HISTORY


OF THE

6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

1 January - 30 June 1969

RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1)

Queek by



UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200,10 DOES NOT APPLY

USAFSS FORM 86

4 1 of 4 Cys

HISTORY OF THE 6994TH SECURITY SQUADRON

1 January - 30 June 1969

RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1)

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18, USC, Sections 793 and 794) the transmission or revelation of which, in any manner, to an unauthorized person, is prohibited by law.

Prepared by:

FELICE FOTI, MSgt, USAF

Operational Historian

Approved:

DUANE E RUSSELL, Lt Colonel, USAF

Commander



This history covers the operational activities of the 6994th Security Squadron during the reporting period 1 January 1969 through 30 June 1969. The histories of the detachments are presented as attachments to this document.

This history was prepared primarily from files, interviews and project folders available at this unit. Because this unit was located in a war zone, unit files were kept to a minimum for obvious security reasons. Consequently, the amount and kind of supporting documents available for a history of this kind were somewhat limited. What this history lacks in depth however, is more than compensated for by its uniqueness in Security Service channels. During the historical period reported herein, the 6994th Security Squadron and its detachments were the only security service units engaged in an ARDF Mission under combat conditions. As such, this unit was actively engaged in performing a distinctive tactical combat support role. Its performance could well have a dynamic impact on future COMINT support in conceptual military planning.

The research and writing of this history was accomplished by MSgt Foti. All suggestions and comments concerning this history should be directed to the Operations Officer, 6994th Security Squadron.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Cover Page	i
Title Page	ii
Frontispiece	iii
Foreword	iv
Table of Contents	v
List of Illustrations	vii
Chronology	viii
CHAPTER I - MISSION AND ORGANIZATION	-1
Mission and Organization	ì
Organizational Changes	2
Deployment to Nakhon Phanom	2
Hue Phu Bai Contingency Planning	3
Internal Organizational Changes	4
CHAPTER II - SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION	6
Basic Missions	6
The Tasking Cycle	7
Change in ARDF Tasking Priorities	8
COMJAN Mission	9
SIGINT Collection Facilities	10
SIGINT Collection Policies	13
Manning Problems	12
Airborne Analysis	14
Special Collection Projects	14

	V1
Centurian IV	14
Centurian V	15
Carpenter	15
Centurian VI	16
CHAPTER III - PROCESSING AND REPORTING	18
Introduction	18
Aviation Daily Status Report	18
Southeast Asia Technical Summary	19
Iocal Analysis	19
Implementation of New DURMIS Format	20
New ARDF Recovery Report Format	21
Data Base	21
Unit MUSSO File Established	. 22
FOOTNOTES	24
LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS	29
GLOSSARY	32
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS	
HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 1, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON	
HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 2, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON	
HISTORY OF DETACHMENT 3, 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON	

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

- Figure 1 MACV Areas
- Figure 2 Combat Cougar EC-47 Basic System
- Figure 3 Combat Cougar Zulu
- Chart 1 Organizational Chart 6994 Scty Sq
- Chart 2 Organizational Chart 6994 Scty Sq Operations Branch
- Chart 3 Tasking Cycle
- Table 1 A List of Coordinates of MACV Areas 1 thru 11
- Table 2 Reports Issued by 6994th Security Squadron

CHRONOLOGY

- 14 January USAFSS authorizes selected MUSSO documents to be held by 6994th Scty Sq and Detachments.
- 28 January USAFSS grants 6994th Scty Sq waiver of maximum flying hours restriction for 203Xls.
- 5 February 6994th Scty Sq begins participation in Operation Carpenter.
- 9 February 6994th Scty Sq begins participation in Operation Centurian IV.
- 14 February New DURMIS format implemented.
- 15 February Internal Organization Changes made in Squadron Operations.
- 16 February 6994th Scty Sq completes participation in Centurian IV.
- 18 February 6994th Scty Sq begins participation in Centurian V.
- 22 February 6994th Scty Sq completes participation in Centurian V.
- 28 February ACC directs aviation units to discontinue ID of targets in Recovery Reports.
- 5 March 6994th Scty Sq completes participation in Operation Carpenter.
- 6 March 6994th Scty Sq begins participation in Centurian VI.
- 14 March 6994th Scty Sq directs Detachments to improve their data base.
- 18 March Meeting of 7AF Staff Agencies for Phu Bai contingency planning held.
- 28 March MUSSO documents dispatched by NSA to 6994th Scty Sq and subordinate Detachments.
- 29 March New ARDF Recovery Report Format Implemented.
- 29 March New AVN Daily Status Report Implemented.
- 6 April 6994th Scty Sq participation in Centurian VI completed.
- 12 April Detachment 3, 6994th Scty Sq established at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

Southeast Asia Technical Summary (SEATS) implemented on a 12 April 90 day test basis. 14 April First EC-47 aircraft deployed to Nakhon Phanom. Aircraft fly first tasked missions. 24 April COMJAM equipment removed from aircraft to reduce weight. Temporary storage authorized until final disposition. Aircraft fly limited Zulu Missions. 24 May 6940th Scty Sq proposes linguist pool to solve chronic shortage of linguists in SEA. 6994th Scty Sq rejects linguist pool in favor of a long 28 May term solution. Preliminary data indicates SEATS is successful at 6994th 28 Jun

Scty Sq. Pac Scty Rgn recommends its continuation.

Chapter I

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

Mission and Organization:

Headquarters for the 6994th Security Squadron was located at Tan Son Nhut Air Base Republic of Vietnam. Its operational mission was to conduct Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) and specified Communications Intelligence (COMINT) collection against enemy targets in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zone in direct support of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). In addition to its own operational mission, the 6994th Scty Sq provided operational control for its subordinate units which were Detachment 1 at Nha Trang, Detachment 2 at Pleiku and the newly formed Detachment 3 at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

The 6994th Scty Sq Operations Branch was located in the AFSSO 7th Air Force Compound within the 7AF Headquarters complex at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. In performing its operational mission, the 6994th Scty Sq was assisted by the 360th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (TEWS) which provided the necessary aircraft and front end crews. The 360th TEWS was subordinate to the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TEW) whose subordinate units, 361TEWS, 362TEWS and Det 2, 460TEW supported Det 1, Det 2 and Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq respectively.

The 6994th Security Squadron performed its operational mission aboard EC-47 aircraft. With the phase out of the Sentinel Sara l Project in 1968, missions tasked were of three types: Combat Cougar, Combat Cougar Zulu, Primary ARDF and Combat Cougar Zulu Primary Collection.

The 6994th Scty Sq was administratively subordinate to the 6922nd Security Wing, Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philipines. However, operational control was nominally exercised by 7th Air Force, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam. Because of the inter-service involvement in the ARDF program in Southeast Asia (SEA), general operational control was exercised by MACV (J2).

Organizational Changes

Deployment to Nakhon Phanom

The activation of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand in April 1969 was the principal organizational change to take place during this reporting period. Two Combat Cougar aircraft were assigned on a TDY basis, and official tasking for them was begun on 12 April 1969. Since its activation, Detachment 3 made significant and substantial contributions to the operational ARDF mission 4 in Southeast Asia, as was evidenced by their productivity figures.

The decision to deploy EC-47 aircraft to Thailand in support of Commando Forge was not without its difficulties. The principal problem centered over the location of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron. Non-Air Force agencies involved in the planning of the Commando Forge deployment favored basing the aircraft at Udorn, Thailand. The basis for their stand was the desirability of co-locating the aviation unit with the Collection Management Authority (CMA). The official USAFSS position was that Nakhon Phanom would better serve USAFSS requirements. This position was based on several considerations:

- l. Army analysts were unable to maintain target continuity without input of Combat Cougar intercept because targets in North Laos were
 unreadable from ground positions at Udorn.
- 2. Any sizeable input from Combat Cougar aircraft probably would exceed the austere Army processing capability, thereby making it desirable to have remedial input from USAFSS Analysts.
- 3. Aircraft based at Nakhon Phanom would be closer to target areas in Laos than they would be at Udorn thereby reducing in-flight time to target area frag points and increasing time spent over targets (TOT). A sampling of aerial distances made this readily apparent. The distance from Nakhon Phanom to Tchepone was 95 nautical miles while the distance from Udorn to Tchepone was 200 nautical miles. (Tchepone was then at the southern end of MACV area 1). Though the distance from Udorn to Sam Neua in Northern Laos is 180 nautical miles as opposed to 210 nautical miles from Nakhon Phanom, the overall advantage seemed to be with Nakhon Phanom. The question of location of Detachment 3 being resolved, deployment took place on 14 April 1969 and Detachment 3, 6994 Scty Sq became a valuable element of this Squadron.

