APPENDIX B

HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 1, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON

[redacted]

HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 1, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON

1 January 1968 - 30 June 1968

RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1)

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[redacted]

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FOREWORD

This historical study is a record of Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron (Operations), covering the period 1 January - 30 June 1968. All references to date are within this period unless otherwise indicated.

The majority of the information contained herein was taken from files and records maintained at this unit. Additional information was gained from personal interviews with members assigned to the unit.

All suggestions and comments should be directed to the Operations Officer who is responsible for perparing this report.

[redacted]

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CHAPTER I - MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

Organization

[redacted] Detachment 1, 6994 Security Squadron was located at Nha Trang, Republic of Vietnam. The Operations Section continued to be located at Camp McDermott in the 313th Radio Research Battalion compound area. The flying crews continued to operate from Nha Trang AB proper, in conjunction with the 361st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron.

[redacted] The detachment maintained and improved a close working relationship with personnel of IFFV and the 313th RRB. This greatly enhanced the operating capabilities of the detachment by providing a ready channel to exchange ideas which had affected or would affect the mission accomplishment of the unit.

Organizational Changes

(UNCLAS) During this period (1 Jan - 30 Jun 68) operations experienced no shortages in any operational personnel. Many personnel were sent on TDY to various places in the Republic of Vietnam. (Further details contained in the Mission Accomplishment portion of this history)

[redacted] On 1 April 1968, due to the increased workload placed on the analysis section with various reports etc, the Operations Officer requested that a Mission Management Section be established in Operations. This section's responsibilities included the accomplishment of : The In-Station Evaluation, awards and decorations, all mission feedback for submission to the 361st TEWS, quality of DOMRs, the Unit History, current posting of all charts essential to the unit's mission, maintaining the Master Program, and keeping current a statistical account of the monthly and quarterly flying time of all personnel. This change greatly relieved the overtaxed analysis section.

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[redacted] On 3 April 1968, due to the large number of problems associated with qualifying operators, updating of the Crew Information Folder (CIF), and lack of proper instruction by Instructor Radio Operators, the Standard Evaluation Flight Examiner Section (SEFE) was reorganized. Senior NCOs who had gained a complete knowledge of the intracacies of the ARDF program were designated as Squadron SEFE's to replace members who were to be rotated to other assignments. One week after implementation of this section, they completely rewrote the CIF and set up a Personal Equipment refresher course. The refresher course was made mandatory for all flying personnel and attendance was required at least every three months. Instructor Radio Operators were given extensive guidance by the SEFEs and strictly reevaluated in all areas. Individuals failing to pass any part of the check ride were grounded and sent back through ground school until they were completely familiar with all requirements of their job. Several operators lost their IRO status and several more ROs were upgraded to IROs due to their demonstrated capabilities as ROs and their ability to instruct. This realignment resulted in a much smoother and more efficient Standardization and Evaluation Section.

Personnel

[redacted] We were tasked to send operators to Pleiku in support of project Sentinel Sara. Five Det 1, personnel were TDY in support of that project at the end of this reporting period.

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Det 1, 6994th Security Squadron

Operations Division

Organizational Chart



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CHAPTER II - TASKING AND COLLECTION

[redacted] On 1 Feb 68 the IFFV Liason Office deleted the requirements for this unit to submit a Daily Mission Summary Report. This report was initially established to provide a recapitulation of this unit's mission results for each mission flown, and used as an input to the daily IFFV staff briefing. However, the ARDF Recovery Report was expanded in content to contain basically all the data that was formerly issued in the Mission Summary Report. Because of this, the IFFV Staff received full briefings on all of the results of Combat Cougar missions.

[redacted] Also on 1 Feb 68, this unit began ommitting the schedules of tasked targets from the cherry sheets. This was done because target schedules were found to be undependable or inaccurate and rarely did operators intercept a target at a time specified by Army produced ARDF Tech support. However, navigators were strictly adhering to these schedules and positioning the aircraft accordingly. As such, mission aircraft were not traversing the entire area but going to only those locations where a target was scheduled to become active only to arrive at that point and have the target silent and unfixable. After this practice was initiated, the number of priority targets fixed increased, especially those highly desired by field commanders. This increase was mainly due to the navigators being compelled to fly the entire area vice portions.

Special Collection Projects

[redacted] There were some problems being encountered by our aircraft and the DSUs in the various areas during the air-to-ground working. Because of this we wrote a letter on the 26th of Feb and sent it to all Direct Support Units (DSUs) to better familiarize them with our Air Force ARDF program. These problems

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[redacted]

were due mostly to a lack of understanding between our operators and those of the DSUs concerning particular procedures and difficulties associated with both ends. Although this letter better familiarized these ground stations with our program, still we felt a definite need to personally talk to all of the Army personnel concerned with our mission. Through close coordination with the 313th RRB and several of the Direct Support Units, we were given permission to send our Airborne Radio Operators on TDY to several of the large installations.

[redacted] On 6 Mar 68 we started sending two operators a week to four separate Direct Support Units (Dak To, An Khe, Dragon Mountain, and Chu Lai). Over a three week period we sent a total of twenty Radio Operators, 25 percent of the number assigned at this organization. We learned that the Army personnel were concerned mostly about the following: Negative contact with aircraft in the area, inability of our aircraft to obtain fixes on certain tip-offs, lack of knowledge as to the particular portion of our assigned area that our aircraft could fly and a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of our equipment. Our operators explained to them the necessity of negative FM transmissions from the aircraft while working targets, thereby clearing up the reasons for most of the negative contacts involved.

[redacted] The Army operators were also given a brief explanation of the limited range of the ARDF equipment in obtaining accurate fixes and how long it took to travel to a certain point after the DSU had tipped us off. (Two NM in one minute) Then we explained the various special emphasis areas and it was decided that if the Direct Support Unit was in doubt as to an aircraft's position, he would inquire. The Airborne Operators would quickly pass this tip-off to the aircraft flying in the area concerned via KY-8. Our Operators

[redacted]

[redacted] briefed the DSU personnel on our equipment and many of the reasons for aborts etc. Upon completion of themuch needed personal corrdination between us and the DSU, we took over the ground duties of the Army personnel for several days, actually working the ground intercept positions and the ground-to-air voice net. Working at these ground intercept sites as an operator, we obtained a better overall understanding of priority targets active in their area, schedules, and where targets were located. We learned that any fix received by the DSU, whether priority or not, which had a radius of 500 meters or less was immediately acted upon by artillery. Also, all priority 1A's that were 1000 meters or less were immediately acted upon. There were many other problems of mutual interest discussed and a great number of minor difficulties were resolved through these efforts.

