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
HISTORY  
OF  
THE  
6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON  
1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1969  
RCS: USS-D3



31 MARCH 1970



TAN SON NHUT AIR BASE, VIETNAM



## HISTORY OF THE 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

1 July - 31 December 1969

RCS: USS-D3


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
Prepared by:

FELICE FOTI, MSgt, USAF

Squadron Historian

Approved:

DUANE E. RUSSELL, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Commander



## FOREWORD

The war in Southeast Asia has resulted in a continuing evolution of military concepts and policies. New strategies and tactics were needed to cope with this unconventional war. One of the most important concepts to evolve from this need, was the operational development of the Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) program. Too often, because of security, lack of glamor or expediency, valuable techniques such as ARDF "get lost" in the aftermath of a conflict. This history is dedicated to preventing this occurrence. It covers the operational activities of the 6994th Security Squadron during the period 1 July 1969 through 31 December 1969. The histories of the detachments are presented in separate volumes.

The research and writing of this history was accomplished by MSgt Foti. All suggestions and comments pertaining to it should be directed to the Commander, 6994th Security Squadron.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Duane E. Russell

Duane Elliott Russell was born in [REDACTED] He graduated from Libby High School in Toledo in 1941. During his final high school years, he worked for the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway, continuing as a traffic rate clerk until December 1942, when he prepared for entry into the U.S. Army.

Serving as an infantryman and an aviation cadet, he graduated from pilot training in December 1944. Separated from active duty in the fall of 1945, he reenlisted in the U.S. Army Air Corps in early 1946. He served in Germany, California, and Brooks AFB, Texas as a MSgt, and was returned to commissioned status in late 1950. After a short tour as commercial transportation officer at McChord AFB, Wash., he re-entered language training at Syracuse University. Completing the school in March 1952, he reported to Brooks AFB, and then to Germany. From June 1952 to July 1956, he served in the 6910 Radio Group Mobile and the 6901 Special Communications Group, where he spent the last year as assistant to the group OPS officer.

From 1956 through 1959, he served at HQ USAFSS, (ODC), as a Planning Project Officer, and Chief of Plans Review Division. In 1960 he became Commander, Det 1, 6988 Radio Squadron Mobile, Yokota, Japan. In January 1962 he moved to the 6989 Radio Squadron Mobile, Misawa, Japan, where he became Chief of Operations. It was during this period that he was ordered TDY to Det 42-2, 2nd ADVON. By May 1963, he rotated to Muncie, Indiana, where he served at Ball State University, as a professor of Aerospace Studies.


In August 1966, he was assigned to Eielson AFB, Alaska, where he assumed command of the 6985th Security Squadron, and in May 1969 he departed Eielson AFB, Alaska and assumed command of the 6994th Security Squadron, Viet Nam.

He is married to the former [REDACTED] of Forestville, Michigan and they have two sons, [REDACTED]



## FACT SHEET

A.



## B. Education:

1. Graduated Libby High School, Toledo, Ohio - 1941
2. Completed Air Tactical School Course - 1951
3. Completed Air Command and Staff School Course - 1957
4. Received Bachelor of Science degree, University of Maryland - 1961
5. Completed Industrial College of Armed Forces Course - 1962
6. Received Master of Arts degree, Ball State University - 1966
7. Completed Air War College Associate Program - 1969

## C. Service Dates:

1. January 1943 - December 1944 - Infantryman and Pilot Trainee
2. December 1944 - November 1945 - Pilot
3. February 1946 - August 1950 - Air Operations Specialist, (MSgt)
4. August 1950 - October 1950 - SRSM, Brooks AFB
5. November 1950 - March 1951 - Commerical Transportation Officer  
McChord AFB, Wash.
6. April 1951 - March 1952 - Language School, Syracuse University



7. April 1952 - June 1952 - USAFSS, Brooks AFB
8. June 1952 - July 1956 - 6910 RGM, 6901 SCG, Germany
9. August 1956 - August 1959 - Plans Officer, ODC, USAFSS, Kelly AFB
10. August 1959 - March 1960 - Student, Ohio State University
11. March 1960 - December 1961 - Commander, Det 1, 6988 RSM, Yokota, Japan.
12. December 1961 - May 1963 - Operations Officer, 6989 RSM, Misawa Japan
13. May 1963 - July 1966 - Assistant Professor of Aerospace Studies, Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana
14. August 1966 - May 1969 - Commander, 6985 Security Squadron
15. May 1969 - Present - Commander, 6994th Security Squadron


D. Decorations and Medals

1. Meritorious Service Medal
2. Air Medal (2 OLC)
3. Air Force Commendation Medal (1 OLC)
4. Air Force Outstanding Unit Award
5. Good Conduct Medal with two loops
6. American Campaign Medal
7. World War II Victory Medal
8. Army Occupation Medal
9. National Defense Service Medal
10. Viet Nam Service Medal with 1 BSS
11. Air Force Longevity Service Medal

E. Promotions:


<u>Rank</u>	<u>Temporary</u>	<u>Permanent</u>
1st Lieutenant		31 October 1950
Captain	15 April 1954	31 October 1957
Major	3 February 1961	31 October 1964
Lt Col	30 July 1966	

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART  
6994A SECURITY SQUADRON  
COMMAND RELATIONSHIP



ORGANIZATION OF THE 699th SECURITY SQUADRON

CHART 2



H

## List of Key Personnel (U)

		DUTY/HOME PHONE
<u>Commander (CC)</u>	Lt Colonel D. E. Russell	4437/5163
First Sergeant	TSgt C. W. Hankins	4437/2843
Operations (OPS)	Lt Col J. W. Johnson Jr. Major M. Holmes CMSgt J. L. Norwood SMSgt C. W. Miller	4891/5163 4891 4891/2261 4891/923-4970
ACC (OPS-1)	Major W. E. Dorffi	923-2435/923-2485
Mission Management	Capt R. T. Osborne MSgt F. Foti	4641 4641/923-4970
Local Operations	Capt M. T. Christy MSgt L. Maness	3706/5218 3706/923-4970
Materiel (MAT)	Capt B. James	3164 3445
Maintenance (MAT-M)	MSgt R. G. Fitz	3164/2843 3445
Supply (MAT-S)	Capt G. H. Lewis MSgt A. J. Edwards	3164 3164/2843
Communications (COM)	Capt CC Yahnke SMSgt E. J. Puroi	4455 4455
Administration (ADM) Security (SP)	TSgt W. Worrell, Jr. TSgt N. L. Shelton	3623/2843 3623/2843
Personnel (PER)	MSgt E. A. Zalis	3261/2843

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

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Table 2 - Combat Cougar Zulu Configuration

Table 3 - Combat Cougar Zulu Mini-Mod

Chart 3 - Tasking Cycle

Figure 3 - Target Intelligence

Table 4 - 6994th Security Squadron Collection Resources

[REDACTED]

CHRONOLOGY

05 July SEATS test concluded. DIRNSA requested continued SEATS reporting by this unit and its detachments.

10 July Headquarters PACAF issued orders requiring Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq to move from Nha Trang to Phu Cat.

10 July Detachment 2, 6994th Scty Sq recommended OPS Stops at Da Nang be substituted for OPS Stops at Hue/Phu Bai.

19 July Dual Frequency Test commenced in III and IV CTZs.

25 July Dual Frequency Test completed.

22-23 August Squadron DURMIS Conference held at Tan Son Nhut. Recommendations forwarded to USAFSS.

28 August PACSCTYRGN authorized move of 4th aircraft to NKP.

28 August Chief of the Aerial Reconnaissance Division MACV J211 proposed the reorganization of ACC.

30 August 460th TRW directed the deployment of a fourth aircraft to NKP.

30 August 6994th Scty Sq senior aircrew members billeted at the Merlin Hotel.

02 September 6994th Scty Sq requested TEMPO authority for Detachment 3.

03 September Colonel Bradley, 509th RRGF, disagreed with MACV J211 proposal to reorganize ACC.

05-06 September [REDACTED] ARDF Conference [REDACTED] aired differences on Commando Forge concepts.

06 September PACSCTYRGN directed the 6994th Scty Sq to seek a reduction in fraged time for CCZ missions.

09 September Detachment 1, 6994 Scty Sq moved from Nha Trang to Phu Cat.

10 September Project Above Board postponed because of the late arrival of test equipment.

11 September 6994th Scty Sq recommends closing of ARDF Calibration site at Cam Ranh Bay.

11 September PACSCTYRGN approved removal of COMJAM positions.



13 September Mini-Mod Test begun at Detachment 2.

19 September Mini-Mod Test ended at Detachment 2.

19 September DIRNSA expressed desire to have AVN units prepare EMR.

20 September MACV requested evaluation of Mission 999.

20 September All CCZ missions fraged for 5 hours.

22 September 46OTRW rescinded regulation requiring mandatory wear of survival gear aboard aircraft. Aircraft commanders were given authority to determine survival gear policies for their crews.

25 September Project Above Board 15 day test commenced.

27 September New SEA ARDF Areas became effective. As per MACV directive 19 September 1969.

30 September Aircraft 43-48959 crashed and burned on take off from Hue/Phu Bai.

02 October MACV approved removal of COMJAM positions.

02 October PACSCTYRGN proposed new UDL for 6994th Scty Sq.

03 October 46OTRW directed discontinuance of OPS Stops at Hue/Phu Bai pending investigation into flight safety hazards.

04 October Dual Frequency System implemented in III and IV CTZs (SEA Areas 1-2-3-4).

08 October 7AF acquiesces in 46OTRW action in discontinuing Phu Bai OPS Stops.

08 October Aircraft 43-49100 crashed in jungle area near Phu Cat.

09 October USAFSS published Annex C T-9810.

09 October PACSCTYRGN tasked 6994th Scty Sq with the Weekly Combat Cougar Report.

15 October 6994th Scty Sq proposed the elimination of all OPS Stops by CCZ aircraft.

20 October 6994th Scty Sq requests waiver of water soluble paper requirements.

25 October New DURMIS format implemented.

- 28 October USAFSS denies waiver of water soluble paper for Cherry Sheets.
- 28 October DIRNSA issued guidelines for EMR preparation.
- 29 October 7AF directed relocation of 1 CCZ aircraft plus 1 additional and complete set of 2 consoles from Phu Cat to TSN.
- 30 October Det 1 carries out deployment of ARDF resources as directed by 7AF.
- 13 November PACSCTYRCN directed 6994th Scty Sq to implement EMR in accordance with DIRNSA **guidelines**.
- 14 November DIRNSA authorized Detachment 3 to issue TACREPS.
- 21 November PACSCTYRCN directed turn in of A/G/A communications facilities.
- 22 November Transcribe Test commenced at Detachment 2.
- 24 November One additional CCZ aircraft transferred from Phu Cat to Tan Son Nhut.
- 26 November Detachment 3 begins issuing TACREPS.
- 28 November Pre-Mission briefings standardized.
- 30 November 46OTRW directs TEWS to remove 5 gallon water can from aircraft. 6994th Scty Sq asked for waiver of water soluble paper requirements based on 46OTRW action.
- 04 December First TECHWECAP issued by 6994th Scty Sq.
- 05 December DIRNSA disapproves TEMPO authority for Detachment 3.
- 05 December 6994th Scty Sq presented its concept for Vietnamization of the USAF ARDF program.
- 15 December First Commando Forge Operations/Exploitation Summary issued by 6994th Scty Sq.
- 19 December USAFSS disapproved waiver of water soluble paper requirements for 6994th Scty Sq.
- 20 December Enemy COMINT unit captured as a result of an ARDF fix by 6994th Scty Sq on 19 December.
- 24 December [redacted] advised that the [redacted] had approved a temporary increase in the cryptologic ceiling for 120 days effective 27 December 1969.



[REDACTED]

CHAPTER I

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

MISSION STATEMENT:

[REDACTED] Headquarters for the 6994th Security Squadron was located at Tan Son Nhut Air Base Republic of Vietnam. Its operational mission was to conduct Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and specified Communications Intelligence (COMINT) collection against enemy targets in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) in direct support of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). In addition to its own operational mission, the 6994th Security Squadron provided operational and administrative control for its subordinate units which were Detachment 1 at Phu Cat, Detachment 2 at Pleiku and Detachment 3 at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

[REDACTED] The Command, Administration, Personnel, Communications and Operations Branches were located in the AFSSO 7th Air Force Compound within the 7AF Headquarters complex at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The Squadron Materiel Branch was located on the flight line adjacent to the 360th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS). In performing its operational mission, the 6994th Security Squadron was assisted by the 360th TEWS which provided the necessary aircraft and front end crews. The 360th TEWS was subordinate to the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) whose subordinate units, 361 TEWS, 362 TEWS and Detachment 2, 460 TRW supported Detachment 1, Detachment 2 and Detachment 3 of the 6994th Security Squadron respectively.

[REDACTED] The 6994th Security Squadron performed its operational mission aboard EC-47 aircraft. There were three types of mission tasked: Combat

[REDACTED]

Cougar, Combat Cougar Zulu Primary ARDF, and Combat Cougar Zulu Primary Collection.<sup>2</sup>

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE:

[REDACTED] The 6994th Security Squadron was administratively subordinate to the 6922nd Security Wing, Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines, however, operational control was nominally exercised by Headquarters 7th Air Force, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam. Because of the inter-service involvement in the ARDF program in South East Asia (SEA), general operational control was exercised by MACV (J2).

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES:

Detachment 1 Moves to Phu Cat:

[REDACTED] On 12 January 1969 the Commander of 7th Air Force approved a proposal to relocate USAF flying units from Nha Trang AB, Vietnam.<sup>3</sup> The decision was based on a 7AF study which recommended deployment to four permanent USAF bases in the same general area and return of Nha Trang to the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). Principal considerations in this decision were:<sup>4</sup>

1. Planned VNAF expansion and modernization in conjunction with the "Vietnamization" of the war necessitated release of ramp and facility space to the VNAF.
2. 7AF anticipated difficulty in justifying and securing funds necessary to continue operations from Nha Trang.
3. The need to relieve chronic South Vietnam (SVN) headroom problems. Immediate and long term advantages of the move to the USAF were:<sup>5</sup>
  1. A saving of 1000 military headroom spaces and the elimination of 400 civilian spaces with attendant dollar savings.

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
2. Capital invested in the four relocation bases would be capital invested in bases for which the USAF was the sole proprietor.
  3. Cancellation of approved Nha Trang construction projects resulted in a savings of approximately 7.4 million dollars to the 7AF budget.
  4. Return of Nha Trang to the VNAF enhanced the process of "Vietnamization".

[REDACTED] On 10 July 1969 Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) issued orders which required Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron to relocate to Phu Cat.<sup>6</sup> Details of this relocation were formalized by USAFSS in Programmed Action Directive (PAD) 69-8. Relocation took place on 9 September 1969. No missions were flown on relocation day. This was the only interruption. Normal mission activity was resumed on the following day.

Joint Operating Agreements With 460th TRW:

[REDACTED] From the time that USAFSS became involved in the ARDF program in SEA the 460th TRW has been providing the aircraft and front end crews for tasked missions. Though 6994th Security Squadron units have been involved daily in flying missions with units subordinate to 460th TRW, no written agreements between the two units had ever been undertaken.

[REDACTED] Both the 460th TRW and the 6994th Security Squadron have been performing their missions together as tasked by 7AF.<sup>7</sup> The close working relationship between them has always been marked by very friendly relations and close cooperation. However, because most of the mutual problems have been resolved by verbal agreements, interpretations of procedures and responsibilities have varied with the turn over of personnel in each units' staff sections. Furthermore operational actions taken by one of the units, even when the actions were clearly under the specific jurisdiction of a subject unit, frequently had an impact on the other.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) In September 1969 it became obvious that the mutual relationship which had evolved between the two units needed to be formalized in written agreements. The first such agreement was negotiated and drafted during the closing months of 1969<sup>8</sup> to become effective in January 1970. This Joint Operating Agreement outlined specific responsibilities of each unit toward areas of mutual interest, and set up the framework for establishing future Joint Operating Agreements. This agreement, a milestone in the history of both units, is expected to inaugurate an era of improved operational relationships and cooperation between them in production of a better mission product.

Location of SEA ARDF Resources:

[REDACTED] As was reported in the previous history,<sup>9</sup> contingency planning for deployment of some Detachment 2 aircraft to Hue/Phu Bai was already in progress. On site inspection of Hue/Phu Bai was made at the end of the last historical period. It was discovered that austere living conditions, the possibility of maintenance problems, and the inadequacy of existing facilities made Phu Bai an undesirable location from which to conduct ARDF operations.<sup>10</sup> The feasibility of deploying to Da Nang<sup>11</sup> was suggested. This unit's position was indorsed by 7AF in correspondence with MACV which stated that: "...we view any transfer of existing ARDF resources to Hue/Phu Bai as contrary to the best interest of the overall ARDF program."<sup>12</sup>

[REDACTED] In August 1969 MACV seized the opportunity given by the impending move of Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron to Phu Cat to press for co-location of ARDF/Airborne Collection aircraft with the analytic facility doing the processing. MACV's suggestion was to alter the existing GMA/Aviation unit relationship so that aircraft based at Pleiku would cover targets tasked to

[REDACTED]

USM-604 (Pleiku CMA) while aircraft soon to deploy to Phu Cat (September 1969) would cover targets tasked to USM-808 (Phu Bai CMA). MACV requested AFSSO 7AF to conduct a feasibility study on the matter. The MACV proposal was re-<sup>13</sup>jected by this unit because it would entail relocation several aircraft within which equipment configurations differed, thereby creating a situation where this units maintenance capability would be seriously taxed beyond resources.<sup>14</sup> The matter however was rendered academic when 7AF announced its intention to close Pleiku.

The Pleiku closure proposal resulted in a series of discussions and numerous proposals still not resolved at the close of this historical period. The proposals included:

1. Split Detachment 2 resources between Detachment 1 and Detachment 3. This proposal would result in Detachment 1 having 27 aircraft and Detachment 3 having 10.<sup>15</sup>
2. Colocate all Detachment 2 resources with Detachment 1 at Phu Cat.<sup>16</sup>
3. Split Detachment 2 resources between Da Nang and Nakhon Phanom.<sup>17</sup>
4. Relocate Detachment 2 to Da Nang, while Phu Cat would be closed and Detachment 1 relocated to Cam Rahn Bay.<sup>18</sup>
5. Relocate Detachment 2 to Da Nang.<sup>19</sup>

Complicating matters was the uncertainty of future developments in SEA. In depth studies based on the eventual attainment of 62 ARDF aircraft led PACSCTYRGN to recommend to USAFSS the following distribution of aircraft:<sup>20</sup>

1. Da Nang 15 aircraft
2. Tan Son Nhut 18 aircraft
3. Phu Cat 17 aircraft
4. Thailand 12 aircraft

[REDACTED] Uncertainty concerning the cryptologic ceiling in Thailand and crowded facilities at Da Nang coupled with postponement of the Pleiku closure left the outcome of projected relocation of Detachment 2 resources obscure.

NKP Buildup:

[REDACTED] Since the establishment of Detachment 3 at Nakhon Phanom in <sup>21</sup> April 1969, its service to consumers was of such quality that a third aircraft was deployed on a TDY basis. Because of increased enemy activity in Laos, tasking requirements continued to increase. Consumers urged deployment of additional aircraft to Thailand. Three major problems however continued to complicate the pattern of any buildup at NKP. These problems were

1. The desire of non-Air Force agencies to have ARDF collection resources co-located with the CMA.
2. The reluctance of the [REDACTED] to provide permanent increases in the cryptologic ceiling.
3. The limited maintenance capability for servicing mission aircraft based at NKP.

[REDACTED] The 7AF decision to base aircraft at NKP instead of Udorn failed <sup>22</sup> to really satisfy NSA Representative Vietnam (NRV) [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Army Security Agency (ASA) and MACV as well as the principal consumer of data processed from the Detachment 3 collection effort, Confidential American Source Vientaine (CAS Vientaine). Their position was that co-location of collection unit and CMA would result in a better product. With the projected build up of ARDF resources in support of CAS Vientaine, the issue of co-location of collection unit and CMA surfaced again at the [REDACTED] ARDF conference

[REDACTED] <sup>23</sup> 5-6 September 1969. [REDACTED]



[REDACTED] The USAFSS policy has been to oppose moving all or part of Detachment 3 resources to achieve co-location with the CMA (USA 29/USM 7) (at Ramasun Station). Further, USAFSS has rejected the principle of co-location based on the fact that:

"...in South Vietnam today we cannot find where one single aircraft is permanently co-located with CMA (either Army or Air Force). Have informal info there are approx 180 plus such aircraft assigned. This provides some indication the Army did not consider such deployment essential in their ARDF/Airborne Collection programming."<sup>24</sup>

Other significant reasons for USAFSS opposition were:<sup>25</sup>

1. Even if NKP effort were relocated to Udorn there would still be 10 miles between Detachment 3 and the CMA.
2. Accepting the principle of co-location of ARDF unit with CMA would probably result in reduction of this unit's mission to "...one of pure ARDF and eliminate entirely the requirement for an analytical capability to do the vital first echelon analysis and reporting."

[REDACTED] Seventh Air Force continued to support the USAFSS position even though they conceded that aircraft operating from Udorn would achieve fifty minutes more time over target (TOT) than NKP based aircraft in Northern Laos (Barrel Roll Area). This disadvantage was offset by the fifty minute TOT advantage NKP based aircraft achieved in Southern Laos (Steel Tiger Area). The principal factor in favor of basing additional aircraft at NKP vice Udorn was that NKP already possessed the basic support necessary to handle EC-47 aircraft, while Udorn lacked such facilities.<sup>26</sup> Increased enemy activity in the "Barrel Roll" Area during the late summer and fall of 1969 led to increased pressure to stage some ARDF flights from Udorn. At the close of this historical period solution to the question of placing an ARDF collection capability at

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Udorn or increasing existing collection capability at NKP remained part of the overall settlement of the redistribution of ARDF assets throughout SEA.<sup>27</sup>

On 26 September PACSCTYRGN clarified the USAFSS position thusly:

"Our objectives should be to place ARDF resources where they can best fulfill the MACV stated requirements. Appears that to accomplish this goal it is highly desirable that capability be established at Tan Son Nhut, Phu Cat, Da Nang, NKP and eventually even possibly Udorn."<sup>28</sup>

[REDACTED] At the beginning of this historical period, three aircraft were performing ARDF missions from NKP. Aircraft were assigned on a TDY basis primarily because it was not economical to maintain a complete maintenance facility for less than ten aircraft. The military situation in Laos continued to require additional ARDF missions. On 28 August 1969 PACSCTYRGN authorized this unit to support the move of the fourth aircraft to NKP providing both the cryptologic and Program VI ceilings were raised.<sup>29</sup> On 30 August 1969 the 460TRW directed the deployment of a fourth aircraft to NKP for 120 day TDY period.<sup>30</sup> On 12 October MACV directed 7AF and this unit to make necessary arrangements to operate five EC-47s on a sustained basis from Thailand prior to 1 January 1970.<sup>31</sup>

[REDACTED] In response to the MACV directive this unit requested [REDACTED] to secure a permanent increase of twenty spaces in our cryptologic ceiling.<sup>32</sup> [REDACTED] reply stated that there were 1278 authorized Program VII spaces for cryptologic units in Thailand and that there were 1259 cryptologic personnel in Thailand against Program VII spaces. Though 19 spaces existed, programmed CCP increases would absorb them. Therefore:

"It is the position of both the AMEB and MACTHAI (By JCS Direction) that there can be no rpt no increases in currently authorized program VII spaces for Thailand, thus the increases required to accommodate a total of five FCS EC-47 acft must be on a trade-off basis."<sup>33</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Thus the fifth aircraft was sent to NKP on a TDY basis. In late December 1969 there was some question whether the [REDACTED] would approve extension of the temporary cryptologic ceiling increase. Failure to approve the extension would result in reducing the NKP EC-47 fleet to three aircraft. On 24 December 1969 [REDACTED] advised that 120 day extension had been approved commencing 27 December and extending through 27 April 1970.<sup>34</sup>

[REDACTED] Political pressures within Thailand have caused [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to move slowly and carefully scrutinize requests for increases in the cryptologic ceiling.<sup>35</sup> It was obvious that developments in U.S. - Thailand relations must be carefully calculated in planning any substantial increase of ARDF resources in Thailand.

[REDACTED] The third major obstacle in the NKP buildup was the lack of adequate ARDF maintenance and materiel resources. Primarily this problem was a function of the previous two. It is neither economically feasible, nor even possible for that matter, to provide phase maintenance facilities at NKP for less than ten aircraft. Any additional aircraft based at NKP would have to be drawn from existing resources in SEA. Making necessary aircraft available is therefore dependent on the outcome of discussions concerning future loca-<sup>36</sup>tions of ARDF resources in SEA, and in particular the disposition of Detach-<sup>37</sup>ment 2 ARDF assets after Fleiku's closure. Finally, any permanent build-up at NKP is inextricably bound to the [REDACTED] willingness to acquiesce in raising the cryptologic ceiling. Therefore some important decisions concerning the future role of NKP in the SEA ARDF effort are to be expected during the forth coming historical period.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Proposed Reorganization of ARDF Coordination Center (ACC).

[REDACTED] The mission of the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC) was to provide for the coordination of all functions connected with the ARDF program and schedule ARDF and Airborne Intercept collection missions as directed by MACV.<sup>38</sup> The ACC was established on 1 July 1966 by agreement between the 509th Radio Research Group (RRGP) and the 6994th Security Squadron.<sup>39</sup>

[REDACTED] The ACC functioned under the supervision of two OICs, one from the Army and one from the Air Force, both considered equals in direction of operations. Routine matters were handled by either. Major decisions, changes or new items were coordinated and mutually agreed upon. Each of the OICs came under the direct supervision of the respective Operations Officers of the 509th RRGF (for the Army OIC) and the 6994 Security Squadron (for the Air Force OIC). Each was rated by his respective service supervisor.<sup>40</sup>

[REDACTED] On 28 August 1969 the Chief of the Aerial Reconnaissance Division, MACV J211 submitted for coordination a proposal to reorganize the ACC. Principal features of the proposed reorganization were:<sup>41</sup>

1. Establishment of a "Joint Special Operations Center" (JSOC) under the direction and operational control of MACVJ2 to replace ACC.
  2. Designation of the JSOC as a Joint Cryptologic Activity by DIRNSA.
  3. The JSOC was to consist of an OIC, deputy OIC and other officers and enlisted personnel to be determined jointly by MACV-J2, 509th RRGF and the 6994th Security Squadron.
  4. The billet of the OIC was to be filled on a 6 month rotating basis by the 509th RRGF and the 6994th Security Squadron. The deputy OIC would be rotated on the same basis and would be from the unit not furnishing the OIC.
- [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. During the tenure, the OIC was to be responsible to, under the direction of and rated by MACV-J2.

6. The JSOC was to be manned jointly by personnel of the 509th RRGF and 6994th Security Squadron. Where possible, a balance of strength between services was to be maintained.

7. JSOC personnel were to remain assigned to and under the command of their parent unit.

[REDACTED] PACSCTYRGN immediately took exception to several of the features of the MACV J-211 proposal. The PACSCTYRGN position was:<sup>42</sup>

1. That this unit should attempt to have the term "Joint" eliminated from the new functional title. USAFSS preferred maintaining the "collocated" status of equal Army/Air Force elements and elimination of any connotation of "Joint" operations.

2. It did not concur with assigning a cryptologic unit designator to the ACC because it would lessen its effectiveness as an operation under control of MACV-J2 by placing NSA in a predominant position to infringe on MACV prerogatives in providing tactical support to field commanders.

3. It did not concur with having MACV-J2 rating the OIC of JSOC. PACSCTYRGN concurred with the idea of attempting to balance Air Force strength vis a vis the Army on the JSOC, but felt that the increase in Air Force personnel necessary to achieve this must be satisfied from existing resources.

[REDACTED] At the 3 September 1969 Weekly ARDF Meeting with MACV, Colonel Bradley from the 509th RRGF took exception to the MACV-J2 proposal. His objection was based on the fact that MACV-J2 was outside the SIGINT Community, and consequently members of the SIGINT Community (6994th Security Squadron and 509th RRGF) should study the problem and make proposals. MACV J-2 agreed to

[REDACTED]

let 509th RRGF and 7AF work out the problem.<sup>43</sup>

[REDACTED] In subsequent meetings held by the 509th RRGF between Air Force and Army representatives (Lt Col Johnson represented this unit at these meetings). The 509th RRGF insisted that the OIC and Deputy OIC should remain under the control of, and be rated by, their respective units.<sup>44</sup> 7AF favored the original MACV J2 proposal contending that it would allow individuals to be more objective in regulating and evaluating the overall ARDF program.<sup>45</sup> At the close of this historical period it appeared that the basic structure of the ACC would remain relatively unchanged. MACV J-2114 was preparing a new MACV Directive 381-23 which was expected to be placed in coordination sometime during the next historical period.

#### Disposition of the Calibration Facility:

[REDACTED] On 11 September 1969 this unit recommended to PACSCTYRGN closing down the ARDF Calibration Site at Cam Ranh Bay because it was determined that there was not sufficient utilization of its facilities. During the period 13 October 1968 through 7 February 1969 seven aircraft were recalibrated, none required any significant change to calibration curves. No further recalibrations have taken place since 7 February 1969, nor are any envisioned in the foreseeable future.<sup>46</sup> PACSCTYRGN advised that USAFSS was rewriting post mission test procedures, and that a staff study was in progress for determining requirements for a calibration facility.<sup>47</sup> A decision on the disposition of Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron Operation Location 1, Cam Ranh Bay ARDF Calibration Facility was therefore postponed pending further guidance from USAFSS.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Phase Out of 6922 Security Wing

[REDACTED] In the later part of 1969 USAFSS decided to discontinue its overseas operational wing headquarters not later than 1 April 1970. Details of the Command reorganization became available with receipt of PAD 69-12, Region Reorganization (U). Projected organizational changes which will affect this unit in the coming historical period included the deactivation of the 6922nd Security Wing (expected date 31 March 1970)<sup>48</sup> and the assimilation of Detachment 5, 6922 Security Wing into the 6994th Security Squadron<sup>49</sup> (expected date 1 April 1970). The former action would place this unit under PACSCTYRGN. The latter action would assimilate the TRANSEC function of the deactivated unit into the 6994th Security Squadron Operations Branch.

INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

[REDACTED] On 9 October 1969 USAFSS published Annex C to TECHINS 9810. This Annex standardized the overall operational and organizational structure of ARDF Operations. Accordingly, the local operations section was re-organized to conform with organizational structure contained in the USAFSS directive. Functional areas of local operations now included: Standardization Evaluation Flight Examiners (SEFE), Mission Management, Flight Operations and Processing, Analysis and Reporting.

SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

(U) Though personnel quarters and recreational facilities on Tan Son Nhut still left a lot to be desired, it was generally recognized that facilities at Tan Son Nhut were still considerably better than those of other USAF installations in Vietnam.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) To relieve overcrowded conditions in the barracks, billeting space for 20 enlisted personnel was secured at the Merlin Hotel in the Saigon/Cholon sector of town. These quarters were occupied on 30 August 1969 by Squadron flying personnel in enlisted grades TSgt and above. Quarters consisted of two man air-conditioned rooms with shower and toilet facilities in each unit. Messing facilities were available in the Montana Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (BEQ) within short walking distance from the Merlin. Twenty-four hour a day bus service from the Merlin to Tan Son Nhut AB was provided by the base motor pool.

(U) Arrangements were made with Base Civil Engineers to air-condition two of the three barracks housing personnel of this unit. The target date set for this project was February 1970.

(U) During November 1969 a Squadron recreation facility, the Cougar's Cavern, was opened in the barracks area. The facility, built by members of the Squadron as a self-help project, included a television set, card tables, lounge chairs, an outdoor patio with picnic tables and a barbecue grill. The recreation room is open 24 hours a day. The NCO Club operates a beer and soft drink concession in the Cougar's Cavern from 1400 through 2300 hours daily.