Hue Phu Bai Contingency Planning

On 18 March 1969, the Director of Electronic Warfare (DOE) called a meeting of 7AF staff agencies, 460THW and 6994 Scty Sq representatives to determine the status of planning for establishment of an operating location at Hue Phu Bai. EC-47 operations at Phu Bai were

suspended by 7AF during the 1968 Tet Offensive because of the lack of revetments, ramp space and support facilities. Resumption of operations from this location would result in uncreased productivity for all of the I Corps area missions. An increase of over 200 hours per month over target areas could be realized over the current operations from Det 2 10 at Pleiku. It was agreed at this meeting that the 6994 Scty Sq should restate its position on this matter.

Further study by this unit revealed that DaNang (USA-32) was a leading candidate for best satisfying requirements in regards to an alternate site for processing of the USM-808 (CMA at Phu Bai) portion of the General Directorate Rear Services (GDRS) problem. The principal advantages of this move were:

- 1. The availability of adequate operations spaces.
- 2. A relatively safe airfield.
- 3. The proximity to Phu Bai, allowing for rapid transfer of required personnel and possibly equipment.
 - 4. Existence of adequate communications facilities.
- At the close of this reporting period contingency planning for Hue Phu Bai was still in progress. Further details will be provided in the 6994 Scty Sq History for period 1 July 1969 through 31 December 1969.

 Internal Organizational Changes

On 15 February 1969 internal organizational changes were made within the 6994th Security Squadron's Operations Branch with the

objective of making local flight operations more efficient and providing greater operational control and standardization of subordinate units. At the time, the existing organizational structure was not broad enough to allow this organization to perform adequate second echelon functions. Overlapping responsibilities between related elements resulted in needless duplication of effort in some areas and inadequate control in others. Consequently, squadron management of detachment operations was relatively inefficient.

Squadron level Mission Management and Standardization and Evaluation (SEFE) section which was designated OPS-2. This section, directly responsible to the Operations Officer, performed second echelon management functions. Airborne Operations (OPS-3) was divided into four sections: SEFE, Mission Management, Flight Operations, and Processing, Analysis and Reporting. The reorganization resulted in more efficient mission accomplishment at the local level, improved control of subordinate units, and more realistic utilization of mission resources.

Chapter II

SIGINT TASKING AND COLLECTION

Basic Missions

The 6994th Security Squadron Local Operations was tasked with flying ARDF missions in MACV Areas 08, 09, 10 and 11 (see figure 1). The objective of these missions was to fix the location of Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in South Viet Nam (SVN), and to collect target communications data in order to derive exploitable intelligence therefrom.

- Basically there were three types of missions tasked:
- 1. Combat Cougar. Primary mission of a Combat Cougar Mission was to fix targets on intercept assignment. Aircraft utilized on this mission were configured with an "X" and "Y" console. The "X" console was the ARDF position, utilizing AIR-34 or AIR-35 equipment. Its frequency range was 2 MHZ through 16 MHZ. The "Y" console was used to provide support intercept copy for targets being fixed on the "X" console and also used to collect COMINT for continuity and development. The frequency range of the "Y" console was .5 MHZ through 30 MHZ.
- 2. Combat Cougar Zulu Primary Collection. The primary mission was to collect exploitable traffic on intercept assignment and to fix these targets as required. In addition to the "X" and "Y" consoles, Combat Cougar Zulu aircraft were configured with "Zl" and Z2" consoles. (see figure 3). The "Zl" position was capable of HF/VHF intercept collection. Frequency range on this console was .5 MHZ through 30 MHZ

and AM/FM 10 MHZ through 260 MHZ. The "Z2" console had a frequency range of .5 MHZ through 30 MHZ.

3. Combat Cougar Zulu Primary ARDF. This type of mission differed from other Combat Cougar Zulu Missions only in the priority of its objective. In this type of mission the primary tasking was fixing targets and the secondary tasking was collection.

The Tasking Cycle

The tasking cycle by which the 6994 Scty Sq was assigned missions was unique for a Security Service unit in that it was designed for tactical support in a fluid combat situation. Targets were highly mobile, and targets fixed one day frequently moved the next or could have been eliminated through action of friendly forces.

The tasking cycle began with Army Field Commanders, the cryptologic community and 7AF submission of their ARDF requirements to MACV J211-4. (See Chart 3). On Wednesday of each week MACV J211-4 submitted the proposed tasking to the ARDF Coordinating Committee.

This committee consisted of representatives of the 509th Radio Research Group (509RRG), 6994 Scty Sq, ARDF Coordination Center (ACC), J2 MACV, 7AF, Department of Defense Special Representative (DODSPECREP) and Commander Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV). The ARDF Coordinating Committee then passed its recommendations to J2 MACV for final approval.

J2 MACV then forwarded the approved tasking to ACC. During this time 460th TRW had made available to ACC an aircraft capability forecast for the tasking week. ACC then assigned missions to fulfill the tasking.

The mission data was then forwarded to the 6994 Scty Sq who scheduled back end crews to meet assigned missions. Meanwhile ACC also issued mission data (sanitized version) to 7AF (DCCRS) who issued frag orders for each mission.

Tech support data for each mission was provided by the appropriate CMA. Once missions were airborne, Direct Support Units (DSU) received fixes and exploitable messages from mission aircraft and passed tip-offs ground-to-air.

Change in ARDF Tasking Priorities

On 1 June 1969 ACC Working Aid 02-69 was received. In Section III, Paragraph 5 were listed new priority designators pertaining to ARDF Missions. The new designations were necessary because the number of enemy radio stations targeted increased from 787 in May 1967 to 3126 in June 1969. This increase was coupled with a more diversified disposition of Free World Military Forces, resulting in commanders at all echelons requesting increasingly higher ARDF priorities on those enemy elements within close proximity of their areas of operation (AO). This trend reduced the significance of the then existing priority system.

The following system was implemented:

PRIORITY
DESIGNATOR

CLASSIFYING CRITERIA

PREQUENCY OF UPDATING LOCATIONS

Priority 1 a. Combat elements in contact, geographically situated to pose a threat to friendly forces, or moving

Fix twice daily (one morning, one later afternoon or evening) b. During allied sweep or specified attack operations elements known to be in the area may be elevated to priority 1 prior to initiation of combat operations.

Priority 2 Combat elements comprising DTV/REGT/BN,
MI and MA elements, fwd CP's of DTV/
REGT/BN, local force BN's and selected
front Hqs operating in established areas
of operations of that specific unit
when not in contact with friendly forces.
Unidentified elements which are determined as serving maneuver units of
DTV/REGT/BN echelon to determine OB
identification.

Fix once daily maintain location

Priority 3 Targets which move infrequently, COSVN, VNC, HQ SVN, MR HQS, transportation and infiltration elements, combat support and party HQS and elements. Unidentified elements for which continuity has been established for determining OB identification.

Fix once every third day to maintain location

COMJAM Mission

The 6994th Security Squadron had been tasked with a Communications Jamming (COMJAM) mission in support of U.S. Military Land

Operations in South Vietnam as far back as 24 December 1966. This project was given the name MONKEY POD. COMUSHACV was authorized to implement this plan as required. The MONKEY POD Plan called for the communications jamming of enemy HF tactical circuits in support of selected U.S. Military Land Operations in South Vietnam to increase the combat effectiveness of the units supported. During the periods before this history, COMJAM equipment (QRC-346) system was received and installed.

At the beginning of this reporting period five aircraft had QRC-346 systems installed. The configuration of these aircraft

was identical with the Combat Cougar Zulu configuration (see figure 3) but in place of the "Zl and "Z2" consoles there were "Q1" and "Q2" consoles equipped with the QRC-346.

In January 1969, this unit requested the integration of nontraining into the AZK course in order that a sufficient COMJAM capability
could be achieved. USAFSS advised that should it become necessary to
activate the COMJAM mission, this unit should develop a training program
utilizing local resources. Steps were taken to develop a local training
program, but the program could not be activated because MACV approval
to utilize the equipment could not be secured.

Meanwhile the weight of the QRC-345 system was creating a safety problem. The weight was so great the "Q" configured aircraft were at least one thousand pounds overweight to meet safety-of-flight minimum climb restrictions. This required downloading of fuel and subsequent reduction in TOT. 7AF approached PACAF concerning removal of th QRC-346 equipment because of the adverse effect on TOT. Approval was received and equipment was removed on 24 Apr 69 on the condition that it could be replaced within 48 hours. "Q" consoles, however, were left aboard the aircraft so that the aircraft could be utilized with a limited "Z" capability.