[redacted] All the Airborne Radio Operators sent to these stations were representing the particular area that they normally flew and upon completion of their visit, they resumed flying in the same area. These radio operators were highly motivated after going TDY to the ground stations and their end product increased considerably, attesting to the benefits of this exchange program. It then became evident that the Army personnel at the various DSUs had a far better working relationship with our Radio Operators, since they had become aware of our problems and now knew the individuals personally rather than just by the sound of their voices in the air. These trips have proved beneficial to the overall success of the ARDF program and their results have greatly aided mission accomplishment. Army personnel were most cooperative, and the treatment afforded every operator who visited these units was outstanding.

[redacted] On 7 March 68, at the request of the 330th Radio Research Company, two knowledgeable analysts were sent to Pleiku for ten days on TDY status to assist that unit in the generation of ARDF technical support. The requirement for this

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[redacted] assistance occured when seven of the analysts assigned to the 330th RRC were hospitalized for wounds suffered during a mortar attack. In addition to the daily duties required to provide technical support to aviation units, these noncommissioned officers took advantage of this opportunity to provide detailed briefings to Army analysts and operators concerning the ARDF program. All personnel were thoroughly briefed on the concept, capabilities, limitations and technical aspects of ARDF. It became evident that prior to these briefings, many personnel had only a vague idea of the program. Subsequent to this TDY, and after the exchange of several informal messages, tasking changes were formulated and much better utilization of ARDF aircraft resulted.[3]

[redacted] Operation Six Stix:[4] On 28 March 1968, due to a shortage of Radio Operators in the 313th Radio Research Battalion, our unit was asked to supply four operators to assist them in conducting a hearability test. The test was conducted at Dong Ba Thin (near Cam Rahm Bay) from 8 April to 25 April 1968. The primary objective of the test was to determine if signals emanating from Military Region Six could be heard at Dong Ba Thin, and secondly, to determine the overall hearability for all targets in South Vietnam.

[redacted] To further assist the Army at their Direct Support Units, two Radio Operators were sent to An Khe on 15 April to assume the duties of ground operatators. This was necessary in order for the Army to perform and fulfill normal duties required at their ground station during a period of insufficient manning. Because of their outstanding assistance they were recommended for the Army Commendation Medal.

[redacted] On 13 May this unit was instructed to deploy one "Z" configured aircraft and entire crew for fifteen days to Udorn, Thailand. Ten missions

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[redacted] were fragged for the period 18 - 31 May 68. The operational control of the aircraft was assumed by the 432nd Tactical Recon Wing and the operational mission by the 7th Radio Research Field Station. A "Z" configured aircraft was requested for a twofold purpose, primarily to provide vitally needed ARDF coverage for Lima Site 36, and secondly to gain an insight into the disposition, composition, and intentions of enemy forces in the mission area.

[redacted] To better understand the importance of this mission the following is a resume of events prior to May. In mid January 1968 Lima Site 85 (located in the northeastern part of Laos) was overrun by Pathe-Lao/VNC forces. The site was very heavily defended on three sides by friendly forces, and on the fourth side by a cliff which was thought to be unscalable. The enemy did the impossible and scaled the cliff and overran the entire site. The loss of this was significant because it was the northernmost navigational facility in Laos which provided free world forces with invaluable air control and warning facilities. Aside from this very important aspect of the site, it was also an operational intelligence collection organ. This loss provided the enemy with a forward operating base with which they could conduct operations against friendly positions to the south and especially Lima Site 36 which has now assumed the responsibilities of Site 85.

[redacted] The importance of these missions was further accelerated by the coming monsoon which would soon engulf Lima Site 36 with heavy rains. This would hamper resupply missions flown to the site, the only means available for replenishment of supplies, and would also give the enemy units a strategic location from which to operate. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Assesment of the results after two days of missions revealed that there were between eight and eleven enemy battalions surrounding the site within twelve kilometers. Photo recon missions were performed and air strikes were programmed into the area. The remaining missions (8) were flown, and upon termination of ARDF coverage, additional photo recon missions and sixty tactical air sorties were targeted into the mission area with very favorable results.

[redacted] Specifics of this special project are not readily available due to the clandestine nature of the operation, however, reliable sources stated that the missions were of immense value to all agencies concerned.

[redacted] A noticeable increase in voice transmissions by the NVA and Viet Cong in South Vietnam occured during April and May. In hopes of exploiting this traffic and gathering valuable intelligence, several linguists were assigned to this unit on 16 May. Due to the amount of NVA located in MACV 14, one voice operator flew in place of a Radio Operator in hopes of developing the intercept of these VHF communications. Over a two week period, very little communication between the enemy units was detected.

[redacted] Near the end of May, information from collateral sources, revealed that the 2nd PAVN Division would soon begin conducting HF Voice tests for new communication procedures in MACV Area 12. Consequently, on 24 June, the voice operators were diverted from Area 14 to 12. Several messages were copied, but the overall amount of voice traffic being intercepted remained at a minimum.

Mission Accomplishments

[redacted] During the hostilities in and around Nha Trang, from 29 Jan to 5 Feb 68, all mission tasking was fulfilled satisfactorily. Although enemy

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attacks began at 0130H on 29 Jan and continued for several days, personnel residing in downtown Nha Trang escaped injury and most reported for duty without knowledge that street fighting was in progress. On the evening of 30 January, this unit coordinated with the 361st TEWS and made arrangements to fly an unscheduled mission in the vicinity of Nha Trang and Cam Rahn Bay (MACV Area 19). Completion of this flight in 31 January proved fruitful, in that local consumers were extremely pleased with the unexpected but desirous intelligence. During this flight, a total of nine fixes were obtained on local area targets, and as each fix was acquired it was immediately passed air-to-ground via KY-8. In turn, these fixes were sent electrically to IFFV Headquarters and subsequently released for action to the 5th Special Forces at Nha Trang Air Base. Based on the results of this mission, a second mission was flown during the late afternoon of 31 January which achieved equally favorable results. Accordingly, from 1 Feb to 6 Feb, one mission a day was flown in support of the local tactical situation. The 361st TEWS reacted quickly and launched each of these missions with an aircraft (#520) that was NORS for TACAN repair.