Survival Training:

[REDACTED] At the close of this historical period nearly all flying personnel assigned to this unit had completed PACAF Jungle Survival School. However, in July 1969 additional survival training requirements were levied as PACAF stated that PACAF Life Support School (PLSS) was a mandatory requirement for all aircrews in SEA. Immediate action was taken to comply with the PACAF requirement. This unit requested quotas to accommodate training for 358 officers



51

and enlisted personnel within 90 days. However, 5AF replied that no increase in class quotas was possible before calendar year 1970.<sup>52</sup> Meanwhile USAFSS acted to ensure that aircrews enroute to this unit in January 1970 and thereafter would receive life support training prior to departure from continental United States (CONUS).<sup>53</sup> Members of this unit were scheduled to attend PLSS at Kadena, Okinawa beginning in February 1970.

SUMMARY:

[REDACTED] The mission of the 6994th Security Squadron was to conduct ARDF and COMINT collection against enemy targets in III and IV CTZs in support of MACV. It was subordinate to the 6922nd Security Wing, however operational control was nominally exercised by Headquarters 7AF. Because of the inter-service involvement in the ARDF program in SEA general operational control was exercised by MACV.

[REDACTED] During September 1969 Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron was relocated from Nha Trang AB to Phu Cat AB. The working relationships between the 6994th Security Squadron and the 460th TRW was formalized by drafting of a Joint Operating Agreement which made provision for future Joint Operating Agreements to cover areas of mutual interest. Protracted discussions continued throughout the period concerning the location of SEA ARDF assets. The impending closure of Pleiku AB in 1970 makes a re-distribution of these assets inevitable, but what the resulting distribution will be is still not certain. Though all agencies concerned would like to see an increase of ARDF assets in Thailand to provide additional coverage of the "Barrel Roll" and "Steel Tiger" areas of Laos, three major problems stand in the way of any build-up. These problems are:

1. The desire of non-Air Force agencies to have ARDF collection resources co-located with the CMA.
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. The reluctance of the [REDACTED] to provide permanent increases in the cryptologic ceiling.

3. The limited maintenance capability for servicing mission aircraft based at NKP.

[REDACTED] MACVs attempt to re-organize the ACC as a JSOC met with opposition from USAFSS, ASA and 7AF. Discussions continued with the objective to work out a solution which would be satisfactory to all concerned. It was believed that the outcome would be an ACC structure which is relatively unchanged.

[REDACTED] PACSCTYRGN delayed action requested by this unit to close the ARDF calibration facility at Cam Ranh Bay pending USAFSS rewrite of post mission test procedures and the results of a staff study on determining requirements for calibration facilities.

[REDACTED] USAFSS planned to phase out overseas operational wing headquarters. This unit was expected to become subordinate to PACSCTYRGN. As a result of the impending de-activation of the 6922nd Security Wing, this unit will assimilate Detachment 5, 6922nd Security Wing's TRANSEC function.

[REDACTED] The only internal organizational change which took place during this historical period was the reorganization of Squadron local operations in accordance with TECHINS 9810 Annex C.

(U) Congestion in Squadron barracks facilities was relieved by assignment of 20 billeting spaces for aircrew members at the Merlin Hotel. Arrangements were made with Civil Engineers to air-condition two of the Squadron barracks.

[REDACTED] Almost all personnel in this squadron had completed PJSS training. A new requirement for attendance at PLSS was levied, but because of 5AF's inability to provide quotas during this historical period, members of this organization were not scheduled to attend until calendar year 1970.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Chapter II

SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION

SIGINT TASKING

Basic Missions


[REDACTED] The 6994th Security Squadron Local Operations was tasked with flying ARDF missions in SEA Areas 01, 02, 03 and 04.<sup>1</sup> (See figure 1). The objective of these missions was to fix the location of Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in South Vietnam, and to collect target communications data in order to derive exploitable intelligence therefrom.

[REDACTED] Basically there were three types of mission tasked:

1. Combat Cougar - A mission whose primary objective was to fix targets on intercept assignment. Aircraft utilized on this mission were configured with an "X" and "Y" console. The "X" console was the ARDF position utilizing ALR-34 or ALR-35 equipment. Its frequency range was 2 MHZ through 16 MHZ. The "Y" console was used to provide support intercept copy for targets being fixed on the "X" console and also to collect COMINT for continuity and development. The frequency range of the "Y" console was .5 MHZ through 30 MHZ. (See Table 1).

2. Combat Cougar Zulu Primary Collection - A mission whose primary objective was to collect exploitable traffic on intercept assignment and to fix these targets as required. In addition to the "X" and "Y" consoles, Combat Cougar Zulu aircraft were configured with "Z1" and "Z2" consoles. The "Z1" position was capable of HF/VHF intercept collection. Frequency range on this console was .5 MHZ through 30 MHZ and AM/FM 10 MHZ through 260 MHZ. The "Z2" console had a frequency range of .5 MHZ through 30 MHZ. (See Table 2)

3. Combat Cougar Zulu Primary ARDF - This type of mission differed



SEA AND AIR AREAS  
EFFECTIVE 27  
SEPTEMBER 1969

FIGURE 1



CHINA

19

BURMA

HANOI

BARREL ROLL AREA

PLEIKU

MISSION AREA

NARKON PHANOM

S 1001  
SIEL TIGER AREA

HUE

DA NANG

THAILAND

03

04

PHU  
05

PHU  
CAT

06

CAMBODIA

07

PHNOM PENH

09

08

SAIGON

PHU  
TAN

10


11

SEL ANDP AREA  
PRICR TO 27  
SEPTEMBER 1961

FIGURE 2

[REDACTED]

BASIC COMBAT COUGAR CONFIGURATION



Capability: "X" Position= ARDF, "Y" Position= Target Acquisition.

Flight Time: 7 Hours

Cruise Speed: 120 Knots

Crew: Pilot, Copilot, Navigator, Flight Mechanic and 2 Operators.

Communications Radios: 1 VHF Radio, 1 FM Radio, 1 HF Radio and 1 UHF Radio.

Navigation Equipment: TACAN, Weather Radar, and Doppler.


Navigator's Position Includes: Plotting table and Franklin Printer that provides fix data readout.

The ALR-35 system differs from the ALR-34 in that it is coupled with a data processor. The processor converts the target magnetic bearings to true bearings, calculates target location relative to the selected doppler set point and determines the circular error of the fix. In the ALR-34 system these functions are performed manually by the navigator.

TABLE 1

[REDACTED]

## COMBAT COUGAR ZULU CONFIGURATION



Capability: "X" Position= ARDF, "Y" Position= Target Acquisition/Intercept, "Z1" Position= Intercept, "Z2" Position= Intercept.

Flight Time: 5 Hours

Cruise Speed: 120 Knots

Crew: Pilot, Copilot, Navigator, Flight Mechanic, 4 Operators and 1 Airborne Analyst.


Communications Radios: 1 VHF Radio, 1 FM Radio, 1 HF Radio and 1 UHF Radio.

Navigation Equipment: TACAN, Weather Radar and Doppler.

The ALR-35 system differs from the ALR-34 in that it is coupled with a data processor. The processor converts the target magnetic bearings to true bearings, calculates target location relative to the selected doppler set point and determines the circular error of the fix. In the ALR-34 system these functions are performed manually by the navigator.

TABLE 2

## COMBAT COUGAR ZULU MINI-MOD



Capability: "X" Position= ARDF, "Y" Position= Target Acquisition/Intercept,  
"Z1" Position= Intercept, "Z2" Position= Intercept.

Flight Time: 7 Hours

Cruise Speed: 140 Knots

Crew: Pilot, Copilot, Navigator, Flight Mechanic, 4 Operators and 1 Airborne Analyst.

Communications Radios: 1 VHF Radio, 1 FM Radio, 1 HF Radio and 1 UHF Radio.

Navigation Equipment: TACAN, Weather Radar and Doppler.

The ALR-38 system is basically the ALR-35 with the directional finding capability expanded to include the VHF portion of the frequency spectrum.

TABLE 3



[REDACTED]

from other Combat Cougar Zulu Missions only in the priority of its objectives. In this type of mission the primary tasking was fixing targets and the secondary tasking was collection.


#### Tasking Cycle

[REDACTED] The tasking cycle by which the 6994th Security Squadron was assigned missions was unique for a Security Service unit in that it was designed for tactical support in a fluid combat situation. Targets were highly mobile, and targets fixed one day frequently moved the next or could have been eliminated through action of friendly forces.


[REDACTED] The tasking cycle began with Army Field Commanders, the cryptologic community and 7AF submission of their ARDF requirements to MACV J211-4 (See Chart 3). On Wednesday of each week MACV J211-4 submitted the proposed tasking to the ARDF Coordinating Committee. This committee consisted of representatives of the 509th RRGF, 6994th Security Squadron, ACC, J2 MACV, 7AF, [REDACTED] and Commander Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV). The ACC then passed its recommendations to J2 MACV for final approval. J2 MACV then forwarded the approved tasking to ACC. During this time 460th TRW had made available to ACC an aircraft capability forecast for the tasking week. ACC then assigned missions to fulfill the tasking. The mission data was then forwarded to the 6994th Security Squadron which scheduled back end crews to meet assigned missions. Meanwhile, ACC also issued mission data (sanitized version) to 7AF (DOCRS) which issued frag orders for each mission.

[REDACTED] Tech support for each mission was provided by the appropriate CMA. Once the missions were airborne, Direct Support Units (DSU) received fixes and exploitable messages from mission aircraft and passed tip-offs ground to air.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]







TARGET INTELLIGENCE

- A Seven Mountains
- B Bu Prang
- C Parrot's Beak
- D Fish Hook
- E Site of captured enemy COMINT unit  
December 1969

FIGURE 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] One of the most significant contributions made to the war effort by this unit was the capture of an enemy COMINT collection unit which resulted from two ARDF fixes made on 19 December 1969. Not only did this action provide convincing proof of the ARDF program's value in tactical military operations, but it also revealed the enemy's effectiveness in exploiting U.S. military communications. MACV commented on the matter to all subordinate units:<sup>2</sup>

[REDACTED]

#### Projected Vietnamization of the SEA ARDF Program

[REDACTED] On 5 December 1969 this unit, in response to a verbal requirement made by 7AF Director of Intelligence, presented its concept for Vietnamization of the USAF ARDF Program.<sup>3</sup> Concepts were based on the assumptions that:

1. VNAF forces would have to expand their ARDF Program with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam.
  2. The Department of Defense would authorize delivery of EC-47 aircraft and ARDF equipment to the VNAF.
  3. Approval for the VNAF to participate in the ARDF Program would be given by the Senior U.S. Cryptologic Agency.
- [REDACTED]

4. VNAF requirements would be consistent with those of the USAF in relation to geographical considerations.

Recommendations presented included:

1. The VNAF be equipped with from 30 to 35 C-47 aircraft configured similar to the ALR-34 system.
2. Suggested location of VNAF ARDF units at Da Nang, Nha Trang and Tan Son Nhut.
3. Stationing of a USAF advisory technician at each location which possesses full maintenance capability.
4. Allowance of one year for crew training and turn over of the program to the VNAF with specific phasing to be determined at a later date.

#### SIGINT COLLECTION FACILITIES

##### Aircraft Collection Resources

On the whole this unit's materiel resources remained relatively stable during this historical period. (See Table A) In July the entire Squadron collection capability (including subordinate detachments) consisted of 57 EC-47 aircraft. This figure was reduced to 55 as a result of two crashes. Aircraft 43-48959 based at Detachment 2 crashed and burned on take off on 30 September 1969 after making an OPS Stop at Hue/Phu Bai. Equipment lost to Squadron resources as a result of the crash included one each "X", "Y", "Z1" and "Z2" positions. Equipment was recovered from the crash site and shipped to the depot. Aircraft 43-49100 based at Detachment 1 crashed on 8 October 1969. One "X" and one "Y" position as well as all other mission equipment aboard was destroyed beyond recognition.

##### Loss of COMJAM Capability

As was reported in the last history approval was received to remove COMJAM equipment (QRC-346). Equipment was removed on 24 April 1969 on condition that it could be replaced within 48 hours. Consoles were left aboard the aircraft so that the aircraft could be utilized with a limited "Z" capability.

## 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

## COLLECTION RESOURCES

UNIT	Nr of Act Assigned	ALR-34	ALR-35	ALR-38	CC	CCZ
6994 Scty Sq	21	15	6	0	15	6
Det 1	18	18	0	0	16	2
Det 2	16	0	13	3	4	12
TOTALS	55	33	19	3	35	20

Detachment 3 has no permanently assigned aircraft. Generally 5 aircraft are based at NKP on a TDY basis. Usually, two aircraft are provided by the 6994th Scty Sq, Tan Son Nhut, and three by Detachment 1, Phu Cat. Three of these 5 aircraft are normally CCZ configuration.

The two CCZ configured aircraft assigned to Detachment 1 have been on TDY loan to the 6994th Security Squadron at Tan Son Nhut since November 1969.

TABLE 4

[REDACTED] On 11 September 1970 PACSCTYRGN stated that USAFSS advised that "...the 'Q' Jamming equipment could be removed from the five (5) EC-47s. These aircraft would then revert to a primary mission of ARDF only, with no Z collection capability.<sup>8</sup>" Justification for this action was the fact that it would add about 1½ hours per sortie.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, the matter was coordinated with 7AF and MACV.<sup>10</sup> On 2 October 1969 approval was received from MACV. Because of the stipulation that this unit be capable of reinstalling COMJAM equipment within 48 hours, arrangements were made with 460th TRW to ensure that five aircraft wired for Q-equipment were retained at Tan Son Nhut where the equipment was offloaded<sup>11</sup> and stored. The aircraft concerned were: 43-16055, 43-16123, 42-10513, 43-15603 and 42-10984. They were off-loaded on 5 October 1970 with the result<sup>12</sup> that they were configured for Combat Cougar Missions only.

#### Increased Collection Capability

[REDACTED] Ten days after the removal of the Q equipment consoles NSAPACREP Vietnam [REDACTED] became very concerned about the resulting drop in airborne collection missions, particularly in view of the enemy buildup in the Seven Mountains area.<sup>13</sup> (The removal of Q-consoles which had been performing with a limited Z-capability reduced this unit's potential for Combat Cougar Zulu (CGZ) missions from eight aircraft to three). Though NSAPACREP Vietnam [REDACTED] was made aware of our intention to remove the equipment and its affect on the collection effort, they were unable to state their position since MACV J2<sup>14</sup> failed to coordinate the matter with them. MACV expressed the opinion that they had misunderstood the affect on the collection effort thinking that the request concerned only the jammer and not the entire position.<sup>15</sup> On 14 October it was noted with much concern that only one collection mission had been flown in three days. It was obvious that action was necessary to increase this unit's collection capability.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]



[REDACTED] To resolve the problem discussion took place which included MACV, 7AF (DOCR), 460 TRW, 6994 Scty Sq and Detachment 1, 6994 Scty Sq concerning the relocation of two CCZ configured EC-47 aircraft from Phu Cat to Tan Son Nhut. These discussions resulted in MACV requesting that 7AF authorize realignment of ARDF resources by relocating two CCZ configured aircraft from Phu Cat to Tan Son Nhut, and one CC configured aircraft from Tan Son Nhut to Phu Cat. It was expected that this relocation would definitely improve this unit's collection capability without appreciable loss in Detachment 1's collection effort, since collection missions flown from Detachment 1 had been relatively unproductive. These missions had been fraged for effective area coverage in search of low level exploitable communications. The majority of copy produced however, was high level communications with unreadable traffic. Detachment 1, 6994th Scty Sq therefore concluded that CCZ missions were not effective in their tasked areas. On 29 October 1969 7AF directed the relocation of 1 CCZ configured aircraft plus one additional and complete set of Zulu console equipment from Phu Cat to Tan Son Nhut thereby satisfying the MACV request. Detachment 1 dispatched the spare Z console with the TDY aircraft to Tan Son Nhut on 30 October 1969. Equipment was installed on aircraft 42-24300 on 4 November 1969. On 24 November 1969 a net gain of one additional CCZ configured aircraft resulted from a 460th TRW directed redeployment.

#### Reduced Frag Time for CCZ Missions

[REDACTED] Prior to 20 September 1969 all Combat Cougar and Combat Cougar Zulu missions were fraged for seven hour missions by 7AF DOCR. The Combat Cougar missions fulfilled their fraged time with little difficulty. The Combat Cougar Zulu missions, on the other hand, frequently returned to base because of low fuel reserves prior to completing the seven hour fraged time.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

The disparity between the two types of mission was the result of the added load require to accomplish CCZ missions. (CCZ missions required two "Z" consoles and three additional back end crew members to man the "Z" consoles and the analyst position, thus adding considerable load to the aircraft.) (See Table 2)

On 6 September 1969 PACSCTYRGN directed this unit to seek a reduction in fraggd time for CCZ missions based on an authoritative statement concerning the impact of take-off weight restrictions on EC-47 cruise duration.<sup>22</sup> The matter was once again broached with 7AF and MACV. As a result of these discussions, all CCZ missions were fraggd for 5 hour missions beginning 20 September 1969.<sup>23</sup>

#### Loss of Local Air/Ground Communications Capability

In response to PACSCTYRGN correspondence concerning our operational requirement for unit A/G/A KY-8,<sup>24</sup> this unit attempted to justify continued retention of the equipment for the following reasons:

1. Projected expansion of the analytic effort could necessitate use of secure A/G/A communications facilities in local operations. (E.g. "We plan to pass all exploitable msgs/fixes to the local analysis section for immediate exploitation and relay to the CMA."<sup>25</sup>)

2. Local AFCS expended less than three maintenance hours per month servicing the equipment.<sup>26</sup>

On 21 November 1969 PACSCTYRGN directed this unit and Detachments 1 and 2 to turn in their A/G/A communications facilities.<sup>27</sup> In a last ditch effort to retain the equipment this unit in an impassioned plea asked PACSCTYRGN to reconsider its action based on the fact that:

"Feel the 6994th complex, after nearly four years of effort, is well on its way to obtaining a sanctioned analysis and reporting effort.... If/when Det 2 relocates to Da Nang they will be in the

[REDACTED]

necessary geographical location to accept A/G traffic from the larger majority of their area of responsibility; the 6994th is already in that position and currently has the analytical capability of TACREP reporting. However, without A/G/A coms, we would never hope to justify a fully sanctioned analysis and reporting effort. On the basis of the potential of acquiring a timely reporting function it would appear that USAFSS should be exerting effort to obtain better A/G/A comm facs rather than directing the removal of those facs presently processed. (sic)\* 28

This plea however, failed to reverse the decision, and this unit lost its A/G/A communications capability.

#### Manpower Resources

[REDACTED] On 2 October 1969 PACSCTYRGN proposed the following UDL author-  
29  
izations for operational AFSC:

AFSC	6994 SCTY SQ TAN SON NHUT	DET 1 PHU CAT	DET 2 PLEIKU	DET 3 NAKHON PHANOM	TOTALS
292X1	74	66	84	21	245
203X1	22	14	24	5	65
202X0	25	13	15	12	65
TOTALS	121	93	123	38	375

After careful study of these figures this unit developed a counter proposal  
30  
based on the concept of providing 40 missions per day using four men per  
31  
CCZ mission.

[REDACTED]

AFSC	6994 SCTY SQ TAN SON NHUT	DET 1 PHU CAT	DET 2 PLEIKU	DET 3 NAKHON PHANOM	TOTALS
292X1	91	64	84	21	260
203X1	18	9	17	5	49
202X0	32	9	13	12	66
TOTALS	141	82	114	38	375

These figures included the retention of twelve R202X0 analysts at ACC, (four 292X1s and six 202X0s) for Squadron Mission Management. It was emphasized in the counter proposal that proposed manpower figures were minimum requirements based on 100% manning. It was felt that less than 100% manning would result in mission degradation. Any increase in number of missions per day would require augmentation of manning. Using the PACSCTYRGN proposal as a basis for comparison the following differences were noted in what we needed in relation to their proposal:

AFSC	6994 SCTY SQ TAN SON NHUT	DET 1 PHU CAT	DET 2 PLEIKU	DET 3 NAKHON PHANOM	NET DIFFERENCE
292X1	+17	-2	0	0	+15
203X1	-4	-5	-7	0	-16
202X0	+7	-4	-2	0	+1
TOTALS	+20	-11	-9	0	0

Planning and projection of figures for the new UDL became complicated by the uncertainty concerning overall location of ARDF resources in SEA. Numerous proposals had been put forward by all concerned or involved with the program, so that the final outcome of the new UDL remained inextricably bound to a settlement of the disposition of ARDF assets in the coming calendar

year. This unit prepared three sets of UDL figures based on three different alternatives for ARDF aircraft deployment. A summary of these figures is depicted below. (For complete UDL requirement figures see Support Documents 47 and 48 of this History.)

ALTERNATIVE 1

6994th Security Sq., Tan Son Nhut (TSN) 22 aircraft (10 CC - 12 CCZ)  
 Det 1, 6994th Security Sq., Phu Cat (PHU) 13 aircraft (13 CC)  
 Det 2, 6994th Security Sq., Da Nang (DNG) 15 aircraft (4 CC - 11 CCZ)  
 Det 3, 6994th Security Sq., Nakhon Phanom (NKP) 5 aircraft (5 CCZ)

Based on this aircraft alignment manpower requirements would be: <sup>33</sup>

<u>AFSC</u>	<u>TSN</u>	<u>PHU</u>	<u>DNG</u>	<u>NKP</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
R202XO	10	12	0	0	22
A202XO	26	0	14	20	60
A203XIMD	22	0	20	9	51
A203XIMU	0	0	0	2	2
A292XI	106	52	79	34	271
R291XO	12	5	0	5	22
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>176</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>113</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>428</u>

ALTERNATIVE 2

6994th Security Sq., Tan Son Nhut (TSN) 22 aircraft (10 CC - 22 CCZ)  
 Det 1, 6994th Security Sq., Phu Cat (PHU) 22 aircraft (17 CC - 5 CCZ)  
 Det 2, 6994th Security Sq., Da Nang (DNG) 6 aircraft (6 CCZ)  
 Det 3, 6994th Security Sq., Nakhon Phanom (NKP) 5 aircraft (5 CCZ)

[REDACTED]

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Based on this aircraft alignment manpower requirements would be:

<u>AFSC</u>	<u>TSN</u>	<u>PHU</u>	<u>DNG</u>	<u>NKP</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
R202XO	10	0	0	0	10
A202XO	26	20	6	20	72
A203XIMD	22	9	11	9	51
A203XIMU	0	0	0	2	2
A292X1	106	98	35	34	273
<u>R291XO</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>22</u>
TOTALS	176	132	52	70	430

ALTERNATIVE 3

6994th Security Sq., Tan Son Nhut (TSN) 10 aircraft (10 CC)

Det 1, 6994th Security Sq., Phu Cat (PHU) 28 aircraft (17 CC - 11 CCZ)

Det 2, 6994th Security Sq., Da Nang (DNG) 12 aircraft (12 CCZ)


Det 3, 6994th Security Sq., Nakhon Phanom (NKP) 5 aircraft (5 CCZ)


Based on this aircraft alignment manpower requirements would be:


<u>AFSC</u>	<u>TSN</u>	<u>PHU</u>	<u>DNG</u>	<u>NKP</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
R202XO	10	0	0	0	10
A202XO	26	20	6	20	72
A203XIMD	22	9	11	9	51
A203XIMU	0	0	0	2	2
A292X1	106	98	35	34	273
<u>R291XO</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>22</u>
TOTALS	176	132	52	70	430





  
Mini-Mod Test

 The Mini-Mod system (ARDF) was designed to fix transmitters within a frequency range of 2 MHz to 50 MHz (well above the 16 MHz limit of the ALR-35, but below the expected 180 MHz limit of the full ALR-38 system). The ALR-38 Mini-Mod system was deployed to SEA in January 1969 as an interim bridge between the ALR-35 and ALR-38. The equipment was installed aboard three EC-47 aircraft based at Pleiku. (See Table 3)

 From the beginning the Mini-Mod failed to live up to expectations particularly in the HF band, 2-16 MHz. These HF problems were overcome through a series of modifications which took place during March through June 1969. After modification however it was noted that VHF results were erratic. Though it was recognized that weather, friendly artillery, aircrew experience and operating restrictions in fringed areas were limiting factors, none-the-less the basic capabilities of the system were being questioned. Headquarters USAFSS expressed a desire to conduct operational tests, and in coordination with 7AF and MACV the test was scheduled to begin on 13 September 1969.

 The test extended through 19 September 1969. It was conducted in two phases. Phase I, Sensitivity, was designed to determine the relative sensitivity of the Z1 position as compared with the Mini-Mod DF position in the VHF range on voice. Phase II, Accuracy and Performance, consisted of a series of tests designed to determine the accuracy of the Mini-Mod with voice in the VHF range. Accuracy was determined by computing the distance in meters between the fix location given by the system and the known target location.

 The Mini-Mod test gave conclusive evidence that the sensitivity of the DF position was extremely high and compared favorably with the ALR-34



[REDACTED]

and ALR-35 systems in the HF range. The demonstrated sensitivity of the Mini-Mod System indicated that performance problems experienced in mission areas were the result of unfavorable terrain, weather and limitations in the DF patterns that could be flown.<sup>35</sup>

[REDACTED] Phase II of the Mini-Mod test revealed that the Mini-Mod's accuracy was acceptable and generally compared to the ALR-34 and ALR-35 systems. The average miss distance of all targets worked was 1600 meters. Navigator judgement in detecting parallel bearings, improper tracking and compensating for doppler reduced the average miss distance to 830 meters, with a low of 200 meters and a high of 1800 meters. This was considered quite good by those conducting the test because of the "...number of variables at work."<sup>36</sup>

[REDACTED] Recommendations made as a result of the Mini-Mod Test were:<sup>37</sup>

1. The doppler and compass should be thoroughly tested during the operational test and evaluation of the ALR-38 system.
2. The ALR-38 should be specifically checked for ease of holding lock on and degree of difficulty in the threshold and fine tuning process.
3. Consideration should be given to changing the attenuator of the ALR-34 and ALR-35 to the values used with the Mini-Mod in order to provide the operator with more flexibility in working his targets.

#### Low Frequency Collection

[REDACTED] At the MACV ARDF Weekly Meeting of 19 November 1969 it was revealed that NVA/VC elements had been noted using communications in the 1.2 - 2.0 MHz range. The Army had conducted experiments with a trailing wire and found that it increased their capability to copy the signals. However, the Army's ability

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

to fix signals below 3 MHz was severely limited. Combat Cougar missions were able to intercept signals as low as 200 KHZ, but in order to do so the aircraft had to be situated almost on top of the target to hear it. Since it was anticipated that this unit might be tasked to perform low frequency collection, a request was made to PACSCTYRGN to explore the possibility of installing additional antennas for the one to two MHz range.

[REDACTED] PACSCTYRGN stated:

"...Do not believe that requirement for LF collection has been adequately stated to justify modification of Cougar antenna system. It would seem that LF propagation characteristics would permit targeting by ground sites. In addition, installation of long-wire antenna EC-47 could change DF calibration."<sup>39</sup>

At the close of this historical period this unit requested PACSCTYRGN to reconsider its stand based on the fact that:

1. "...NVA/VC units actively engaged in combat against Allied Forces in Vietnam are known to be using radio communications operating in the 1.2 - 2.0 frequency range."

2. Tasking assigned to this unit has included the 1st NVA Regiment had the 7th NVA Regiment both known to have used 1.2 - 2.0 MHz portion of the frequency spectrum.

#### SIGINT COLLECTION POLICIES

##### New SEA Areas

[REDACTED] On 19 September 1970 MACV published an electrical change to MACV Directive 381-23 incorporating new SEA ARDF areas. SEA ARDF areas have been used in the past to provide a common geographical basis for stating requests for ARDF and airborne collection support. This squadron's tasked geographical areas remained the same but were re-numbered as follows: Old areas 11, 10, 9

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

and 8 became new areas 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. (See Figures 1 and 2) The new areas became effective on 27 September 1969.

#### Evaluation of Mission 999

On 20 September 1969 this unit received a request from MACV to participate in an evaluation of missions flown by Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron off-shore north of the DMZ (Mission 999) (See Figure 1 and 2). In our reply through AGC this unit stated the belief that, "From the stand-point of overall productivity and activity level there does not appear to be sufficient reason to continue this mission." Reasons for this belief were:

1. Radar monitoring of the mission had been severely downgraded because of storm damage to Dang Ha (Waterboy) radar facility. (Loss of this facility alone was considered sufficient justification for discontinuing the mission).

2. The need for rapid fixing of targets north of the DMZ was questionable since cessation of the bombing precluded military action against targets fixed.

3. Fuel and distance considerations when compared to productivity of the missions indicated that the aircraft could be more effectively used in other areas.

Though no official policy statements were made by MACV, no further tasking in the mission 999 area was received by Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron.

#### Operational Stops (OPS STOPS) At Hue/Phu Bai

In order to avoid delay in the delivery of perishable exploitable traffic to the Collection Management Authority (CMA), missions flown by Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron were tasked to make operational stops (OPS STOPS) at Hue/Phu Bai. These OPS STOPS were required for all CCZ collection missions flown in CMA Phu Bai (USM-808) area of responsibility. On 10 July 1969 this unit received a proposal from Detachment 2, 6994 Security Squadron recommending

[REDACTED]

that OPS STOPS at Hue/Phu Bai be discontinued and replaced by OPS STOPS at Da Nang. The following reasons were given to support the proposal:<sup>44</sup>

1. Improved courier service should result from the formation of the new Joint Courier Activity Da Nang (JCAD).
2. Lack of EC-47 maintenance facilities at Hue/Phu Bai. Aircraft grounded there for mechanical failure remained grounded until appropriate maintenance personnel and parts were flown in. Complete maintenance service was available at Da Nang.
3. Better runway and lighting conditions existed at Da Nang. No take-off could take place at Hue/Phu Bai after dark.
4. Weather minimums were more favorable at Da Nang.
5. Lack of adequate billeting for crews at Hue/Phu Bai.

MACV was approached on the matter, but they stated that JCAD was an experimental project. Accordingly, Detachment 2 was advised that their proposal would be reconsidered should JCAD be made a permanent operation.<sup>45</sup>

[REDACTED] On 8 October 1969 7AF acquiesced in the 460 TRW 3 October 1969 decision to discontinue OPS STOPS at Hue/Phu Bai pending investigation into flight safety hazards which existed there. 7AF directed that OPS STOPS be made at Da Nang instead of Phu Bai.<sup>46</sup>

[REDACTED] During the Weekly MACV ARDF Tasking Meeting on 15 October 1969 the 6994th Security Squadron representative proposed that the feasibility of eliminating all OPS STOPS be evaluated. Both the 460 TRW and this unit felt that elimination of OPS STOPS would reduce wear and tear on aircraft and increase time over target. MACV agreed with the proposal and requested [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in conjunction with 509th RRG, 7AF DOCR and the 6994th Scty Sq evaluate the necessity for OPS STOPS by Combat Cougar Zulu aircraft. MACV would consider any

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

proposal the group would make providing the following conditions were met:

47

[REDACTED]

As a result of the ensuing discussions a six weeks transcribing test was proposed to MACV. If this test was successful, an adequate solution to the problem of OPS STCPS would have been found.

[REDACTED] The Transcribe Test was to be conducted by Detachment 2. The following procedures for electrical forwarding were agreed upon with MACV:

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1. All material not previously passed air-to-ground would be forwarded as soon as possible upon recovery.
2. All tapes were to be transcribed immediately upon recovery, and all possible exploitable traffic forwarded electrically.
3. South East Asian Technical Summary (SEATS) and Airborne Recovery Reports (ARR) were to be prepared and forwarded on as they were before the test.
4. After full transcription, tapes and one copy of transcript were to be forwarded to the 330th RRCO VIA their courier service.
5. NRV [REDACTED] in conjunction with all concerned was to evaluate results of the test.

[REDACTED] The transcribe test was officially started on 22 November 1969. Midway through the test (13 December 1969) the outlook for its success was gloomy. An operations representative was sent to Detachment 2 and USM-808 in an effort to determine ways of improving prospects for success. His findings were:

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1. Detachment 2 linguists lacked sufficient experience to provide full and accurate transcriptions.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. USM-808 was being overly critical in their feedback and evaluation since they were under the impression that the Air Force would move a contingent of aircraft to Da Nang if the test was unsuccessful.

3. USM-808 personnel expressed serious doubt that Detachment 2 could ever fully produce a reliable and accurate transcript because of the various regional dialects and jargons encountered in VC and NVA plain text. He suggested use of native linguists (Dancer) colocated with the Detachment 2 transcribe effort. NRV [REDACTED] agreed with the Dancer approach, but because of the extreme shortage of these personnel it did not seem likely that their assistance could be secured. At the close of this historical period the transcribe test was still in progress.