Sigint Collection Facilities

At the beginning of this historical period, the entire squadron collection capability (including subordinate detachments) consisted of 57 EC-47 aircraft. Local operations utilized 21 of these aircraft and the remainder were split between Detachment 1 at Nha Trang

and Detachment 2 at Pleiku. Aircraft used by local operations were assigned to the 360th TEWS at Tan Son Nhut. The 360th provided front end crews and air frame maintenance. Back end mission equipment was serviced by the 6994th Security Squadron "Bravo" Maintenance.

When Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron was established in April 1969, aircraft to perform its mission were provided on a rotational TDY basis from this unit and its other detachments.

of the twenty-one aircraft used by local operations, all were equipped with "X" and "Y" consoles. Fifteen of the "X" consoles were AN/AIR-34 (X1) and six were AN/AIR-35 (X2). The basic difference between these two systems was that the AN/AIR-35 was equipped with a computer which automatically plotted fixes. The AN/AIR-34 yielded a line of position to the target which the navigator used to plot the fix manually. The "Y" console was invariable on all aircraft.

Four of the aircraft were also equipped with two "Z" consoles (Zl and Z2) each. These aircraft were utilized for Combat Cougar Zulu missions, Primary Collection or Primary ARDF. Five of the aircraft were equipped with the QRC-346. As stated previously, these positions were removed on 24 April 1969, "G" equipment was left aboard the aircraft, and they were used to perform with a limited "Z" capability. This represented the only significant change in mission equipment during this reporting period.

Sigint Collection Policies

The USAFSS Master Program was the standard used to determine the extent to which this unit was using its resources. Because of the

need to move aircraft between this unit and its detachments for TDY in support of special collection missions and the need to have aircraft meet maintenance schedules, it was rare, if ever, that all mission resources being used at 100% mission capability. The Squadron Master Program Review Board continued to meet quarterly to evaluate mission resources and recommend changes.

During this reporting period the following number of aircraft were not operational for periods of 24 hours or more for reasons
10
stated:

Maintenance, including parts for both front and back end equipment - 35
Reduced capability - 3

IRAN Maintenance at Taiwan - 6

Corresion Control at Kadena - 4

Calibration - 2

2042 Modification - 2

TDY to Det 3 - 6

TOTAL 115

Manning Problems

Manning continued to present problems during this period.

A severe shortage of linguists developed at Detachment 2 and continued through most of this period. To assist them, linguists were sent TDY from this unit and Detachment 1, but this caused undue strain on this unit. With the establishment of Detachment 3 in April 1969, the situation became critical.

In late January 1969, it became necessary to request a waiver of the maximum flying time provisions of AFR 60-7 for linguists at Detachment 2. This waiver was granted by USAFSS on 28 January 1969. Stopgap TDY measures were used to shore up the manning but it became obvious by May 1969 that more positive steps would have to be taken to alleviate the problem. Thus the 6922nd Security Wing tasked the 6990th Security Squadron to conduct a study on effective utilization of 203X-MD personnel. The study was completed on 24 May 1969. It was a very detailed and exhaustive study. The principal recommendation made was to pool all MD liquists at USA-522 and support SEA requirements with 60 day TDY's.

On 28 May 1969, this unit forwarded its comments to the 6922nd Security Wing. It was felt here that the recurring TDY proposed would be satisfactory in meeting urgent requirements but still provide no long range solution to the problem. Principal objections to the proposal were:

- 1. It would not induce extension in the frequency of TDY nor lighten the burden of 320 hours flying time per 60 days.
- 2. The commander would lose control of part of the mission in that supervisors and operators would come from a "central pool" making the voice mission a responsibility of another chain of command.
- 3. The single manager concept would not ensure positive control of training and standardization because the 6990th Scty Sq voice problem was not compatible with that of the 6994th Scty Sq. 6990th linguists were targeted mostly against GDRS (RIXX).
- (U) At the end of this historical period the quest for a long term solution was still in progress.

Airborne Analysts

In the last historical report it was stated that airborne analysts loss and loss that elimination of the airborne analyst would reduce the effectiveness of loss collection missions. Additionally, a definite need for airborne analysts existed at Detachment 3. At the close of this reporting period only two airborne analysts were authorized and assigned. Under these circumstances, A292Xls were performing the bulk of the airborne analyst duties.

Special Collection Projects

This unit was tasked with providing operational support for several tactical ground operations. Included were Centurion IV, Centurion V, Carpenter, Centurion VI and Centurion VII.

Centurian IV

This operation was conducted during the period 9 through 16
February 1969 in support of the 3d Mobile Strike Force (MSF), Co A, 5th
Special Forces Group. Centurian IV ground operations included conventional combat patrols and search and clear operations, combat operations, mobile guerrilla operations, raids and ambushes within the AC. The
6994th Security Squadron shared the aircraft support function with the
Army's 146th Aviation Company. The ARDF monitor position was stationed at Forward Operating Base (FOB) DOTTIE and manned by personnel of the
403rd Special Operation Detachment (SOD), 5th Special Forces. This monitor position was used to receive data from our aircraft and provide the 3d MSF with intelligence reports and guidance pertaining to the deployment of troops and fire support against ARDF fixed targets, considering radius of fix and timeliness of reports.

The role of the 6994th Security Squadron was mentioned in the After Action Report as follows: "The Air Force mission proved to be the 19 most profilic (sic) in their support. Daily hours of coverage averaged 20 l7 hours. A total of 58 Intelligence Reports (IR) were passed during 21 this operation".

Centurian V

The mission of Centurian V was similar to Centurian IV except that an additional objective was "interdiction and denial of enemy access 22 to Bien Hoa and Long Binh". The role of the 6994th was the same as for Centurian IV. The ARDF monitoring position was positioned at FOB TERRY and was manned by the 403rd SCD. This operation took place between 18 and 22 February 1969. A total of 121 IR's were passed with average daily hours of coverage being 17 hours.

The following comments concerning this unit's support of the operation were noted by the Army's 403rd SOD: "Though only in operation for four days, the most significant factor contributing to the success of this operation was the support of the 6994th Security Squadron. The 6994th went out of its way to provide support. 90% of the IRs received and passed were from 6994th aircraft".

Carpenter

Operation Carpenter was an in-force reconnaissance operation conducted by 3rd BN, II Corps Mobile Strike Force between 5 February - 5 March 1969. Its mission was to locate the COMINT identified Darlac Provincial Unit, B3 Front associates and suspected VC sympathizers in

an area 45 kilometers (KM) Southeast of Ban Me Thout in an area locally known as Happy Valley. The entire operation was planned based on COMINT intelligence developed by the 403rd SOD at Ban Me Thout and ARDF locations provided by the 144th Aviation Co (RR) and the 6994th Security Squadron (USAF).

The ARDF support provided to this operation was evidenced by comments made in the 403rd SOD After Action Report: "At all times enemy location within the AO were known due to ARDF support. If friendly units were close enough to a reported location they would immediately move to the area and investigate. The 403rd team advised the company to investigate a previously reported location which resulted in discovery of an enemy base camp, supplies and documents. The captured documents proved to be the best intelligence find in II Corps for the past three years, providing complete personnel rosters of 401st and 301st IF Bn's and strength figures for subordinate units of the Darlac Provinical Unit."

In its conclusions and recommendations, the 403rd SOD stated "This operation (Carpenter) has decisively proved the value of direct mobile ARDF support for tactical operations. ARDF intelligence is immediately available to the tactical commander who can most effectively 26 employ the intelligence".

Centurian VI

The objective of Centurian VI differed very little from its predecessors, Centurian IV and Centurian V. An ARDF monitor position was placed at FOB KATE. The operation took place from 6 March through 6 April 1969. There were 17 hours of daily coverage. 662 intelligence

reports were padded during this period.

Actions initiated and results obtained by the 3rd Mobile Strike Force in reaction to direct ARDF support included: 72 air strikes, 157 artillery strikes, 27 combat operations resulting in 297 enemy killed in action, 72 killed by air strikes and 6 prisoners taken. Targets destroyed: 297 bunkers, 1070 meters of trench line, 12 fighting positions, 7 tunnel entrances, 8 trails cut, 6 huts, 1 footbridge, 1 water supply and a great amount of ordnance captured.

The operation was considered a success based on the tactical situation and the results obtained. The accuracy of intelligence produced from ARDF operations was evidenced by the fact that 40% of the IRs 29 passed were acted upon.

