CRYPTO SYSTEMS, OR OTHER CLASSIFIED MATTER IS CONSIDERED HIGHLY IMPROBABLE.

A COPY OF THE FULL SET OF PHOTOS TAKEN FOR THE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM HAS BEEN REQUESTED AND WILL BE FORWARDED THROUGH CHANNELS UPON RECEIPT. *GPL*


CONTROL NO	FOR INFO	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>		<i>AS</i>
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			RE-GRADING INSTRUCTIONS		

STATEMENT

On 14 October 1969, I accompanied the Accident Investigation Team to the wreckage of EC-47, number 43-49100. The aircraft appeared to have impacted nearly perpendicularly into a steep slope. The fuselage apparently was immediately inundated by a fire accompanied by intense heat.

The force of the impact and the heat combined to render the USAFSS equipment in the fuselage totally unrecognizable with the following exceptions: Two each G-133FOO000-5 radio receivers, serial numbers unattainable due to destroyed data plates; 1 each KYK-5/TSEC radio, serial number 1289, with one each KYK-3/TSEC inserted and impossible to remove, serial number unknown; one each Franklin Printer, serial number 400. These items were destroyed by BOD personnel upon completion of the accident investigation team's inspection of the wreckage. In addition, the bearing correction tables, pages 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, and 18 were discovered outside the wreckage as were the charred remains of four other pages (two sheets). A thorough search of the area turned up no other classified gear. I handcarried these pages to Ftm Cnt Air Base.

After inspecting the wreckage and the surrounding area, I feel that there is very little probability that anyone had previously visited the scene prior to the arrival of the group to which I was attached. Under these circumstances, I am convinced that no compromise of USAFSS equipment or mission has occurred due to the loss of EC-47 number 43-49100.


JOHN A. ARTMAN, 285-34-2157 FY
1st Lt, USAF
Det 1, 6994th Scty Sq