#### Dual Frequency Concept

[REDACTED] Since the ARDF and its associated collection program were a primary source of timely tactical intelligence, target emphasis had always been on those entities which could not be intercepted at ground based sites. A significant percentage of this perishable intelligence was passed via radio from the aircraft to the SIGINT Direct Support Unit (DSU) which in turn passed the information to tactical commanders for their action or information. In addition to these air to ground communications (A/G), the DSU often passed information concerning targets who were in the process of transmitting which the DSU desired the aircraft to fix (G/A Tip Off). Both the A/G report of perishable material (fixes and exploitable traffic) to the DSU, and the DSU G/A Tip Off were considered a vital part of the ARDF program.

[REDACTED] The A/G/A communications system however was judged unsatisfactory both from the point of view of perishable data passed to the ground and action

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

taken on Tip Offs passed to the aircraft. The problem appeared to center on the limited number of frequencies available for use by the aircraft. There were about 135 aircraft committed to the ARDF program in SEA, and only five frequencies were available country-wide for A/G/A use. To illustrate the significance of the "bottleneck" caused by this paucity of frequencies, if five aircraft had fixes to pass to two DSUs located in the same general area only one aircraft at a time would be able to pass his traffic because only one frequency would be available. Frequently perishable intelligence could not be passed to DSUs. To alleviate the problem attempts were made to secure more frequencies, but without success.

[REDACTED] From 19 through 25 July 1969 a test of a dual frequency system was conducted by units flying ARDF missions in III and IV CTZs. While its results were being evaluated, USM 626 released results of the analysis of ARDF Tip-Off operations in August and concluded:

[REDACTED]

As a result of this study the need for implementation of the Dual Frequency System became urgent.

[REDACTED] On 28 September 1969 ACC directed the implementation of the Dual Frequency System effective 4 October 1969 for all units in III and IV CTZs.

The frequencies were to be used as follows:

43.1 MHZ for Tip-Off (G/A) in III & IV CTZs

40.8 MHZ for Reporting (A/G) in III CTZ

42.7 MHZ for Reporting (A/G) in IV CTZ

[REDACTED]

Since DSUs had the capability of monitoring both frequencies simultaneously while the aircraft didn't, the aircraft was to monitor the Tip-Off frequency and change to the reporting frequency only to pass A/G traffic.

At the close of this historical period it was obvious that the Dual Frequency System was not enough to overcome the great congestion on the reporting frequency. Contributing to the congestion was the fact that there were eight active DSUs and eleven inactive DSUs (who frequently transmitted requesting repeats of missed traffic) as well as all of the ARDF aircraft both Army and Air Force competing to transmit. Nor was the situation any better on the Tip-Off frequency. USM-626's November evaluation of Tip-Off operations revealed that 3.4 fixes per day were being achieved from all Tip-Offs passed in III and IV CTZs, and though this was over double the 1.5 fixes per day achieved in August, it was still far below expectations as the number of Tip-Offs per day averaged 50 as opposed to 57 per day in August. Not all of the problems involved in Tip-Off operations could be attributed to frequency congestion. Other factors were:

1. Targets which ceased transmitting before the aircraft could receive the Tip-Off and perform the DF functions.
2. Lack of aircraft in the area at the time a target was active.

TEMPO Authority for Detachment 3 Disapproved

On 2 September this unit requested TEMPO authority for Detachment 3 claiming that the low ID rate was the direct result of the lack of assigned notations on a number of target nets. Their CMA, USM-7, (CMA Udorn) was reluctant to issue TEMPO on USA-564 developed targets. Since August 1969 continuity on a number of targets had been pointed out, but no action had been taken by the CMA or NSA to issue TEMPO. Despite strong USAFSS support, On 5 December 1969 DIRNSA disapproved TEMPO authority for Detachment 3.

[REDACTED]

### Survival Gear Policies

[REDACTED] Prior to September 1969 6994th Security Squadron aircrew members were required to wear their survival vest and parachute harness during flight in order to comply with provisions of 460th TRW Regulation 501-1. This made it very uncomfortable for them to perform their duties. After efforts by this unit to bring about a change in policy, 460th TRW rescinded regulation 501-1 effective 22 September 1969. Aircraft commanders were given the authority to determine survival needs of crew members on their individual flights.

### SPECIAL COLLECTION PROJECTS

[REDACTED] The only special collection project tasked during this historical period was Project Above Board. This project was conducted under the auspices of NRV [REDACTED]. Its intent was to test the feasibility of obtaining HF/VHF intercept through the use of specially equipped balloons, and compare the success of the balloon intercept with that of ARDF aircraft. Since the first test was to take place in the DMZ area, support for this project was assigned to Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron.

[REDACTED] Detachment Two's role in this project was to tip off the ground test site when HF voice, and VHF morse/voice targets were active. The test was scheduled to begin 10 September 1969 for an estimated 15 day duration, but because of the late arrival of test equipment the project was postponed. The first balloon was launched from Dong Ha on 25 September 1969. Selected missions in SEA Area 9 provided support for this project.

### Summary

[REDACTED] The 6994th Security Squadron Local Operations was tasked with flying ARDF missions in SEA Area 01, 02, 03 and 04. The objective of these missions was to fix the location of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

in South Vietnam, and to collect target communications data in order to derive exploitable intelligence therefrom. The three basic missions were:

1. Combat Cougar - Objective: Fix targets on intercept assignment.
2. Combat Cougar Zulu Primary Collection - Objective: Collect exploitable traffic and fix targets on assignment.
3. Combat Cougar Zulu Primary Collection - Objective: Fix targets on assignment and collect exploitable traffic.

[REDACTED] Enemy activity in III and IV Corps Tactical Zones remained light through most of the historical period. There was continued buildup of enemy forces in the Mekong Delta in the Seven Mountains area and along the Cambodian Border opposite Special Forces Camps and Fire Support Bases. Intensive fighting around Bu Prang and Duc Lap resulted in heavy losses by the enemy. On 20 December 1969 an entire enemy COMINT unit was captured as a result of two ARDF fixes made by this unit on 19 December 1969. As a result, dramatic and detailed evidence was revealed concerning enemy exploitation of U.S. communications.

[REDACTED] On 5 December 1969 this unit presented its concept for Vietnamization of the USAF ARDF program. This concept projected a VNAF ARDF Force of from 30 to 35 C-47 aircraft configured with ALR-34 system and ARDF acquisition positions situated at Da Nang, Nha Trang and Tan Son Nhut, a USAF advisory technician at each location with full maintenance capability and a one year phase in period for crew training and transfer of resources.

[REDACTED] Except for the loss of two aircraft (Detachment 2 on 30 September and Detachment 1 on 8 October 1969) unit materiel resources remained relatively the same. The down loading of the COMJAM equipment, which took place during the last historical period leaving the positions operational with a limited Z capability, was approved by MACV. The consoles were removed from the aircraft

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

on 5 October 1969. With the resulting loss of 5 Z capable positions, NSAPACREP Vietnam [REDACTED] became concerned about the drop in collection missions. Collection capability was increased with the permanent transfer of Z consoles from Detachment 1 and the placing of two aircraft TDY from Detachment 1. On 20 September 1969 Combat Cougar Zulu mission frag times were reduced to 5 hours from the standard 7 hours because the additional weight of men and equipment required was resulting in many reduced missions.

[REDACTED] On 21 November 1969 PACSGTYRGN directed the removal of this unit's air to ground/ground to air KY-8 equipment. This capability was also lost by Detachments 1 and 2.

[REDACTED] Numerous studies on manpower requirements for this Squadron took place, but the final outcome was dependent on the relocation of ARDF resources in SEA, which at the close of this historical period was still uncertain.

[REDACTED] A test of the ALR-38 Mini-Mod system was conducted between 13 and 19 September 1969. Test results gave conclusive evidence that the sensitivity of the DF position was extremely high and compared favorably with the ALR-34 and ALR-35 systems in the HF range. The test also attested to the Mini-Mod's accuracy in relation to the other two systems.

[REDACTED] New SEA ARDF Areas were established by MACV and became effective on 27 September 1969. This unit recommended discontinuing missions flown off shore north of the DMZ because of lack of radar monitoring of the mission, and lack of any real need for rapid fixing of targets north of the DMZ. Furthermore, considering the expenditure of time and fuel in relation to the low level of productivity of these missions, it appeared that the aircraft could be more effectively used in other areas.

[REDACTED] Safety hazards at Hue/Phu Bai caused the 460th TRW to discontinue

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OPS STOPS there and substitute stops at Da Nang in their place. In an attempt to eliminate OPS STOPS all together, a six weeks transcribe test took place at Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron. Though the test was still in progress at the close of this historical period, the outlook for success was not promising.

[REDACTED] In order to relieve congestion on A/G/A frequencies, ACC directed the implementation of the DUAL Frequency System on 4 October 1969 for all units in III and IV CTZs. Despite the use of the additional frequency, congestion continued to plague the A/G/A frequencies.

[REDACTED] TEMPO Authority for Detachment 3 was disapproved by NSA despite strong USAFSS support.

[REDACTED] On 22 September 1969, 460th TRW rescinded their regulation 501-1, thereby allowing individual aircraft commanders to decide on when and how much survival gear should be worn by crew members on board the aircraft.

[REDACTED] In September 1969 Detachment 2 participated in Projected Above Board, a test of the ability of obtaining HF/VHF intercept through use of specially equipped balloons.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## Chapter III

### PROCESSING AND REPORTING

#### GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

[REDACTED] During this historical period the Squadron as a whole continued to build data base files on all tasked entities. Pre-mission briefings were standardized Squadron-wide. The South East Asian Technical Summary (SEATS), Exploitable Message Report (EMR) and Technical Weekly Recapitulation (TECHWECAP) were established here and at the detachments. The Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS) format was standardized by USAFSSM 200-4, Volume XV, and Detachment 3 was authorized by DIRNSA to issue TACREPS.

#### SIGINT PROCESSING

##### Water Soluble Paper

[REDACTED] On 20 October 1969 this unit asked USAFSS to waive the water soluble paper requirements of USAFSSM 205-7, Chapter 11 paragraph 11-3b for certain materials carried aboard mission aircraft. Waivers were asked for the following SIGINT technical support documents and materials:

1. Cherry Sheets (Compilations of technical data produced by the CMA).
2. NSA Call Sign Listing
3. Raw Traffic
4. Hestia Pads (One time encryption pads used as an alternate method for passing data air/ground when KY-8 encryption system was inoperative).
5. Scratch Books
6. NSA B-64 Working Aid 05-69 UTF and superseding documents (Used by Detachment only.)

Waiver was requested because it was felt that reproduction of these materials would consume an excessive number of man-hours and result in prohibitive costs.

[REDACTED] On 28 October, 1969 USAFSS stated that water soluble paper need not be used for raw traffic, Hestia Pads and scratch pads, but that Cherry Sheets would have to be compiled on water soluble paper. USAFSS reserved judgement on the NSA Call Sign Listing and NSA B-64 Working Aid 05-69 UTF, and concluded:

"It is realized that the costs in preparing tech support materials on water soluble paper, both in manhours and money are high; however, the time available to effective destruction of classified materials during an air emergency is also precious and the more tech materials that are on water soluble paper, the easier the task of ensuring that these materials do not fall into enemy hands."

A further complication was introduced on 30 November 1969 when the 460th TRW directed their subordinate units to remove the five gallon jerry can of water normally carried on mission aircraft, because of the "...weight problems encountered...." As a result of this action this unit found it necessary to request another waiver of USAFSSM 205-7 paragraph 11-3b, since the only remaining source of water being carried was approximately one-half gallon used for drinking and making coffee. On 19 December 1969 USAFSS denied the waiver.

#### FM Interference

One of the major problems encountered on all mission aircraft was the interference resulting from FM radio transmissions. This interference rendered all receivers inoperative during the period that the FM transmitter was being utilized for A/G communications. Research was begun in July 1969 in an effort to eliminate this interference. It was discovered that the FM622A antenna coupler (P/N CU-943) was the major cause of FM interference.

In efforts to reduce it, the CU-943 was shielded to eliminate strong induction field around the coupler. This resulted in reduced interference

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

but caused voltage standing wave ratio (VSWR) to increase, thereby reducing transmission range. Re-orientation of the antenna coupler and its antenna element provided a decrease in FM interference but also reduced the transmission range. The antenna element (AS-1703/ARC) length was increased from 2½ feet to 7½ feet. This provided a good VSWR, but did nothing to reduce interference. The antenna coupler was detached and operated from different positions on the aircraft surface. Even at distances of 25 to 50 feet from the aircraft, the signal emitted from coupler/antenna overloaded G133F receivers and completely blanked the DF system.

[REDACTED] A VHF/FM blade antenna (P/N 437S-1, S/N 5821-054-6374) was obtained from an Army unit. This antenna was mounted in the original coupler mounting hole where it provided 50% less interference. When mounted just forward of the main cargo door it provided 85% to 90% less interference than the CU-943. When the VHF/FM blade antenna was mounted 32 inches forward of the tail wheel well, only negligible interference resulted. The aircraft was then flown for 14 missions with very satisfactory results. These results were used to support Military Suggestion Number 70-94042. At the close of this historical period, tests were being conducted by Warner Robbins Air Materiel Area (WRAMA) with a filter which is expected to achieve the desired results. This unit's suggestion was also under consideration. Hopefully, the problem of FM interference will be overcome during the next historical period.

#### Standardization of Pre-Mission Briefings

[REDACTED] In order to ensure that all aircrew members were provided with as much current information as possible, provisions were made on 28 November 1969 to standardize pre-mission briefings Squadron-wide. This standardized concept provided for two separate briefings; one given by the Analysis and

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Reporting section within the 6994th Security Squadron Operations area and the other given by the Senior Ranking Radio Operator (SRO) as part of the crew briefing within the TEWS Operation area. Minimum requirements for pre-mission briefings given to Squadron aircrews included:

1. Review of previous day's mission results.
2. Technical SIGINT information pertaining to the current mission.
3. DSU information.
4. General intelligence picture of tactical activity in the mission area.

These items were to be presented in sanitized form by the SRO in the front end crew briefing in TEWS Operations.

#### SIGINT REPORTING

##### TACREP Authority at Detachment 3

[REDACTED] Probably the most significant change in the SIGINT reporting posture of this Squadron was the establishment of TACREP reporting authority at Detachment 3. Shortly after Detachment 3 was formed in April 1969 it was realized that because of the uniqueness of the intercept, the amount of exploitable messages intercepted and the time-sensitiveness of some of these messages, that TACREP authority might be desirable. As early as June 1969 DIRNSA recognized the potential value of Detachment 3 to the Cryptologic Community thusly:

[REDACTED]

Encouraged by these comments immediate steps were taken to obtain required code systems and appropriate TECHINS (T-4046), as well as developing the

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

analytic capability at Detachment 3 to be ready for TACREP authority.

[REDACTED] In August 1969 6922 Scty Wg requested DIRNSA to include USA-564 in the COMINT catalogue for purpose of TACREP reporting. Other items requested were a distribution symbol for USA-564 and a product reporting designator to be reflected in TECHINS 1055 and TECHINS 4016. In reply to this request DIRNSA stated "Delegation of authority to issue TACREPS is the responsibility of DIRNSA only. USA-564 has not been authorized to issue TACREPS." After reviewing the concept of operations, DIRNSA felt that they "...see no need for USA-564 to issue TACREPS at the present time." The DIRNSA position was predicated on the premise that USM-7 and USM-808 were effectively accomplishing the task, but added that reconsideration would be given if the situation should change.

[REDACTED] The apparent contradiction in DIRNSA attitudes (See Support Documents 71 and 73) was quickly identified by the 6922nd Scty Wg which requested that USAFSS approach DIRNSA in order to resolve the conflicting guidance on TACREPS. In the interim preparations for establishing TACREP authority continued. On 14 November 1969 DIRNSA authorized Detachment 3 to issue TACREPS on GDRS (General Directorate Rear Services)/Infiltration activity and enemy activity in Laos. On 26 November 1969 Detachment 3 was ready to start issuing TACREPS.

#### Implementation of Exploitable Message Report (EMR)

[REDACTED] On 19 September 1969 DIRNSA expressed a desire to implement Exploitable Message Report (EMR) preparation by aviation units (USA-561, USA-562, USA-563 and USA-564 (this unit and its detachments)). DIRNSA expected their proposal would increase the CMA potential for more timely processing and reporting, and through simultaneous transmission of the EMR to DIRNSA, elimination of man hours spent at CMA in EMR preparation. This unit and its

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

detachments had already been routinely forwarding EMRs to their respective CMAs.

[REDACTED]

On 13 November 1969 PACSCTYRGN directed this Squadron to implement the EMR  
18  
following the aforementioned DIRNSA guidelines.

Responsibility for the Weekly Combat Cougar Report

[REDACTED] On 1 October 1969 PACSCTYRGN undertook an assessment of this Squadron's capability to compile the Weekly Combat Cougar Report. This report, previously produced by the 6922nd Security Wing, was a weekly recapitulation of mission results of all missions flown by this Squadron and its subordinate detachments. It also contained consumer feedback which consisted of a summary of military operations conducted as a result of this unit's collection efforts. This assessment was completed on 9 October 1969 when PACSCTYRGN tasked this unit with compiling the Weekly Combat Cougar Report effective with the tasking  
19  
period 25 through 31 October 1969.

South East Asian Technical Summary (SEATS)

[REDACTED] The 90 day South East Asian Technical Summary (SEATS) test was con-  
20  
cluded on 5 July 1969. Prior to conclusion of the test PACSCTYRGN had recommended  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

21  
continuation of SEATS reporting for this Squadron and Detachment 1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

As a result of the SEATS test DIRNSA requested that this Squadron and its subordinate detachments be tasked with SEATS preparation on a permanent basis. Accordingly this Squadron and Detachment 1 continued their SEATS reporting. Detachment 3 began SEATS reporting as part of the 90 day test in May 1969. Detachment 2 initiated SEATS reporting on 1 September 1969.

Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS)

[REDACTED] In further efforts to standardize evaluation of ARDF mission results and achieve optimum operational performance, USAFSS promulgated USAFSS Manual 200-4 Volume XV-ARDF Management (Provisional Draft). This volume was designed to formalize the procedures adopted in January 1969. Draft copies of Volume XV were received by this unit for review and comments. A Squadron DURMIS conference was held on 22-23 August 1969. Recommendations were forwarded to USAFSS through channels. On 25 October 1969 the new DURMIS format contained

[REDACTED]

in USAFSSM 200-4 Volume XV was implemented.

Commando Forge Operations/Exploitation Summary

[REDACTED] On 13 December 1969 the Director of Operational Intelligence, 7th Air Force requested this unit to provide inputs to their Weekly Commando Forge Operations/Exploitation Summary. This report, addressed to PACAF, USAF, PACSCTYRCN, USAFSS and others, was designed to provide a continuing evaluation of Commando Forge Operations. Features of this report were:

1. Statistics on the total ARDF/COMINT product provided by Commando Forge to 7AF, Task Force Alpha (TFA) and 7/13 AF.
2. Actions taken by the consumers regarding target development and exploitation.
3. Results achieved (Bomb Damage Assessments (BDA)) based wholly or partially on ARDF/COMINT inputs.

The first report submitted by this unit was on 15 December 1969 covering the period 6-12 December 1969.

TECHWECAP

[REDACTED] On 6 October 1969 6922nd Scty Wg announced its intention to have this Squadron and its subordinate detachments added to Annex Hotel TECHINS 1043. Accordingly input was made concerning technical reports produced by this unit and detachments. DIRNSA issued Annex Hotel T-1043 on 31 October 1969. In accordance with T-1043 this unit's first Weekly TECHWECAP was issued on 4 December 1969.

Summary

[REDACTED] During this historical period the Squadron as a whole continued to build data base files on all tasked entities. USAFSS disapproved this Squadron's request for waiver of USAFSSM 205-7 Chapter II paragraph 11-3b water soluble

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

paper requirements for certain materials carried aboard mission aircraft. However, a new waiver request was submitted when the 460 TRW directed their subordinate units to remove the 5 gallon jerry can of water normally carried on mission aircraft.

[REDACTED] Studies were conducted in efforts to reduce interference caused by A/G FM radio transmissions. This interference rendered all receivers inoperative during periods of transmission. It was discovered that the FM 622A antenna coupler (P/N CU-943) was the major cause of interference. When the VHF/FM blade antenna was mounted 32 inches forward of the tail wheel well, only negligible interference resulted. A military suggestion was submitted and was under consideration at the close of this historical period.

[REDACTED] Pre-mission briefings were standardized in order to provide aircrew members with as much current information as possible. On 14 November 1969, Detachment 3 was authorized to issue TACREPS by DIRNSA. On 28 October 1969 PACSCTYRGN tasked this Squadron with the responsibility for compilation of the Weekly Combat Cougar Report. This report consisted of a weekly recapitulation of all missions flown by this Squadron and its subordinate detachments.

[REDACTED] The 90 day SEATS test was concluded on 5 July 1969. The test was successful and DIRNSA directed this unit and Detachment 1 to continue SEATS reporting. DIRNSA also directed that Detachments 2 and 3 be tasked with SEATS preparation. The new DURMIS format outlined in USAFSSM 200-4 Volume XV was implemented on 25 October 1969. This unit also was tasked with the TECHWECAP and the Commando Forge Operations/Exploitation Summary. The reporting of the former was begun on 4 December 1969 and of the latter on 15 December 1969.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 1

1. Detachment 1 relocated to Phu Cat during September 1969. It was located at Nha Trang previous to relocation. See page 2 this History.
2. See Chapter II, page 17 this History.
3. PAD 69-8 Headquarters USAFSS 30 July 70 para 3.
4. PAD 69-8 Headquarters USAFSS 30 July 70 para 4.
5. Ibid
6. Movement Order 22, HQ PACAF 10 July 69. (Support Document 1)
7. 7AF OPORD 450-69, 15 June 1969 para 3f and 3l give execution responsibilities for the 460 TRW and 6994 Scty Sq respectively in relation to Combat Cougar missions.
8. 460 TRW and 6994 Scty Sq Joint Operating Agreement 2-1, 4 January 1970. (Support Document 2)
9. History of the 6994th Security Squadron 1 January - 30 June 1969  
RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1) Chapter 1 page 4.
10. 6994 Scty Sq MAT, Hue Phu Bai Trip Report (U), 4 July 1969. (Support Document 3)
11. Ibid
12. Message Ho 7AF 212325Z July 69, Subject: Redeployment of EC-47s to Hue/Fhu Bai [REDACTED]. (Support Document 4)
13. Message SSO MACV 140952Z August 1969, Relocation of EC-47 acft. (Support Document 5)
14. 6994 Scty Sq OPS Ltr undated, Subject: Relocation of EC-47 Aircraft. (Support Document 6).
15. 6994 Scty Sq OPS 4 October 1969, Subject: Relocation of ARDF Resources From Fleiku AB, RVN. (Support Document 7)
16. Ibid
17. Message 6994 Scty Sq 060355Z (no subject stated). (Support Document 8)
18. Message PACSCTYRGN 010345Z November 1969, Subject: Disposition of ARDF Assets. (Support Document 9)
19. Ibid

## FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 1 CONTINUED

20. Message PACSCTYRGN 080600Z October 1969, Subject: Disposition of ARDF Assets. (Support Document 10)
21. History of the 6994th Security Squadron 1 January - 30 June 1969. RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1). Chapter 1 pages 2 and 3.
22. Ibid
23. 6994 Scty Sq OPS, 2 Oct 69, Subject: Report of TDY Visit. (Support Document 11)
24. Message 6922 Scty Wg 160230Z August 1969, Subject: ARDF for SEA. (Support Document 12)
25. Ibid
26. Message 7AF 231000Z Aug 69, Subject: Basing of EC-47 Aircraft in Thailand [REDACTED]. (Support Document 13)
27. See pages 4 & 5 this History.
28. Message PACSCTYRGN 260332Z September 1969 (Support Document 14).
29. Message 6994 Scty Sq 300805Z August 1969, Subject: Additional Aircraft at NKP. (Support Document 15)
30. Message 460 TRW 300220Z August 1969, Subject: NKP Deployment. (Support Document 16)
31. Message MACV 122352Z October 1969, Subject: Move of Additional EC-47s to Thailand (Support Document 17).
32. Message 6994 Scty Sq 140710Z October 1969, Subject: Move of Additional EC-47s RCS to Thailand. (Support Document 18)
33. Message [REDACTED] 180435Z October 1969. Subject: Move of Additional EC-47 Acft to Thailand. (Support Document 19)
34. Message [REDACTED] 240524Z December 1969, Subject: Extension of EC-47s at NKP RTAFB (Support Document 20).
35. 6994 Scty Sq OPS, 2 Oct 69, Subject: Report of TDY Visit. (Support Document 11)
36. See Chapter I pages 4 & 5 this History.
37. Ibid
38. ACC Working Aid 01-69, 12 May 1969, ARDF Program - General, Section II, para 1  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

## FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 1 CONTINUED

39. ACC Working Aid 01-69, 12 May 1969, ARDF Program - General, Section II, para 2.
40. ACC Working Aid 01-69, 12 May 1969, ARDF Program - General Section II, para 8.
41. Message 6994th Scty Sq SSLO 290545Z August 1969, Subject: Reorganization of the ACC. (Support Document 21)
42. Message PACSCTYRGN 140630Z September 1969, Subject: ACC Reorganization. (Support Document 22)
43. Message 6994th Scty Sq, 250845Z September 1969, Subject: Discussion of Current ACC Situation. (Support Document 23)
44. Ibid
45. Ibid
46. Message 6994th Scty Sq 120807Z September 1969, Subject: ARDF Calibration Site, Cam Ranh Bay. (Support Document 24.)
47. Message PACSCTYRGN 162130Z September 1969, Subject: Requirement For Calibration Facility. (Support Document 25)
48. HQ USAFSS PAD 69-12, 9 December 1969, Subject: Region Reorganization. Paragraph 4b (2).
49. Ibid atch 2
50. Message CINCPACAF/DO 180538Z July 1969. (Message not in unit files)
51. Message 7AF 010145Z September 1969, Subject: PACAF Life Support School (PLSS); Training Quotas, paragraph 1. (Support Document 26)
52. Message PACSCTYRGN 060125Z September 1969, Subject: PACAF Life Support School (PLSS). (Support Document 27)
53. Message USAFSS 171945Z December 1969, Subject: Life Support TNG for 6994SS. (Support Document 28)

[REDACTED]

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER II

1. New SEA Areas became effective 27 Sep 69. Areas were previously 11 - 10 - 09 and 08 respectively. (See figures 1 and 2 this History)
2. Message 6994 Scty Sq 310635Z, Subject: Capture of Enemy COMINT Collection Unit. (Support Document 29)
3. 6994 Scty Sq Ltr, CDR, 5 December 1969, Subject: Vietnamization of ARDF program [REDACTED]. (Support Document 30)
4. Message Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq 300822Z, Subject: Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq AIR 3-69. (Support Document 31)
5. 6994 Scty Sq OPS-2 Ltr, 29 December 1969, Subject: Master Program Review Board, Para 3b. (Support Document 32)
6. Ibid. Para 3a
7. History of the 6994th Security Squadron 1 January - 30 June 1969. RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1) Chapter II, page 10.
8. Message PACSCTYRGN 110307Z September 1969, Subject: Removal of "Q" Jamming Equipment Aboard EC-47 Aircraft. (Support Document 33)
9. Ibid.
10. Message SSO MACV 022341Z, Subject: Removal of "Q" Jamming Equipment. (Support Document 34)
11. 6994 Scty Sq OPS Ltr, 8 October 1969, Subject: Removal of the "Q" Consoles From Five EC-47 Aircraft [REDACTED]. (Support Document 35)
12. USA-561 Position Status Reports - 466, 470, 471, 472 and 473, 6 October 1969.
13. Message, NSAPACREP Vietnam [REDACTED], 150520Z, Subject: ABN Coll Mans. (Support Document 36)
14. Message 6994 Scty Sq 150848Z, Subject not listed. (Support Document 37)
15. Ibid
16. Message SSO MACV 272346Z October 1969, Subject: In-Country EC-47 Relocation. (Support Document 38)
17. Message, Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq, 280200Z October 1969, Subject: Redistribution of ARDF Aircraft. (Support Document 39)
18. Message 7AF 291040Z October 1969, Subject: In-Country EC-47 Relocation (U). (Support Document 40)



19. USA-562 Position Status Report Nr 177, 31 October 1969.
20. USA-561 Position Status Report Nr 569, 5 November 1970.
21. Message 460 TRW 120836Z November 1969, Subject: Movement of Aircraft (U). (Support Document 41)
22. Message, PACSCTYRGN 060041Z September 1969, Subject: Accomplishment of Scheduled TOT. (Support Document 42.)
23. Message, 460 TRW 161203Z, Subject: Aircraft Utilization (Support Document 43)
24. Message, PACSCTYRGN OPS/COM 120448Z September 1969. (Message not in files)
25. Message 6994 Scty Sq 180845Z September 1969, Subject: Opnl Requirement for Unit A/G/A KY-3 FOCS. (Support Document 44)
26. Ibid.
27. Message PACSCTYRGN COM-S 210018Z November 1969. (Message not in files)
28. Message 6994 Scty Sq 220902Z November 1969, Subject: Removal of 6994th Complex A/G/A COMM FACS. (Support Document 45)
29. Message, PACSCTYRGN OPS 020825Z October 1969, (Message not in files).
30. Message, USAFSS OPD 011846Z (Message not in files).
31. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 100955Z October 1969, Subject: ARDF Manpower Reduction. (Support Document 46)
32. See this History Chapter I pages 4 and 5.
33. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 080830Z November 1969, Subject: UDL, 6994SS After 703 Reduction. (Support Document 47)
34. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 180340Z November 1969, Subject: 6994SS UDL. (Support Document 48)
35. Det 2, 6994 Security Squadron, Mini Mod Tests 13 -19 September 1969, page 9, paragraph 1.
36. Ibid. Page 9, paragraph 2.
37. Ibid. Page 10, paragraph 3.
38. Message 6994 Scty Sq SSLO 210315Z November 1969, Subject: MACV ARDF Weekly Meeting 19 November 1969. (Support Document 49)

## FOOTNOTES CHAPTER II CONTINUED

39. Message, PACSCTYRGN 200223Z December 1969, Subject: Low Frequency Collection. (Support Document 50)
40. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 220857Z December 1969, Subject: Low Frequency ARDF Capability. (Support Document 51)
41. Message, SSO MACV 190318Z September 1969, Subject: Elec Chng to MACV DIR 381-23. (Support Document 52)
42. Message, SSO MACV 200716Z September 1969, Subject: Evaluation of MSN 999. (Support Document 53)
43. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 250834Z September 1969, Subject: Evaluation of MSN 999 (Support Document 54)
44. Message, 6994th Scty Sq 100545Z July 1969, Subject: Joint Courier Activity Da Nang (JCAD)/OPS Stops at Hue Phu Bai. (Support Document 55)
45. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 280441Z July 1969, Subject: Joint Courier Activity Da Nang (JCAD)/OPS Stops at Hue Phu Bai. (Support Document 56)
46. Message 7AF, 080450Z October 1969, Subject: Operations Stops - Hue. (Support Document 57)
47. Message, SSO MACV 260806Z October 1969, Subject: OPSTOPS at Phu Bai/ Da Nang by EC-47s. (Support Documents 58)
48. Message, USM-704 171220Z November 1969, Subject: Courier OPS Stop Da Nang by EC-47s. (Support Document 59)
49. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 130415Z December 1969, Subject: Detachment 2, 6994SS Transcribe Test. (Support Document 60)
50. Ibid
51. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 300430Z September 1969, Subject: SIGINT ARDF/ Collection Program. (Support Document 61)
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Message USM-626, 111231Z September 1969, Subject: ARDF Tip-Off. (Support Document 62)
55. Message USM 704, 280155Z September 1969, Subject: Implementation of Dual Frequency System (U). (Support Document 63)
56. Message, USM-626, 151303Z December 1969, Subject: ARDF. (Support Document 64)

## FOOTNOTES CHAPTER II CONTINUED

57. Message, USM-626 111231Z September 1969, Subject: ARDF Tip-Off. (Support Document 62)
58. Message, PACSCTYRGN 042143Z September 1969, Subject: Det 3 TEMPO Authority. (Support Document 65)
59. Message USAFSS TAD/TAG 241545Z November 1969 (Message not in files).
60. Message DIRNSA B-561 051840Z December 1969. (Message not in files)

[REDACTED]

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER III.