Following the termination of Centurian VI, members of the 403rd SOD came to Tan Son Nhut to brief 6994th Security Squadron air-crews on the results of their ARDF support. A sanitized briefing was also provided to the aircrews of the 360th TEWS. The 6994th was presented a Certificate of Service, two captured Viet Cong radios, and a Letter of Commendation from the Commander, 5th Special Forces.

Chapter III

PROCESSING AND REPORTING

Introduction

The mission of this Squadron's Processing, Analysis and Reporting Section underwent significant changes during this reporting period. Current technical information and related data based files on all tasked entities continued to be maintained during this time. Preparation of identification and working aids proceeded on a continual basis. Other functions included pre-mission briefing of aircrew members on appropriate technical data, related information and equipment for each mission, and post-mission debrief of aircrews. Quality control of all reports was also conducted within this section.

A summary of this unit's reporting responsibilities may be found in table 2 of this report. Product reports were issued by the CMA, USM-626. This unit did not have the authorization to issue Crities, Spots and TACREPS or other consumer reports.

Aviation Daily Status Report

On 27 March 1969 ACC directed the implementation of the AVN Daily Status Report. The purpose of the report was to reduce the length and increase the timeliness of ARDF Recovery Reports. Implementation of the Status Report took place on 29 March 1969 and coincided with the new ARDF Recovery Report Format implemented the same day. The AVN Daily Status Report included items formerly contained in the first ARDF Recovery Report of each tasking day. Its implementation expedited processing of recovery reports at ACC and at the respective CMAs.

South East Asia Technical Summary (SEATS)

Local Analysis

On April 12, 1969 this unit implemented SEATS reporting at the direction of USAFSS. Implementation was on a ninety day test basis to determine the feasibility of 6994th units participation in the program. Results were highly satisfactory, and at the end of this reporting period, PACSCTYRGN recommended continuation of the program indefinitely. The success of the program was evidenced by the 43% average identification rate of fixes achieved by 6994th Security Squadron and Detachments.

Perhaps more importantly, the SEATS test precipitated a change in the concept of operations for local analysis at the 6994th. Emphasis was placed upon building a local technical data base. Analysts were relieved of all recovery reporting and debriefing duties and these functions were assumed by A292X1's. The immediate goal was to develop a local identification capability.

The measure used to determine progress in this regard was the identification (ID) rate, which was the percentage of total targets which could be identified to case notation by local analysts. (Only those targets on which call signs were obtained were included in this figure since the technical documents available to 6994th analysts made it impossible to identify other than by callsign). The percentage of targets with call signs was very high, since the importance of obtaining call signs whenever possible had been stressed to the operators for some time. The ID rate for 6994th Local Airborne Operations at the end of the reporting period had climbed to a very respectable 54% of targets fixed and 46% of all targets intercepted.

Another important goal of the local analysis effort was to provide more current technical data to the aircrews, thereby increasing their chances of intercepting and fixing priority targets. Progress was made in this area through the development of supplemental "cherry sheets" which were prepared locally for each mission by 6994th analysts. The supplemental cherry sheets provided the latest tech data on priority or special emphasis targets. Since the standard cherry sheets (previously the only source of mission tech data available to aircrews) were prepared by the CMA two or three days in advance, the supplemental cherry sheets proved to be a most valuable vehicle for coping with the rapidly changing SIGINT and tactical environment in III and IV Corps.

In another attempt to provide more usable tech data to the aircrews, local analysts provided a mission profile for each mission. The profile was a pictorial representation of the mission area showing a suggested flight path and locations of the most important targets. The 6994th radio operators used the profile to brief the navagator on positioning of the aircraft.

Implementation of New DURMIS Format.

The new Daily Unit Resource Management Information Summary (DURMIS) promulgated by USAFSS on 28 January 1969 was implemented on 14 February 1969. The purpose of the new format was to provide standardized reporting and incorporate principles of efficient management contained in USAFSSM 200-4. The new format was designed with a view toward future machine processing. The principal impact of the new DURMIS format at this

unit was the elimination of the consolidated Squadron DURMIS. Each subordinate Detachment forwarded their DURMIS directly to appropriate addressees. Quality control of DURMIS produced by subordinate units continued at this headquarters. Principal problems encountered were primarily centered around unfamiliarity with the new format and difficulty with using a VII part message as a basic reference indefinitely. The former problem was eliminated as those preparing the DURMIS gained experience in using the new format. An active quality control program also helped to stablised the situation. The latter problem remained through the remainder of the reporting period but USAFSS was nearing publication of Volume XV, USAFSS 200-4 which would embody the new format.

New ARDF Recovery Report Format

As was mentioned previously, 10 a new ARDF Recovery Report format was initiated on 29 March 1969. The principal features of this new format were: The elimination of certain data formerly included in the AVN Daily Status Report and the establishment of a machine format for the ARDF Recovery Report. As a result of the new format, it became necessary to use some 292X1s in preparation of recovery reports. The new format, plus the addition of the AVN Daily Status Report coupled with the impending SEATS 11 Test put a manpower squeeze on the already undermanned 202X0s.

Data Base

The new ACC Working Aid 03-69 ARDF Mission Procedures and Product Reporting System dated 28 February 1969 did not require case notations in the Recovery Report. The only RDs that could be reported were those that appeared on the cherry sheet. At the same time, this action was not in keeping

with USAFSS desires to retain as much organic analytic capability as possible within our ARDF Squadron. 12

Meanwhile, the impending SEATS test made it absolutely necessary that the analytic Data Base here and at subordinate detachments be expanded in order to provide adequate support for SEATS.

On 14 Merch this unit took action directing its subordinate detachments to improve their Data Base Development and Identification procedures. 13 Pac Scty Rgn directed a maximum effort on ARDF target identification. 14

Unit MUSSO File Established

In January 1969 USAFSS responded to this unit's efforts to secure Manual United States Sigint Operations (MUSSO)¹⁵ documents pertinent to our operations by authorizing certain documents to be held by us and requesting copies of these documents for us and our subordinate detachments.

On 28 March 1969 NSA forwarded most of the documents and upon their receipt a MUSSO library was set up. The library, however, was not complete and at the close of this reporting period efforts were being made to procure those documents still not received. 16

Documents authorized by USAFSS¹⁷ Document Forwarded by NSA¹⁸

Introduction to MUSSO Introduction to MUSSO

T-1001 T-1001

T-1002 (Basic only)
T-1002 (Ch 1 and memo to holders entered)

T-1003 T-1003

T-1042 (Basic Plus Annex AO) T-1042

T-1043	T-1043
T-1056	T-1056
T-2020	TEXTA Manual*
T-6002	T-6002
T-9001	T-9001
T-9003	T-9003
T-9006	T-9006
T-9008	T-9007**
T-9010	T-9010
NSACIR 90-1	NSACIR 90-1
NSACIR 120-2	(Not forwarded)
TECH DOC 400	TECH DOC 400

^{*} Changes 1, 2, 4 and 7 not forwarded.

An adequate MUSSO Library was deemed essential to standardisation of operations here and at subordinate detachments.

^{**} T-9007 Ch 2 was forwarded instead of T-9008.

Footnotes

Chapter I

- 1. History of the 6994th Security Squadron 1 July 31 December 1968 RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1) 29 May 1969 Chapter III page 19.
- 2. See Chapter II page 6 this publication.
- 3. Weekly Activity Report (5 11 April) OFS-1 ACC 12 April 1969.
- 4. History of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron 1 January 30 June 1969 RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1), page 6.
- 5. Message, PACSCTYRGN 072045Z January 1969, Subj: Commando Forge Personnel Requirements/TFA Support Para B. PACAF applied the nickname Commando Forge to ARDF missions in support of CAS Vientiane and Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI). (Document 2).
- 6. Informal Message, Major Mrak to Lt Col Twombly, January 1970.
- 7. Message, USAFSS 082200Z January 1969, Subj: Commando Forge.
 (Document 3)
- 8. Message, Seventh Air Force, 131028Z April 1969, Subj: Commando Forge Deployment. (Document 5)
- 9. Memo for Record, 7AF Special Reconnaissance Division 19 March 1969, Subj: Reestablishment of an EC-47 Detachment at Hue Phu Bai. (Document 6)
- 10. Ibid.
- 11. Message, 6994th Security Squadron 190345Z April 1969, Subj: Phu Bai Contingency Planning. (Document 7)

Chapter II

- 1. ACC Working Aid 02-69, <u>The ARDF Mission Tasking Process</u>, 1 June 1969, Section III paragraph 3.
- 2. CINCPAC Plan SSO-00350-66, 24 December 1966, Subj: COMJAM Plan Monkey Pod.
- 3. Ibid; paragraph 3.
- 4. Message, USAFSS 141730Z January 1969, Subj: QRC-346 System. (Document 8)
- 5. Message, 6994 Security Squadron 110130Z April 1969, Subj: Over-weight Q-Wired Aircraft. (Document 9)
- 6. Message, 6994 Security Squadron 010705Z May 1969, Subj: Q Equipment. (Document 10)
- 7. At the beginning of this reporting period there were 17 AN/ALR-34 and 4 AN/ALR-35. Two of these AN/ALR-34s underwent 2042 modification to become AN/ALR-35. Position Status Report 182,05 June 1969 and Position Status Report 233, 25 June 1969 refers.
- 8. See this History Chapter II page 10.
- 9. See this History Chapter II page 2.
- 10. USA-561 Position Status Reports 1 through 243, 1 January 1969 through 30 June 1969.
- 11. See 6994SS History (AU-D5) 1 Jan 30 Jun 1969, page 11.
- 12. See this History Chapter 1 page 2.
- 13. Message, USAFSS 282320Z January 1969, Subj: Waiver of Maximum Flying Time.