[redacted] A total of eight missions were flown in the local area for 34.7 extra air-hours. Local consumers were extremely pleased with the collection and rapid handling of 43 fixes during this crucial period and praised the manner in which both Air Force organizations responded to meet the needs of the Allied Commanders in the Nha Trang Area.

[redacted] The ground functions of Det 1, 6994th Security Squadron personnel continued almost normally during this period and no loss of effectiveness was observed. The Commander took steps to relocate all personnel residing off-base in temporary on-base billets. However, the overflow of personnel required that

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[redacted] some operations personnel be quartered in the orderly room and operations complex. Along with our personnel were sixteen members of the 6994th Security Squadron who evacuated from Phu Bai on 31 Jan 68 and recovered at Nha Trang. Since the threat to Nha Trang and Camp McDermott was somewhat unpredictable, senior operations personnel remained in the operations complex from 30 Jan to 5 Feb 68. During these days, all unnecessary classified correspondence was destroyed, extra M16s and ammunition were procured and all personnel received familiarization training in the use of incendiary grenades. Moreover, to insure that mission materials would be readily available to early morning crews, they were prepared for the forthcoming day's mission and transported during relatively safe hours of travel to the orderly room. Thus, if hostilities became more severe or if action broke out between Camp McDermott and the Nha Trang Air Base that would prevent road travel, mission materials would already be available to the aircrews on base.

[redacted] On 2 Feb, an ARDF mission flown by this unit acquired twenty fixes in MACV Area 20. Prior to this date the activity level for this area averaged eight fixes per day. Immediately after the 2 Feb mission recovered, a special report was dispatched to IFFV citing the abnormal amount of target concentration in proximity of Ban Me Thout. At their request, a "Z" configured aircraft began flying MACV Area 20 on 3 Feb 68. Of the many targets fixed, the 32nd and 33rd PAVN Regiments were the most significant threat to that area. On 4 Feb, Lt General Rossen CG IFFV, was briefed on the ARDF results and embarked on a personal trip to Ban Me Thout to direct the redeployment of a battalion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

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[redacted] As a result of the deployment of the 32nd and 33rd Regiments in area 20, and the establishment of a B-3 Front headquarters in Darlac Province, a larger number of messages containing readable traffic was intercepted by our aircraft. This intercept was not only accomplished by operators on "Z" aircraft, but by those assigned to regular Compass Dart aircraft as well. In order to collect as much of the readable traffic as possible, all operators were taught the various methods of distinguishing the readable form unreadable messages. Our results were successful in that USM-604, the CMA, issued a substantial number of translated reports based on Compass Dart/Combat Cougar intercept.

[redacted] On 4 March 1968, this unit received a message from the Commanding Officer, Americal RRC, complimenting the performance of our Radio Operators on the quality and quantity of the fixes they were obtaining.[7]

[redacted] After the "Tet Offensive" hostile activity in the Nha Trang area remained at a low level. VC/NVA forces in this area did not launch any major attacks after 1 February when they mortared the Air Base, and attempted a ground probe at a nearby Special Forces Camp. Fortunately, no damage was done to property or personnel on base. The reason that the enemy did not launch more attacks is probably due, in part, to the successful ARDF program. On 29 February one of our missions returning to Nha Trang intercepted signals coming from the South China Sea. These signals were emanating from four trawlers and three of these were fixed and passed to Navy ships for possible action. Contact was made and two of the trawlers were sunk while the other was captured and found to contain over 100,000 pounds of ammunition that was to be shipped to enemy units located the Nha Trang area[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] On 9 April 1968, readable traffic copied on a regular Compass 8 Dart mission in MACV Area 15 resulted in the loss of 39 enemy.

[redacted] Our overall effort in MACV Area 04 and 14 during this period gained favorable results. On 21 April a cut was obtained on the Hq 325C Division in MACV 04. Previously this division had been noted in many battles in I Corps. A 23 April fix of the same target in MACV Area 04 immediately brought the move of this very dangerous enemy division to the attention of MACV.

[redacted] During this period we supported two completed operations. During Operation MacArthur, 922 sorties were flown and 4949 enemy were KIA. During Operation Wheeler-Wallowa, 167 sorties were flown and 8746 enemy KIA. We also flew in support of Operations Pershing, Pershing-Walker, Bolling, McLain, Houston, Cochise-Walker, and Baek-ma 6.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CHAPTER III - HOSTILE ACTIVITIES

[redacted] Since the Tet Offensive on 29 January 1968, Nha Trang was attacked only three times. The first occured on 20 April when four mortar rounds and possible recoiless rifle fire were directed at the Air Base. The only damage done was that one round set fire to and destroyed a building located fifty yards from our operations complex at Camp McDermott. On 22 May seven mortar rounds impacted on Nha Trang with no damage reported. During a mortar attack on 21 June, considerable damage was done to 361st TEWS EC-47 9126. Approximately eleven rounds hit the base during this attack. One round impacted in front of aircraft 9126 but a power unit between the point of impact and the aircraft absorbed much of the shrapnel, preventing even more extensive damage to the aircraft. A change of both engines and propellers and approximately 250 manhours of sheet metal work was required to repair the aircraft. It was grounded from 21 June through 30 June 1968.

[redacted] On 11 March 1968, aircraft 016 sustained severe combat damage from 37MM anti-aircraft fire while flying in area 03 in Laos. The pilot managed to control the aircraft, recovered, and flew it back into South Vietnam while steadily losing altitude. A crash landing was successfully accomplished near Ben Het Special Forces Camp and all crew members were able to exit the aircraft safely. The following paragraphs are the statements of the two Radio Operators who flew this mission.(1)

" (UNCLAS) Eleven March started out as another typical day, with just one exception. The Radio Operators had a little trouble getting to their survival gear. Other than that, things went smoothly. This was the first time this crew had ever flown together, so after the intelligence briefing, everyone introduced themselves.

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[redacted] Aircraft 016 was functioning normally and we were off the ground at 0545L. Since there isn't much happening that early in the morning and we had a two hour flight to our assigned area 03, the entire crew was feeling somewhat relaxed. Our Flight Mechanic made coffee and passed it around to all those who wanted it. To help pass the time, on the way to the area, the Aircraft Commander amused the entire crew by telling us some of his previous experiences. The entire crew got some good laughs from these stories, but even greater than that, I think it gave us a little sense of security knowing that we had a very capable and highly experienced AC. Besides listening to these stories, the ROs were doing their normal jobs as usual.