1. Message 6994 Scty Sq 211005Z October 1969, Subject: Waiver for Use of Water Soluble Paper. (Support Document 66)
2. Message USAFSS 281357Z 29 October 1969, Subject: (not listed) (Support Document 67)
3. Ibid
4. Message 6994 Scty Sq 300315Z November 1969, Subject: Water Soluble Paper. (Support Document 68)
5. Ibid
6. Message USAFSS/CSP-S 191735Z December 1969. (Message not in files)
7. Message 6994 Scty Sq 060740Z October 1969, Subject: FM Interference. (Support Document 69)
8. Message 6994 Scty Sq 280551Z November 1969, Subject: Pre-Mission Briefings. (Support Document 70)
9. Message DIRNSA 201708Z June 1969, Subject: Commando Forge Concept of Operations. (Support Document 71)
10. Message USA-57 290338Z August 1969, Subject: TACREP Reporting From USA-564. (Support Document 72)
11. Message DIRNSA 051746Z September 1969, Subject: TACREP Reporting For USA-564. (Support Document 73)
12. Ibid
13. Ibid
14. Message 6922 Scty Wg 110240Z September 1969, Subject: TACREP Reporting At USA-564. (Support Document 74)
15. Message DIRNSA 140026Z November 1969, (Subject not listed). (Support Document 75)
16. Message DIRNSA 192338 September 1969, Subject: Preparation of EMR by Aviation Units. (Support Document 76)
17. Message DIRNSA 281745Z October 1969, Subject: Preparation of EMR by Airborne Collection Units. (Support Document 77)
18. Message PACSCTYFGN 130218Z November 1969, Subject: EMR Preparation. (Support Document 78)

## FOOTNOTES CHAPTER III CONTINUED

19. Message PACSCTYRGN 092312Z, October 1969, Subject: Weekly Combat Cougar Report. (Support Document 79)
20. See History of the 6994th Security Squadron 1 January - 30 June 1969  
RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1) page 19.
21. Ibid
22. Message, DIRNSA 122122Z August 1969, Subject: SEATS Preparation by USAFSS Units USA-561/USA-562. (Support Document 80)
23. Ibid
24. Ibid
25. See History of the 6994th Security Squadron 1 January - 30 June 1969  
RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1) page 20-21.
26. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 250130Z August 1969, Subject: USAFSSM 200-4  
Volume IV. (Support Document 81)
27. Letter Headquarters 7AF (DIOR), 13 December 1969, Subject: Commando Forge Operations/Exploitation Summary. (Support Document 82)

[REDACTED]

GLOSSARY

ACC - Airborne Radio Direction Finding Coordination Center

AMEB - American Embassy

ARDF - Airborne Radio Direction Finding

ASA - Army Security Agency

Barrell Roll Area - Northern Laos-Plaine Des Jarres

BEQ - Bachelor Enlisted Quarters

CAS - Controlled American Source

CC - Combat Cougar - nickname for ARDF Program in SEA

CCS - Combat Cougar Sulu - nickname for ARDF missions with collection capability.

CMA - Collection Management Authority

COMJAM - Communications Jamming

Commando Forge - A nickname for the ARDF missions flown in Laos

CONUS - Continental United States

CTZ - Corps Tactical Zone

DIRNSA - Director of National Security Agency

DOCERS - 7AF Deputy for Special Reconnaissance

DODSPECREP - Department of Defense Special Representative

DSU - Direct Support Unit

GDRS - General Directorate Rear Services

HF - High Frequency

JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff

JSOC - Joint Service Operations Center

MACTHAI - Military Assistance Command Thailand

MACV - Military Assistance Command Vietnam

NKP - Nakhon Phanom, Thailand

NRV [REDACTED] - NSA PAC REP Vietnam [REDACTED]

NSA - National Security Agency

NSAPACREP [REDACTED] - NSA Pacific Representative

NVA - North Vietnamese Army

OIC - Officer In Charge

PACAF - Pacific Air Forces

PACSCOTYRGN - Pacific Security Region

PJSS - PACAF Jungle Survival School

PLSS - PACAF Life Support School

RRGP - Radio Research Group

RTG - Royal Thai Government

SEA - South East Asia

SEFE - Standardization/Evaluation Flight Examiner

SIGINT - Signal Intelligence

STEEL TIGER - Southern Laos-The Laotian Panhandle

SVN - South Vietnam

TECHINS - Technical Instructions

TEWS - Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

TFA - Task Force Alpha

TOT - Time Over Target

TRANSEC - Transmission Security

TRW - Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

USAFSS - United States Air Force Security Service

VC - Viet Cong

VHF - Very High Frequency

VNAF - Vietnamese Air Force

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



LIST OF SUPPORT DOCUMENTS




1. Movement Order 22, HQ PACAF 10 July 69.
2. Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) 2-1). Between 460th TRW and 6994th Scty Sq , 4 January 70.
3. 6994th Scty Sq MAT, Hue/Phu Bai Trip Report (U), 4 July 1969.
4. Message HQ 7AF 212325Z Jul 69, Subject: Redeployment of EC-47s to Hue/Phu Bai [REDACTED].
5. Message SSO MACV 140952Z August 1969. Relocation of EC-47 Aircraft.
6. 6994 Scty Sq OPS Ltr, undated, Subject: Relocation of EC-47 Aircraft.
7. 6994 Scty Sq OPS Ltr, 4 October 1969, Subject: Relocation of ARDF resources From Pleiku AB, RVN.
8. Message 6994 Scty Sq 060355Z (no subject stated).
9. Message PACSCTYRGN 010345Z November 1969, Subject: Disposition of ARDF Assets.
10. Message PACSCTYRGN 080600Z October 1969, Subject: Disposition of ARDF Assets.
11. 6994 Scty Sq OPS, 2 Oct 69, Subject: Report of TDY Visit.
12. Message 6922 Scty Wg 160230Z August 1969, Subject: ARDF for SEA.
13. Message 7AF 231000Z August 1969, Subject: Basing of EC-47 Aircraft In Thailand [REDACTED].
14. Message PACSCTYRGN 260332Z September 1969.
15. Message 6994 Scty Sq 300805Z August 1969, Subject: Additional Aircraft at NKP.
16. Message 460TRW 300220Z August 1969, Subject: NKP Deployment.
17. Message MACV 122352Z October 1969, Subject: Move of Additional EC-47s To Thailand.
18. Message 6994 Scty Sq 140710Z October 1969, Subject: Move of Additional EC-47s PCS to Thailand.
19. Message [REDACTED] 180435Z October 1969. Subject: Move of Additional EC-47 Acft to Thailand.



20. Message [REDACTED] 240524Z December 1969, Subject: Extension of EC-47's at NKP RTAFB.
21. Message 6994 Scty Sq SSL0 290545Z August 1969, Subject: Reorganization of the ACC.
22. Message PACSCTYRGN 140630Z September 1969, Subject: ACC Reorganization.
23. Message 6994 Scty Sq 250845Z September 1969, Subject: Discussion of Current ACC Situation.
24. Message 6994 Scty Sq 120807Z September 1969, Subject: ARDF Calibration Site, Cam Ranh Bay.
25. Message PACSCTYRGN 162130Z September 1969, Subject: Requirement For Calibration Facility.
26. Message 7AF 010145Z September 1969, Subject: PACAF Life Support School (PLSS) Training Quotas.
27. Message PACSCTYRGN 060125Z September 1969, Subject: PACAF Life Support School (PLSS).
28. Message USAFSS 171945Z December 1969, Subject: Life Support Tng for 6994SS.
29. Message 6994 Scty Sq 310635Z December 1969, Subject: Capture of Enemy COMINT Collection Unit.
30. 6994 Scty Sq GDR 5 December 1969, Subject: Vietnamization of ARDF Program [REDACTED].
31. Message Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq 300822Z, Subject: Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq AIR 3-69.
32. 6994 Scty Sq OPS-2, 29 December 1969, Subject: Master Program Review Board.
33. Message PACSCTYRGN 110307Z September 1969, Subject: Removal of "Q" Jamming Equipment Aboard EC-47 Aircraft.
34. Message SSO MACV 022341Z, Subject: Removal of "Q" Jamming Equipment.
35. 6994 Scty Sq Ltr, OPS, 8 October 1969, Subject: Removal of the "Q" Consoles from Five EC-47 Aircraft [REDACTED].
36. Message NSAPACREP Vietnam [REDACTED] 150520Z, October 69, Subject: ABN Coll Mens.
37. Message 6994 Scty Sq 150848Z October 1969, subject not listed.
38. Message SSO MACV 272346Z October 1969, Subject: In-Country EC-47 Relocation.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
39. Message Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq 280200Z October 1969, Subject: Redistribution of ARDF Aircraft.
  40. Message 7AF 291040Z October 1969, Subject: In-Country EC-47 Relocation (U).
  41. Message 46OTRW 120836Z November 1969, Subject: Movement of Aircraft (U).
  42. Message PACSCTYRGN 060041Z September 1969, Subject: Accomplishment of Scheduled TOT.
  43. Message 46OTRW 161203Z Subject: Aircraft Utilization.
  44. Message 6994 Scty Sq 180845Z September 1969, Subject: Opnl Requirement for Unit A/G/A KY-8 FOCS.
  45. Message 6994 Scty Sq 220902Z November 1969, Subject: Removal of 6994th Complex A/G/A COMM FACS.
  46. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 100955Z October 1969, Subject: ARDF Manpower Reduction.
  47. Message 6994 Scty Sq 080830Z November 1969, Subject: UDL, 6994SS After 703 Reduction.
  48. Message 6994 Scty Sq 180340Z November 1969, Subject: 6994SS UDL.
  49. Message 6994 Scty Sq SSLO 210315Z November 1969, Subject: MACV ARDF Weekly Meeting 19 November 1969.
  50. Message PACSCTYRGN 200223Z December 1969, Subject: Low Frequency Collection.
  51. Message 6994 Scty Sq 220857Z December 1969, Subject: Low Frequency ARDF Capability.
  52. Message SSO MACV 190318Z September 1969, Subject: Elec Chng to MACV Dir 381-23.
  53. Message SSO MACV 200716Z September 1969, Subject: Evaluation of Man 999.
  54. Message 6994 Scty Sq 250834Z September 1969, Subject: Evaluation of Man 999.
  55. Message 6994 Scty Sq 100545Z July 1969, Subject: Joint Courier Activity Da Nang (JCAD)/OPS Stops at Hue Phu Bai.
  56. Message 6994 Scty Sq 280441Z July 1969, Subject: Joint Courier Activity Da Nang (JCAD)/OPS Stops at Phu Bai.
  57. Message 7AF 080450Z October 1969, Subject: Operations Stops - Hue.
  58. Message SSO MACV 260806Z October 1969, Subject: OPSTOPS at Phu Bai/ Da Nang by EC-47a.
- [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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59. Message USM-704 171220Z November 1969, Subject: Courier OPS Stop Da Nang by EC-47s.
  60. Message 6994 Scty Sq 130415Z December 1969, Subject: Detachment 2, 6994 SS Transcribe Test.
  61. Message 6994 Scty Sq 300430Z September 1969, Subject: SIGINT ARDF/Collection Program.
  62. Message USM 626 111231Z September 1969, Subject: ARDF Tip-Off.
  63. Message USM 704, 280155Z September 1969, Subject: Implementation of Dual Frequency System.
  64. Message USM 626 151303Z December 1969, Subject: ARDF.
  65. Message PACSCTYRGN 042143Z September 1969, Subject: Det 3 TEMPO Authority.
  66. Message 6994 Scty Sq 211005Z October 1969, Subject: Waiver for Use of Water Soluble Paper.
  67. Message USAFSS 281357Z October 1969, Subject: (Not listed).
  68. Message 6994 Scty Sq 300315Z November 1969, Subject: Water Soluble Paper.
  69. Message 6994 Scty Sq 060740Z October 1969, Subject: FM Interference.
  70. Message 6994 Scty Sq 280551Z November 1969, Subject: Pre-Mission Briefings.
  71. Message DIRNSA 201708Z June 1969, Subject: Commando Forge Concept of Operations.
  72. Message USA-57 290338Z August 1969, Subject: TACREP Reporting From USA-564.
  73. Message DIRNSA 051746Z September 1969, Subject: TACREP Reporting For USA-564.
  74. Message 6922 Scty Wg 110240Z September 1969, Subject: TACREP Reporting at USA-564.
  75. Message DIRNSA 140026Z November 1969, (Subject not listed).
  76. Message 6994 Scty Sq 192338Z September 1969, Subject: Preparation of EMR by Aviation Units.
  77. Message DIRNSA 281745Z October 1969, Subject: Preparation of EMR by Airborne Collection Units.
  78. Message PACSCTYRGN 130218Z November 1969, Subject: EMR Preparation.
  79. Message PACSCTYRGN 092312Z October 1969, Subject: Weekly Combat Cougar Report.
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80. Message DIRNSA 122122Z August 1969, Subject: SEATS Preparation by USAFSS Units USA-561/USA-562.
  81. Message 6994 Scty Sq 250130Z August 1969, Subject: USAFSSM 200-4 Volume XV.
  82. Letter, Headquarters 7AF (DIOR), 13 December 1969, Subject: Commando Forge Operations/Exploitation Summary.
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
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
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
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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
6994 SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

3



REP/ TO  
ATTN: MAT

4 Jul 1969

*ops for file/USAF*

SUBJECT: Hue - Phu Bai Trip Report (U)

TO: CDR

1. On 29 Jun 1969, I visited the Hue - Phu Bai complex to ascertain present and future requirements to move our operation into the area.
2. Hue - Phu Bai is a joint army marine camp and living conditions are austere. Personnel who are generally in the field would consider the barracks good. However, for USAF personnel, they will be sub-standard. The barracks are located in a very sandy area. Any vehicles which go into that area will have to be four wheel drive. The barracks area was occupied so we were unable to perform a close inspection of the area. We did not see any shower facilities or latrine facilities. Based on observation at other areas in the complex, latrines will probably be slit trenches.
3. The barracks will house both the TEWS and USAFSS personnel. These barracks are not air conditioned and crew rest may pose a problem.
4. Construction for the EC-47 area is not completed. The extension of the taxiway to the EC-47 area has been graded but not paved. The parking apron for the aircraft has not been started. The revetments have not been started. The 800 square foot air conditioned building for maintenance and supply has no status. The building has neither been approved or disapproved.
5. Transportation for TDY personnel is non-existent. Telecon with USR 808 (509th Radio Research Group) was the only effective means of communication with these personnel. The operations officer stated that our operators can have access to the army analysts for mission briefing and debriefing, we can use their area to store our mission pouches and we can have access to their communication facility to pass our reports.
6. Estimates given by 7AF personnel on this trip indicated it would probably be late September before we could begin operations there. With the maintenance concept we will be operating under (black box change only), recommend we not go into operation there until our building is completed. The heavy dust in the area could induce failures in the electronic gear.
7. In the area of aircraft maintenance, we discussed the differences between our operation at Det 3 and Phu Bai. The biggest

*M/R - Hold for near future discussion of expenses*

REPEATED AT YEAR INTERVALS;  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.  
DD FORM 1300, 10

*ASR 5 Jul 69*




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
problem that we could foresee was that Phu Bai has only parts and equipment to support light aircraft such as O-1E's. A simple action such as changing a tire could cause an aircraft to stay on the ground for several days awaiting equipment. NKP was equipped to handle larger aircraft so no problems were encountered.


8. [REDACTED] In view of the austere conditions and the possibility of maintenance problems, 7AF is studying the feasibility of deploying to Da Nang rather than Phu Bai. This action requires staffing at 7AF and then at MACV so it will probably be 30 to 45 days before a decision is made.


*Donald E. Keese*

DONALD E. KEESE, Captain, USAF  
Chief of Maintenance









OPS

Relocation of EC-47 Aircraft

7AF DIO

1. In consideration of MACV msg 10595 Intel 140952Z Aug, Subject same as above. In response to request from Col Franco the following opinions/considerations are forwarded:

a. The first thing that must be considered is that USAFSS has only two complete sets of ALR-35 Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) so any consideration of continued three site operation must include the fact that only two of those sites can contain ALR-35 equipped aircraft.

b. The second consideration is the Mini-mod (ALR-38). These are currently based at Pleiku due to their compatibility with the intelligence/signal environment. There are only three of these equipments but they are mounted in the "Q" model EC-47 of which there are eight, the remaining five (after ALR-38) are configured with ALR-35's. It would be necessary to move all eight aircraft together.

2. With these two considerations, it is readily apparent that a shift of eight aircraft to Phu Cat would add 5 ALR-35's and 3 ALR-38's to their current ALR-34's which would then require similar moves of the equipment from TSN and Phu Cat to preclude three ALR-35 locations.

3. At this point it would become necessary for the 6994th to move all the ALR-35/38 AGE and other associated equipment to Phu Cat and acquire approximately 1,000 sq ft of added maintenance space. We suspect this same difficulty would also pertain to airframe maintenance when the "Q"s are mixed with present aircraft at Phu Cat.

4. An additional consideration would then be the training of maintenance people, operators, and navigators into new equipment.

5. The alternate to the above would of course be to move the 362/Det 2 to Phu Cat and the 361/Det 1 to Pleiku with all their associated equipment and continue present operations in new locations.

FOR THE COMMANDER

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF  
Operations Officer



OPS

7  
4 OCT 1969

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Relocation of ARDF Resources from Pleiku AB, RVN (S)

7AF DPLG (Lt Col Sillwell)


1. [REDACTED] With the closure of Pleiku AB to the USAF, it will be necessary to relocate those EC-47's presently assigned to Pleiku to other in/out country locations. To best satisfy consumer requirements, the present Pleiku ARDF assets should, ideally, be relocated to Makou Phanom RTAFB and DaNang AB. That proposal will not be considered at this time, but will, however, be addressed at a later date. This paper, then, will address our first and second alternate proposals for the relocation of the Pleiku ARDF assets.

2. [REDACTED] Our first alternate for Pleiku ARDF resource relocation is to increase the NKP effort to 5 ALR34Z's and 5 ALR34OC's. The Phu Cat realignment would then consist of 27 aircraft (9 ALR35/38Z's, 2 ALR34Z's, 2 ALR35OC's, 14 ALR34CC's). USAFSS will require 117 personnel at NKP to support the 10 aircraft operation. We will also require a 2400 square foot maintenance and supply area and a 5600 square foot operations and communications area. The operations/communications function can, on an emergency basis, be carried out by adding four additional vans in the TFA compound. The maintenance/supply function requires a permanent type building to house mock-ups, test equipments and bench stock. The Phu Cat expansion will require the addition of approximately 100 USAFSS personnel. With the exception of dormitory space, existing facilities at Phu Cat can absorb the proposed expansion. The second alternate would be to leave the present NKP structure as is and relocate all remaining resources to Phu Cat. This alternate proposal would require additional construction for the maintenance/supply and operations/communications function. It would add approximately 150 personnel to the current Phu Cat authorizations.

FOR THE COMMANDER

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF  
Operations Officer

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]



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
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PRIORITY

6994SCTYSQ

PAGSCTYRGN

6922SCTTWC



OCT 69

1. AS YOU KNOW THERE HAVE BEEN MANY MEETINGS RECENTLY ON DISPOSITION OF  
 PLEIKU ASSETS WHEN THE BASE CLOSES. WE HAVE REVIEWED THE PRESENT  
 ASSETS AND ADDED THE PROGRAMMED UPGRADE TO REACH TEN AIR-36'S IN  
 THIRTEEN Q MODEL EC47'S. DURING THE REVIEW WE CONSIDERED THE FOLLOW-  
 ING FACTORS:

316

A. CURRENT AIR-36'S INCREASE FROM THREE TO TEN ALL OF WHICH ARE  
 IN A "Q" MODEL EC47. IN ADDITION THAT UNIT WILL HAVE THREE MORE "Q"  
 MODEL EC47'S. EQUIPPED WITH AIR-35.


B. IT IS DESIRABLE TO RETAIN ALL OF THESE AIRCRAFT AT ONE LOCATION.

C. THESE AIRCRAFT ARE EQUIPPED TO PERFORM BEST (SINGLE ENGINE,  
 TAKE OFF, ETC) AT HIGHER ALTITUDE AIRFIELDS.

D. THE CURRENTLY EXPRESSED REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AIR36 ARE IN  
 STEEL TIGER AND DMZ AREAS. CAS HAS EXPRESSED REQUIREMENTS (AS YET  
 unfulfilled) for VHF CAPABILITY IN BARREL ROLL AREA.

E. TO MEET REQUIREMENTS IN ALL THREE OF THESE AREAS REQUIRES

6 03552  
 OCT  
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4891

W JOHNSON, JR., 1stCol, USAF  
 Operations Officer



EITHER SPLIT RESOURCES OR A CENTRAL LOCATION.

F. BY THE ROUTES THAT MUST BE FLOWN THE DMZ MISSION AREAS ARE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME DISTANCE FROM PLEIKU AS FROM NKP.

G. IF WE WERE TO SPLIT THE AIR-38, BETWEEN NKP AND DANANG/PHU CAT, THE SECOND SET OF AGE COULD NOT BE DELIVERED IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO ACCOMPANY THE PROJECTED MOVES OR REQUIREMENTS. (REF PDR LOG/OPS 302355Z SEP).

H. GENERAL BROWN HAS STATED THAT HE DOES NOT WANT ANY PLEIKU ASSETS MOVED TO DANANG. *However this could change. JD*

I. CSAF STATED POSITION IS THAT AIR FORCE EC47 ASSETS IN THAILAND SHOULD BE BASED AT NKP VICE UDORN.

J. CAS, [REDACTED] AND MACV FAVOR BASING EC47 AIRCRAFT AT UDORN FOR BARREL ROLL SUPPORT TO CAS.

2. IN FULL CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE FACTORS LISTED ABOVE OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION IS TO AUGMENT THE CAT WITH THREE AIR-34 AIRCRAFT FROM TAN SON NHUT, MOVE THREE OF THE PRESENT PLEIKU AIR -35 AIRCRAFT TO TAN SON NHUT, THEN MOVE THE REST OF THE DETACHMENT TWO ASSETS TO NKP. THIS WOULD PUT 14 AIRCRAFT AT NKP WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY BE THE TEN AIR-38 PLUS FOUR AIR-35'S IN THE Q MODEL EC47'S. AT THIS POINT WE WOULD HAVE THAT ONE LOCATION FROM WHICH WE COULD SUPPORT BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER AND THE DMZ.

THE AIR-38'S AND THE Q MODEL AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE BEEN RETAINED AS A SINGLE MAINTENANCE ENTITY. THE EC-47C WILL BE PLACED IN OPTIMUM OPERATING POSITION. THE FOUR AIRCRAFT ADDED TO THE FNU CAT FLEET COULD SERVE TO WORK THOSE MISSIONS FRAGGED IN AREAS 8 AND 10. WE WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED A MERGER OF TWO DETACHMENTS WHICH WOULD OFFER LIMITED MANPOWER SAVINGS AND IN ADDITION WOULD OFFER A THREE UNIT SQUADRON VICE FOUR.

3. PERHAPS THE BIGGEST CONSIDERATION IS THAT ONCE PLACED AT NEP THIS PROPOSED SQUADRON WOULD HAVE THE DMZ AND STEEL TIGER AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE NUMBER OF MISSIONS WOULD PROBABLY CLOSELY EQUATE THOSE FLOWN INTO BARREL ROLL. THIS WOULD ESTABLISH A SOLID OPERATIONAL REASON FOR LOCATION AT NEP AND IN ADDITION WOULD PROTECT THE AIR STAFF POSITION OF LOCATING AT NEP VICE UDORN.

4. WE WOULD LIKE TO APPROACH 7AF WITH THIS PROPOSAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BEFORE FIRM PLANS ARE MADE. HOWEVER, WE WILL WITHHOLD ANY ACTION PENDING YOUR COMMENTS. PLEASE ADVISE.



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10

SUBJ: DISPOSITION OF ARDF ASSETS

1. AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF SEA ARDF REQUIREMENTS ALONG WITH THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS LOCATIONS TO POSITION THOSE ASSETS HAS JUST BEEN COMPLETED. THE PLANNED BOLSONAE OF PLEIKU IN DEC 69 AND INCREASED LAOTIAN COVERAGE ARE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WHICH CAUSED THIS REVIEW OF ARDF RESOURCES. THIS STUDY RECOGNIZES THE EVENTUAL ATTAINMENT OF 62 ARDF AIRCRAFT IN SEA 3 FIVE OF WHICH WILL BE HQA. OUR PRESENT ASSETS ARE 34 ALR 34, 10LR 33 AND 1 MINIMOD FOR A TOTAL OF 35 ACFT. UPON RECEIPT OF FIVE ALR 35 AND ONE ALR 34, ALONG WITH CONVERSION OF THREE MINIMOD AND TWO ALR 34'S TO ALR 35'S, WE WILL HAVE 35 ALR 34, 12 ALR 35 AND 18 ALR 34. FOR A TOTAL OF 63 ACFT OF WHICH 25 WILL BE 2 UNDEVELOPED. AS A RESULT WE RECOMMEND THE ARDF UNITS/ASSETS BE REALIGNED AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

- 1. DANANG, FIFTEEN ACFT: TEN ALR 35 ECAT/94 AND FIVE ALR 34 ECAT/94 ACFT.
- 2. TAN SON NHUT, EIGHTEEN ALR 34 ECAT/94 ACFT.
- 3. PHU CAT, SEVENTEEN ALR 34 ECAT/94 ACFT.
- 4. THAILAND, TWELVE ACFT: TWELVE ALR 35 ECAT/94.

2. THE ABOVE ALIGNMENT IS BASED ON OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND PERSONNEL. IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT USAFBS CANNOT SUPPORT MORE THAN FOUR SEPARATE LOCATIONS. THE ABOVE DISPOSITION OF RESOURCES WILL PROVIDE APPROX 50 PER CENT MORE TOL IN THE STEEL TIGER, DMZ, AND 1 CORP AREA WITH EITHER RESOURCES THAT IS NOT BEING PROVIDED IN THOSE AREAS BY PLEIKU BASED ACFT. SINCE APPROX 95 PERCENT OF THE VHF SIGNALS INTERCEPTED BY COMBAT 2 CORPS ACFT ARE TAKEN IN THE DMZ AND 1 CORP AREAS, WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ASSEMBLE ALL ALR 35 VHF ACFT ASSETS AT THE BASE CLOSEST TO THOSE TARGET AREAS FOR OPERATIONAL AS WELL AS SUPPORT MANAGEMENT.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT CONSIDERATION IS NOW BEING GIVEN TO THE LOCATION OF THE 18 ALR 35 ECAT/94 ACFT AT NKP WITH THE BALANCE OF 52 ACFT SPLIT BETWEEN PHU CAT AND TSN. THIS REALIGNMENT WILL NOT REPEAT NOT ENHANCE THE ARDF EFFORT. AS OUTLINED ABOVE, THE MAJORITY OF THE VHF MISSION IS IN THE DMZ/1 CORP AREA AND WE WOULD NOT REALIZE ANY LONG TOL FROM NKP THAN WE DO NOW FROM PLEIKU. THE REQUIREMENTS IN CENTRAL SVN CAN ADEQUATELY BE SUPPORTED FROM PHU CAT WITH 17 ACFT. TO FLY MISSIONS FROM PHU CAT IN THE DMZ, STEEL TIGER OR LAOS WILL BE LESS PRODUCTIVE BECAUSE OF LOSS IN FLYING TIME TO TARGET AREA. IN ADDITION WE WERE RECENTLY BRIEFED BY THE COMD ACR TRN THAT PHU CAT WILL HAVE CROSS WIND COMPONENT IN EXCESS OF 1000 OPERATION AT LEAST THREE MONTHS A YEAR. THEREFORE, WE CAN NOT AFFORD ADDITIONAL ACFT BEING OPERATED FROM THIS LOCATION.

4. WE ARE AWARE OF THE NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE LOCATIONS OF THE ARDF FLEET IN THAILAND AND AFTER EXTENSIVE STUDY/CONSIDERATION, OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ARE TO CONSOLIDATE OUR THAILAND RESOURCES AT ONE BASE, WITH EITHER UDORN OR NKP AS THE THAILAND ARDF LOCATION. WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO SATISFY CAS REQUIREMENTS IN LAOS

DISPOSITION OF ARDF ASSETS

AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF SEA ARDF REQUIREMENTS ALONG WITH THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS LOCATIONS TO POSITION THESE ASSETS HAS JUST BEEN COMPLETED. THE PLANNED CLOSURE OF FLEIKU IN DEC 69 AND INCREASED LAOTIAN COVERAGE ARE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WHICH CAUSED THIS REVIEW OF ARDF RESOURCES. THIS STUDY RECOGNIZES THE EVENTUAL ATTAINMENT OF 62 ARDF AIRCRAFT IN SEA FIVE OF WHICH WILL BE NGA. OUR PRESENT ASSETS ARE 50 ALR 34, 19LR 35 AND 3 MINIMOO FOR A TOTAL OF 53 ACFT. UPON RECEIPT OF FIVE ALR 35 AND ONE ALR 34, ALONG WITH CONVERSION OF THREE MINIMOO AND TWO ALR 31'S TO ALR 35'S, WE WILL HAVE 54 ALR 34, 17 ALR 35 AND 19 ALR 35, FOR A TOTAL OF 62 ACFT ON WHICH 57 WILL BE 2 CONFIGURED. AS A RESULT WE RECOMMEND THE ARDF UNITS/ASSETS BE REALIGNED AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

- 1. THE INDICATED NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AND CONFIGURATIONS:
  - A. DANANG, FIFTEEN ACFT: TEN ALR 35 COA720 AND FIVE ALR 35 COA71/P ACFT.
  - B. TAN SON NHUT, EIGHTEEN ALR 35 CO 47N/P ACFT.
  - C. PHU CAT, SEVENTEEN ALR 35 CO 47N/P ACFT.
  - D. THAILAND, TWELVE ACFT: TWELVE ALR 35 COA7 N/P.

2. THE ABOVE ALIGNMENT IS BASED ON OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND PERSONNEL. IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT USAFSS CANNOT SUPPORT MORE THAN FOUR SEPARATE LOCATIONS. THE ABOVE DISPOSITION OF RESOURCES WILL PROVIDE APPROX 58 PER CENT MORE TOT IN THE STEEL TIGER, DMZ, AND 1 CORP AREA WITH FEWER RESOURCES THAN IS NOW BEING PROVIDED IN THOSE AREAS BY FLEIKU BASED ACFT. SINCE APPROX 90 PERCENT OF THE VHF SIGNALS INTERCEPTED BY COMBAT AIRCRAFT ARE TAKEN IN THE DMZ AND 1 CORP AREAS, WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ASSEMBLE ALL ALR 35 (VHF ARDF) ASSETS AT THE BASE CLOSEST TO THOSE TARGET AREAS FOR OPERATIONAL AS WELL AS SUPPORT MANAGEMENT.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT CONSIDERATION IS NOW BEING GIVEN TO THE LOCATION OF THE 10 ALR 35 COA720 ACFT AT NKP WITH THE BALANCE OF 50 ACFT SPLIT BETWEEN PHU CAT AND TSN. THIS REALIGNMENT WILL NOT REPEAT NOR ENHANCE THE ARDF EFFORT. AS OUTLINED ABOVE, THE MAJORITY OF THE VHF MISSION IS IN THE DMZ/1 CORP AREA AND WE WOULD NOT REALIZE ANY MORE TOT FROM NKP THAN WE DO NOW FROM FLEIKU. THE REQUIREMENTS IN CENTRAL SVN CAN ADEQUATELY BE SUPPORTED FROM PHU CAT WITH 17 ACFT. TO FLY MISSIONS FROM PHU CAT IN THE DMZ, STEEL TIGER OR LABS WILL BE LESS PRODUCTIVE BECAUSE OF LOSS IN FLYING TIME TO TARGET AREA. IN ADDITION WE WERE RECENTLY BRIEFED BY THE COMAR 463 TRS THAT PHU CAT WILL HAVE CROSS WIND COMPONENT IN EXCESS OF COA7 OPERATION AT LEAST THREE MONTHS A YEAR. THEREFORE, WE CAN NOT AFFORD ADDITIONAL ACFT BEING OPERATED FROM THIS LOCATION.