- 14. Message, 6922 Scty Wg 240407Z May 1969, Subj: 203X1-MD Utilization. (Document 11)
- 15. Message, 6994th Security Squadron, 2807502 May 1969, Subj: (not stated) 203X1-MD Utilization. (Document 12)
- 16. History of the 6994th Security Squadron 1 July 31 December 1968 RCS: AU-D5 (USS-1).
- 17. OPS-3 6994th Security Squadron Memo, 28 April 1969, Subj: "Fifth Man" Justification. (Document 13)
- 18. Message USAFSS 082015Z May 1969, Subj: Additional 202XO personnel for NKP. (Document 14)
- 19. Letter 403d SOD (USA) 1 March 1969, Subj: After Action Report (Centurian IV). (Document 19)
- 20. Ibid. Para 6.
- 21. Ibid. Para 6.
- 22. Letter, 403 SOD (USA) 1 March 1969, Subj: After Action Report (Centurian V). (Document 20)
- 23. <u>Ibid</u>. Para 6.
- 24. <u>Ibid</u>. Para 7.
- 25. Letter, 403RD SOD, 17 March 1969, Subj: After Action Report, Carpenter 1 para 5b(3)(a). (Document 22)
- 26. Ibid. Para 6a.
- 27. Letter, 403RRSOD, 10 April 1969, Subj: After Action Report (Centurian VI). (Document 23)
- 28. <u>Ibid</u>. Para 6b.
- 29. Ibid. Para 7g.

Chapter III

- 1. Message, USM-704 270720Z IAPVACC/9086/1119, Subj: AVN Unit Daily ARDF Status Report. (Document 15)
- 2. Message, USM-704 240200Z IAPVACC/9083/1076, Subj: Implementation of New Recovery Report Format. (Document 16)
- 3. Message, USAFSS 191700Z March 1969, Subj: Tech Support Test for USAFSS ARDF Effort.
- 4. Message PACSCTYRGN 280045Z June 1969, Subj: SEATS Test. (Document 24)
- 5. Ibid.
- 6. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 090905Z May 69. (Document 25)
- 7. Message USAFSS 131624Z Feb 1969, Subj: ARDF DURMIS Procedures. (Document 18)
- 8. Message USAFSS 282003Z Jan 1969, Subj: Proposed ARDF DURMIS. (Document 17)
- 9. <u>Ibid</u>.
- 10. See this History Chapter III page 18.
- 11. See this History Chapter III page 19.
- 12. Message PACSCTYRGN 060221Z Mar 1969, Subj:
- ACC Working Aid 03-69. (Document 25)
- 13. Message 6994 Sety Sq 142345Z Mar 1969. (Document 26)
- 14. Message PACSCTYRGN 180155Z Mar 1969. (Document 27)
- 15. Message, PACSCTYRGN 300231Z Jan 1969. Subj: MUSSO (U)
 Publications Request. This Message quotes USAFSS TMD/TME 212213Z Jan 69
 message which stated USAFSS position on MUSSO documents required by this
 organisation and subordinate detachments. (Document 28)
- 16. Transmittal of Material Form A1295 from P22132 28 Mar 69. (Document 29)

- 17. See footnote 14 above.
- 18. See footnote 15 above.

List of Supporting Documents

- 1. Letter, OPS-1 (ACC) 12 April 1969, Subj: Weekly Activity Report (5-11 Apr).
- 2. Message PACSCTIRGN 072045Z January 1969, Subj: Commando Forge Personnel Requirements.
- 3. Message USAFSS 082200Z January 1969, Subj: Commando Forge.
- 4. Informal Message Major Mrak to Lt Col Twombly January 1969, Subj: EC-47 Program Conference.
- 5. Message, 7AF 131028Z April 1969, Subj: Commando Forge Deployment.
- 6. Memo for Record, 7AF Special Reconnaissance Division, 19
 March 1969, Subj: Reestablishment of an EC-47 Detachment at Hue Phu Bai.
- 7. Message 6994 Scty Sq 190345Z April 1969, Subj: Phu Bai Contingency Planning.
- 8. Message, USAFSS 141730Z January 1969, Subj: QRC-346 System.
- 9. Message 6994 Scty Sq 110130Z April 1969, Subj: Overweight Q-Wired aircraft.
- 10. Message, 6994 Sety Sq 0107052 May 1969, Subj: "Q" Equipment.
- 11. Message , 6922 Scty Wg 240407Z May 1969, Subj: Effective Utilization of 203X-MD Personnel.
- 12. Message 6994 Scty Sq 280705Z May 1969, Subj: (not listed)
- 13. Letter OPS-3 6994 Sety Sq, 28 April 1969, Subj: "Fifth Man" Justification.
- 14. Message USAFSS 082015Z May 1969, Subj: Additional 202X0 Personnel.

- 15. Message, USM-704 270720Z March 1969, Subj: AVN Unit Daily ARDF Status Report.
- 16. Message, USM-704 240200Z March 1969, Subj: Implementation of New Recovery Report Format.
- 17. Message, USAFSS 282003Z January 1969, Subj: Proposed ARDF DURMIS.
- 18. Message, USAFSS 131624Z February 1969, Subj: ARDF DURMIS Procedures.
- 19. Letter, 403d SOD 1 March 1969, Subj: After Action Report (Genturian IV).
- 20. Letter 403 SOD 1 March 1969, Subj: After Action Report (Centurian V).
- 21. Message, Co B 5th SFGA 280245Z February 1969, Subj: Combat Response to Intel Reports.
- 22. Letter 403 SOD 17 March 1969, Subj: After Action Report (Carpenter).
- 23. Letter, 403 SOD 10 April 1969, Subj: After Action Report (Genturien VI).
- 24. Message PACSCTYRGN 280045Z June 1969, Subj: SEATS Test.
- 25. Message, 6994 Scty Sq 0909052 May 1969.
- 26. Message, PACSCTYRGN 060221Z March 1969, Subj: ACC Working Aid 03-69.
- 27. Message, USA-561 1423452 March 1969, Subj: Data Base Development, Identification Procedures and Zulu Management.
- 28. Message, PACSCTYRGN 180155Z March 1969, Subj: ARDF Target Identification.

- 29. Message, PACSCTYRGN 300231Z January 1969, Subj: MUSSC Publications Request.
- 30. Transmittal of Material P2213" NSA 28 March 1969, List of MUSSO Documents shipped.

Glossary

A

ACC Airborne Radio Direction Finding Coordination Center.

A0 Area of Operation.

В

BN Battalion

Ç

CAS Controlled American Source

CMA Collection Management Authority

COMJAM Communications Jamming.

COMNAVFORV Commander Naval Forces Vietnam

COMUSMACV Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam

COSVN Central Office, South Vietnam

CP Command Post

D

DIV Division

DOCRS 7AF Deputy Commander for Special Reconnaissance

DODSPECREP Department of Defense Special Representative

DOE 7AF Deputy for Electronic Intelligence

DSU Direct Support Unit

FOB Forward Operating Base

Ç

GDRS General Directorate Rear Services

Ħ

HF High frequency

HQS Headquarters IRs

Intelligence Reports

IRAN

Inspect and Repair as Necessary

M

MACTHAI

Military Assistance Command Thailand

MACV

Military Assistance Command Vietnam

MI

Military Intelligence

MR.