[redacted] Before reaching our assigned area we had changed positions a coupled times. At the time of the hit, 0835L, the "X" operator notified the AC of the damage to the #1 engine observed from his vantage point. After perhaps a moment of indecision as to what to do next, the back end crew went to work and functioned as a well organized team. Our radios were set up on the emergency frequencies, and the destruction of all classified material was begun by the ROs. While we were doing this the FM was busy jettisoning the rear door, to clear the aircraft of smoke and make ready for the jettisoning of our equipment. As this was being done, the AC handled the May Day procedures and the Navigator, remaining very calm, plotted our position and gave the AC the heading for our nearest friendly unit.

[redacted] Up front the pilot and co-pilot had their hands full. The #1 engine took the hit, but the #2 engine was the one that gave them all the trouble. The #2 engine started to race and the AC directed the

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co-pilot to allow the engine to run 2400 RPMs and then bring it back to 1800 RPMs. This was done approximately 18 to 20 times. By so doing, they were able to keep the engine running for some time rather than feathering it. When it got so bad that they could no longer control it, they tried to feather it and found it impossible, thus causing them to cut the engine completely. This happened at approximately 0850L. With #2 engine frozen and because the landing gear had come down when we took the hit, we had a tremendous amount of drag and were losing 700 feet of altitude per minute. Because of this condition, the AC directed that all unnecessary equipment be jettisoned.

[redacted] Since the FMs tool kit was sucked out when the rear door was jettisoned, we had no tools to work with. The receivers on the "X" and "Y" were jettisoned along with the MC88 from the "Y" position. The X operator literally tore the typewriter from the table to which it was secured. Since there were no tools, this was virtually all of the heavy equipment that could be jettisoned. All of the spare parachutes and harnessed were thrown out, along with the raft and Gibson Girl Radio. We kept the M16s until the AC directed that they go. It is the general opinion of the backend crew that everything that was loose, or could be torn loose, was jettisoned from the aircraft.

[redacted] As soon as the May Day was sent out by the AC we were joined by an "O-2".* The "O-2" pilot worked directly with our AC and advised him on what directions to take to get to Ben Het. This just confirmed what the Navigator had already passed to the AC. This again points out the efficiency and accuracy of the work that the NAV had done. The "O-2" pilot at one point recommended to the AC that he give the order for the entire crew to bail out.

*Light aircraft used by Forward Air Controllers and Phychological Warfare Units in SEA.

[redacted]

[redacted]

The AC had every right to give that order, but we feel that he did not do so because of the information that he was continually getting from his navigator and his own experience. Because we were losing altitude, we could not go over the mountains that were in front of us. Instead, the "O-2" pilot directed us around them and over the lowest possible terrain.

(UNCLAS) At this point, we feel it is fitting to pay the highest possible tribute to the rescue people and those who aided us when we reached Dak To. We are fairly certain that had we bailed out, the Jolly Greens would have been there to pick us up the minute we hit the ground. These people are certainly a welcome sight when someone is in trouble and any recognition that they receive is well deserved.

(UNCLAS) Minutes prior to our crash landing at Ben Het, the AC directed that everyone buckle in and prepare for the impact, and this was immediately accomplished. Upon impact, the aircraft bounced once and then turned in a large loop before coming to its final resting position. As far as the back crew goes, the NAV got bounced around more than anyone else. Within thirty seconds after the aircraft came to an abrupt halt, the entire crew was off the bird and on the ground. As soon as we were a safe distance from the aircraft, the Special Forces and Montangards joined us and really could not do enough for us.* When the AC determined that the aircraft was not going to burn, he along with the two Radio Operators, went back aboard the aircraft to gather up all of the classified material that had been torn and scattered about. At this point we feel it should be said that the AC was interested first in crew

* Point of clarification: Were extremely helpful to us.

[redacted]

[redacted] safety and then he wanted to make sure that all classified material was either destroyed or properly guarded. After guards were placed around the aircraft, the entire crew was flown to Dak To in the gun ships that had been with us from the beginning.

[redacted] Once at Dak To, a phone patch was put through to the 361st TEWS at Nha Trang. The AC informed them of the crash and said that all the crew was safe and all classified material had been destroyed. He also informed them that the crew would be leaving for Pleiku as soon as possible. There was an "O-2" leaving almost immediately and the AC told the FM, navigator and co-pilot to leave with it. He instructed them to check with the flight surgeon as soon as they got to pleiku. This again shows the interest he had in the safety of his crew. As soon as they had left for Pleiku, the AC and the ROs returned to the downed aircraft to make sure that all classified material had been removed and destroyed. A small amount of classified material was found on the aircraft, this was gathered by the ROs and burned. The burning of this material was witness by an Army officer assigned to Dak To. After this had been done, we again returned to Dak Tc and awaited our transportation to Pleiku. From Plieku we were flown home by another 361st TEWS aircraft flying that area.

(UNCLAS) As far as praise goes, there are not enough words to express the feeling of the ROs. The pilot and co-pilot did a highly outstanding and professional job on bringing that aircraft back to Ben Het. Although this was

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[redacted] the co-pilot's first crash landing, he handled himself like a veteran. When the gear collapsed upon landing, they did an outstanding job of controlling. Also, enough cannot be said about the crew coordination. Without this we feel that we would certainly have had to bail out. The entire effort was directed by the AC and his directions were followed to the letter. He, at all times, kept the crew informed of what was happening. It is because of the coordination and highly professional manner in which everyone handled themselves that we are back here today. Also, we most assuredly had the Grace of God."