62  
27  
35

4. WE ARE AWARE OF THE NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE LOCATIONS OF THE ARDF FLEET IN THAILAND AND AFTER EXTENSIVE STUDY/CONSIDERATION, OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ARE TO CONSOLIDATE OUR THAILAND RESOURCES AT ONE BASE, WITH EITHER UDORN OR NKP AS THE THAILAND ARDF LOCATION. WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO SATISFY GAV REQUIREMENTS IN LABS AND TAP/DAOV/MAOT REQUIREMENTS IN NORTHERN THAILAND AND THE STEEL TIGER AREA.

5. WE SOLICIT YOUR SUPPORT IN THE STAGING OF ARDF AIRCRAFT AS OUTLINED IN PARA 3 ABOVE. REQUEST YOU KEEP US ADVISED OF YOUR ACTION.

Lt Colonel Johnson (OP8/4891)

Report of TDY Visit

about  
2 Oct 67

11

Commander

1. Purpose of Visit. To represent 6994 Security Squadron at a [REDACTED] ARDF Conference.

2. Names of Attendees. Lt Colonel James W. Johnson Jr.

3. Personnel Contacted.

[REDACTED]

AMEMB SAIGON

Mr. Spigner

7/13th AF

Col Wootton  
Maj Beaver

MACTHAI J-2

Col Smith  
Capt Kerr

ARMA VIENTIANE

LTC Duskin  
Maj Durant

MACV J2114-4

L  
Lt Col Dearer  
Capt Layman

83RD RR SQ

LTC ULMEN

[REDACTED]

6994TH SCTY SQ

LTC Johnson  
Maj Borff  
Capt Wheeler

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

CUSASAPAC

LTC GARRANT

7th AF

Maj Kagarise  
Capt Lombardi  
Capt Krebs

No 0463390

Mr. Devlin  
Mr. Weber  
Mr. Ross

7th BRFS

Maj Swift  
WO1 Sanderson

AMEMB BANGKOK

Mr. Cooper

509th RR GP

CW4 Newell

[REDACTED]

FILE COPY



[REDACTED] and was  
4. Comments. This conference was called by [REDACTED] and was chaired by Mr Dal Lang of that organization.

After all introductions the floor was given to representatives of MACV J2114, he then undertook, for the benefit of CAS Udorn and CAS Vientiane attendees, a description of the Tasking procedures presently used in SVN by MACV. The explanation was primarily aimed at the value of the SVN system as compared to the system currently being used in Laos. The main point of the J2114 pitch was that good, bad or indifferent there was a system in South Vietnam and single management was mandatory to ensure that CAS got all that they should. His point was that CAS Vientiane should accept the current MACV system and become a part of it. The J2 representative pointed out that change proposals could be entertained at some later date but that entry into the system was the main point at this time.

Mr. Devlin (CAS Vientiane) took the floor and concluded that he had the distinct impression that he was being told what he would have and not being asked. He finally accepted that and said he would reluctantly go along with the proposal. CAS has continually advocated their having operational control. In fact another strong pitch was made later in the day. The first session was adjourned and regrouped after lunch. It was during the afternoon session that the subjects of (1) The 5th Acft at MR (2) Move of Comando Forge to Udorn (3) OPS GCM to CAS, came up. These were addressed with considerable emotion and these topics carried on through the next day.

These discussions came to no conclusions, but did expose the direction and magnitude of the feelings on these subjects.

Mr. Devlin CAS Vientiane definitely feels he is being slighted. He expressed that he had justified a fourth and fifth aircraft and that five had been approved but he is only getting four. He did not care about NKP's inability to support them; he stated that he wanted them at Udorn anyway. At this time NKP, [REDACTED] ASA REP and MACV joined him in agreeing that Udorn was the place for the aircraft to be. It was then that a proposed move to Udorn was discussed and when the 7AF rep pointed out post hostilities planning, Mr Devlin assured everyone that Udorn Air Base was going to stay. After this discussion, CAS Udorn (Mr Ross and Mr Weber) made a long and plaintif plea for operational control of the aircraft. They feel that they need more control so they can use the resources to the best flexible tactical advantage. They expressed the basic desire for management data, i.e., if they got no fixes from a given area where an acft was fraged, did this mean the acft did not fly or that it flew and achieved no fixes. Strangely enough no one can presently offer that answer. This seemed to drive home MACV's point that once under their system with daily reporting of mission accomplishments, they (J2) could provide the type information that CAS wants.

Prior to adjourning the meeting a representative of the American Embassy was invited to speak to us relative to the US-THAI relations as they effect our troop and aircraft ceilings. The most significant point made was that the four top Thai political posts are friendly to the U.S. and are most cooperative but their opposition is continually attempting to demonstrate that Americans are allowed to use Thailand in any way they desire with impunity. They attempt to prove this by finding instances of troops or

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

American activities in country of which these people are not aware of. So American Embassy Bangkok must be very careful to keep these people informed. Since each day to day detail would be a communication burden, a continual evaluation of what is necessary to pass to them is being made. Occasionally, after the fact, it may be found that information should have been passed and wasn't, the case of the 4th aircraft at NIP was an example. It was allowed in by the Thai Gov't for one week, the American Ambassador took the liberty of extending it another week. Later, as he was attempting to get approval for another extended period, he found that the aircraft and crew were still in country and it became necessary to remove it even while attempting to get it back in country.

the second point that was made was that if we desire further TDY aircraft, we should plan as far in advance as possible and let them know so that permission can be properly and leisurely obtained.

Shortly thereafter the conference was adjourned.

I made no agreements or commitments for security service or the 699th Security Squadron during this conference.

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF  
Operations Officer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ARDF CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

FRIDAY - 5 SEPTEMBER

- 0700 - BUS PICK-UP AT CHAO PHYA (SKING BY IMPERIAL HOTEL)
- 0810 - CONFEREES TO MAC THAI J2 CONFERENCE ROOM 2-101
- 0815 - INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND OPENING OF ARDF CONFERENCE BY CHAIRMAN (MR. LANG) - OVERVIEWS OF AGENDA AND AGENDA ITEMS DESIRED
- 0930 - 0920 PRESENTATION OF AGENDA ITEM ALFA (MACV J211-4)
- 0920 - 0930 BREAK
- 0930 - 1020 DISCUSSIONS OF AGENDA ITEMS ALFA
- 1020 - 1030 BREAK
- 1030 - 1100 MACV RECAP AGENDA ITEM ALFA
- 1100 - 1130 CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS ON AGENDA ITEM ALFA
- 1130 - LUNCH (JUSMAG COMPOUND - GOLDEN TEAK)
- 1300 - RESUME CONFERENCE
- 1300 - 1350 AGENDA ITEM BRAVO
- 1350 - 1400 BREAK
- 1400 - 1450 AGENDA ITEM CHARLIE
- 1450 - 1500 BREAK
- 1500 - 1550 AGENDA ITEM DELTA
- 1550 - 1600 BREAK
- 1600 - 1630 AGENDA ITEM ECHO
- 1630 - 1645 BUS DEPARTS JUSMAG COMPOUND FOR HOTELS
- 1830 - 2030 COCKTAILS/DRINKS AND LIGHT SNACK - CHAO PHYA HOTEL (PAY AS YOU GO BAR - TWENTY-FIVE CLINTS A DRINK)

ARDF CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

SATURDAY - 6 SEPTEMBER

0700 - BUS PICK-UP AT CHAO PHYA HOTEL

0810 - 0900 RESUME CONFERENCE NACTHAI J2 CONFERENCE ROOM - AGENDA ITEM FOX-TROT

0900 - 0910 BREAK

0910 - 1000 AGENDA ITEM GOLF

1000 - 1010 BREAK

1010 - 1115 AGENDA ITEM HOTEL

1115 - LUNCH (JUSNAG COMPOUND - GOLDEN LEAF)


1245 - 1400 RESUME CONFERENCE - OPEN FOR ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION OF ARDF PROCEDURES/REQUIREMENTS - RESUME OF AGENDA AND ITEMS NOT DISCUSSED IN ENOUGH DETAIL OR NEEDING EXPANSION

1400 - 1410 BREAK

1410 - 1530 CONFERENCE SUMMARIZATION/ACCOMPLISHMENTS/CLOSING REMARKS

1530 - 1545 BUS DEPARTS JUSNAG COMPOUND FOR HOTELS

ARDF CONFERENCE ATTENDEES




MACTHAI J-2

COL SMITH  
CAPT KERR

MACV J211-4

LTC BOERER  
CAPT LAYMAN



CUSASAPAC

LTC GARRANT

AMEMB VIENTIANE

MR. DEVLIN  
MR. WEBER  
MR. ROSS

AMEMB BANGKOK

MR. COOPER

AMEMB SAIGON

MR. SPIGNER

7/13TH AF

COL WOOTEN  
MAJ BEAVER

ARVA VIENTIANE

LTC BURNIN  
MAJ DURANT

53RD BRSQU

LTC ULLEN

698TH SQTY SQDN

LTC JOHNSON  
MAJ WOFFET  
CAPT WHEELER

7TH AF

MAJ KAGROUSE  
CAPT LONTARRE  
CAPT KERR

7TH RPTS

MAJ SWIFT  
WO1 SANDERSON

505TH BN CP

CM4 PISSELE

NRN2000DC300  
FM 75220Z  
FM YMZADL #2 228023Z  
P 160250Z  
FM 6922SOTYWG  
TO 6924SOTYSO/CDR  
ZEM

SUBJECT DOCUMENT

104  
15 Aug 69 05 37z

CDR  
12  
Policy


SUBJECT: ARDF FOR SEA  
REF OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION OF 15 AUG 69, THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE  
WAS FORWARDED TO PACSOTYRGN/CDR ON 15 AUG 69. QUOTE


"SUBJECT: ARDF FOR SEA  
THERE IS ONE POINT IN THE ARDF PROBLEM THAT NEEDS CLARIFICATION AND  
THAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE AIRCRAFT AND THE CMA. PRACTICALLY  
EVERY MESSAGE DEALING WITH CURRENT PROBLEM OF IDENT RATES AND  
EFFECTIVENESS STATES PROBLEM COULD BE RESOLVED BY THE CO-LOCATION  
OF THE AIRCRAFT AND CMA, YET IN SOUTH VIETNAM TODAY WE CANNOT FIND  
WHERE A SINGLE AIRCRAFT IS PERMANENTLY CO-LOCATED WITH CMA  
(EITHER ARMY OR AIR FORCE). HAVE INFORMAL INFO THERE ARE APPROX  
100 PLUS SUCH AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED. THIS PROVIDES SOME INDICATION THE  
ARMY DID NOT CONSIDER SUCH DEPLOYMENT ESSENTIAL IN THEIR ARDF/  
AIRBORN COLLECTION PROGRAMMING. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE 6994TH AT  
TAN SON KHUT IS SOME 15 MILES FROM THE CMA WHICH IS LOCATED AT  
BIEN HOA. ALL THE OTHER STATIONS ARE ALMOST THE SAME AS NEAR AS  
CMA DETERMINE. EVEN IF THE NKP EFFORT WERE TO BE RELOCATED TO  
UDORN THE AIRCRAFT WOULD STILL BE SEPARATED APPROX 10 MILES FROM  
THE CMA AT USM-7. BELIEVE THIS POINT IS VERY IMPORTANT BECAUSE  
IF THE PRINCIPLE OF AIRCRAFT AND CMA CO-LOCATION IS RECOGNIZED BE-  
LIEVE IT WILL REDUCE OUR UNIT MISSION TO ONE OF PURE ARDF AND ELIM-  
INATE ENTIRELY THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY TO DO THE  
VITAL FIRST ECHELON ANALYSIS AND REPORTING. THIS IS CONFIRMED IN  
PART 3 OF DIRNSA MSG 86-222, 120122Z AUG (TRANSMITTED TO PSR  
OPS BY 6994SS 0500 140515Z AUG). UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS  
THERE AN ARGUMENT THAT USAFSS TAKE OVER THE CMA FUNCTION; HOWEVER,  
BELIEVE THAT TASKING AND RESPONSIBILITY RELATIONSHIP OF THE CMA UNIT  
SHOULD BE EXACTLY AS THEY ARE IN ANY OTHER COMINT STATION. AS AN  
EXAMPLE, IF DET 3, 6994 SS IS RELOCATED FROM NKP TO UDORN OR IF  
AN ARDF UNIT IS ESTABLISHED AT UDORN, IT SHOULD BE A COMPLETE SITE  
WITH A USA NUMBER LOCATED ON UDORN AIR BASE RATHER THAN ANY  
CONSOLIDATION WITH USA 29/USM 7 AT BAKASUN STATION. REQUIRE-  
MENTS OF CMA WITH RESPECT TO FORWARDING OF INFORMATION CAN BE  
ACCOMMODATED IN SAME MANNER AS GROUND INTERCEPT SITE, I.E.  
ELECTRICAL FORWARDING OF PERISHABLE AND COURIER FOR ROUTINE. SAME  
PRINCIPLE WOULD BE APPLIED TO ANY OF THE OTHER RELOCATIONS OF ARDF  
UNITS NOW BEING CONSIDERED. IF THIS TYPE UNIT INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED,  
THE NEED AND RESPONSIBILITY TO DO FIRST ECHELON ANALYSIS AND REPORTING  
WILL BE INHERENT IN THE USAFSS STRUCTURE AND WE WILL BE ABLE TO  
DEVELOP THE REQUIRED EXPERTISE IN THIS AREA. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU  
CONCUR AND THIS POINT WILL BE CONSIDERED IN ALL DISCUSSION AND  
PLANNING EFFORTS IN THE FUTURE." UNQUOTE. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTED

FOR YOUR INFO QUOTE  
P 152540Z  
FM PACSOTYRGN  
TO 6922SOTYWG/CDR/  
ZEM


*Col Johnson - pls perform  
CMA to det's & log own  
para of this position. Requests  
Wing to me. CDR*


SUBJECT: ARDF FOR SEA  
REF YOUR CDR 75220Z AUG 69 (DTG GARBLED).  
WE WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT RATIONALE YOU HAVE PRESENTED.  
SOLICIT YOUR CONTINUED ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN CURRENT  
DISCUSSIONS OF THIS VITAL SUBJECT TO ENSURE FULL CONSID-  
ERATION OF USAFSS VIEWS POSITION. BELIEVE FACTORS CURRENT-  
LY UNDER STUDY BY JAF NAKY ET AL WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT











SECRET 14

14

MINNOCZCRDA371  
PP YMRDR  
DE YHLAKZ 29 269040  
P 260332Z  
FM PAOSCTYRGN  
TO 69228W/CDR  
INFO 6994SS/CDR/SLO



26 SEP 69 09 52z

169

Coe Johnson -  
Consider this as  
policy  
D&P

SUBJ: A. 69228W CDR 190219Z SEP 69  
REF: A. B. 6994SS SLO 170430Z SEP 69.

1. BELIEVE THE 7AF POSITION AS PORTRAYED BY SSLO IS DESIRABLE COURSE OF ACTION. OUR OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE TO PLACE ARDF RESOURCES WHERE THEY CAN BEST FULFILL THE MACV STATED REQUIREMENTS. APPEARS THAT TO ACCOMPLISH THIS GOAL IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT CAPABILITY BE ESTABLISHED AT TAN SON NHUT, PHU CAT, DANANG, NKP AND EVENTUALLY EVEN POSSIBLY UDORN. THE CAPABILITIES OF THE EC-47 DICTATE LOCATING AT THESE BASES IN ORDER TO BEST COVER TARGET AREAS.
2. BELIEVE THAT 7AF BASES WILL BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR ON WHERE AIRCRAFT CAN BEST BE LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTED. HOWEVER, IF FACILITIES WERE AVAILABLE AT A CMA BASE WE WOULD BE HARD PRESSED NOT TO COLLOCATE AS LONG AS WE MAINTAIN UNIT INTEGRITY WITH REPORTING CAPABILITY AND USA DESIGNATOR.
3. SINCE 7AF HAS TAKEN A MUCH STRONGER POSITION IN RUNNING ARDF BELIEVE IT BEHOVES ALL CONCERNED TO SUPPORT THEIR POSITION.

CDR  
SSA

280



SUPPORT DOCUMENTS

OPS-1  
2R

15

ROUTINE

6994SCTYSQ

30/0805 Z

6922SCTYWC

INFO: PACSOTIRGN

[REDACTED]

AUG 69.

REF PSR MSG OPS 280500Z AUG.

SUBJ: ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT AT NKP.

PSR MSG REFERENCED ABOVE AUTHORIZED US TO SUPPORT THE MOVE OF THE FOURTH AIRCRAFT TO NKP IF BOTH CRYPTOLOGIC AND PROGRAM VI CEILINGS WERE RAISED. WE HAVE MSG CONFIRMATION FROM [REDACTED] INCREASING CRYPTOLOGIC CEILING BY NINE SPACES AS REQUESTED, HOWEVER, 7AF DPL ADVISES THAT 13AF VERBALLY ASSUMES THAT APPROVAL OF ACFT ENTRY INCLUDED APPROVAL OF PEOPLE AND STATES THAT TDY IN THAILAND CONSTITUTES NO CEILING PROBLEM UNDER PROGRAM VI. REQUEST YOUR HQ COORDINATE WITH 13AF AND CONFIRM THAT WE ARE, IN FACT, AUTHORIZED TO INCREASE PRESENT PROGRAM VI CEILING BY NINE SPACES. PLEASE ADVISE.

30

AUG 1969

1

1


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
LT COL JOHNSON


[REDACTED]

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF  
Communications Officer

[REDACTED]







SUPPORT DOCUMENT 18

18

File  
200

9m

PRIORITY

699430TY8Q

14/0710 Z

INFO: 692230TYW6 CLARK AB PHIL

PACDOTIDEN WHEELER AFB HAWAII

NRV

AFSSO 7AF (MESSENGER)

13AF CLARK AB PHIL

ZEN: Det 3, 699430TY8Q

File

OCT 69.

REF 380 MACV MSG MAC13288 INTEL 122342Z OCT 69. SUBJ: MOVE OF  
ADDITIONAL RC47'S PGS TO THAILAND.

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 3 OF REF MSG, REQUEST YOU OBTAIN A PERME-  
NANT CRYPTOLOGIC INCREASE OF 20 SPACES ABOVE OUR PRESENT CEILING OF  
54 SPACES. WE PRESENTLY HAVE A PERMANENT CEILING OF 54, PLUS A  
RECOGNIZING TBY OF 5 SPACES AND WHEN WE SENT THE FOURTH AIRCRAFT TDY  
WE RECEIVED APPROVAL FOR A TEMPORARY INCREASE OF NINE SPACES. GIVING  
US A CURRENT TOTAL IN-COUNTRY CEILING OF 68 SPACES.

2. THE NINE TEMPORARY SPACES ARE DUE TO EXPIRE on 27 DEC 69. THE

14

OCT

1969

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1891

LT COL JOHNSON

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF  
Operations Officer







PRIORITY


ACTION REQUESTED WHEN APPROVAL WOULD CONSIDER THE RECURRING AND TEMPORARY TEST'S AND CREATE A NEW CRYPTOLOGIC BILLING OF SEVENTY-FOUR (74) SPACES. THIS IS THE TOTAL REQUIRED TO OPERATE FIVE (5) AGPT ON A SUSTAINED BASIS. UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED WE WILL ASSUME THAT YOU ARE OBTAINING BOTH PROGRAM VI AND CRYPTOLOGIC HEADROOM SPACE INCREASES. 88

3. WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE 74 SPACES REQUESTED ABOVE ARE CRYPTOLOGIC SPACES FOR WRAFS PERSONNEL AND DO NOT INCLUDE "FRONT-END" AIRCRAFTS.

4. FOR OPTIMUM PLANNING REQUEST EARLIEST POSSIBLE REPLY.







PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

1. THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO A FINAL DRAFT FOR COORDINATION WITH MACV J2/C0509TH RR GP, CO 6994TH SS, [REDACTED] VIETNAM AND 7TH AF.

3. REQUEST INFORMAL WRITTEN COMMENTS ON THE ATTACHED TO BE PROVIDED MACV J211 NLT 2 SEPT 69.

END QUOTE

QUOTE (OF ATTACHED)

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS CENTER

I GENERAL

1. THE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS CENTER (JSOC) IS ESTABLISHED IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO PROVIDE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND (COMUSMACV), SUBORDINATE COMMANDS, AND AUTHORIZED NON-DOD ACTIVITIES ON MATTERS RELATED TO THEIR MISSIONS AS DEFINED IN MACV DIR 381-23. THESE TERMS OF REFERENCE HAVE BEEN COORDINATED WITH CO, 509TH RRGP, CDR 6994TH SS AND [REDACTED]

2. THESE TERMS OF REFERENCE WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL PROMULGATION OF AN APPROPRIATE OPINS FOR THE JSOC.

3. THE DIRECTIVES PROMULGATED FOR THE DIRECTION AND OPERATION OF THE MACV CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE PROGRAMS, AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNITY, WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL SUPERSEDED BY AN APPROPRIATE TECHINS. SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVES, ADDRESSED TO NON-CRYPTOLOGIC UNITS WILL CONTINUE TO BE PUBLISHED BY MACV.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	6	[REDACTED]	
GRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SE [REDACTED]	

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM  
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

II. ACCREDITATION

4. JSOC IS ACCREDITED TO COMUSMACV.
5. THE JSOC IS A JOINT OPERATION UNDER THE DIRECTION AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MACV J2.
6. THE JSOC IS DESIGNATED A JOINT CRYPTOLOGIC ACTIVITY BY DIRNSA AND ASSIGNED THE CRYPTOLOGIC UNIT DESIGNATOR USJ.
7. THE JSOC WILL CONSIST OF AN OIC, A DEPUTY OIC, AND SUCH OTHER OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL AS MAY BE DETERMINED JOINTLY BY MACV J2, 509TH RRGP AND 6994TH SS.
8. THE JSOC IS MANNED JOINTLY BY PERSONNEL OF THE 509TH RRGP, AND 6994TH SS. WHERE POSSIBLE A BALANCE OF STRENGTH BETWEEN SERVICES WILL BE MAINTAINED.
9. NSA WILL ASSIGN TECHNICAL ADVISORS TO JSOC IN THE NUMBER AND SKILLS REQUESTED BY MACV J2 AND APPROVED BY NSA. NSA PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO JSOC WILL BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND RATED BY THE OIC, JSOC.
10. THE BILLET OF OIC WILL BE FILLED ON A 6 MONTH ROTATING BASIS BY 509TH RRGP AND 6994TH SS. NOMINEES WILL BE SELECTED AND PRESENTED TO MACV J2 30 DAYS PRIOR TO ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES. DURING HIS TENURE, THE OIC WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF, AND RATED BY J2. THE DEPUTY OIC WILL BE ROTATED ON THE SAME BASIS AND WILL BE FROM THE UNIT NOT FURNISHING THE OIC.
11. JSOC PERSONNEL WILL REMAIN ASSIGNED TO, AND UNDER THE COMMAND OF, THEIR PARENT UNIT. JSOC PERSONNEL ARE AVAILABLE FOR NECESSARY

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 3	NO. OF PAGES 6	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
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REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM  
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

DEFENSE/FATIGUE DUTIES WITH THEIR PARENT UNIT, HOWEVER OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT WILL TAKE PRECEDENCE.

12. ALL PUBLICATIONS, DIRECTIVE IN NATURE, THAT ARE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE JSOC WILL BE PREPARED BY JSOC, COORDINATED IN DRAFT FORM WITH MACV J2 AND ISSUED IN THE MACV DIR 381-SERIES. INTERNAL WORKING AIDS WILL BE ISSUED BY THE OIC, JSOC.

IV- MISSION

13. THE MISSION OF JSOC IS TO ASSIST MACV J2 IN THE FULFILLMENT OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN REGARDS TO AIRBORNE COLLECTION AND ARDF MANAGEMENT. IN PARTICULAR, JSOC WILL:

- A. BASED ON CONSUMER REQUIREMENTS AND STATED PFI, SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AIRBORNE TASKING TO MACV J2.
- B. IMPLEMENT AIRBORNE TASKING.
- C. PERFORM EVALUATIONS AND STUDIES NECESSARY FOR MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS AND UTILIZATION OF MACV CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE RESOURCES, AND OTHER CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE RESOURCES WITHIN MACV AREA OF INTEREST AND AS DIRECTED BY MACV J2.
- D. DIRECT AND EVALUATE THE USE OF OPSCOM CIRCUITS AND AIR TO GROUND SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMMED/UTILIZED IN SUPPORT OF THE MACV CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE EFFORT.

V- FUNCTIONS

14. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JSOC ARE TO:

- A. BASED ON PREPLANNED REQUESTS FROM FIELD COMMANDERS, THE CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNITY AND OTHER AUTHORIZED AGENCIES, SUBMIT RECOMMENDED

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		4	6		

DEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS



ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM  
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAWN BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

ASKING FOR MACV J2 APPROVAL.

- B. IMPLEMENT PREPLANNED TASKING OF AIRBORNE RESOURCES AS DIRECTED BY MACV J2.
- C. APPROVE AND IMPLEMENT EMERGENCY CHANGES TO PREPLANNED TASKING IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING MACV DIRECTIVES.
- D. PERFORM EVALUATIONS OF CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES IN CONJUNCTION WITH, AND THE ASSISTANCE OF, DIPNSA [REDACTED].
- E. OPERATE OPSCOM CIRCUITS, AS REQUIRED, WITH CRYPTOLOGIC/AVIATION UNITS AS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE AIRBORNE COLLECTION AND ARDF PROGRAMS.
- F. PERFORM EVALUATIONS ON EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURE AIR TO GROUND COMMUNICATIONS UTILIZED BY CRYPTOLOGIC UNITS IN SEA IN SUPPORT OF THE CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE PROGRAMS.
- G. ADVISE, AND ASSIST CRYPTOLOGIC AND AVIATION UNITS ON SECURE COMMUNICATIONS RELATED TO CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE PROGRAMS.
- H. PREPARE FOR MACV J2 RELEASE, THOSE DIRECTIVES NECESSARY TO OPERATE ALL PHASES OF THE AIRBORNE COLLECTION AND ARDF PROGRAMS.
- I. ORGANIZE, AND PRESENT PROPOSED TASKING TO THE WEEKLY TASKING COMMITTEE MEETING.
- J. ORGANIZE AND CHAIR THE QUARTERLY ARDF/AIRBORNE COLLECTION CONFERENCE.
- K. CONDUCT SPECIAL BRIEFINGS ON THE ARDF/AIRBORNE COLLECTION PROGRAMS AS REQUIRED BY MACV J2.



CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		5	6		
DEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				[REDACTED]	



PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

L. PERFORM FREQUENT TECHNICAL LIAISON VISITS TO THE CMA'S AND AVIATION UNITS TO INSURE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE OPERATIONS.

M. ADVISE MACV J2 ON ALL MATTERS RELATING TO THE MACV CRYPTOLOGIC AIRBORNE PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES. RECOMMEND NECESSARY ACTIONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THESE PROGRAMS, UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES, AND THE SATISFACTION OF THESE PROGRAMS.


VI. ORGANIZATION AND SUPPORT

15. THE JSOC WILL BE ORGANIZED FUNCTIONALLY AS P COMENDED BY THE OIC, JSOC AND APPROVED BY MACV J2.

16. EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED IN PARA 8 ABOVE, ASSIGNMENTS OF PERSONNEL WITHIN THE JSOC WILL BE MADE ON A BASIS OF MISSION AND QUALIFICATIONS, AND THE RANKING MEMBER OF ANY ELEMENT WILL BE THE OIC/NCOIC. WHERE FEASIBLE, INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS WILL ALSO REFLECT A BALANCE BETWEEN SERVICES. EXCEPT FOR THE OIC AND D/OIC, ALL INTERNAL ASSIGNMENTS WILL BE MADE BY THE OIC, JSOC.

END QUOTE.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
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ZOZCRD854U  
YRDR  
DE YHAKZ 2 237657d  
P 140650Z  
FM PACSOTYRON  
TO 6994 SOTY SC/DMDR/SSLO  
INFO 6922 SOTY MCA/DMDR/OPS  
ZEM

11 9 21  
22

SUBJ: ACC REORGANIZATION  
REFS: A. NY OPS 300325Z AUG 69.  
B. 6994SS SSLO 290745Z AUG 69.  
C. USAFSS 003 261947Z NOV 68.

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE THIS HQ'S COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS CENTER. REFERENCED BELOW RELATE TO PARA 3, REF BRAVO.
  - A. REQUEST YOU ATTEMPT TO HAVE THE TERM JOINT ELIMINATED FROM THE NEW FUNCTIONAL TITLE. YOU WILL RECALL OCG CONCERN OVER THE USE OF THIS TERM IN REFERENCE TO THE ACC AND HIS EXPRESSED DESIRE THAT ALL ACTIONS BE DIRECTED TOWARD MAINTAINING THE "COLLOCATED" STATUS OF EQUAL ARMY/AIR FORCE ELEMENTS AND ELIMINATION OF ANY CONNOTATIONS OF "JOINT" OPERATIONS. (REF CHARLIE REFERS).
  - B. REFERENCE SECTION 11 - ACCREDITATION, PARA 6: DO NOT CONCUR WITH ASSIGNING A CRYPTOLOGIC UNIT DESIGNATOR TO THE ACC (JSPO). THIS ACTION WOULD LESSEN THE EFFECTIVENESS AS A OPERATION ACCREDITED TO, AND UNDER THE DIRECTION AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MACV J2. IT WOULD PLACE NSA IN A PREDOMINANT POSITION TO INTERFERE OF MACV PREROGATIVES IN THE DIRECTION OF TACTICAL SUPPORT TO COMMANDERS UNDER THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF MACV.
  - C. REF PARA 8: WHILE WE CONCUR THAT A BALANCE OF STRENGTH IS DESIRABLE, IT MUST BE REALIZED THAT THIS REQUIRES AN INCREASE IN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE ACC. IN VIEW OF THE LENGTHY PROCESS ENCOUNTERED WITH SV HEADROOM, THIS INCREASE WOULD MOST LIKELY BE SATISFIED WITH EXISTING RESOURCES AND AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER 6994TH REQUIREMENTS. IF THE ACC OVERALL STRENGTH IS TO REMAIN CONSISTENT WITH PRESENT LEVELS, THE ARMY WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS CURRENT STRENGTH IN PROPORTION TO THE NUMBERS OF AIR FORCE INCREASES. HOWEVER, AF PARTICIPATION MAY HAVE LITTLE MEANING IF NSA WERE TO GAIN A PREDOMINANT ROLE IN ACC OPERATIONS AS OUTLINED IN OUR COMMENTS TO PARA 6 ABOVE.
  - D. REF PARAS 10 AND 11: THESE PARAS ARE NOT COMPATIBLE IF THE DIO OF THE JSPO (ACC) IS TO BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THEIR PARENT UNIT (PARA 11), WHICH HE SHOULD BE, AND ALSO RATED BY MACV J2 (PARA 10). DO NOT CONCUR THAT MACV J2 RATES THE DIO.
  - E. REF SECTION 11 - MISSION: IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT BY AIRBORNE COLLECTION WE ARE REFERRING TO THOSE AIRBORNE PLATFORMS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE USIC (ACC). THIS SAME CLARIFICATION WOULD ENHANCE SECTION 11 FUNCTIONS, PARA 6.
  - F. REF SECTION 11 - FUNCTIONS, PARAS D AND L: THE EXTENT OF EVALUATION NEEDS CLARIFICATION. THERE IS A CONTINUING PROGRAM TO EVALUATE UNIT PERFORMANCE AND MISSION EFFECTIVENESS WITHIN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND OF THE 6994SS. THESE PROCEDURES ARE INHERENT TO THE COMMAND AUTHORITY OF USAFSS ORGANIZATIONS. SUCH A FUNCTION BEING PERFORMED BY THE JSOC (ACC) WOULD DUPLICATE THAT BEING ACCOMPLISHED. PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN THESE TWO PARAS WOULD USURP PREROGATIVES OF THE COMMANDERS OF 6994SS, PACSOTYRON, AND USAFSS.
2. WE SEE NO MENTION OF ZAF PARTICIPATION IN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE. AS THE OPERATING AGENCY FOR THE AIR FORCE ARDF PROGRAM IN SEA, ZAF PARTICIPATION IS A NECESSITY. AS WRITTEN PERSONNEL NOT IN COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF AIRFRAME PROCEDURES COULD CAUSE CONFUSION AND CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE AIRCRAFT OPERATOR. SINCE ZAF HAS SHOWN AN INCREASED INTEREST IN MANAGEMENT OF AF ARDF, THEY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN JSOC (ACC) OPERATIONS.
3. THE INTENT OF THE REORGANIZATION APPEARS TO BE TO INCREASE DIRECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY OF WHAT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST A COORDINATING BODY. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE ORGANIZATION DOES HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES DIRECTIVE IN NATURE; HOWEVER, IT IS STILL ONLY A COORDINATING BODY. THOSE DIRECTIVES IT DOES ISSUE ARE A RESULT OF ARMY/AIR FORCE COORDINATION. THE SUBTLE CHANGE OF THE ACC TO A JSOC AND THE APPARENT INTENT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT COULD LEAD TO INCREASED LOSS OF COORDINATION AND CHANGES IN DIRECTION AND DIRECTIVES EVERY 6 MONTHS AS DIO ROTATES FROM ARMY TO AIR FORCE. MUST EMPHASIZE WE FEEL THE ACC BODY IS A COORDINATING BODY AND ALL FUNCTIONS BEST IN THAT ROLE AND SHOULD NOT BE DEVELOPED AS JOINT OPERATIONAL BODY.