Military Region

MUSSO

Manual U.S. SIGINT Operations

N

NSA

National Security Agency

NVA

North Vietnamese Army

<u>0</u>

OB

Order of Battle

A

Reg

Regiment

RRG

Radio Research Group

S

SEA

Southeast Asia

SEFE

Standardization/Evaluation Flight Examiner

SOD

Special Operations Detachment

SVN

South Vietnam

Ī

TEWS

Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

TOT

Time over Target

TRW


Tactical Reconnaissance Wing


AC

Viet Cong


VHF

Very High Frequency





_....



A LIST OF COORDINATES OF MACY AREAS Ø1 THRU 11 SFFECTIVE Ø5 OCT 68

MACV AREA Ø1: WD9Ø2Ø, XD666Ø NVN BORDER TO WE7958, VE 989Ø: AND WE1629.

MACV ARBA Ø2: DMZ TO XD666Ø, WD9Ø22, XC1268, YC7Ø68, AU86Ø2 AND COAST.

MACY AREA Ø3: XC1268, XB4596, XB6112, LAOS/CAMBODIAN BORDER TO YB7Ø38.

AND YC7Ø68.

MACY AREA Ø4: AU86Ø2, YC7Ø68, YB7Ø38, BS8638 AND COAST

MACV AREA Ø5: YB7Ø38, LAOS AND CAMBODIAN BORDERS TO YA78Ø8, CR1ØØ8.

AND COAST TO BS8638.

MACY AREA Ø6: TU7888, CP1577, COAST TO CRIGOS, TA7808 AND CAMBODIAN BORDER.

MACV AREA Ø7: YU686Ø, BN3234, COAST TO CP1577, YU7888 AND CAMBODIAN BORDER.

MACV AREA Ø8: YU1535, YS3246, COAST TO BN3234, YU686Ø AND CAMBODIAN BORDER.

MACV AREA Ø9: XS3Ø92, XS3Ø48, XS9648, COAST TO YS3246, YU1535 AND CAMBODIAN BORDER.


MACV AREA 10: X53048, X53092, CAMBODIAN BORDER TO COAST TO VR8360.


MACY AREA 11: XS3048, VR8360 AND COAST TO XS9648.


TABLE

AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF

RADIO INTERFERENCE AND USM-764 JAMING REPORT ATTN: SIGO	CAMS WARDEN COMNAVFORV USM-764, DODSFECTEP	MARKET TIME COMNAVFORV USM-704 DOINSPECRED	ARDF DAILY UNIT RESOURCE 6922 SCIY WG MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SUMMARY USAPSS (DURMIS) PACSCTYRGN 6940 SW	POSITION STATUS REPORT (FSR) DIRNSA DIRNSA USAFSS PACSCTTEGN AFSCG	EXPLOITABLE MESSAGE REPORT USM-626 (EMR.)	SOUTH EAST ASIA TECHNICAL DIRUSA SUMMARY (SEATS)	AVIATION DAILY STATUS REPORT USA-794	ARDS RECOVERY RESCRIT (ARR) USM-626 USM-624D USM-624D USM-613M
M/A	N/A	N/A	V/A	!	ARH ZIS DZZ	OIA	X	WA.
IMUSDIATE	RIVERMI	TWHEDIATE	FRICHITY	ROUTINE	FLASH	TMEDIATE	IMMEDIATE	FYA
ACC-WA-\$1,-69	ACC-WA-\$5-69	ACC-WA-Ø5-69	USAFSSM 266-4	TECHINS 1056	NSA NSG B6-395	TECHINS 2037	ACC MSG IAPVACC 9086/11119, 27/07202 MAR 69	лсс-мл-03-69
AS REQUIRED	AS REQUIRED	as required	DAILY	as required	as required	TALLY	DATIX	OF REGOVERY OF EACH MISSION ACET







FROM: OPS-1 (ACC)

SUBJECT: Weekly Activity Report (5 - 11 Apr)

TO: OPS

1. Personnel Matters: Nothing of significance to report.

2. Operational Fatters:

- This week Mission Control initiated a new report entitled the "Weekly Artillery Clearance Request " Anitially this action will encompass III Corps only (MACV Areas 8 and 9) After a 30-cay test period it will be expanded to include other areas of South Vietnam A massage will be prepared on Friday of each week. This will be accomplished immediately upon completion of the weekly ARDF tasking and receipt of the Seventh Air Force frag orders, The consumer must have this data in his possession upon initiation of each tasking crois . The report, or more correctly the request, will include the desired operating altitude, the radius of operation for each area in III that, and the time of expected flight duration in the different areas. It will be forwarded to the Fire Support Coordination Viewent (FSCE) along with the tactical callsign of the aircraft that will fly the area. Alpon receipt of the massage, the rSCE will, on a daily basis, request a clearance from the artillery control center for the missions to be flow on the following day. After take-off, the aircraft crew will contact the control center for the area and request entry clearance into the They will also determine if a clearance has been grented for their mission and confirm the altitude that has been cleared. The changes to altitude must be coordinated with the control center. It for any reason an assigned mission cannot be flown, the aircraft oren will follow normal operating procedures and request a new area. Upon receipt of a new area, the crew will again contact the control center and request a clearance and the altitude to be flown. It is inticipated that approximately 20 minutes will be required for a new artillery clearance to be granted and during this time the aircraft will leiter in a clear area. This procedure will apply any time an aircraft is requested to depart the assigned area. During the mission, the aircraft crew will monitor the local Artillery Warning Control Center (AWCC) INFO frequency for any changes that could affect the mission. The crew will advise the AWCC that the frequency is being monitored for any changes.
- b. Mission Control initiated a message on 6 April concerning technical support, as requested by Det 2, 6994th, involving MACV Area 3. The message was sent to two DA's (USP-604 and 808) plus USP-7. The list

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

040 S.9-31

of it was that there appeared to be a lack of technical support from the CMA's for targets in Area 3. USM-7 answered that there are only limited targets in the area and listed the lst/927th Battalion and substand 2nd Companies. They also cited additional tech data being provided in MACT Area 4 Alfa. It appears that the CMA's are doing all that is possible to satisfy the aviation units needs for these areas.

- c. Det 3 of the 6994th was established during this period. ACC's Reporting Section insured that the 6994th had instructed the personnel of Det 3 regarding proper procedures of reporting via the Daily Status Report and Recovery Report. Mission Control initiated AMDF tasking to Nakhon Phanom and established numeral six for the initial digit of the mission number for Det 3 to represent sorties active out of MAP. Wo CONFAT COUGAR aircraft are permanently assigned to NKP and official tasking for these commenced with the 12 thru 18 April tasking cycle. A COUGAR Zulu aircraft will be assigned as soon as secure communications can be installed between NKP and USM-808. Det 3 has been assigned USA designator number 564; source code NM.
- d. It projected that USM-621 Alfa will soon have two LAFFIME FAGILY aircraft evailable for tasking. The target date is not firm but the 221th Avn Bn reports that it should be sometime during the 12 thru 18 tasking cycle.
- e. In reference to item juliett of the W.A.R. (29 Mar 4 Apr).

 WMAF Air Force Day will be on 17 and 19 April vice the earlier reported date of 15 and 17 April. The event will be celebrated between the hours of 0900 1200 Fotel on each of the two days. Mission Control, in coordination with Seventh Air Force (DOCR-S), has scheduled all ARDF aircraft around these dates times to eliminate having to deploy any of our aircraft elsewhere due to non-availability of the airfield.
- f. On 7 April, Seventh Air Force called to report that a FAC had spotted the wreckage of what appeared to be a C-47 aircraft at Tankee Bravo 333 967. The supposition on this is that this may be the COMBAT ON B aircraft that went down in Laos on 5 February. No further word has been received on the results of photo-intelligence.
- g. Some difficulty has been experienced in implementation of the new Recovery Report format and the aviation Unit Daily ARDF Status. Report (UDASR). The major difficulty has been machine format errors in the Recovery Reports. Some units are not using the comments portion of the aircraft status section of the UDASR to account for aircraft TDT to/from the unit. Action is being taken to eliminate these errors through quality control messages.

- h. No further information has been received construint the particle posed NSA change to the Daily Fix Report format. We do not sufficient anything firm until after completion of the ARDY Effectiveness dudy presently being conducted by personnel from the Reporting Section 1.
- i. The Special Projects Section is currently conducting a study of Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa Provinces concerning target density. The purpose of this effectiveness study is to try to determine if it would be more feasible to task ARDF into a Province vice the present method of flying within the confines of a 37km or 22km radius of a fragged point.
- j. On 10 April, the ARDF Activity Report for March was lasted. This report showed a 13 rise in identifications and established an all-time high for fix totals. The fix total was 12,281. It exceeded last months figures by approximately 2,000.
- k. The Working Aid status remains basically as reported in last week's W.A.R. WA #6 is in the process of being published wills #2 and #4, will be ready for publication in the near future.
- 1. 1'ACV J211-4 responded positively to ACC's message requesting the the 6994th and its two Detachments be placed on distribution for the Baily Vietnamese Communist SIGINT Location Report (DVCSLR) from their respective CMA's.
- person el assigned to ACC and their respective DEROS. I have also nuchered in red pencil the order on which they will be leaving. It is interesting to note that again this year 8 of the 12 will have left bol Cct. Ty replacement and the new MCOIC may well arrive during the same month; reference Personnel's message 101030Z Apr to Wing requesting Sgt Parr's replacement be accelerated. This again will complicate the need for OIC MCOIC overlap for the next two coming yearly cycles at a minimum.