//End of statement//

[redacted] Information obtained from debriefing these operators was passed on to other operators at this Detachment and those at the 6994 Scty Sq and Det 2, 6994 Scty Sq. Aircraft 016 was declared a loss and deleted from the inventory on 13 March 1968.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Notes

Chapter II

1. Ltr, USAF ARDF Familiarization, Det 1, 6994 Scty Sq, dtd 26 Feb 68. Doc 1
2. Msg, 374th RR Co., dtd 29 Mar 68. Doc 2 Msg, Det 1/330th RR Co., dtd 31 Mar 68. Doc 3
3. Msg, 330th RR Co., dtd 18 Mar 68. Doc 4
4. Rpt, Hearability Tests, dtd 2 Jul 68. Doc 5
5. Interview by Sgt Lane with SSgt Robert Dunbar, Mission Analyst.
6. Msg, 6994 Scty Sq, dtd 17 May 68. Doc 6
7. Msg, AMCAL RRC, dtd 4 Mar 68. Doc 7
8. Msg, SSO IFFV, dtd 9 Apr 68. Doc 8
9. Msg, SSO MACV, dtd 27 Apr 68. Doc 9

Chapter III

1. Interview with SSgt Louis R. Stennes, and SSgt Kenneth J. Corbin, Airborne Morse Intercept Specialists, by Sgt Lane.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DETACHMENT 1, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON (USAFSS)
APO San Francisco, 96205

[boilerplate] DESTROY

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: OPS

26 Feb 1968

044208

SUBJECT: USAF ARDF Familiarization Letter

TO: See Distribution

1. The Air Force Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) units are tasked with a two fold mission. The primary mission is ARDF, in direct support of tasking levied by the tactical commanders through MAC-V (J-2). The secondary or complimentary mission is COMINT collection. An overt action on our part is the dropping of psy-war leaflets over selected target areas as a cover for our primary and secondary functions.

2. The Air Force program is presently staged out of Saigon (6994th Security Squadron), Nha Trang (Det 1), and Pleiku (Det 2). Our unit at Nha Trang has 15 EC-47 aircraft assigned. Four of these aircraft are dually configured to provide an ARDF (X and Y positions) and COMINT collection (2 each Z positions) capability. Two additional aircraft are so configured that the "Z" positions can be transferred to these aircraft in theevent one of the prime aircraft is grounded for any reason. All aircraft are equipped with the KY-8 secure voice communications system for both FM and UHF utilization.

3. The heart of the Air Force ARDF system is the "X" position. This position was designed to provide the operator with a visual and aural signal presentation thereby giving him the capability of working up to six targets simultaneously. Ideally, for a more refined fix radii, no more than four targets should be worked simultaneously. This multiple signal capability is made possible by utilizing the 422 oscilloscope. This scope presents a trace line of 2000 KCS and another trace line reflecting a 200 KCS portion of the 2000 KCS presented on the top line. By vernier adjustment on a third trace line, any signal on the 200 KCS trace line can be instantly tuned for aural presentation and subsequent fixing. An experienced operator can tune from one end of the 200 KCS trace line in less than 20 seconds and extract known targets for fixing. The only manual operation on the position is selecting the target (anywhere between 2 and 16 MCS) and "locking on", which is accomplished by throwing the AFC (Automatic Frequency Control) switch to the ON position.

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[redacted]

4. After "lock on" has been accomplished by the "X" operator, the navigator positions the aircraft and proceeds to "shoot" the target transmitter. This is accomplished by pressing a button to activate the Franklin Printer. All the information from the X console (time, frequency, relative bearing, and signal strength) plus the aircraft position from the last doppler (aircraft navigation system) set point and the aircraft heading are presented on pressure sensitive tape from the Franklin Printer. The different targets being shot are identified by the "X" operator as "Alpha", "Bravo", etc. An experienced navigator can normally fix a target with 6 to 10 LOP's and with at least a 10 degree spread between LOP's. Since the Air Force ARDF system has a 360 degree capability, he can effectively work 4 targets and work as many as 6 targets with an increase in the fix radius.

5. The "Y" positions operator is in charge of all Air/Ground Ground/Air communications relating to mission tasking. He also has two HF receivers installed (.5 to 32 MCS) to provide backup copy on all targets worked on the "X" position. This copy is used primarily as an assist in identifying targets upon recovery and by the wideband function at USM-604 for additional coverage, if required.

6. The "Z" positions are primarily COMINT collection positions utilized in direct support of the X position to provide in-depth coverage of selected targets. The primary emphasis is on targets passing readable traffic, or when tasked, specific coverage of in-area targets requiring supplementary coverage as directed by the CMA.

7. While we feel we have an extremely accurate and highly sophisticated system, there are some inherent problems that we would like to bring to your attention:

a. When the "Y" operator activates the UHF or FM transceiver, the navigator is unable to shoot an LOP as the transmitter emissions override incoming target signals and the equipment "tracks" to the UHF or FM aircraft antenna. This is the reason that on numerous occasions, the aircraft does not immediately respond to queries from the DSU. To do so could quite possibly cause the loss of an LOP and a fix.

b. Since there is only one FM transceiver on the aircraft, both the pilot and navigator also use the radio to obtain artillery information. This also causes some of the negative contacts between the DSU and aircraft.

c. While the Air Force ARDF is extremely effective during the day, we encounter a serious handicap during night operations. This is due

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

to the presence of sky-waves. Since the operator must "seek the target on the scope in order to lock on and track the signal, he must be within 5-8 miles in order for the presentation of the ground wave to over ride the presence of the sky waves. The DSU is the only agency that can ensure an effective night mission by the Air Force ARDF platform. By providing "prior knowledge tip-offs" (known scheduled activity in the area) and the last known location, the navigator can pre-position the aircraft for best target working.

1

d. The Air Force ARDF program differs from the Army program in that two separate major Air Commands are responsible for mission accomplishment. The "backend" crew (X, Y and Z operators) are provided by the United States Air Force Security Service (equivalent to ASA) and the front end crews are provided by the Tactical Air Command. Only the navigator from the front end crew is SI cleared, and only on a need to know basis. All crew members are cognizant of our responsibility to provide direct support to the local area tactical commanders and the DSU is directing this requirement. Therefore, DSU tip-offs take precedence over other targets, except when we are actually working a priority 1A target.

8. In retrospect, we feel that only through the fullest cooperation between the airborne platform and the DSU's can an effective program be maintained. We are proud of the experience level of our operators (an average of 8 years) and analysts (10 years) who are required to fly a minimum of ten missions before checking out as fully qualified. Our relationship with the collocated 313th Radio Research Battalion is one of the finest enjoyed anywhere. We extend an open invitation to any of you who may wish to visit us to do so at the earliest opportunity. We will provide you with a more comprehensive briefing and a tour of our "birds."

s/James D. Cagle, Major, USAF
t/JAMES D. CAGLE, Major, USAF

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USM 604
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USM 634
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USM 613J

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













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SSN 602
R 280702Z
FM 6994 S
TO DET 1 6994 SS
INFO DET 2 6994 SS
ZEM

[redacted] OPS APR 68.