15 13500

SUPPORT DOCUMENT 23



301

23

OPS  
JCH

95  
88  
560  
[initials]

PRIORITY

69945CTISQ

69235CTIAG

[Redacted] SEP 69

SUBJ: DISCUSSION OF CURRENT ACC SITUATION.

- REFS: A. 6994/SBL 290545Z AUG 69.
- B. PSR OPS 140630Z AUG 69.
- C. 6994 OPS 220935Z SEP 69.
- D. PSR COM 240757Z SEP 69.

1. AFTER A REVIEW HERE OF ALL MSGS REFERRED ON THE SUBJECT AND THE VIEW THAT OUR MSG CITE OPS 220935Z SEP 69 MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN SLIGHTLY OUT OF CONTEXT WE FEEL MORE INFORMATION CAN BE ADDED TO THE MESSAGE TO THE CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE ACC.

2. WHEN THE ARDF PROGRAM FIRST CAME INTO BEING ITS ONLY GOAL WAS TO OBTAIN FILES AND THERE WAS NO APPARENT PROBLEM WITH THE CAPACITY OF THE ACC TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY. HOWEVER, ON 1 APRIL 1969 A NEW MACV DIR 381-23 WAS PUBLISHED AND IT ATTEMPTED TO REGULATE THE INCREASED FUNCTION OF COLLECTION AND PRESCRIBED THAT THE ACC SHOULD CONTINUALLY EVALUATE THE TECHNICAL OPERATION OF THE ARDF PROGRAM AND PROVIDE MACV J2 WITH THE RECOMMENDED METHODS OF IMPROVING EFFICIENCY

25

SEP

69

3623

LTCOL JAMES W JOHNSON




DIANE E RUSSELL, LtCol, USAF  
Commander

AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM DESIGNS. AT THIS POINT WE NOW HAD  
A COMBINED ARMY/AF COMPOSITE ORGANIZATION ATTEMPTING, WITHIN THE  
POLITICAL ARENA ASSOCIATED WITH ROLES AND MISSIONS IN THE ARMY  
HARRIER TO OPERATE AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX MISSION. BEARING IN MIND  
THAT THE WORKING AID IS THE GUIDE FOR ALL ACTION, WE NOW HAD A  
SITUATION WHERE PROCEDURES HAD TO BE DEVELOPED FOR AIR FORCE  
EQUIPMENT THAT WAS DUAL CAPABLE WHEN ARMY DID NOT HAVE THEIR DUAL  
CAPABILITY YET. WE HAD TO ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE EVALUATIONS OF THESE  
VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF EFFORT. THE SUSPICIONS DERIVED FROM  
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS MADE COORDINATION EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND  
HAS TENDED TO WATER DOWN THE DIRECTIVES AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS.  
MACV-J211, ON THE OTHER HAND HAVING TASKED THE ACC TO EVALUATE  
EXISTS INFORMATION FROM THEM. THIS HAS PLACED THE ACC IN THE  
AWKWARD POSITION OF RECEIVING DIRECTION FROM MACV J2 AND YET THEY  
ARE REQUIRED TO COORDINATE THEIR ANSWER. IN RECOGNITION OF THIS  
PROBLEM MACV J21 SUBMITTED A PROPOSAL TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.  
THIS PROPOSAL WAS FORWARDED TO YOU IN REF A.  
3. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT A MEETING  
TO BE HELD ON 3 SEP. COL FRANCO, 7AF BDE, COL LIENER, 7AF BDE AND  
LTCOL BENA DECS ATTENDED IN ADDITION TO THE REPS FROM 6994. AT  
THIS MEETING COL BRADLEY FROM THE SOUTH BR GROUP TOOK EXCEPTION TO  
THE J2 PROPOSAL FOR THE SINGULAR REASON THAT THEY <sup>HAD</sup> MADE IT. IT WAS

HIS POSITION THAT HE IS OUTSIDE THE SIGINT COMMUNITY AND SHOULD ASK  
THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY I.E. 6994TH AND 509TH TO STUDY THE  
PROBLEM (HE QUESTIONED THAT THERE WAS ONE) AND OFFER A SOLUTION.  
COL FRANK TAP DID MAKE EXCEPTION TO HIS REF TO 6994TH AND STATED  
THAT THE 509TH AND TAP WOULD WORK OUT THE PROBLEM. THROUGH THIS  
AVENUE TAP AND 509TH GOT JC MACV APPROVAL TO SUBMIT THEIR JOINT  
EVALUATION OF THE PROBLEM BY 1 OCT 69. SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WERE  
HELD AT THE SOUTH BETWEEN AF AND ARMY REPRESENTATIVES (LTCOL  
JOHNSON WAS REPRESENTED 6994/USAF AT ALL OF THESE MEETINGS). PER  
POSITION AS STATED IN REF B WAS MADE KNOWN TO TAP. THE PURPOSE  
OF THE MEETINGS WITH 509 WAS IN DIRECT CONCORD WITH PARA 3 OF  
UR MSG (REF D) IN THAT THE PURPOSE WAS TO REVIEW, UPDATE OR  
REVISE AS DEEMED NECESSARY. THE QUESTIONS EXAMINED WERE (1) IS  
THERE A PROBLEM? (2) IS THE CURRENT ORGANIZATION ADEQUATE? (3)  
DOES IT NEED REVISION ETC. THERE WAS MUTUAL AGREEMENT THAT THERE  
WAS A PROBLEM. A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE  
AND FUNCTIONS DEMONSTRATED THAT BOTH PARTIES WERE SATISFIED THAT  
THIS WAS ADEQUATE EXCEPT FOR AVIATION UNIT REPRESENTATION IN SOME  
MANNER. THE ONLY THING LEFT TO CONSIDER WAS THE SOURCE OF ORIGINAL  
CONCEPT I.E. DOES THE MANAGEMENT OF THE AGC FUNCTION PROPERLY?  
THOUGH THERE ARE SOME MINOR DIFFERENCES THIS SEEMS TO BE THE ONLY

POINT OF CONTENTION. THIS DIFFERENCE IN OPINION HAS PRECIPITATED AT THIS POINT TWO SEPARATE PROPOSALS; 7AF AND 509TH. BOTH PROPOSALS TREAT IDENTICALLY WITH FUNCTIONS, LOGISTICS ETC. AND ARE IN FACT VERY SIMILAR TO THE ORIGINAL MACV PROPOSAL. INTERESTINGLY, WE NOTE THAT ORGANIZATIONALLY THERE IS NO REAL CHANGE FROM THE PRESENT STRUCTURE. THE 509TH BR GROUP PROPOSAL INSISTS THAT THE OIC AND DEP OIC WILL REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL OF AND BE RATED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS, WHEREAS THE AF PROPOSAL RELINQUISHES CONTROL AND RATING OF THE OIC TO MACV J2 AND THE DEPUTY RATING TO OIC. 7AF POSITION IS THAT THIS ALLOWS THE INDIVIDUALS TO BE OBJECTIVE IN REGULATING AND EVALUATING THE OVERALL ARDF PROGRAM FOR MACV. 509TH PROPOSAL IS INSISTING THAT THE OIC AND DEP OIC REMAIN UNDER THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS, WHICH IN FACT, IMPLIES THAT NO CHANGE IS NECESSARY. A. THIS, OF COURSE, CONSTITUTES REASON FOR OUR COMMENT (DEF C) ON OIC BEING AN O5. PRESENT 7AF PROPOSAL, ALSO INFORMALLY FAVORED BY MACV J21, IS THAT IF OIC'S ARE ROTATED, AF SHOULD BE INITIAL INCUMBENT. FURTHER REASON FOR ARMED TECHNICIANS IS EXPANDING ROLE IN EVALUATION CITED EARLIER THIS MSG. FULLY BELIEVE 7AF TO BE ASSENTIVE IN THEIR HOME/RESPONSIBILITY IN AGC. AT THIS POINT, WE NOW HAVE AN AGGRESSIVELY STAFFED 7AF POSITION SOMEWHAT OPPOSED TO A 509 POSITION. FEEL CERTAIN ARMED MEETINGS WILL BE HELD TO

ATTEND AGREEMENT BEFORE 1 OCT MAGV SUSPENSE DATE. WILL ADVISE  
FURTHER, AND WILL DISCUSS THOROUGHLY WITH COL FRESSE 26 SEP.



SUPPORT DOCUMENT 24

24

089  
240

12/08/07

6994SCTYSQ

PAC86TYRGN

INFO: DET 1, 6994SCTYSQ

6922SCTYWG

[REDACTED]

SEP 69.

SUBJ: ARDF CALIBRATION SITE, CAM RAHN BAY.

REF: CONVERSATION BETWEEN LT COL RUSSELL AND MAJ EDDY, SAME SUBJECT.

1. CALIBRATION/RECALIBRATION REQUIREMENTS FOR ARDF SYSTEMS ARE CONSIDERED INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT RETENTION OF EXISTING CALIBRATION FACILITY AT CAM RAHN BAY. DURING THE PERIOD 13 OCT 68 THRU 7 FEB 69, SEVEN AIRCRAFT WERE RECALIBRATION OF THESE SEVEN AIRCRAFT REVEALED INSIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO CALIBRATION CURVES WERE NECESSARY. AS A RESULT, NO FURTHER RECALIBRATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE 7 FEB 69, NOR ARE ANY ROUTINE RECALIBRATIONS ENVISIONED. THE ONLY POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR FUTURE RECALIBRATIONS IS AFTER AN AIRCRAFT HAS SUFFERED MAJOR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE; AND THEN ONLY AFTER POST MISSION TEST CHECKS ARE CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE IF EXISTING CALIBRATION CURVES ARE ERRONEOUS.

11  
SEP 1969  
1 2

4891

MAJOR HOLMES

FRANK R. RUSSELL, Lt Colonel, USAF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

ROUTINE

2. PART READILY AVAILABLE AIRFIELD/SUPPORT FACILITIES USED IN CON-  
JUNCTION WITH CALIBRATION AND LOCATED IN IMMEDIATE AREA OF CALIBRA-  
TION FACILITY ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE, SINCE DET 1, 6994SCTYSQ MOVE  
TO PHOENIX.

3. RECORDED AND CALIBRATION STRIPS AT CAM RAIN MAY BE REMOVED FROM  
SITE AND STORED AT OLNEY AFB.

[REDACTED]

CDR 12/08072-SP69

[REDACTED]

ROUTINE

25

PT 00143  
RTTSZYUW RUHHWHA3739 2592140-SSSS— SQSNA.  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 162130Z SEP 69  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO RUMMWA/6922SCTYWG MAT CLARK AB PEH  
INFO BUSQSNA/6994SCTYSQ MAT TAN SON NH AB HVN  
BT

LOG

SUBJ: REQUIREMENT FOR CALIBRATION FACILITY

- REF: A. 6994 ~~REF~~ 120807Z SEP 69  
B. PSR LOG-MFO 110235Z SEP 69  
C. 6994 MAT 130857Z SEP 69  
D. PSR LTR, SUBJ: PSR STAFF VISIT TO HQ USAFSS 2-5 SEP 69, DATED 10 SEP 69.  
E. USAFSS TED 122100Z SEP 69, PARA C AND D.  
F. 6922 SPT SQ MAT 150416Z SEP 69

1. REF D, WHICH IS ENROUTE YOUR ORGANIZATION STATES THAT USAFSS LDM IS NOW COMMAND OPR FOR REWRITING POST MISSION TEST PROCEDURES AND FOR DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS FOR A CALIBRATION FACILITY. 30 SEP 69 IS THE DATE FOR COMPLETING THE STAFF STUDY ON THE POST MISSION TEST PROCEDURES. LDM IS CONSIDERING POSSIBLE USE OF DSU AND OR OTHER FRIENDLY EMITTERS.

PAGE 2 RUHHWHA3739


2. LT COL HENNING MET WITH LDM AND TED MAJ EDDY AND THEY HAVE AGREED TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE CALIBRATION FACILITY AFTER SATISFACTORY POST MISSION TEST PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. LDM WILL ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP PNT PROCEDURES WHICH WILL ALSO SUFFICE FOR CALIBRATION. ASD AND USAFSS ARE WORKING TOWARD IMPROVED CALIBRATION PROCEDURES AS MENTIONED IN REF E.


3. CONCUR WITH YOUR PROPOSAL IN REF F. ESSENTIAL THAT UPPER AND LOWER GUY SYSTEMS BE REPLACED SOONEST. GP-1.

BT

N3739

NNNN/





202004300055  
AF YARDB  
DE THE HQ 20 2490159  
R 000105Z  
FM PACSTYRIN  
TO 699453/OPS  
INFO 692254/OPS  
USAFSW/TED/PAD



OPS-1  
SUBJ PACAF LIFE SUPPORT SONGO. (PLSS)  
REF: 699453/OPS 050119Z SEPT 69. (NOFAL USAFSS/692254)  
1. REF MSG PASSED TAF HQO REQUESTING INCREASE IN PLSS  
QUOTA FROM 5AF TO ACCOMMODATE 699453 PERSONNEL. 5AF REPLY  
STATED THAT EARLIEST INCREASE IN CLASS QUOTAS WOULD BE IN  
QY 69 SCHEDULE. AS RESULT, 699453 DESIRES WAIVER FOR  
REMAINDER OF QY 69.  
2. PACAF (DOTSRL) IS INFORMING TAF THAT WAIVER WILL BE  
GRANTED FOR REMAINDER OF THIS YEAR, HOWEVER, PROVISIO IS  
INCLUDED THAT TAF PROVIDE INTERIM INFORMAL TRAINING FOR  
699453 AIRCREWS ON USE OF WATER SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT.  
3. REQUEST YOU COORDINATE WITH LIFE SUPPORT OFFICE AT TAF  
(MAJ LAYMON) TO ENSURE THAT TRAINING IS ACCOMPLISHED PENDING  
ENTRY OF 699453 PERSONNEL INTO THE PLSS IN QY70. OP-1  
BTB



*Support Document*

*Recd  
6994  
28*

ROUTINE



PT 00119  
RTTCZYUW RUMTEJA2274 3512217-CCCC--RUSQNSA.  
ZNY CCECC  
R 171945Z DEC 69  
FM USAFSS  
TO RUMHADA/CINCPACAF/DO/  
INFO RUMHWA/PACSCTYRGN/OPS-A/WHEELER AFB HAWAII  
RUSQNSA/6994SCTYSO/OPS/TAN SON NHUT AFLC VIETNAM  
RUMMWA/6922SCTYW6/OPS/CLARK AB PHIL  
BT

*OPS/OPS-*

*PTD 7*

SUBJ: LIFE SUPPORT TNG FOR 6994SS.  
REF UR DO 152030Z NOV 69 (NOTAL).

1. QUOTAS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AND LIFE SUPPORT TNG WILL COMMENCE AT PERRIN AND TYNDALL AFBS IN JAN 70 FOR AIR CREWS ENROUTE TO 6994SS AND DETS.
2. SINCE APPROX ONE-THIRD OF THE RESOURCES FOR THESE UNITS COME COT FROM UNITS WITHIN PSR, HIS HQ HAS SUGGESTED THE REGION OBTAIN QUOTAS AT KADENA FOR THESE PERSONNEL IN-THEATER PRIOR TO RETURNING TO CONUS FOR OTHER TNG. THIS WILL REDUCE THE EXCESSIVE TNG AND LEAVE TIME IN THE CONUS.
3. PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN YOUR HQ AND PSR PROPOSED THE METHOD FOR TNG THOSE PERSONNEL ALREADY ON-BOARD

PAGE 2 RUMTEJA2274  
AT 6994SS AND DETS.


4. THE ABOVE ACTIONS SHOULD ASSURE THAT ALL PERSONNEL EXCEPT ISOLATED CASES GET LIFE SUPPORT TNG. SCHEDULING PROBLEMS WILL PREVENT SOME FROM RECEIVING THIS TNG PRIOR TO ARRIVAL AT THE UNITS. THESE PERSONNEL WILL HAVE TO BE SENT TOY TO KADENA AFTER ARRIVAL AT THE UNIT. RP-3


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


ROUTINE









SUPPORT DOCUMENT  
30

File OPS  
A 123  
30

5 DEC 1969

000

Victimization of ARDF Program [REDACTED]

VNAF (M)

1. [REDACTED] For verbal requirements as a result of conversation between Colonel Frank, Lt Colonel McDonald, JAF DI and Lt Colonel Russell, 670th Security Squadron, the following concept for victimization of the VNAF ARDF program is forwarded.

2. AGREEMENTS

a. [REDACTED] There will be a requirement for VNAF forces to expand their ARDF program concurrent with the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the RVN.

b. [REDACTED] Appropriate defense department agencies will authorize delivery of EC-47 aircraft and ARDF equipment to the VNAF.

c. [REDACTED] Approval for the VNAF to participate in the ARDF program will be given by the Senior U.S. Cryptologic Agency.

d. [REDACTED] VNAF requirements for ARDF coverage will approximate those of the current Air Force fleet insofar as geography is concerned.

3. DISCUSSION

[REDACTED] With the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Vietnam, the VNAF will continue to have an intelligence requirement regarding disposition of PVA and VC forces in South Vietnam. The primary and most effective method of locating these forces is through employment of ARDF techniques as operated by the U.S. Air Force in the current time-frame. Because of the increased requirement for ARDF fleet, the limited capability of the current VNAF fleet (Three EC-47 aircraft) will be entirely inadequate to satisfy the need for ARDF. The Aural Hull system contained in the EC-47 aircraft presently in use by the VNAF ARDF effort is inferior to the 360 degree time differential measurement technique used by the U.S. Air Force. VNAF requirements can be satisfied by using the current AIR-31 ARDF system with four aircrafts than could be required if the Aural Hull system were to be employed.

[REDACTED]

#### 4. AIRFRAME

The most effective airframe for use in conjunction with the AIR-34 system is the C-47. Weight limitations preclude use of the AIR-34 system with F-6 or F-8 aircraft. Aircraft will be configured with ARDF and acquisition positions. The ARDF and navigator positions will be configured the same as the current AIR-34 system. The acquisition position will be the same as the current acquisition except that the G-184, G-186 and G-176 equipments will not be included. Secure air/ground communications capability will be provided with the KI-8 encryption devices being used.

#### 5. BATTLEPOSTS

Approximately 30 - 35 aircraft will be required to fulfill the ARDF requirements of the VNAF. The aircraft will be deployed at various bases within South Vietnam. Ideally, there would be no less than three units equally divided in number and deployed so that maximum time could be obtained in desired area of coverage. Possible locations for ARDF units include Hanoi, Nha Trang, and Tan Son Nhut.

#### 6. MAINTENANCE

The sophistication of the AIR-34 system would require a U.S. maintenance advisory technician at each location that possesses full maintenance capability.

#### 7. TRAINING

Training of operators on the ARDF fix techniques can be accomplished in no more than 1 - 2 months assuming proficient radio operators are provided as inputs. Training of the aircrew will be accomplished by the VNAF. Training of proficient navigators in the techniques employed in the AIR-34 system can be accomplished within a maximum period of 1 - 2 months. Training would be accomplished in-country through ground school on theory of the system. Checkout of operators and navigators will be accomplished through check flights on VNAF assigned aircraft flown and operated by VNAF crews. U.S. crews would accompany the VNAF forces for approximately 10 missions prior to certifying VNAF crews.

#### 8. PHASING

Crew training and assumption of the ARDF operational mission will be accomplished over a period of approximately one year. Specific phasing will be determined at a later date.

WALTER S. RUSSELL, Lt Col, USAF  
Commander

[REDACTED]

SECRET

31 015-1  
204



(WB)

08422  
2064

(NRP)




... AIRCRAFT, TAIL NUMBER 45-25900, MISSION

... AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME INDICATES SUBJECT AIR-  
... TAKOFF AFTER MAKING OPS STOP AT

- ... LOCAL.
- ... EDGE OF RUNWAY.
- ... SGT SIMONSON, CURTIS G. [REDACTED]
- ... SGT ROSS, GILLY G. [REDACTED]
- ... SGT ROSS, WAYNE E. [REDACTED]
- ... SGT BATTSON, ROBERT B. [REDACTED]

INFORMATION RECEIVED BY ACPF COMMANDER INDICATES NO CREW MEMBERS  
... INJURIES TO THE

IDENTITY UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.  
... NONE REQUIRED.  
... CRASHED ON TAKE-OFF OF ...  
... UNABLE TO MAKE SUCCESSFUL STOP. ...  
... EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO ACPF. ...  
... PICK UP CREW. SECURITY ASSIS-  
... TANCE BEING REQUESTED FROM USA-805 TILL MILIT PERSONNEL CAN GET TO  
... REMOVE EQUIP AS



DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE  
4994 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON (USAFSS)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

32



29 December 1969

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: OPS-2

Subject: Master Program Review Board

To: CDR

1. The Master Program Review Board convened at 0945 hours, 26 December 1969 in Squadron Operations. The following members were present:

Major Holmes  
Captain Lewis  
CWO Harwood  
SMS Robbins  
MSgt Foti

Assistant Operations Officer  
Chief of Maintenance  
NCOIC Operations  
NCOIC Mission Management  
Recorder

2. MSgt Foti read the minutes of the previous meeting.

3. The Board examined the two outstanding Squadron-wide Master Program deviations. The following changes are necessary to accurately reflect present conditions:

a. Page 55, Row 2, YFO 100. Delete one position to reflect the permanent loss of EDFX 103. Page 55, Row 4, YFO 110. Delete one position to reflect the permanent loss of EDFY 103. Mission equipment was destroyed and burned beyond recognition when aircraft 43-49100 crashed and burned. Loss was reflected in USA-562 PSR 157. Destruction team completed destruction of remaining portions of the aircraft.

b. Page 57, Row 2, YFO 101. Delete one position to reflect the permanent loss of EDFX 218. Page 57, Row 8, YFO 110. Delete one position to reflect the permanent loss of EDFY 218. Page 57, Row 10, YFO 120. Delete two positions to reflect the permanent loss of EDFZ 229-230. Loss of equipment resulted from the crash of aircraft 43-48959 at Hue Phu Bai on 30 September 1969. (USA-563 PSRs 296 & 298 refer.) Mission equipment was removed and returned to Pleiku. Captain Lewis reported to the Board that equipment was subsequently shipped to the depot.

Master Program Change Requests on the above items have been submitted to USAFSS by PACSCT/IRGN (see PSR OPS-R 142031Z OCT 69). Final USAFSS approval is pending.

4. Consideration was given to a request made by the Detachment 1 Master Program Review Board concerning the transfer of ground calibration equipment accountability from Detachment to Squadron level. Though the

*Review Requested*  
*OK Reviewer H. Lockwood*  
*27 Dec 69*



request had sufficient merit, the Board felt that a decision on the matter should be deferred until a final resolution is made on the disposition of the calibration site. A decision on accountability for calibration equipment will be made at that time.

5. Major Holmes suggested that Detachments may not be aware of the USAFSS view on submitting Master Program Change Requests for permanent changes only. Since the Detachments were not addressees on the message which expressed this view, the Board agreed that paragraph 2 of 6922 Security Wing OFSM 200849Z August 1969 should be quoted to the Detachments for their guidance in holding future Master Program Review Boards.

6. The matter of the Master Program Change Request submitted by Detachment 3 on 6 October 1969 concerning deletion of one Radio Telephone Processing position (TAP 001D) was discussed. The Board agreed with the view expressed by 6922 Security Wing (see 6922 SCTWING OFSM 100737Z Nov-69, Subject: Master Program Change Request) that this Master Program Change Request should be held in abeyance until a firm decision is reached regarding the number of aircraft to be based at NKP subsequent to the projected re-location of Detachment 2.

7. Captain Lewis reported that all CONJAN(?) equipment, Page 52, Line 10, YFO 130 has been down loaded and all except one console stored in the warehouse. The one console not stored in the warehouse is used as a mock-up in 6994 Scty Sq Maintenance. The Master Program will continue to show the availability of the equipment. Captain Lewis restated the official position that equipment could be re-installed within 48 hours if needed.

8. There being no further business to discuss, the meeting was adjourned at 1035.

*J. W. Johnson Jr.*  
JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt. Col., USAF  
Operations Officer


Cy to:  
6922 SW OPS  
Det 1  
Det 2  
Det 3

91 / 10456

ZCZORDA113  
PP YMRDQR  
DE ZHL AKZ 39 2540589  
P 110507Z  
FM PACSOTYR GM  
TO 699453/CDR  
ZEN

[REDACTED] VCD  
SUBJECT: REMOVAL OF "Q" JAMMING EQUIPMENT ABOARD EC-47  
AIRCRAFT  
DURING RECENT VISIT TO COMMAND WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE  
"Q" JAMMING EQUIPMENT COULD BE REMOVED FROM THE FIVE (5)  
EC-47S. THESE AIRCRAFT WOULD THEN REVERT TO A PRIMARY  
MISSION OF ARDF ONLY, WITH NO "Z" COLLECTION CAPABILITY  
ABOARD. AS YOU MAY RECALL, THE MASTER PROGRAM WAS TO  
REFLECT THESE AIRCRAFT AS BEING EQUIPPED BUT NOT MANNED,  
WITH A FOOTNOTE TO THE EFFECT THAT EQUIPMENT WOULD BE  
REMOVED AND STORED WITH REINSTALLATION CAPABILITY OF 48  
HOURS. WE WERE IN THE PROCESS OF ADVISING YOU TO REMOVE  
THE EQUIPMENT AND PLACE IT IN STORAGE, HOWEVER, PRIOR TO  
THE RELEASE OF THE MESSAGE THIS WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE  
HEADQUARTERS (TED) AND WE WERE REQUESTED TO DETERMINE  
WHETHER IT WOULD HAVE ANY IMPACT UPON MACV OR 7AF IF THIS  
POSITION WAS IN FACT IMPLEMENTED. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR  
DISCUSSING THIS WITH 7AF AND, DEPENDING UPON THE OUTCOME OF  
THESE DISCUSSIONS, THEN PROCEED TO OBTAIN A J2 MACV  
CONCURRENCE TO THE REMOVAL OF THIS EQUIPMENT. AS YOU WELL  
KNOW WE WILL OBTAIN ABOUT 1 1/2 HOURS MORE PER SORTIE WITH THE  
REMOVAL OF THIS EQUIPMENT. WE WILL WITHHOLD ANY FURTHER  
ACTION UNTIL RECEIPT OF YOUR REPLY.

ops/cdr







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REPORT DOCUMENT 38

51 Miller  
11/11/69

8 October 1969

OFS

Removal of the "Q" Consoles from Five EC 47 Aircraft (C)

Col Shorne

10-69

460 TFW (DSON)  
Attn: Lt Col Thurber

CDR

1. [REDACTED] This letter is to confirm our telecon regarding the removal of the "Q" consoles from five EC 47 aircraft.


2. [REDACTED] MCV has approved the removal of these equipments and the subsequent utilization of these aircraft as straight combat cougar aircraft. However, the requirement remains that we be capable of reinstalling and flying in the original configuration within 48 hours. Since the residual configuration (i.e. wiring etc) of these aircraft is peculiar, they must remain together and at Tan Son Nhut. This precludes their being used in any other capacity or being sent as replacement aircraft to NKP.

3. (S) Should you desire any further information on this subject, please advise.

FOR THE COMMANDER

JAMES W. JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF  
Operations Officer







73

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OPS-1  
2RH

ROUTINE

15/0848Z

6994SCTYSQ

6922SCTYWG

PAOSCTYRGN



FOLLOWING RESUME OF INFO IS FORWARDED FOR UR INFORMATION.

File

1. Prior TO OUR FORWARDING THE MSG TO J2 REQUESTING DELETION OF THE JAMMING POSITIONS FROM THE EC47 NEV EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN OVER THE LOSE OF THIS COLLECTION CAPABILITY.

2. AT THAT TIME WE ADVISED THEIR REP THAT WE WOULD SEND A MSG TO J2 AND THEY SHOULD MAKE THEIR VIEWS A PART OF HIS CONSIDERATION FOR APPROVAL OR DISSAPPROVAL. AS YOU KNOW WE SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED J2'S CONCURRENCE AND HAVE REMOVED THE POSITIONS. AT THE NEXT WEDNESDAY MEETING AFTER THAT ACTION (8 OCT 69) J2114 EXPRESSED THAT THEY HAD MISUNDERSTOOD AND THOUGHT THAT THE REQUEST CONCERNED ONLY THE JAMMER AND NOT THE ENTIRE POSITION. When ADVISED OF WRIGHT AND FLT TIME DIFFERENCE, THEY RELENTED AND THE INCIDENT WAS DROPPED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WITH THE CONVERSION OF THE JAMMER ACFT TO STRAIGHT ANDY, THERE ARE ONLY THREE ZULU CONFIGURED ACFT ASSIGNED AT TSN.




15  
OCT 1969

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4891


JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF



ROUTINE

WE HAD PREVIOUSLY POINTED OUT THIS FACT TO J2 AND HAVE ASKED FOR AN ASSESSMENT ON POSSIBLY RELOCATING ZULU RESOURCES. ON 14 OCT 69, WE NOTED WITH SOME CONCERN THAT ONLY ONE COLLECTION MISSION HAD BEEN FLOWN IN THREE DAYS.

3. WE THEN APPROACHED [REDACTED] WITH THE VIEW OF REASSESSING AND MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RELOCATION OF ZULU ACFT. OUR CONCERN IS THAT THE FEW ACFT IN THE TSM AREA WILL BEGIN TO AFFECT OUR CONTINUITY AND SUBSEQUENT IDENTIFICATION CAPABILITY. IT WAS AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS DISCUSSION THAT WE FOUND THAT [REDACTED] HAD NOT BEEN COORDINATED BY J2 ON REMOVAL OF THE JAMMING POSITIONS. THEY STATED SOME FAIRLY SEVERE OBJECTIONS TO <sup>the positions</sup> ~~THEIR~~ HAVING BEEN REMOVED AND BEGAN TO QUERY US REGARDING THE REPLACEMENT ASAP. OUR POSITION WAS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN LEGALLY REMOVED. REINSTALLATION WOULD HAVE TO BE A MATTER BETWEEN NSA AND USAFSS SINCE OTHER PROGRAMMING ACTIONS HAVE BEEN PRECIPITATED BY THIS ACTION. FROM THE TONES AND STRONG FEELINGS, BELIEVE [REDACTED] WILL PURSUE MATTER FURTHER WITH NSA WITH VIEW TO THEIR SUPPORT FOR REINSTALLATION. IN THE MEANTIME THEY WILL EVALUATE THE RELATIVE MERITS OF RELOCATION OF ZULU RESOURCES. WE WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.