JACT D. STRVENS, Pajor, USAF

1 Atch

AF ACC PERSONNEL

NAME	GRADE	SN DOR	DEROS
Stevens, Jack D.	Maj		10 Jul 69 2
Parry-Ralph-W	SVSgt	-Jen-	-68 26 Aug 69
May, Ramon L.	SSgt	1 Dec	68 23 Aug 69 4
Botkin, Thomas G.	MSgt	1 Jan	68 5 Nov 69 15
Edgcomb, Donald A.	SSgt	1 Feb	66 13 May 69
Malone, Dale E.	SSgt	1 Jun	66 16 Mar 70 /
Twogood, Gary J.	SSgt	I Jan	68 12 Oct 69 9
Tutor, James L.	MSgt	1 Aug	68 2 Dec 69 5
Rood, Harland E.	TSgt	1 Dec	65 11 Jul 69 3
Glenn, James C.	SSgt	1 May	65 27 Jan 70 1/
Pairbanks, Kenneth D.	TSgt	1 Sep	68 : 1 Oct 69 8
Anderson, Milton R.	SSgt	1 Dec	68" 7 Sep 69 6
Bodine, Glinton S.	- SSgt	l Dec	68 1 Ney 69
Pagano, Paul Jr.	Sgt	1 May	67 : 26 Sep 69 7
Campbell, Bobbie R.	TSgt	1 Dec	66 ; 18 Sep 69.
Strout, Robert H.	SSgt	1 Feb	65 /8 Apr 69
Amundson, Lloyd J.	Sgt		29 Oct 69
Eckrich, Robert	Sgt	1 Jul	68 - 3 Dec 69
Repik, Charles A.	Sgt	1 Jun	66 25 Apr 70
			· 2011年 1911年 191

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

R 072345Z R PACSCTYRGN TO 6922SCTYGP/OPS INFO 6994SCTYSQ/OPS

OPS-A

SUBJ: COMMANDO FORCE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS/TFA SUPPORT.

RHF A: 6994SS OPS 040855Z JAN 60

B: 6022SU OPS 060933Z JAN 69 (NOTAL)

C: USAFSS ODC 132330Z SEP 38

D: PACAF OPL 031931Z NOV 68

E: USAFSS ODC 061512Z JAN 69

ARDF

#0405932

1. TO CLARIFY TOTAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS INVOLVED IN USAF XXX THAILAND PROPOSAL AND CLARIFY MISUNDERSTANDING UNION MAY EXIST, THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY IS PROVIDED AS CLARIFICATION TO REF ECHO.

- A. THE ORIGINAL USAFSS PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED TO CSAF FOR ARDF THAILAND AND SUPPORT TO CAS VIETIANE AND ISC(?) REQUIREMENTS HERE AS CONTAINED IN REF CHARLIE. A TOTAL OF (?) PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED IF LOCATION WAS AT MELP AND USAFSS CONTINGENT OPERATED FROM WITHIN ISC SECURE COMPOUND.
- B. PACAF STAFFED THE PROPOSAL FOR USAF ARDF THATLAND AND APPLIED NICKMAME COMMANDO FORCE. DURING PACAF STAFFING AUSTERE MEASURES WERE APPLIED TO MAINING REQUIREMENTS. SUBSEQUENTLY, TEN PERSONNEL WERE DELETED FROM USAFSS PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS, AS FOLLOWS: ONE 543MO, ONE 545MO, ONE 732MO, ONE 73251, AND SIX R 202MOS. THIS ACTION RESULTED IN TOTAL OF 50(?) USAFSS PERSONNEL BEING INCLUDED IN PACAF PROPOSAL TO CINCPAC AND ULTIMATELY TO JCS.
- C. USAFSS POSITION IS THAT ONE S32XG AND SIX 202XOS HAY BE ADDED TO 50 FIGURE FOR TOTAL MINIMUM MANHING OF 61 USAFSS PERSONNEL. IN SOME USAFSS HSGS, THE REQUIREMENT FOR ONE 702XO(?) HAS BEEN OMITTED AND REFERENCE TO 60 USAFSS PERSONNEL FOR COMMANDO FORCE HAS RESULTED. PACAF WILL NOT CONSIDER CHANGING THE 50 USAFSS PERSONNEL FIGURE WITTL COMMANDO FORCE IS DEPLOYED, AFSCC AND MANNING HUST INITIALLY REMAIN AS INDICATED IN REF CHANGE (?), LESS CHANGES SUMMARIZED IN THIS HSG, AND PENDING SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS BASED ON REF ECHO. DI TFA ACTIONS TO OBTAIN FOUR 2023 (?) AND ONE TRANSLATOR (203 HD) FOR DUTY IN ISC (?) CENTER DOES NOT CHANGE MINIMUM REQUIREMENT (?) BY USAFSS.

CERTIFIED BY: No Moore
DATE: 8 Nor72

Presidency. E CATION THAT OF THE C 494 SOTT MODE ENOUGH-CORDEA WARVES Sibil Colemnia role Personel Requirements/Tex Supports 1995 ETT & CSEAR WAS BEEN 72 MAKED The species are accepted Jan to America 4405933 ". Call'in gar, 1929 pp set ge" B. PANE OR STIRLL MY 48 THE THE SECOND S LANGE MENT THE PER TOWNER, REQUIREMENTS INVOLVED IN USAF MUSE THE EAST PROPOSEL AND ILLES WESTER WISDOWN TANDING WHICH AT WE THE DE PELICIAL RUNSY IS PROVIDED AS AND ATTEMPORAL COO. N. A THE MILLER DESPET PERSONNEL SERVINGUENTS PODVIDED THE THE THE LINE AND SEPTEME TO DAY VIETIANE AND ME SERVICE HTT THE AR CONTAINED IN SET CHARLIE. A TOTAL OF THE THE WALLYED IN LOCATION HAS AT HER AND USAFES PARTIE OF GLAVES THOU STITLING SECURE CONTOUND. MANUAL THE PROPOSE FOR USAF AND THAILAND AND THE STATE OF THE CASE OF THE PACAL TRAFFIES MISTER BELLINERS MARE LAPE THE MANNING REQUIREMENTS. PERSONNEL TE THE PRESENCE NEW TELETED FROM USAYES PER SONNEL AND AND PERSONAL ONE SHAME THE TRANSPORT THE TRANSPORT MASSE AND ADDRESS A PINE ACTION RESILIED IN TOTAL THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPOSAL TO HE AND STRUMENTS TO USE THE RESERVE TO THE DOWN TO ALL AND VILL TREND'S TO THE PARK THE MOTHER WHITE OF EACH THE REQUIREMENT FOR ONE THE AND RESERVENT VIA SE USAFES PER SUMME MANAGER LE NOT CONSIGER THE WARRY THROUGH THE COURSE OF FICTOR OF THE COURSE OF TH ATTENT OF THE WATER WITT THE FIALLY NEWLY AS DEN SERVICE STEPPEN SERVICE THE THIS PASS TO DARES L. C. OF 774

Corona Harriest
0405933

GERTIFIED TRUE COPY

ROUTINE
TDYC 082200Z
FM USAFSS
TO AFSSO USAF/AFNIN
INFO CINCPACAF
PACSCTYRGN
AFUSO 7AF
AEM

GCG SUBJECT: CONTANDO FORCE.