FOLLOWING SSO MACV MESSAGE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE.
R 271095Z
FM SSO MACV
TO CO 509TH RRGP
SSO 7TH AF
INFO USAPACREP VIETNAM (C)
ZEM
[redacted] MAC 9771 INTEL
DI AND DO FOR CMDR 6994TH SCTY SQDN
J2 11-4 SENDS
SUBJ: LOCATION OF ENEMY UNIT
REF: MAC 9583 INTEL 271715Z APR 68 (NOTAL)
1. ON 26 APRIL AT 2126Z US AIR FORCE ARDF AIRCRAFT NUMBER
65-... LOCATED THE HQ, 325 ... DIVISION AT YD ... 110.
2. THIS ARDF FIX CONFIRMED THE LOCATION OF A CRITICAL ENEMY
UNIT WHICH HAS BEEN A MATTER OF UTMOST CONCERN TO THIS HEAD-
QUARTERS.
3. THE EXCELLENT EFFORTS OF BOTH THE AIR FORCE ARDF CREW AND
THE PERSONNEL OF THE 8TH RRFS AND 509TH RR GP WHO PROCESSED
THE INFORMATION ON THIS IMPORTANT TARGET, HAS PROVIDED VITAL
INTELLIGENCE OF SIGNIFICANT VALUE.
4. WE EXTEND OUR APPRECIATION AND CONGRATULATIONS FOR A JOB
WELL DONE. UNQUOTE.
THE ABOVE RESULT, ON THE PART OF THE CREW MEMBERS INVOLVED, IS
TRULY COMMENDABLE AND ALSO REFLECTS EXTREMELY FAVORABLY UPON
THE SUPERVISORY AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL INVOLVED. THIS ACTION HAS
SURELY ENHANCED OUR OUTSTANDING REPUTATION IN THE ARDF BUSINESS.
PLEASE CONVEY THE COMMANDERS APPRECIATION TO THE PEOPLE INVOLVED
AND CONTINUE THE OUTSTANDING JOB.
ZEM

[redacted]

APPENDIX C

HISTORY

DETACHMENT 2, 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

[redacted]

HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 2, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON

1 January 1968 - 30 June 1968

RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1)

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, USC, Sections 793 and 794) the transmission or revelation of which, in any manner, to an unauthorized person, is prohibited by law.

Prepared by:

MSgt JOHN D. MULKEY
NCOIC, Mission Management

TSgt JAMES P. CASSIDY
NCOIC, Mission Control

Approved:

SIGNED

WILLIAM J. PORTER, Captain, USAF
Operations Officer

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

FOREWORD

This historial report is a record of Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron (Operations), covering the period 1 January - 30 June 1968. All references to dates are within this period unless otherwise indicated.

The majority of the information contained herein was submitted by the major staff sections. Additional information was taken from files and records maintained at the unit.

Any comments or suggestions which would improve the next report would be appreciated.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CHAPTER I

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

MISSION

[redacted] Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron, was activated at Pleiku AB, Vietnam, on 1 September 1966. The detachment was activated for the purpose of conduction Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) operations against low-powered enemy ground tactical transmitters in South Vietnam, Laos, and adjacent waters.

ORGANIZATION

[redacted] The detachment was directly subordinated to the 6994th Security Squadron located at Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam. The detachment provided the back-end crews for operational missions; the 362nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron provided the front-end crews.

Organizational Changes

(UNCLAS) No major organizational changes occurred during this reporting period; however, several minor organizational changes were make on 7 May as outlined below.

(UNCLAS) The Operations Division was divided into three major staff sections: Operations I (Airborne Operations), consisting of Alpa, Bravo, and Charlie Flights; Operations II (Mission Management), consisting of Mission Control, Training and Standard Evaluation Flight Examination, Flight Management, and the Linguists Section; Operations III (Analysis), divided into two distinct areas, Airborne Analysis and Ground Analysis.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONS

Airborne Operations

[redacted] Airborne Operations consists of three operational flights manned entirely by RA292X1 personnel. These individuals operate two positions on each EC-47 aircraft. These positions are designated as "X" and "Y" positions. The "X" position is used as the Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) position. The "Y" position is used to back up the "X" position by coping traffic on targets intercepted by the "X" position. The "Y" position is also used as an air-to-ground radio position to pass fix coordinates to and receive tip-offs from the Direct Support Units (DSUs) on enemy target transmitters. They also man the "Z" positions on our "Z" configured EC-47s. In these positions they search for and copy specific low-level exploitable targets.

[redacted] During this reporting period, 1949 missions were flown by this detachment. Airborne Operations amassed 13,680 hours of flying time in copying 18,994 targets in which we had 13,031 fixes and acquired 701 cuts on enemy transmitters. they worked a total of 2,047 high priority targets in which they obtained 1,603 fixes and 88 cuts.

[redacted]

[redacted]

MISSION MANAGEMENT

Mission Control

[redacted] The Mission Control Section prepared the Daily Operational Management Report (DOMR), the Electronic Warfare Position Status Report (EW PSR), made statical studies, and was responsible for monitoring the utilization of HESTIA pads and insuring their proper distribution and disposition not only for this unit but also for the DSUs within nets Kilo and Foxtrot. During this period, the Mission Control Section transmitted a total of 147 EW PSRs to higher headquarters detailing the changes in our mission capabilities. Replacement requests for HESTIA pads were honored in sufficient time by our crypto custodian to meet our requirements. Analysis of the statical studies of mission results led to changes in procedures which increased our productivity and proficiency.

Training and Standard Evaluation Flight Examination

[redacted] During this period the Training and Standard Evaluation Flight Examination (SEFE) Section processed twenty-five students. The training of these students consisted of 16 hours of classroom studies plus an average of 11 flights with an instructor radio operator (IRO). Upon completion of this training and successful passage of a qualified radio operator examination, the students became fully qualified radio operators. There were 12 radio operators

[redacted]

[redacted]

up-graded to IROs and two IROs up-graded to SEFE status. Seventy-five SEFEs were administered during this period. Five members of this unit were administered the SKT. The results are still pending. We had 31 personnel in upgrade training, 35 were enrolled in ECI courses, and 30 in consolidated operational career development courses, of which six were completed. A member of this section went TDY to the 6994th Security Squadron to assist in the review and rewriting of the Squadron Training Operating Instructions. Also on 25 May, the training section reviewed all the operations mission folders and at this time they were all brought up to date and retyped.