*Handwritten:* 2163  
1623


*Handwritten:* 113


7700111111  
1023  
1 1994 CITY ST  
1023 CITY ST 7025

REDISTRIBUTION OF ADF ASSETS  
WERE SENT TO OPS 270300Z OCT 69. CONSIDERED A PROPOSAL TO MOVE  
FROM CONSIDERED ASSET FROM THIS UNIT TO THE...  
...REAR FRAGMENT FOR EFFECTIVE COVER...  
...TWO ACTIVE AREAS WERE TASKED WITH COPYING...  
...COMMUNICATIONS. THE MAJORITY OF COPY...  
...MISSION IS A HIGH LEVEL...  
...CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT...  
...AREA IN ACCOMPLISHING THEIR DESIGNED MISSION.





MINN











019  
506  
42




Support Document 42


PP 04500  
DET 2 502 2491305  
P 06500 12 ZBK  
PA PROSIA YRGN  
TO 6904 55 55L O/OPS  
INFO 6922 5M CPS



SUBJ: ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SCHEDULED TOT.  
REF: DET 2, 699466 DURMIS 63099.  
1. DET 2 REPORTS THAT 362 TEWS WILL NO LONGER MAKE THE FUEL STOPS NECESSARY TO PRODUCE 7 HOUR SORTIES. AS A RESULT, THEY EXPECT A DECREASE IN ACCOMPLISHED FRAGGED TOT.  
2. BELIEVE THIS DEVELOPMENT IS INDICATIVE OF THE CURRENT STATE OF EVENTS AND HIGHLIGHTS THE CRITICAL NEED FOR BETTER MACV/ACC UNDERSTANDING OF CO-47 FLIGHT CAPABILITIES/LIMITATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE COMBAT COUGAR OPERATIONS ORDER (A50-69) DOES NOT CALL FOR 2 HOUR SORTIES, 7AF APPARENTLY HAS NOT INFORMED MACV THAT SHORTER SORTIES WILL BE PROVIDED (WITH A CORRESPONDING DECREASE IN SCHEDULED TOT REQUIRED). IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT MACV BE PROVIDED AN AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT OF THE IMPACT OF TAKE-OFF WEIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON CO-47 MISSION DURATION. UNLESS MACV IS SO ADVISED AND SCHEDULED TOT'S ARE REDUCED TO MATCH AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY, THE RECORD WILL CONTINUE TO REFLECT THAT ARMY ARDF AIRCRAFT ARE MEETING THEIR COMMITMENTS WHILE USAF AIRCRAFT ARE NOT.  
3. REQUEST YOU POINT THIS OUT TO THE MISSION PLANNERS AND FRAGGING OFFICERS AT 7AF AND STRONGLY PUSH FOR COORDINATION WITH MACV TO OBTAIN MORE REALISTIC TOT SCHEDULES. 7AF AND ACC SHOULD BE AWARE THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING THIS A SERIOUS PROBLEM AND ARE EXPLORING EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES FOR INCREASING MISSION TIME. THESE INCLUDE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF FLYING WITH ONLY THOSE OPERATORS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH PRIMARY MISSION (E.G. IF THE MISSION IS TASKED AS PRIMARY COLLECTION, THE ARDF OPERATOR WOULD NOT FLY; IF TASKED AS ARDF, THE Z POSITION WOULD NOT BE MANNED). ADVISE RESULTS OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS ASAP.

320





*Support Document*  
44



183845Z Jan 69

44

ROUTINE

6994SCTYB

PACSTYRGN



SUBJ: OPNL REQUIREMENT FOR UNIT A/G/A X-SPOCS.

REFUR OPS/COM 12044SZ.

*read file*

1. CONCUR THAT PRESENT USE OF UNIT A/G/A COMM PACS DOES NOT JUSTIFY THEIR RETENTION FROM A PURE OPERATIONAL STANDPOINT.
2. PLANNED OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES TO BE IMPLEMENTED WITH THE EXPANDED ANALYTICAL EFFORT COULD, HOWEVER, NECESSITATE SECURE A/G/A COMMS AT THE 6994TH. FOR EXAMPLE, WE PLAN TO PASS ALL EXPLOITABLE WSCS/FIXES TO THE LOCAL ANALYSIS SECTION FOR IMMEDIATE EXPLOITATION AND RELAY TO THE CMA. THAT REQUIREMENT WILL NOT EXIST AT DET 1/2 UNLESS THOSE UNITS' AREAS OF COVERAGE ARE REVERSED (I.E. DET 2'S AND WITH MINOR EXCEPTION DET 1'S AREAS OF COVERAGE ARE TOO FAR FROM THEIR HOME BASE TO PERMIT EFFECTIVE A/G/A COMMS.)
3. FURTHER BE ADVISED THAT THE LOCAL AFCS EXPENDS LESS THAN THREE HRS, THREE MAINTENANCE HOURS PER MONTH ON OUR GRC-27/KY-8 UNIT.
4. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, FEEL IT IS IN OUR BEST INTEREST TO RETAIN

18

SEP

1969


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SMSLT MILLER


JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF  
Operations Officer





ROUTINE

THESE FACTS RATHER THAN RELINQUISH THEM AT THIS TIME AND POSSIBLY  
HAVE TO REJUSTIFY AND WAIT FOR THEIR RE-INSTALLATION WHEN OPERATIONAL  
REQUIREMENTS DICTATE THEIR NEED.



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2210902Z Nov 69  
45



X

PRIORITY

6994SCTYSQ

PACSCZY.GN/OPS/COM/

INFO: 6922SCTYNG

DET 1 6994SCTYSQ

DET 2 6994SCTYSQ



SUBJ: REMOVAL OF 6994TH COMPLEX A/G/A COMM PACS.

As 1916

REF: A. UR COM-6 210018Z NOV 69.

B. DR OPS/COM 120448Z SEP 69 (NOTAL)

C. MY O/S/COM 180845Z SEP 69 (NOTAL)

1. REQUEST IMMEDIATE ACTION BE TAKEN TO RECIAM THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REF A. FEEL THE 6994TH COMPLEX, AFTER NEARLY FOUR YEARS OF EFFORT, IS WELL ON ITS WAY TO OBTAINING A SANCTIONED ANALYSIS AND REPORTING REPORT. DET 3 NOW HAS AUTHORIZED TACREP REPORTING RESPONSIBILITY, DET 2 IS PRESENTLY TESTING TRANSCRIPTION AND ALL 6994TH UNITS ARE CURRENTLY TASKED WITH FULL EMR REPORTING. THEREFORE, IT WOULD APPEAR LOGICAL THAT OUR NEXT STEP OF PROGRESSION WOULD BE TACREP AUTHORITY AT ALL LOCATIONS. IF/WHEN DET 2 RELOCATES TO DANANG THEY WILL BE IN THE NECESSARY GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION TO ACCEPT A/G TRAFFIC FROM THE LARGER MAJORITY OF THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY; THE


22  
NOV 69  
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4891

SMSGT MILLER



JAMES W JOHNSON, JR, 1SG1, USAF  
Operations Officer



[REDACTED]

6994TH IS ALREADY IN THAT POSITION AND CURRENTLY HAS THE ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY OF TACREP REPORTING. HOWEVER, WITHOUT A/G/A COMMS, WE WOULD NEVER HOPE TO JUSTIFY A FULLY SANCTIONED ANALYSIS AND REPORTING EFFORT. ON THE BASIS OF THE POTENTIAL OF ACQUIRING A TIMELY REPORTING FUNCTION IT WOULD APPEAR THAT USAFSS SHOULD BE EXERTING EFFORT TO OBTAIN BETTER A/G/A COMM PACS RATHER THAN DIRECTING THE REMOVAL OF THOSE PACS PRESENTLY PROCESSED.

2. FOR DET 1 AND DET 2. UNTIL OTHER WISE ADVISED, TAKE NO ACTION ON INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REF A.

3. FOR 69223W. IN THE INTEREST OF EXPEDIENCY, THIS WSO HAS COORDINATED DIRECTLY WITH WING CDMO DURING HIS TDY THIS WEEK.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]



*Support Document 46*

46

PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

6994 SCTY SQDN

PACSCTYRGN (OPS)

INFO: 6922 SW (OPS)

SUBJ: ARDF MANPOWER REDUCTION

REF: PACSCTYRGN OPS 020825Z OCT

PHONECON COL WOOD? LTCOL RUSSELL, 03 OCT 69

1. FOLLOWING SHREDOUT BY AFSC WAS PROVIDED TO LTCOL RUSSELL DURING  
PHONECON THIS DATE:

READ/AFSC/TSN/PHU/PKU/NKP/TOTAL

292X1/74/66/84/21/245

203X1/22/14/24/05/65

202X0/25/13/15/12/65 TOTAL: 375

2. CAN ACCOMODATE UP TO 40 MISSIONS PER DAY, USING FOUR MEN PER  
ZULU AIRCRAFT WITH FOLLOWING SHREDOUT:

292X1/91/64/84/21/260

203X1/18/09/17/05/49

202X0/32/09/13/12/66 TOTAL: 375

THE ABOVE FIGURES INCLUDE RETENTION OF TWELVE R202X0 ANALYST AT ACC OCT 69

AND FOUR ~~292S~~ 292S and ~~SIE~~ <sup>X</sup> 202S ( FOUR R202, TWO A202) FOR ~~SQUADRON~~ <sup>SQUADRON</sup>

4891

MAJ HOLMES

*James W. Johnson, Major*  
JAMES W. JOHNSON, LT, COL, USAF  
OPERATIONS OFFICER

39557

Priority  
ROUTINE

LTCOL JOHNSON

MAJ HOLMES

4891

MISSION MANAGEMENTJ SHEDOUT OF PERSONNEL/BILLETS IS BASED ON AIRCRAFT  
CONFIGURATION AND DEPLOYMENT OUTLINED IN USAFSSMP.

3. WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT MANPOWER FIGURES REPRESENTED ABOVE ARE  
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS BASED UPON FULL 100 PERCENT MANNING. LESS THAN  
100 PERCENT MANNING WILL RESULT IN MISSION DEGRADATION. THE FORTY  
MISSIONS PER DAY IS BASED UPON USAFSS MSG OPD 011846Z. INCREASE IN  
NUMBER OF MISSIONS PER DAY BEYOND FORTY WOULD REQUIRE AUGMENTATION  
OF MANNING.

*Support Document 47*

47

PRIORITY

6994SCTYSJ

*03/0531 E*

PACSCITYRGN/VCO

INFO: 6922SCTYJG/CFS

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: UDL, 6994SS AFTER 703 REDUCTION.

1. REF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PSR AND 6994SS. FOLLOWING RESPONSES WERE SUBMITTED IN BRIEF, TOTAL BREAKOUT FOLLOWS BY COURIER. THE BASED ON 557 SPACES ALLOCATED BY PSR.

2. PARA 3 CONTAINS OUR PLACEMENT OF PERSONNEL FOR A ~~SOME~~ TOTAL OF 557 MANPOWER SPACES. OUR PLACEMENTS ARE BASED ON:

- A. 22 ACFT (10 CC AND 12 ZULU) AT 6994SS TSN; 13 ACFT (ALL CC) AT DET 1, PHU CAT; 15 ACFT (4 CC, 11 ZULU) AT DET 2, DANANG AND 5 ACFT (ALL ZULU) AT NAKHON PHANOM.
- B. DELETION OF THE CAM RANH CAL SITE.
- C. DELETION OF THE AFSCC G1575Z SPACE (FC 3510ZK).
- D. CHANGING THE E3034 CPT SPACE (FC 2600) TO A E7024 CPT SPACE (FC 1100).
- E. DANANG LOCATION DELETES DET 2'S COMM AND SCTY FUNCTIONS AS

8  
NOV 1969

4891

SMS MILLER

*Marlan Holmes*  
MARLAN HOLMES, MAJOR, USAF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PRIORITY

RESULT COLLOCATION WITH 6924SS. OBVIOUSLY, IF PLANNED FOR DANANG DOES NOT MATERIALIZE, WE WILL HAVE TO REPROGRAM WAGE. FURTHER, REDUCTIONS IN PERSONNEL (732XO) CONTINUED FOR DET 1 AND 2 FOR THIS UDL.

F. ALL DATA COMPUTED ON BASIS OF 40 MSNS A DAY. MUST RE-EVALUATE NEED FOR 100 PERCENT MANNING TO MEET MSN COMMITMENTS UNDER EXISTING PERSONNEL CEILING.

3. PERSONNEL STATISTICS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

AFSC	699A	DET 1	DET 2	DET 3	TOTAL
G0026 LTC	1	0	0	0	1
E7024 CPT	1	0	0	0	1
E3234C MAJ	1	0	0	0	1
E3234C CPT	0	1	1	0	2
E6424A CPT	1	0	0	0	1
Q8035 LTC	1	0	0	0	1
G8035 MAJ	0	1	1	0	2
E8035 MAJ	2	0	0	0	2
E8035 CPT	1	1	1	2	5
R10070 MSG	1	0	0	0	1
R702XO	11	4	4	2	21
R732XO	2	1	1	1	5
R751X <sup>2</sup>	1	0	0	0	1

PRIORITY

R311X0	1	5	0	0	6
R202X0	10	12	0	0	22
A202X0	26	0	14	20	60
A203X1 MD	22	0	20	9	51
A203X1 MU	0	0	0	2	2
A292X1	106	52	79	34	271
R291X0	12	5	0	5	22
A301/4XX	28	16	18	7	69
R645X0	4	2	2	2	10
TOTAL	232	100	141	84	557



PRIORITY

6994SCTYSQ

PACSCTYRGN/VCO

INFO; 5922SCTYWG/OPS



SUBJ: 6994SS UDL.

REF MY OPS 080830Z NOV 69.

- 1. PARA 2 CONTAINS REVISED UDL BASED ON:
  - A. DANANG BEING OA O/L WITH SIX ACFT AND REMAINDER OF PLEIKU RESOURCES BEING COMBINED WITH DET 1 AT PHU CAT.
  - B. ENTIRE DET 2 OPNS COMBINING WITH DET 1. BY COMBINING THE ENTIRE DET 2 OPNS WITH DET 1, WE COULD MOVE THE CURRENT DET 2 COMMANDER AND MAINTENANCE OFFICER SLOTS TO NKP, DET 2 OPS OFFICER SLOT TO PHU CAT AND THE SECOND E8035 SLOT PROGRAMMED TO NKP WOULD BE RETURNED TO THE 6994SS.

2. PERSONNEL STATISTICS ARE:

A. FOR SPLIT OF PLEIKU RESOURCES WITH AIRCRAFT ALIGNMENTS AS FOLLOWS: TSN010CC AND 12Z; PHC-17CC AND 5Z; DNG-6Z; NKP-5Z.

READ:	AFSC	TSN	PHC	DNG	NKP
	G0026	1	0	0	0



E7024	1	0	0	0
E3234C	1	1	1	1
E6424	1	0	0	0
G8035	1	1	1	0
E8035	3	1	1	1
R10070	1	0	0	0
R702X0	11	4	3	2
R732X0	2	1	1	1
R751X2	1	0	0	0
R811X0	1	5	0	0
R202X0	10	0	0	0
A202X0	26	20	6	20
A203X1M0	22	9	11	9
A203X1M0	0	0	0	2
A292X1	106	98	35	34
R291X0	12	5	0	5
A30XX	23	25	9	7
R645X0	4	2	1	2
TOTALS	232	172	69	84

557

B. FOR CONSOLIDATION OF PLEIKUS RESOURCES WITH AIRCRAFT ALIGNMENT  
 AS FOLLOWS: TSN-10CC ADN 12Z; PHC-17CC AND 11Z; NKP-5Z. READ --

AFSC	TSN	PHC	MXP	
G0026	1	0	0	
E7024	1	0	0	
E3234C	1	1	1	
E6424A	1	0	0	
G3035	1	1	1	
E8035	4	2	1	
R10070	1	0	0	
R702X0	11	8	2	
R732X0	2	2	1	
R751K2	1	0	0	
R811X0	1	5	0	
R202X0	10	0	0	
R202X0	26	26	20	
A203-LMD	22	20	9	
A203Y-LMD	0	0	2	
A292X1	106	131	34	
R292X0	12	5	5	
A30XX	28	34	7	
R645X0	4	4	2	
TOTALS	233	239	85	557



CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]

PRECEDENCE

ACTION **ROUTINE**

INFO

*Support Document 49*

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: 693430TISQ(SSLO)

TO: PACIFICOM/OPS-2/100

INFO: 692230TISQ

ZEN/693430TISQ

1. ONLY SUBJECT OF NOTE IS THAT THERE ARE SOME IN-COMMUNICATING ELEMENTS USING COMMUNICATIONS IN THE 1.2 - 2.0 Mhz RANGE. THE ARMY HAS EXPERIMENTED WITH A TRAILING WIRE AND FOUND IT IMPROVED THEIR CAPABILITY TO COPY BY SEVERAL ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE. SOME EXPERIMENTS WITH ELECTRICALLY LENGTHENING THE WIRE ANTENNAS BY IMMERSION OF [REDACTED] HAS NOT PROVED SUCCESSFUL. THE ARMY'S FIXING CAPABILITY IS SEVERELY LIMITED BELOW THREE PERZ. THE COMBAT COURAGE CAN INTERCEPT DOWN TO TWO HUNDRED KILOGHERTZ BUT EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THEY MUST BE LOCATED ON TOP OF THE TARGET TO HEAR IT. AS FOR FIXING, SOME OF THE COURAGE CAN FIX SLIGHTLY BELOW TWO Mhz IF VERY NEAR THE TARGET.

2. REQUEST THE COURAGE TO BE TASKED WITH FIXING THESE LOW FREQUENCY COMMUNICATIONS WHERE POSSIBLE. IF FEASIBLE, WOULD RECOMMEND STEPS BE TAKEN TO OPTIMIZE EXISTING COLLECTION ANTENNA OR TO INSTALL

[REDACTED]

DATE	TIME
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1	1

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	4437		<i>[Signature]</i>
			TYPED (OR STAMPED) NAME AND TITLE
			ROY R KERRS JR CAPT USAF SSLO
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS		

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	CONTROLLED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE		REGS	4427
INFO			

ADDITIONAL ANTENNAS FOR THE ONE TO TWO MEZ RANGE. BELIEVES THE  
 JAMMING AIRCRAFT HAS PROVISIONS FOR USE OF A TRAILING LONG WIRE  
 ANTENNA - THIS MIGHT BE WORTHY OF INVESTIGATION AS CAPTURED ENEMY  
 SIGS MENTION REGULAR WORKING IN THE LF SPECTRUM FOR SOME ELEMENTS  
 MACV HAS REQUESTED AVIATION UNITS DO WHAT THEY CAN TO INTERCEPT  
 THESE COMMUNICATIONS.



CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2		RLX
CLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY	

FORM 1 NOV 63 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

150  
Subject Docu [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
NNNNZCZCRDA036R1B750ZCZCLAA778VKZA959  
RR YMRDQR  
DE YHLAKZ 19 3540223  
R 200223Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO 6994SCTYSQ/SSLO/OPS  
INFO /22SCTYWG/OPS  
ZEM  
[REDACTED]

50

	ACTION	INFO
COMMANDER		9
ADMIN		
OPS	✓	
OPS-3		
SP		
MAT		
COMM		
FSGT		
PER		

SSLO

(124) FILE

SUBJ: LOW FREQUENCY COLLECTION  
REF: A. YOUR 210315Z NOV 69.  
B. YOUR 270230Z NOV 69.  
C. YOUR 180145Z NOV 69.

1. REF A STATED THAT SOME IN-COUNTRY NVA/VC UNITS ARE COMMUNICATING IN 1.2 - 2.0 MHZ RANGE AND RECOMMENDS MODIFICATION OF CCZ ANTENNA SYSTEM TO OPTIMIZE COLLECTION IN LOW FREQUENCY (LF) SPECTRUM. REF B INDICATES THAT "F INTERCEPT PROBLEMS AGAIN SURFACED AT WEEKLY AROF MEETING. REF C INDICATES THAT USAFSS RESPONSE TO MACV IS OUTSTANDING.
  2. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT REQUIREMENT FOR LF COLLECTION HAS BEEN ADEQUATELY STATED TO JUSTIFY MODIFICATION OF COUGAR ANTENNA SYSTEM. IT WOULD SEEM THAT LF PROPAGATION CHARACTERISTICS WOULD PERMIT TARGETING BY GROUND SITES. IN ADDITION, INSTALLATION OF LONG-WIRE ANTENNA EC-47 COULD CHANGE THE CALIBRATION ENVELOPE. FOR THESE REASONS, WE ARE RELUCTANT TO RECOMMEND ANY CHANGES IN CCZ ANTENNA CONFIGURATION.
  3. IN REGARD TO FIXING LF TARGETS, WISH TO POINT OUT THAT ALR-34/35 DF CAPABILITY DOES NOT EXTEND BELOW 2 MHZ.
- 215
- [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

51

ROUTINE

6994 SCTY SQ

PACSCITYBGN

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: LOW FREQUENCY ARDF CAPABILITY

REF: PACSCITYBGN OPS-A 200223Z DEC 69

1. THE REQUIREMENT FOR MODIFICATION/REDESIGN OF THE COMBAT COUGAR ARDF SYSTEM IS BASED UPON THE FACT THAT THE NVA/VC UNITS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COMBAT AGAINST ALLIED FORCES IN VIETNAM ARE KNOWN TO BE USING RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OPERATING IN THE 1.202.0 MHZ FREQUENCY RANGE. SINCE JULY 1969, THE 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON RESOURCES HAVE BEEN TASKED WITH ARDF AND COLLECTION OF NVA/VC UNITS SUCH AS THE 1ST NVA REGT , 7TH NVA REGT AND SR-2 MORSE/VOICE COMMUNICATIONS. THESE UNITS OPERATE IN THE 1.202.0 MHZ PORTION OF THE SPECTRUM.
  2. WHILE THE G-133F RECEIVER CAN EFFECT COLLECTION OF THESE SIGNALS, THE ARD-18 SYSTEM RECEIVER DOES NOT PROVIDE CAPABILITY FOR ARDF BELOW 2.0 MHZ, ACCORDING TO DESIGN CRITERIA. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, A FEW AIRCRAFT ON WHICH THE CAPABILITY EXISTS TO TUNE THE ARD-18 RECEIVER DOWN TO APPROXIMATELY 1.7 MHZ. THESE AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN USED IN ATTEMPTING TO SATISFY THE ARDF TASKING LEVIED BELOW 2.0 MHZ. THE
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THIS METHOD OF ARDF ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO RELIABILITY. THIS IS THE ONLY CAPABILITY IN-COUNTRY TO PROVIDE ARDF BELOW 2.0 MHZ.


3. REF MSG REFERS TO SERIES OF SSLO MESSAGES WHICH POINTED OUT MACV EXPRESSED NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT OF A CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE ARDF BELOW 2.0 MHZ. WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT WITH CURRENT RESOURCES, THIS UNIT CANNOT FULFILL THE TASKED MISSION SINCE THERE IS NO ARDF CAPABILITY BELOW 2.0 MHZ.


4. REQUEST YOU RECONSIDER INVESTIGATION OF DESIGN CHANGES TO ANTENNA CONFIGURATION AND/OR ARD 1B RECEIVER CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD ALLOW THIS UNIT TO PERFORM ITS MISSION AS TASKED.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]











[REDACTED]

E. NO STATISTICS ARE AVAILABLE TO INDICATE THE VALUE OF NIGHT MISSIONS IN THIS AREA, BUT FROM ALL INDICATIONS THIS WOULD NOT ENHANCE THE VALUE OF THIS MISSION.

F. SINCE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING DEPTH OF THE DMZ, WE QUESTION THE NEED FOR RAPID FIXING OF TARGETS IN THIS AREA. TROOP MOVEMENTS IN AND AROUND THE DMZ ARE ADEQUATELY MONITORED BY MISSION 902 ALFA.

G. RADAR MONITORING OF THIS MISSION HAS BEEN SEVERELY DOWNGRADED SINCE RECENT STORM DAMAGE TO WATERBURY FACILITY. PANAMA IS CURRENTLY BEING USED BUT IS NOT CONSIDERED RELIABLE. WOULD CONSIDER DELETION OF MISSION ON THIS BASIS ALONE.


H. FROM STANDPOINT OF OVERALL PRODUCTIVITY AND ACTIVITY LEVEL THERE DOES APPEAR TO BE SUFFICIENT REASON TO CONTINUE THIS MISSION. A "Q" ENGINE AIRCRAFT IS CONSISTENTLY FLOWN TO THIS AREA BECAUSE OF FUEL AND DISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS. THIS AIRCRAFT COULD BE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED ELSEWHERE.

I. THE AMOUNT OF DUPLICATION OF COPY AND FIXES OBTAINED FROM MISSION 999 AND 902 ALFA, ALONG WITH GROUND SITE INTERCEPT DUPLICATION <sup>100</sup> WOULD BE A STRONG FACTOR IN DETERMINING JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS MISSION.

2. THIS HQS WOULD BE HIGHLY INTERESTED IN USM-808'S COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Support Document 56



1-2  
OPS-8  
ZIN

56

95

ROUTINE

6994SCTYSQ

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ



SUBJ: JOINT COURIER ACTIVITY DA NANG (JCAD)/CPS STOPS AT PHU BAI.  
WE ARE IN RECEIPT OF YOUR PROPOSAL AND IT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH  
J2114 MACV. NO ACTION CAN BE TAKEN AT THIS TIME DUE TO FACT THAT  
JCAD IS EXPERIMENTAL AND PRESENTLY A TEMPORARY OPERATION. SHOULD  
IT BECOME A PERMANENTIZE OPERATION, YOUR PROPOSAL WILL BE RECONSID-  
ERED AT THAT TIME. G P-4.

28 0441Z

JUL 1969


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
4891


LT COL JOHNSON

JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF  
Operations Officer









*Support Document 60*

*100*

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ROUTINE

*13/0415Z*

6994 SCTYSQ

~~6922 SW.~~

*80*

SUBJ: DET 2, 6994SS TRANSCRIBE TEST.

*File by*

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE THE 460TRW HAS CONSISTENTLY OBJECTED TO MAKING OPS STOPS TO DROP OFF TRAFFIC. IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF ELEMENATING OPS STOPS, MACV, THRU NRV (C), DIRECTED DET 2 TO CONDUCT A SIX WEEK TRANSCRIBE TEST TO DETERMINE IF DET 2'S TRANSCRIPTIONS WOULD FULPILL USM-808 TIMELY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. THE TEST OFFICIALLY STARTED 22 NOV 69 AND INITIAL USM-808 feedback WAS MOST UNFAVORABLE. DUE TO THE UNFAVORABLE FEEDBACK WE SENT AN OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE TO DET 2 AND USM-808 IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE HOW THE DET 2 TEST COULD BE MADE SUCCESSFUL. HIS FINDINGS WERE: A. THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF DET 2 LINGUISTS WAS INADEQUATE TO ENSURE FULL, ACURATE, TRANSCRIPTIONS. B. USM-808 WAS BEING OVERLY CRITICAL IN THEIR FEEDBACK/EVALUATION AS THEY WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT IF THE TEST PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL THAT THE AIR FORCE WOULD MOVE A CONTINGENT OF AIRCRAFT TO DAMANG TO PROVIDE THEM WITH TIMELY SUPPORT. OUR REP EXPLAINED THAT THE TEST OUTCOME WOULD HAVE

13  
DEC 69  
1 5

4891

JAMES W JOHNSON, JR., LtCol, USAF  
Operations Officer



NOTHING TO DO WITH MOVING AIRCRAFT TO DANANG AND IT WOULD BE TO  
USM-808'S ADVANTAGE, FROM A TIMELINESS ASPECT, TO RECEIVE THE DET  
2 TRAFFIC ELECTRICALLY. USM-808 PERSONNEL READILY AGREE TO THIS,  
HOWEVER, STATED SERIOUS DOUBT THAT DET 2 COULD EVER PRODUCE A FULLY  
RELIABLE/ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF THEIR INTERCEPT. THIS BASED ON  
PROVEN DIFFICULTIES THAT AMERICAN LINGUISTS HAVE IN TRANSCRIBING  
THE VARIOUS REGIONAL DIALECTS/JARGONS ENCOUNTERED IN VC/NVA PLAIN  
TEXT. IT WAS ALSO LEARNED THAT THE ACTUAL MESSAGE CONTEXT WAS  
BEING ACCURATELY REPORTED BY DET 2 BUT THE RELATED CHATTER/PLAIN  
TEXT PASSED BEFORE/DURING/AFTER MESSAGES WAS, FOR THE MOST PART,  
COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE. USM-808 PERSONNEL POINTED OUT THAT IT IS AN  
ABSOLUTE MIST FOR THEM TO RECEIVE FULL, ACCURATE TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL  
INTERCEPTED TRAFFIC AS THE RELATED CHATTER OFTEN CONTAINS EXTREMELY  
VALUABLE AND PERISHABLE INTELLIGENCE. IN VIEW OF ABOVE FACTS, WE  
HAVE DETERMINED THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IS TO HAVE  
DANCER (NATIVE LINGUISTS) PERSONNEL COLOCATED WITH THE DET 2  
TRANSCRIBE EFFORT.

2. WE DISCUSSED OUR PROBLEM, AND SUGGESTED SOLUTION, WITH NRV [REDACTED]  
WHO AGREED WITH THE DANCER APPROACH. IN THE INTERIM, USM-808 HAS  
STATED AN EMERGENCY REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DANCER PERSONNEL TO  
TRANSCRIBE A NEW SOURCE OF VOICE INTERCEPT. WE ARE PRESSING NRV [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CAS SAIGON FOR DANCER ASSISTANCE, HOWEVER, DUE TO THE EXTREME  
SHORTAGE OF THOSE PERSONNEL, AND IN VIEW OF THE NEW USM-808 REQUIRE-  
MENT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WE WILL NOT RECEIVE THE REQUIRED DANCER  
ASSISTANCE. SHOULD THIS PROVE TRUE, IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT THE  
FINAL EVALUATION OF THE DET 2 TEST WILL BE UNSATISFACTORY--WHICH  
WILL UNDOUBTABLY DICTATE THAT MACV DIRECT REINSTATEMENT OF DANANG  
OPS STOPS.

3. WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS OUR NRV/CAS CONTACTS FOR ASSISTANCE  
AND WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO ROUTINE

DTG

FROM: 6994 SCTY SQ (SSLO)

TO: PACSCTYRGN/OPS-A/COM

6922 SW/OPS/COMM

ZEN/6994 SCTY SQ/OPS/COMM

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[Redacted]

SUBJ: SIGINT ARDP/COLLECTION PROGRAM

THE FOLLOWING IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

- QUOTE
- P 290858Z
- FM SSO MACV
- TO SSO I FFV
- SSO IIFV
- CG III MAF
- SSO CAN IHO
- SSO XXIV CORPS
- INFO SSO USARV
- CG 509TH REGP
- CG 303RD RR BN
- CG 313TH RR BN

DATE	TIME
30	0430
MONTH	YEAR
SEP	69
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
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D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE 4427	SIGNATURE <i>R. R. Krebs Jr.</i>
	[Redacted]		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE ROY R. KREBS JR. CAPT., USAF, SSLO
SE	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS		


DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM  
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

ATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

CG 179TH RR CO  
CG 6994 SS  
AFSSO 7AF  
NRV  
8TH RRFS



J2 SENDS FOR: CG IPFV, CG IIPFV, CGIIMAF, CG DMAC AND CG XXIV CORPS  
SUBJ: SIGINT ARDF/COLLECTION PROGRAM

1. THE AIRBORNE RADIO DIRECTION FINDING (ARDF) AND COLLECTION PROGRAM IS A PRIMARY SOURCE OF TIMELY TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO THIS AND COMPONENT COMMANDS. THROUGH THE COMBINED EFFORTS OF SIGINT FIELD STATIONS, DIRECT SUPPORT UNITS AND AIR FORCE AND ARMY AVIATION UNITS, YOU ARE RAPIDLY PROVIDED LOCATIONS AND IDENTIFICATIONS OF ENEMY UNITS (ARDF), FURTHER, THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF AIRBORNE SIGINT COLLECTION AND GROUND PROCESSING OF ENEMY EXPLOITABLE COMMUNICATIONS (WHICH CANNOT BE HEARD AT GROUND BASED SITES), INFORMATION ON INTENTIONS AND CURRENT OPERATIONS OF THE ENEMY ARE PROVIDED. A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF THIS PERISHABLE INTELLIGENCE IS PASSED VIA RADIO FROM THE AIRCRAFT TO THE SIGINT DIRECT SUPPORT UNIT WHICH IN TURN PASSES THE INFO TO THE TACTICAL COMMANDERS FOR THEIR ACTION/INFO. SOME OF THIS INFO, HOWEVER, IS NOT REACHING YOU IN AS TIMELY OR COMPLETE A MANNER AS IS POSSIBLE. THIS IS DUE TO THE EXTREMELY LIMITED NUMBER OF RADIO



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1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 5

ABBREVIATE DINT MESSAGE FORM  
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

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INFO			


FREQUENCIES ALLOCATED TO THE ARDF/COLL PROGRAM. ONLY FIVE  
FREQUENCIES ARE AVAILABLE COUNTRY-WIDE TO BE USED BY SOME 135  
AIRCRAFT. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE BOTTLENECK THIS FREQUENCY SHORTAGE  
CREATES; IF FIVE AIRCRAFT HAVE FIXES TO BE PASSED TO TWO DSU'S  
LOCATED IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA, ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT AT A TIME MAY  
PASS TRAFFIC BECAUSE ONLY ONE FREQUENCY IS AVAILABLE. IN SOME CASES  
THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CANNOT BE MADE AVAILABLE UNTIL THE  
AIRCRAFT HAVE RECOVERED FROM THE MISSION.


2. UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE PAST TO OBTAIN MORE  
FREQUENCIES IN THE RECOGNIZED CROWDED RADIO SPECTRUM. FEEL CON-  
FIDENT YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT IS MOST URGENT THAT ALL DATA OF THIS  
NATURE, ACQUIRED WITHIN YOUR ~~IAORY~~ IS PASSED TO YOUR TACTICAL  
COMMANDERS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.


I AM CONVINCED THAT ADDITIONAL FREQUENCIES WILL SPEED AND INCREASE  
THE FLOW OF THIS PERISHABLE INTELLIGENCE. I SOLICIT YOUR ASSISTANCE,  
THEREFORE, IN PROVIDING ADDITIONAL SOLE USER FREQUENCIES FOR THE  
ARDF/COLL PROGRAM. AT ~~LEAST~~ LEAST TWO ADDITIONAL FREQUENCIES (WITH 40-  
50 MZH RANGE DUE TO EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS) ARE NEEDED PER CTZ.

3. REQUEST TECHNICAL DATA ON FREQUENCIES BE PROVIDED TO MACV J211-4.


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















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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNCLAS  
CON 1A  
TOTG 042143Z  
FM PACSCTYRGN  
TO USAFSS/TDC/TSD  
INFO 6922 SGT YRG/OPS  
6954 SGT YSQ/OPS

[REDACTED]

CITE: OPS-A

*NAC*  
*[Signature]*

SUBJ: GET 3-TEMPO AUTHORITY.  
REF 6998SS OPS-2 020522Z SEP 69 (ROTAM USAFSS)  
1. THE REF MSG STATES THAT ONE OF THE MAJOR REASONS FOR THE LOW I.D. RATE AT USA-564 IS A LACK OF ASSIGNED NOTATIONS ON A NUMBER OF TARGET NETS. USM-7, THEIR OMA, IS VERY RELUCTANT TO ISSUE TEMPO ON USA-564 DEVELOPED TARGETS, AND NSA IS WORKING APPROXIMATELY 90 DAYS BEHIND.  
2. BELIEVE THAT THE GETD I.D. RATE COULD BE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY, AND THE RESULTS OF THEIR ANALYSIS WOULD BE DEPICTED IF THEY WERE GRANTED TEMPO AUTHORITY.  
3. REQUEST USAFSS INITIATE ACTION WITH NSA TO AUTHORIZE USA-564 TEMPO AUTHORITY. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE REQUESTED AUTHORITY IS AVAILABLE IN THE COMMENTS PORTION OF THE USA-564 STATE (S) PLANING IN ADD IN WHICH CONTINUITY ON A NUMBER OF TARGETS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT BUT NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY USM-7 OR NSA TO ISSUE TEMPO ON THEM. PERHAPS FOR EXPEDIENCY, SGT HAMD COULD DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO NSA.  
4. PLEASE ADVISE.

370

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NNNN

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

*Supplied Document 66*

66

SEC	[REDACTED]
TYPE MSG	MULTI SINGLE
PRECEDENCE	
ACTION ROUTINE	
INFO	

DTG 211005Z OCT 69

FROM: 6994SCTY SQ TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN

TO: USAFSS/ISL  
 INFO: PACSCTYRGN/OPS-A  
 6922SCTYWG/OPS  
 DET 1 6994SCTYSQ  
 DET 2 6994SCTYSQ  
 DET 3 6994SCTYSQ

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[REDACTED]

SUBJ: WAIVER FOR USE OF WATER SOLUBLE PAPER.

REF: USAFSSM 205-7, CHAPTER 11 PARA 11-3B.

1. REQUEST YOU GRANT 6994 SCTY SQ AND DETS ONE, TWO AND THREE, 6994 SCTY SQDN EXCEPTION FOR REQUIREMENT TO HAVE FOLLOWING SIGINT TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENTS PRINTED ON WATER SOLUBLE PAPER.

- A. CHERRY SHEETS.
- B. RAW TRAFFIC.
- C. NSA CALLSIGN LISTING
- D. HESTIA PADS.

DATE	TIME
21	1005Z
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	1969
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
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DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	RELEASER	SIGNATURE
	MAJ HOLMES	4891		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE JAMES W JOHNSON, JR., LtCol, USAF Operations Officer
SECURITY	[REDACTED]	REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS		

DD FORM 173, NOV. 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

☆ GPO 1968-206-282

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM  
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

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ACTION				
INFO				

E. SCRATCH BOOKS.

F. NSA B-64 WORKING AID 05-69 UTF-729 AND SUPERSEDING DOCUMENTS.

2. JUSTIFICATION:

A. CHERRY SHEETS - CHERRY SHEETS ARE COMPILATIONS OF TECHNICAL DATA PRODUCED BY THE COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES AND FORWARDED TO THE 6994 SCTY SQDN AND DETACHMENTS BY ELECTRICAL MEANS ON A DAILY BASIS. THESE DATA ARE HIGHLY PERISHABLE AND VOLUMINOUS. TO TRANSFER THESE DATA ONTO WATER SOLUBLE PAPER WOULD REQUIRE EXCESSIVE MAN-DAYS THROUGHOUT THE SQUADRON ON A DAILY BASIS. (ESTIMATED TEN MAN-DAYS PER DAY FOR ALL UNITS INVOLVED). IN ADDITION TO THE APPROXIMATELY SEVEN MAN DAYS PER DAY REQUIRED TO RECEIVE THE DATA, PROCESS SUFFICIENT COPIES OF THE CHERRY SHEETS AND INSERT THEM INTO THE PROPER MISSION BABS. COST INVOLVED WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 80 SHEETS OF WATER SOLUBLE PAPER PER DAY PLUS MANPOWER. CONSIDER MANPOWER AND PAPER COSTS EXCESSIVE IN VIEW OF PERISHABLE DAILY CHANGING NATURE OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT DATA INVOLVED.

B. NSA CALL SIGN LISTING- THIS DOCUMENT, PRINTED BY NSA ON A MONTHLY BASIS CONTAINS AN ALPHABETIC CALLSIGN LISTING OF ALL KNOWN CALLSIGNS OF USERS OF HIGH LEVEL CRYPT SYSTEMS AND/OR NON-TACTICAL UNITS. THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PRIMARY DOCUMENT USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT AN INTERCEPT SHOULD BE COPIED AND DF'ED IF THE...

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REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY	

PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION				
INFO				

CALLSIGNS ARE NOT LISTED ON THE CHERRY SHEETS OR CHERRY SHEET SUPPLEMENTS. THIS DOCUMENT IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL AND IS USED EACH TIME AN INTERCEPT IS MADE UNLESS CALLS ARE LISTED ON CHERRY SHEETS.

C. RAW TRAFFIC THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 325 INTERCEPTS, MADE DAILY ON ALL SQUADRON AIRCRAFT. EACH INTERCEPT IS RECORDED ON ONE OR MORE SHEETS OF 6 PLY PAPER IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHINS 1002. USE OF WATER SOLUBLE PAPER WOULD BE PROHIBITIVE IN COST IN THIS FUNCTION AS WELL AS OPERATIONALLY IMPRACTICAL.

D. HESTIA PADS HESTIA PADS PRESUMABLY PRINTED BY AFCD DIR NSA ARE ONE-TIME PADS USED AS AN ALTERNATE ENCRYPTION SYSTEM FOR PASSING DATA ON TO GROUND WHEN KY-8 ENCRYPTION IS INOPERATIVE. PRINTING OF THIS DOCUMENT IN BOTH WATER SOLUBLE AND NORMAL PAPER WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL.

E. SCRATCH BOOKS SAME AS RAW TRAFFIC. CALLSIGNS ARE INITIALLY COPIED IN SCRATCH BOOKS TO DETERMINE CALLS AND WHETHER OR NOT COPY IS DESIRED.

F. NSA B-64 WORKING AID 05-69 VTF-729 AND SUPERSEDING DOCUMENTS (DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQDN). THIS DOCUMENT SERVES THE SAME PROPOSE AS THE NSA CALLSIGN LISTING FOR DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQDN AIRCRAFT FLYING IN NORTHERN LAOS. THE CALLS LISTED IN THE NSA CALLSIGN LISTING DO

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	4		
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY	


ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM  
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SEC [REDACTED] TION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

NOT NECESSARILY APPLY TO THE NORTHERN LAOS AREA. THIS DOCUMENT IS PUBLISHED BY NSA.

3. REPRODUCTION OF CHERRY SHEETS, THE NSA CALLSIGN LISTING, HESTIA PADS AND NSA B-64 WORKING AID 05-69 WOULD COST AN EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF MANHOURS TO REPRODUCE IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITY TO SATISFY REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD REQUIRE AUGMENTATION OF CURRENT MANPOWER STRENGTH. USE OF WATER SOLUBLE PAPER FOR SCRATCH BOOKS AND RAW TRAFFIC WOULD BE EXTREMELY COSTLY AND FOR RAW TRAFFIC IMPRACTICAL SINCE SIX COPIES ARE REQUIRED.



CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 4	NO. OF PAGES 4	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SEC [REDACTED]	

DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED



29 Oct 89 03 26z

67

ZCZCPD804SCDR3388  
RR YMRDQR  
DE YW040K 15 3011015  
R 201347Z  
FM USAF85  
TO 69945CCTYSQ/SP  
INFO PACSCTYRGM/OPS  
69225CCTYWS/OPS

- [REDACTED] P-5
1. REF. UR MSG 211000Z [REDACTED] THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT IN CHAP 11, PARA 11-3B FOR RAW TRAFFIC COPIED ON 6 PLY PAPER TO BE PLACED ON WATER SOLUABLE PAPER. IT IS ASSUMED THAT YOU REFER TO QUOTE 2 UNQUOTE POSITIONS FOR THIS REQUEST.
  2. CHERRY SHEETS SHOULD BE COMPILED FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL MISSION AND LIST ONLY THE PRIORITY TARGETS FOR THAT MISSION AREA. THESE WILL BE COMPILED UPON WATER SOLUABLE PAPER.
  3. REF THE NSA CALLSIGN LISTING, NSA B-54 WORKING AID AND VIF-72D. IF THESE DOCUMENTS ARE CAT III COMINT DOCUMENTS, FORWARD COPIES OF SAME TO THIS HQ FOR STUDY PRIOR TO CARRYING THEM ABOARD MISSION AIRCRAFT.
  4. EXTRACTS OF HESTIA PADS REQUIRED FOR BACKUP FOR KY-8 OPERATIONS MAY BE CARRIED ABOARD WITHOUT PREPARATION ON WATER SOLUABLE PAPER.
  5. SCRATCH BOOKWOC.; 431 73D ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CATCHING CALLSIGNS AND FIRST FIVE GROUPS BY THE X AND Y OPERATORS, THIS COPY MAY BE OBTAINED ON NON-SOLUABLE PAPER.
  6. IT IS REALIZED THAT THE COSTS IN PREPARING TECH SUPPORT MATERIALS ON WATER SOLUABLE PAPER, BOTH IN MANHOURS AND MONEY ARE HIGH; HOWEVER, THE TIME AVAILABLE TO EFFECT DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS DURING AN AIR EMERGENCY IS ALSO PRECIOUS AND THE MORE TECH MATERIALS THAT ARE ON WATER SOLUABLE PAPER, THE EASIER THE TASK OF ENSURING THAT THESE MATERIALS DO NOT FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS.
- 318

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



*Supplied Document 69*

68

ROUTINE  
ROUTINE

6994 SCTY SQ

6922 SCTY WG (OPS)

INFO: DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ

DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ

DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

196



SUBJ: WATER SOLUBLE PAPER

REF: A. USAFSS CSP-S 281357Z OCT 69 (NOTAL DETS)

B. MY OPS 310827Z OCT 69 (NOTAL DETS)

C. MY ADM/SP 080250Z NOV 69 (NOTAL DETS)

1. BECAUSE OF WEIGHT PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED ON ARDF AIRCRAFT, THE 460TH TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE WING HAS DIRECTED THEIR SUBORDINATE SQUADRONS TO REMOVE EVERY ITEM FROM EACH AIRCRAFT THAT IS NOT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE MISSION. AMONG THE ITEMS REMOVED WAS A FIVE GALLON JERRY CAN OF WATER.

2. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE AND ADDITIONAL REASONS OUTLINED BELOW, REQUEST THIS UNIT AND SUBORDINATE DETACHMENTS BE GRANTED A WAIVER OF PARAGRAPH 11-3 BRAVO, CHAPTER 11, USAFSSM 205-7.

A. THE USUAL SOURCE OF WATER ABOARD ARDF AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN REMOVED.


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4891

CMSEGT NORWOOD



JAMES W JOHNSON JR, LT COL, USAF  
OPERATIONS OFFICER



ROUTINE  
ROUTINE

JAMES W JOHNSON JR, LT COL CMSGT NORWOOD

4891

THE FLIGHT MECHANIC NORMALLY CARRIES APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF GALLON OF WATER ABOARD FOR DRINKING AND MAKING COFFEE. HOWEVER, DEPENDING ON CONSUMPTION RATE, THIS SMALL WATER SUPPLY MAY OR MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE DURING AN EMERGENCY SITUATION.

B. NONE OF THE ARDF AIRCRAFT FLY AN OVERWATER PROFILE.

C. ALTHOUGH CREWS ARE BRIEFED TO FLY OVERWATER IF POSSIBLE FOR BAILOUT/RESCUE EFFORT, BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY FOR GREAT MAJORITY OF AIRCRAFT TO DO SO BECAUSE OF SLOW SPEEDS, MISSION AREAS, AND LOW ALTITUDES FLOWN.

3. REFS ALFA, BRAVO AND COCOA REFERS.



Support Document 69

69

X

ROUTINE

6994SCTYSQ

6922SCTYWG

INFO: PACSCTYRGN

USAFSS (TED)

275



SUBJ: FM INTERFERENCE.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, THIS UNIT HAS BEEN RESEARCHING AND TESTING MEANS OF RESOLVING THE FM INTERFERENCE PROBLEM ON THE EC-47 AIRCRAFT. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED TO ADVISE YOU OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THIS PROJECT:

A. RESEARCH BEGAN ON THIS PROJECT IN JULY 69. A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF THE FM622A, FEEDLINES AND ANTENNA COUPLER WERE CHECKED AGAINST PUBLISHED SPECIFICATIONS. TO DETERMINE IF THE EQUIPMENT WAS OPERATING PROPERLY. DURING THIS ANALYSIS IT WAS FOUND THAT THE ANTENNA COUPLER (P/N CU-943) WAS THE MAJOR CAUSE OF FM INTERFERENCE. THE FOLLOWING STEPS WERE TAKEN TO ELIMINATE COUPLER INTERFERENCE:

(1) CU-943 WAS SHIELDED TO ELIMINATE STRONG INDUCTION FIELD AROUND COUPLER. THIS ACTION DID REDUCE INTERFERENCE, BUT CAUSED VOLTAGE STANDING WAVE RATIO (VSWR) TO RISE TO AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL AND REDUCED TRANSMISSION RANGE.

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JAMES W JOHNSON, JR., LtCol, USAF  
Operations Officer

(2) COUPLER WAS REMOVED FROM AIRCRAFT AND CLEANED. ALSO, SURFACE OF AIRCRAFT WAS CLEANED TO PROVIDE A PERFECT ELECTRICAL BOND. UNIT WAS REMOUNTED AND TESTED. THIS ACTION DID NOT PROVIDE EXPECTED RESULTS.

(3) ANTENNA COUPLER AND ITS ANTENNA ELEMENT WAS REORIENTED TO CHANGE ITS INDUCTION FIELD FROM VERTICAL TO HORIZONTAL. THIS ACTION CAUSED A HIGH RISE IN VSWR AND DECREASED RANGE, BUT DID PROVIDE SOME ATTENUATION OF FM INTERFERENCE. THIS CHANGE OF FIELDS DID CAUSE CANCELLATION OF INTERFERENCE ON ARDF DIPOLES.

(4) THE ANTENNA ELEMENT (AS-1703/ARC) IS  $4\frac{1}{2}$  FEET, WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY  $2\frac{1}{2}$  FEET SHORTER THAN ACTUAL QUARTERWAVE AT FM622A OPERATING FREQUENCY (30.0 MHZ). ANTENNA ELEMENT WAS INCREASED TO APPROXIMATELY  $7\frac{1}{2}$  FEET. THIS LENGTH PROVIDED A GOOD VSWR READING AT COUPLER, BUT DID NOTHING TO REDUCE INTERFERENCE.

(5) ANTENNA COUPLER WAS REMOVED AND BENCH CHECKED TO CHECK ALIGNMENT OF COILS. HIGH BAND AND LOW BAND COILS WERE CHECKED WITHIN PUBLISHED SPECIFICATIONS.

(6) ANTENNA COUPLER WAS DETACHED AND OPERATED FROM DIFFERENT POSITIONS ON AIRCRAFT SURFACE. VARIOUS LOCATIONS 25 TO 50 FEET FROM AIRCRAFT WERE TESTED. EVEN AT THESE DISTANCES, THE SIGNALS EMITTED FROM COUPLER/ANTENNA OVERLOADED G133F RECEIVERS AND COMPLETELY BLANKED DF SYSTEM.

(7) VARIOUS OTHER TESTS WERE TRIED, BUT NOS SUCCESS.

B. DATA COLLECTED FROM OUR TEST PROVED TO OUR SATISFACTION THAT THE ANTENNA COUPLER (CU-943) WAS AT FAULT AND PROVED THAT A DIFFERENT ANTENNA SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE EMPLOYED. TESTING ALSO PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT ANY TRANSMITTING DEVICE OPERATING IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO ARDF DIPOLES WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS OVERLOADING OF DIPOLES AND COLLECTION SYSTEMS. THIS OVERLOADING IS DUE IN PART TO OUR EQUIPMENT UTILIZING VERY SENSITIVE PREAMPLIFIERS. DUE TO THE VHF RANGE (30 TO 75 MHZ) A SUITABLE LOCATION AS FAR AWAY AS POSSIBLE FROM ARDF AND HF ANTENNAS WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND.

C. A VHF/FM BLADE ANTENNA, P/N 437S-1, S/N 5821-054-6374, WAS OBTAINED FROM AN ARMY UNIT TO CONDUCT TEST ON EC47 AIRCRAFT. THIS TYPE ANTENNA UTILIZES BIPOLARIZATION AND USED LOGIC, SERVO CIRCUITS TO TUNE ANTENNA TO EXACT FREQUENCY. THIS ANTENNA WAS MOUNTED IN ORIGINAL COUPLER MOUNTING HOLE AND PROVIDED 50% LESS INTERFERENCE. IT WAS MOUNTED JUST FORWARD OF THE MAIN CARGO DOOR AND PROVIDED 85 TO 90 PERCENT LESS INTERFERENCE TO MISSION EQUIPMENT THAN CU-943. THROUGH TEST IT WAS FOUND THAT VHF/FM BLADE ANTENNA MOUNTED 32 INCHES FORWARD OF THE TAIL WHEEL WELL PROVIDED NELIGIBLE INTERFERENCE TO MISSION EQUIPMENT.

D. THIS VHF/FM BLADE ANTENNA WAS POSITIONED 32 INCHES FORWARD

OF THE TAIL WHEEL WELL (STATION 609.62) ON BELLY OF EC47, AIRCRAFT  
NUMBER 43-49703. AIRCRAFT HAS FLOWN 14 MISSIONS TO DATE AND INITIAL  
TEST RESULTS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY SATISFACTORY. THIS PROPOSAL IS  
RECORDED IN MILITARY SUGGESTION NUMBER 70-94042 BEING HELD ON FILE  
AT THIS STATION.

E. WE HAVE ONE MORE PROPOSAL TO TEST. THIS CONSTITUTES MOUNTING  
THE CU-943 ON THE VERTICAL STABILIZER BEHIND THE ANTICOLLISION LIGHT.  
THIS POSITION, UTILIZING PRESENT COUPLER, HAS PROVIDED NEGLIGIBLE  
INTERFERENCE TO MISSION EQUIPMENT ON GROUND. WE WILL HAVE THE  
TUNER MOUNTED AND FLOWN TO TEST OVERALL PERFORMANCE.

F. WE WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF PROGRESS. GP-1.



no OP  
JWB

*Suppl Document 70*

70

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ROUTINE

280551Z Nov 69

6994SCTYSQ

DET 1, 6994SCTYSQ

DET 2, 6994SCTYSQ

DET 3, 6994SCTYSQ

ZEN: 6994SS (OPS-3)



SUBJ: PRE-MISSION BRIEFINGS.

*face*


1. DURING THE RECENT VISIT OF THE WING COMMANDER, THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF OUR PRE-MISSION BRIEFINGS WAS STRESSED. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT ALL ASPECTS OF PRE-MISSION BRIEFINGS ARE CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZED. THIS INCLUDES BOTH THE SIGINT BRIEFING PRESENTED TO 6994TH CREW MEMBERS AND THE SANITIZED BRIEFING PRESENTED BY THE SRO TO THE FRONT END CREWS.

2. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THE SIGINT BRIEFING PRESENTED TO 6994TH AIRCREWS WILL INCLUDE, AT A MINIMUM:


A. A REVIEW OF THE PREVIOUS DAY'S MISSION TO THE AREA CONCERNED. THIS WILL INCLUDE NUMBER OF TARGETS WORKED AND FIRED; NUMBER OF PRIORITY AND/OR SPECIAL EMPHASIS TARGETS LOCATED, THEIR LOCATION

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JAMES W JOHNSON JR., Lt Colonel, USAF  
Operations Officer





ROUTINE

AND THEIR IDENTIFICATION; SIGNIFICANT COLLECTION RESULTS; ANY PECULIAR OR SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS OR ACHIEVEMENTS ON THE PREVIOUS DAY'S MISSION.

b. TECHNICAL SIGINT INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE CURRENT MSN. (LOCATIONS AND TECH DATA RELATED TO SPECIAL EMPHASIS AND HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS IN THE MISSION AREA.)

c. DSU INFORMATION TO INCLUDE PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE DSU'S, FREQUENCIES AND CALL SIGNS TO BE UTILIZED, ETC.

d. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE PICTURE OF TACTICAL ACTIVITY IN THE MSN AREA. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ENEMY OB, OPERATIONS OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE AREA AND ANY FEEDBACK RECEIVED FROM SUPPORTED COMMANDS.

e. A SHORT BRIEFING BY THE SRO TO INCLUDE:

(1) A REVIEW OF THE LATEST CIF'S AND ANY SPECIAL EMPHASIS AREAS AS DIRECTLY BY THE OPERATIONS OFFICER.

(2) ASSIGNMENT OF CREW POSITIONS.

(3) CHECK FOR PROPER CLOTHING, PROPER IDENTIFICATION, AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT.


(4) REVIEW OF ANY INTERCEPT/FIX TECHNIQUES PECULIAR TO THE MISSION AREA.

3. THE SRO WILL PRESENT A SANITIZED VERSION OF ITEMS MENTIONED IN PARA 2A THROUGH D ABOVE TO THE FRONT END CREWS. THIS BRIEFING

ROUTINE

SHOULD INCLUDE THE FREQUENT USE OF TRUE UNIT DESIGNATORS OF ENEMY UNITS WHENEVER KNOWN. THE BRIEFING SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON A MAP AND GIVEN TO THE ENTIRE CREW. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EACH SRO REALIZE THAT HE IS SERVING AS THE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE OF USAFSS IN LIAISON WITH ANOTHER MAJOR AIR COMMAND. AS SUCH, THE PROFESSIONALISM AND EFFECTIVENESS REFLECTED IN HIS PRE-MISSION BRIEFING PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ENHANCING THE IMAGE OF THE 6994TH AND SECURITY SERVICE.

4. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF BOTH PRE-MISSION BRIEFINGS IS TO PROVIDE ALL MEMBERS OF THE CREW WITH AS MUCH CURRENT INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE TO ENABLE THEM TO EFFECTIVELY PERFORM THE MISSION. PARAGRAPHS TWO AND THREE OUTLINE ONLY THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS, WHICH SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY. WE SOLICIT YOUR SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS AS TO ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES THAT MAY BE USED OR INFORMATION THAT MAY BE INCLUDED.



ZCZ


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FM YMRDOR  
DE YMZADL 88 2410409  
ZKZK FR RNI DE  
290338Z  
FM USA 57  
TO DIRNSA  
PACSCTYRGN/OPSM  
USA 561/OPSM  
INFO AFSS FT MEADE  
YADVIRC/USA 564/OPSM  
ZEM

241 / 12502  
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File  
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70W

1. FOR DIRNSA: REQUEST YOUR ACTION TO INCLUDE USA-564 IN THE COMINT CATALOGUE - PACIFIC AREA (PACCAT) FOR THE PURPOSE OF TACREP REPORTING. A DISTRIBUTION SYMBOL FOR USA-564 WILL HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED. TECHINS 1055 AND TECHINS 4015 DO NOT REFLECT A PRODUCT REPORTING DESIGNATOR, THIS HQ WILL INFORM USA-564 AND PRODUCT REPORTING DESIGNATOR, THIS HQ WILL INFORM USA-564 THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THEIR TACREP DISTRIBUTION LIST IQW T-4015, SECTION III, PARAS 3 ALFA AND BRAVO.
2. FOR PACSCTYRGN: REQUEST YOUR ACTION TO INCLUDE USA-564 IN THE U-154 AND INITIATE NECESSARY ACTION TO PROVIDE USA-564 WITH THE ABOVE MENTIONED TECHINS.
3. FOR USA-561: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE PACSCTYRGN, INFO THIS HQ, WITH A LIST OF THE NECESSARY MUSSO PUBLICATIONS REQUIRED FOR USA-564.

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
*Supporting Document*  
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
ZCZCRDA109  
RR YMRDQR  
DE YMZADL 58 2540251  
R 110240Z  
FM 6922SCTYWC  
TO 6994SCTYSQ/OPS  
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SUBJ: TACREP REPORTING AT USA-564  
REFS: A. YOUR OPS 330510Z SEP 69  
B. OUR OPSP 350205Z SEP 69  
C. DIRNSA B675-115, 051746Z SEP 69  
D. USAFSS TEO 242248Z JUN 69


1. THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY DIRNSA IN REF CHARLIE CONTRADICTS THE GUIDANCE IN THE DIRNSA MSG QUOTED IN REF DELTA. WE HAVE QUERIED PACSCTYRGN FOR CLARIFICATION. REGION, IN TURN, HAS BROUGHT THE MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF HQ USAFSS AND REQUESTED THEY APPROACH DIRNSA TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN GUIDANCE.
  2. DO NOT TAKE ANY ACTION OF REF BRAVO UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED.
- 120

















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OPS-3

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PP YMRDOR  
DE YHLAKZ 26 3170336  
P 130218Z  
FM PACSCIYRGN  
TO 6994 SCTYSO  
ZEN

*x act*  
*13 NOV*

SUBJ: EMR PREPARATION.  
REFERENCES: A. DIRISA B6-358 072045Z NOV 69 (NOT RCVD THIS HQ)  
B. DIRISA B6-345 281745Z OCT 69.

1. IMPLEMENT EXPLOITABLE MESSAGE REPORTING AS EXPLAINED IN REF ALFA AND BRAVO.
2. PROVIDE THIS HQ, INFO USAFSS/TADZ, THE DATE THAT EACH UNIT CAN INITIATE EMR'S.

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NRN: ZCRDA8730R

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*Support Document 79*

79

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FM YMDQR  
DE YHLAKZ 72 2822314  
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FM PACSCTYRGN  
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*Ops-2 echo*  
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
██████████  
SUBJECT: WEEKLY COMBAT COUGAR REPORT  
REFS: A. 6994SS/OPS-2 282244Z OCT 69.  
B. 6922SN/OPS-4 090710Z OCT 69.

1AW REFS A & B, 6994SS WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR  
PREPARATION OF WEEKLY COMBAT COUGAR REPORT EFFECTIVE  
25 OCTOBER 1969.

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OPS 08  
OPS-7 B  
#OPS-3-MTC

Support Document 81

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81

ABN MSN ROUTINE  
MGT ~~EX~~ ROUTINE

6994 SCTY SQ

6922 SCTY WG (OPSM)

INFO: ZEN DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ

ZEN DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ

ZEN DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ

25

SUBJ: USAFSSM 200-4 VOLUME XV

A. DURMIS CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT THIS UNIT 22 AND 23 AUG WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM DETS 1, 2 AND 3, 6994 SCTY SQ.

THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS WERE AGREED ON:

81X SECTIONS:

1. A SEPARATE ENTRY WITH AMOC WILL BE MADE FOR EACH AREA FLOWN WHEN MISSIONS ARE DIVERTED. APPROPRIATE REMARKS WILL BE MADE IN 81X SECTION.

2. BELIEVE ZZ DIGRAPH SHOULD READ "USED ONLY WHEN "Z" POSITION IS USED" VICE "IS NOT USED".

3. COLLECTION ON "X" POSITION SHOULD BE ENTERED IN 811

SECTION WHEN MISSION IS FLOWN WITH NO ARDF CAPABILITY,

I.E. NO COMPUTER ABOARD BUT POSITION IS MANNED.

23

AUG 1969

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2EC  
SSGT CLARK

4641

JAMES W. JOHNSON, JR, LT COL, USAF,  
OPERATIONS OFFICER

ROUTINE  
ROUTINE

LT COL JOHNSON

SSGT CLARK

4041

4. ✓REQUEST CLARIFICATION IF FIELD NINE OF Ø12 AND Ø13 SHOULD BE TOTAL TARGETS IDENTIFIED OR FIXES IDENTIFIED?  
Ø5Ø SECTION: QUERY IF CONTINUED REPORTING OF AUTHORIZED/ASSIGNED FOR EACH SKILL LEVEL AND AUTH/ASSIGNED/PRESENT ~~PERSONNEL~~ FOR DUTY FOR TOTAL IS DESIRED OR  AUTHORIZED/AVAILABLE AND ASSIGNED/AVAILABLE FOR SKILL LEVELS/TOTALS RESPECTIVELY. ALSO, FEEL PERSONNEL REPORTED AVAILABLE (OR PRESENT) FOR DUTY SHOULD NOT INCLUDE PERSONNEL ON LEAVE/R&R. PERSONNEL LOST TO ONE UNIT FOR TDY IN EXCESS OF SEVEN DAYS SHOULD BE REPORTED AS AVAILABLE FOR DUTY AT THE GAINING UNIT. E.G. DET 1 CURRENTLY HAS 1Ø PEOPLE TDY TO DET 3. DET 3 WILL THEN REPORT THESE PERSONNEL AS AVAILABLE FOR DUTY UNDER THE APPROPRIATE AFSC.

B. THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS ARE NEEDED.


DET 1, 6994 SCTY SQ - USAFSSM 2ØØ-4 VOLUME VII.

DET 2, 6994 SCTY SQ - USAFSSM 2ØØ-4 VOLUME VII.

DET 3, 6994 SCTY SQ - USAFSSM 2ØØ-4 VOLUMES VI AND VII.

C. UPON RESOLVING THESE POINTS WOULD BE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT NEW FORMAT WITH NO FORESEEABLE PROBLEMS.





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1 copy to 6940 Scty Wg (TAL)

1 copy to file