[redacted] In February, a procedure was instituted to alleviate a minor problem with the secure air/ground communications system (KY-8 operation). A briefing and an instructional class was initiated, and attended by all operations personnel, for the purpose of eliminating malpractices in the operation and preventive maintenance of the KY-8 equipment.

Flight Management

(UNCLAS) The Flight Management Section includes a scheduling clerk, an awards and decorations (A&D) clerk, and a flight management supervisor/coordinator. Aside from the A&D task and the maintenance of individual flight records, this section was responsible for: (1) scheduling of unit crew members; (2) insuring that the weekly/daily flying schedules/tasking of the 362nd

[redacted]

[redacted]

Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron and Detachment 2, 6994th Security Squadron were compatable; (3) insuring full coordination of all tasking/scheduling changes. On 1 January, the posting of the individual's flight time was changed from a manual system to an automatic IBM run-off system. In order to maintain records for awards and decorations "Hero Cards" and "Master Hero Cards" were set up in the Flight Management Section. The individual, his supervisor, and flight commander now maintain data for the individual's best single mission during his tour in Vietnam. This data is then added to the ARDF history and submitted as an "End of Tour - Single Best Mission" DFC. The following is a summary of awards and decorations submitted, approved, pending, or disapproved for this unit during the period of this report.

Distinguished Flying Cross		Air Medal		Bronze Star Medal	
Submitted:	17	Submitted:	187	Submitted:	5
Approved:	9	Approved:	168	Approved:	3
Disapproved:	8	Pending:	19	Pending	1
				Disapproved:	1

Air Force Commendation Medal		TOTAL	
Submitted:	8	Submitted:	217
Approved:	6	Approved:	186
Pending:	2	Pending:	22
		Disapproved:	9

[redacted]

[redacted]

Linguists

[redacted] Early during this period, linguists on TDY to this unit from the 6990th Security Squadron for a special MACV/7AF project, had expanded their voice collection efforts to include infiltration routes, rear-service traffic and tactical communications in the Khe Sahn area. In succeeding months the requirement grew and additional VHF equipment was acquired until all Zulu configured aircraft were carrying the G-175J receivers in the Z1 position. In March, six 292X1 UMD slots were dropped from this unit's manning document, in favor of six 203X1-MD slots bringing our authorization to eight. One of the most capable linguists, on TDY here, requested and received PCS assignment specifically to this unit. The unit continued to be augmented by personnel on TDY from the 6990th Security Squadron until May, when sufficient PCS personnel had arrived and been trained.

[redacted] In early April, it was generally agreed that most of the tactical NVA voice traffic was being passed on an HF-FM mode which could be collected by installing the "E" band (10-30 MHZ) tuner in the G-175J. The success of this component led this unit to request enough equipment to configure all five Zulu aircraft with this capability. Installed in late June, the "E" band tuner caused an immediated 63 percent increase in traffic volume. As of this report, the impact of this traffic on the intelligence community was still being evaluated

[redacted] Because this unit was flying five and six linguist positions daily (Combat Cougar Zulu and Sentinel Sara), our eight PCS personnel

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] were augmented by personnel on TDY from the 6994th Security Squadron and Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron for training and utilization.

[redacted] Finally, because of the comparatively large voice effort at this unit and the centralization of expertize, Detachment 2 was charged with the training of all 203X1-MD personnel within the 6994th Security Squadron complex. By the end of June, all but six of the linguists had been trained into Combat Cougar voice collection techniques and procedures.

ANALYSIS

Airborne Analysis

[redacted] The Airborne Analysis Section began a concentrated effort to provide on-the-spot analysis during all ARDF "Z" missions. Primary interest was in the development of communications entities passing exploitable traffic. The initial start of low level intercept began with a TDY trip to the 8th Radio Research Field Station (USM-808) by two senior analysts. A liaison agreement was reached whereby we would have an airborne analyst at USM-808 to provide daily technical support to our missions, feedback of our progress, indentification training on exploitable systems, and procedures for passing this traffic to USM-808. An extensive training program was instituted for the airborne analyst, who became the airborne mission supervisor while flying on a "Z" mission.

[redacted] In May, the tasking and processing responsibility for morse tactical communications along the DMZ was transferred from USM-808 to the 3rd

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Marine Amphibious Force (USN-414J), USM-808 retained ARDF tasking responsibility. A TDY trip by the senior airborne analyst to explain our capability and limitations to USN-414J resulted in a liaison agreement similiar to the one with USM-808. Provisions were made for an advanced ground data base at Dong Ha to receive exploitable traffic from our mission aircraft and for this purpose a specific sole-user frequency was arranged and utilized. All Combat Cougar Zulu operations stops for traffic drop-off were switched from Hue-Phu Bai to Da Nang as of 11 May. During June, USN-414J issued 73 product reports based upon our intercept efforts in our primary area.

Ground Analysis

(UNCLAS) The Ground Analysis Section is responsible for the identification of fix targets, briefing/debriefing of crew members and forwarding post flight mission summaries (Recovery Reports) for each mission.

[redacted] In January 1968, the senior analyst went to Hue-Phu Bai, (USM-808), to correlate identification data and establish procedures for current update of the technicial support required to back break target callsigns to base rads and or basics. This TDY effected an up to date case/rad/basic book used exclusively at this unit to break intercepted callsigns, and is aligned with USM-808 identification aids. A visit was also made to the 330th Radio Research Company (USM-604), in order to establish a similiar base for the Pleiku area. Although we are not responsible for ARDF in this area, we have found

[redacted]

[redacted] it to our advantage to keep abreast of identification techniques and maintain identification aids for the II Corps area.

[redacted] During the Tet offensive this section began working as a psuedo direct support unit, in close coordination with the 509th Special Forces Unit analyst stationed at USM-604. Fixes attained in Kontum, Dak To, Pleiku area were immediately forwarded to the 509th Special Forces Unit via OPSCOMM. Even though reported to a normal direct support unit, we found that by utilizing the OPSCOMM circuit we could provide the Special Forces the opportunity to evaluate and react to our area fix input before they received the fix through CRITICOMM channels, via direct support unit or recovery report media. This support was commended by the Pleiku Air Base Commander verbally to the Detachment Commander in March 1968. He stated that the close direct support provided by this unit to local area commanders, via liaison with the 330th Radio Research Company and 509th Special Forces Unit, provided them with intelligence not readily available, nor so rapid as their normal sources. Further, that the intelligence provided was instrumental in providing the local defense forces prologues of enemy intentions.

[redacted] To increase the aids for the radio operators during their missions, the Ground Analysis Section began providing them with the priority LAs of the surrounding areas and of areas passed through to and from their mission area. This additional technical support allowed for the quick identification of

[redacted]

[redacted]

priority targets not heretofore available because they were not in the fragged area. (MACV has authorized any aircraft noting a priority 1A to take chase and fix the target, even though the target was not in the mission's fragged area). It also provided additional sources to react when a DSU tipped off that a particular 1A target was up. Whereby previously only the one aircraft in that particular area would react, with the additional technical support two or three aircraft would react, affording for more complete coverage of priority targets.

[redacted] Additional trips to USM-808 and USM-604 were performed for training familiarization and coordination during this period. The analysts at this detachment and USM-808/604 and USN-414J work in a close relationship with the ARDF program. The results of this close relationship has proved fruitful as reflected in the increase of mission effectiveness as depicted in the airborne operations section of this report.

[redacted]

APPENDIX D

HISTORY

AIRBORNE RADIO DIRECTION FINDING COORDINATION CENTER

[redacted]

HISTORY

OF THE

AIRBORNE RADIO DIRECTION FINDING

COORDINATION CENTER

(ACC)

1 January - 30 June 1968

This document contains information affecting the nation defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, USC, Sections 793 and 794) the transmission or revelation of which, in any manner, to an unauthorized person, is prohibited by law.

Prepared by
MSgt Tony Z. Odom
Operational Historian, 6994th Security Squadron

Approved:

SIGNED

JACK D. STEVENS, MAJOR, USAF
OIC ACC

[redacted]

[redacted]

Chapter 1

Mission and Organization

Mission

[redacted] The MACV concept of operations for the ARDF program in South Vietnam placed certain responsibilities with the Commander, 6994th Security Squadron and the Commander, 509th Radio Research Group that were to be accomplished as a joint effort. The units subsequently formed a joint operations center to accomplish these responsibilities. The unit was initially formed on 1 July 1966. However, it was not approved by MACV until Octeber 1 1966. The unit was initially designated the Joint Platform Management Group, but was later redesignated as the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC). The mission of the ACC was:

> "To provide for the coordinated management of the ARDF program in South Vietnam and other areas as directed by the Commander, USMACV."

[redacted] To accomplish this mission, the ACC promulgated and issued directives that governed all phases of the ARDF operation that involved both services and were suited for standardization.

Organization

[redacted] The ACC was manned jointly by USAF personnel of the 6994th Security Squadron and U.S. Army personnel of the 509th Radio Research Group. The Command duties were shared jointly by an Officer-in-Charge from each of

[redacted]

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ARDF COORDINATION CENTER (ACC)



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[redacted]

two services (Chart 1). Each OIC was directly responsible to the Commander of his respective organization; the ACC, however, was not subordinated to any headquarters, per-se.

(U) The facility was colocated with the 509th Radio Research Group at Whitebirch Station, within the Vietnamese Joint General Staff Compound, adjacent to Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam.

Internal Organizational Changes

[redacted] During mid March, the Automated Support Section was deactivated. The action resulted from the loss of the section's computer. Personnel formely assigned to the section were reassigned within the ACC.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Chapter II

Support

Personnel

(U) The authorized strength for the ACC was 67 personnel, 52 Army, and 15 Air Force (see Chart 2). The assigned strength as of 30 June was 38 personnel, 23 Army and 15 USAF.

Communications Facilities

[redacted] The activities at the ACC were supported by OPSCOMM circuits to the CMA's and the Army and Air Force ARDF aviation units (Chart 3): Also, KY-3 circuits to the 6994th Security Squadron, DODSPECREP, the 224th Aviation Battalion and MACV-J2.

Chapter III

Tasking

[redacted] During late February, MACV-J2 delegated, to ACC, the responsibility for coordination of sortie scheduling for Airborne COMINT Collection platforms. The ACC subsequently conducted a conference of the CMA's, DODSPECREP, 6994th Security Squadron and 224th AVN BN to discuss the ramifications of this new procedure. The ACC issued the first tasking for the collection aircraft on 6 March. This marked the initial formalization of tasking for the collection aircraft and resulted in the increased effectiveness of their employment.

[redacted]

[redacted]

ACC OPSCOM CIRCUIT DIAGRAM



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Chapter IV

Special Projects

Quarterly ARDF Conferences

[redacted] The 3rd and 4th Quarter ARDF Conferences were conducted during January and June, respectively. The 3rd quarter conference (18-19 January) consisted largely of presentations, by guest speakers, pertaining to the various methods of ARDF employment in SVN and also, other activities associated with the ARDF program. The 4th quarterly conference was oriented toward presenting the conferees with a complete picture of the activities that comprise an ARDF mission - from the levying of the requirement to the successful accomplishment of the mission. In each instance general items of interest and/or problem areas were aired for discussion.

Projects Mustard and All-Spice.

[redacted] These projects consisted of the utilization of wideband intercept to identify ARDF fixes. The basic process consisted of matching ARDF intercept data with similar intercept from wideband. This effort was resulting in approximately 14 identified fixes per day. At the 330th Radio Research Co., Pleiku, the project was called "Mustard"; at the 175th Radio Research Co., Long Binh, it was "All-Spice". The ACC role in these projects was to insure that sufficient target data was included in the ARDF Recovery

[redacted]

[redacted] Report to facilitate the traffic comparison.

[redacted] During January the decision was made to reissue ACC Working Aid 01-68 as a series of working aids, broken down as follows:

01-68 The ARDF program, general

02-68 The ARDF mission tasking process

03-68 ARDF mission procedures and product reporting system

04-68 ARDF A/G, G/A communications

05-68 Programs and operations supported by ARDF (Market Time-Game Warden-Visual Sightings)

06-68 The ARDF opscom and KY-3 support systems

07-68 Tactical Automatic Data Processing Support of ARDF

Working Aids 01-68 through 06-68 were published during May. The publication of 07-68 was withheld pending reinstallation of the computer.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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