KEFS:

- A. JCS 08030, 031614Z JAN 69.
- B. COMUSMACTHAI 191140Z DEC 68.
- C. AFSSO PACAF 272356Z MOV 68.
- D. MY GCG 292355Z NOV 63.
- L. AFSSO USAF AFNIN 112107Z DEC 63.
- F. CINCPAC 040145Z JAH 69 PASEL PSR)

REFERENCE ALES CITES SEVERAL MESSAGES, INCLUDING REFERENCE BRAVO, CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ARDY TO THAILAND. THE ACTION PROVIDED FOR IN JCS MESSAGE APPEARS TO BE A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION TO GET THE COMMANDO FORCE PROJECT OFF DEAD CENTER AND HOPEFULLY MOVING TO THE EXTENT THAT EARLY DE-PLOYILENT IS POSSIBLE. I AM CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MACTHAI STATEMENT THAT FEWER PERSONNEL WOULD BE REQUIRED AT UDORN COULD INFLUENCE HEA TO PRESS JCS FOR A DECISION TO DEPLOY TO UDORN, WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE MACTHAI RATIONALE CONCERNING PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS WE ARE UNABLE TO REFUTE THE STATEMENT. WE DO KNOWN HOUEVER THAT USAFSS REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE SLIGHTLY GREATER REPEAT GREATER AT UDORN THAN NAKNON PHANON. ADDITIONALLY, WHILE ARMY HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH THE LAOTIAN DATA BASE PROBLEM, OUR ARDF CREWS RECENTLY SEMT TO UDORN REPORT THAT ARMY ANALYSTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MAINTAIN TARGET CONTINUITY WITHOUT EMPUT OF COMBAT COUGAR INTERCEPT DUE TO MON-HEARABILITY OF TARGETS IN NORTH LAOS FROM UDORN GROUND POSITIONS. THEREFORE, ANY SIZEABLE INTERCEPT INPUT OF PROPOSED THRIE COUGARS HAY EXCEED AUSTERE ARMY PROCESSING CAPABILITY. THE REMEDIAL (?) INPUT OF REQUIRED ANALYSTS SHOULD THEN BE FROM USAFSS SOURCES PREFEREABLY AT MCP. IN ANY EVENT, WE BELIEVE ME MUST CAREFULLY ASSESS THE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS AND ANY THADE-OFFS TO ENGURE THAT OUR DEPLOYMENT TO NAMHON PHANOM IS ASSURED. IN REFERENCES C, D, AND E, ABOVE WE HAVE COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT THE AIR FORCE MUST DEVELOP ITS OUR AMALYTICAL DATA SUPPORT UNIT, DEPLOYMENT OF COMMANDO FORCE TO UDORN COULD RESULT IN CONTINUING ARMY DOMINATION OF THE AMALYSIS/REPORTING EFFORT AND THUS THE AIR FORCE OVERALL OBJECTIVE COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED. I THEREFORE RECOIDEND THAT WE ALL BE ALERT TO THE POTENTIAL MANIPULATION OF PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS IN AN ATTUMPT TO INFLUENCE THE DECISION. IT WOULD BE REGRETTABLE THAT SHALL NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL RESOURCES BECOME THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN THE SELECTION OF UDORN. THEREFORE, IT APPEARS THE UDORN VERSUS NKP ISSUE MAY BE AVOIDED AT LEAST IN THE CINCPAC AREA. THE MAJOR CONCERN I HAVE RELATES TO POSSIBLE MSA NEGOTIATIONS WITH JCS REGARDING THE CRYPTO-LOGIC CEILING PROBLEM.

CERTIFIED BY: My Mison DATE: 8 Non 72-

NAPHIOUTINE
TOTE #522#EZ
FA USAFSS
TO AFSSO USAF/AFNIN
NEO CINOPACAP
CSOTYACH

#330-74

CONTRACTOR COMMANDS FORCE.

ed had skrater assess the can

L DONUSUACTHAL 1917APZ DEO 68

- C. AFERD PACAK 272356Z HOY SE
- CH MY CCG X983552 NOV 68
- 6. AFSSO USAF AFNIN 1121872 DEC 68
- FASC THEPAC THE 1492 JAN 69 (PASEL PSS)

DETERMINE ALFA CITÉ DEVENAL NESSAGES, INCLUDING REFERÈ CE BRAVO,

DETERMINO THE REPPOYMENT OF AND TO THAILAND. THE ACTION PROVICED FOR

IN ALA NESSAGE APPEARS TO BE A STEM IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION TO GET THE

COMMEND PORCE PROJECT OFF DEAD GENTER AND HOPEFULLY MOVING TO THE

EXTERT THAT EARLY DEPPOYMENT IS POSSIBLE. I AM CONCERNED, HOMEVER,

WAT THE MACTHAI STATEMENT THAT PEDER PERSONNEL HOULD BE REQUIRED AT

MOUNT COLD INFLUENCE HAS TO PRESS JOS FOR A DECISION TO DEPPOY TO

INCLUDE BITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE MACTHAI RATIONALE CONCERNIAG PERSONNEL

MENUINGSCHIE WE ARE CHALLED TO REFUTE THE STATEMENT, HE DO KNOW HOREVER

THAT USAF MITHEUT HOUSE ADDITIONALLY, WHILE ARMY HAS BEEN CHARGED

WITH THE LADYSAN DATA MASS PRODUCKS, OUR ARGE CRENS RECENTLY SENT TO

LEGAN THAT THAT A THY ARE SUBAT SOURCE INTERCEPT DIE TO NON-HEAR-

BILITY OF MARCETS IN MORTH LASS FROM UCONN CACUNI POSTTIONS. Therefore any street therefore, input of profosel three coughrs way EXCEPTION THE FEBRUARY PROCESSING PARTIE ILITY, THE RESECTAL INPUT OF ACCUMENTALISTS SHOULD THEN ES FROM USAFSS SOURCES PREFERABLY AT INPOSTED ANY ENERT OF BELLIEVE ME MUST CAREFULLY ASSESS THE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS AND ANY TRACKED FRETO ENSURE THAT OUR DEPROTERT TO MAPRIN PRINCIPLE ASSERTED. IN SEPERENCES U. D. ALC E. ABOVE WE HAVE COLDERTE ADRESMENT THAT THE AIR FORCE MUST DEVELOP ITS ONN LALER TO ALTO SUPPORT UNITED BERNONIENT OF COUNTRY OF CREWANDO FORCE TO LEGAN COLD RESILTS IN TORT RUTHE MANY DOWNATION OF THE ANALYSIS REPORTING EXERT AND FEMALES FOR A PORCE POYCHALL OBJECTIVE GOULD NOT BE ACHIEVED. EFFERENCE OF COMMEND THAT HE ALC: BE ALERT TO THE POTENTIAL MANAGERATION OF PERSONAL REQUIREMENTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO INFLIENCE THE DESTRIBUTE PROBLET SE RESPECTABLE. THAT SMALL MAKEERS OF PERSONALL ATTO THE PERSON PRIMERY DONS I DERATION IN THE SELECTION OF LOCAL. THE REPORT APPEARS THE LEGGAL WERSUS NKP 135UC WAY BE AVOIDED AT EAST AND THE CINCPAC AREAL THE MAJOR CONCERN I HAVE RELATES TO WELLER WILL BE CONTROL OF THE CHAPTOLICS IC ceil is a problem

NESO JAN CO

EXCLUSIVE FOR LT COL TWOMBLY FROM MAJ MRAN

SUBJECT: EC-47 PROGRA CONFERENCE

1. BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS MUST BE RESOLVED IT COMMANDO
FORGE (CF) IS TO BECOME A REALITY:

A. CAN THE EXISTING FLEET MEET MACV REQUIREMENT GLADO CFT.

THIS IS EXSPECIALLY IMPORTANT SINCE WE HAVE LOST N CCZ AT PLEIX AND THE SE WHILE IN ROUTE TO SEA. IF THIS MATTER IS ADDRESSED. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT FLYING FROM MAR WILL IMPROVE THE TOT IN AN AREA THAT IS ALREADY A MACV AREA OF CONCERN: THE CONLY FACET THAT WILL DILUTE THIS POSITION IN THE SUPPORT TO CAS. THIS HOWEVER, IS UNDER STRUCK BETWEEN MACTHAI AND MACV. AND THE PAST AGREEMENT CONCERNING ARDF IN LAOS IS BELIEVED TO BE IN THE PROCESS OF REVISION.

- B. AS A PARALLEL TO THIS, THE VARIOUS OTHER NON-AIR FORCE AGENCIES WHO FAVOR THE UDORN DEPLOYMENT ARE ON SOLID GROUND FROM THE POINT OF BASING ARDF AT THE CMA. THE ZASLOW:

 COMMENTS WILL BEAR THIS OUT. THIS POSITION CAN BE ANSWERED HEST BY THE FACT THAT WE ARE PRESENTLY POORLY POSITIONED TO COVER THE NORTHERN REACHES OF MACV AREA ONE. SOME COMPARATIVE FIGURES MIGHT POINT THIS OUT.
- (1) THE DISTANCE FROM PLEIKU TO TCHEPONE, LAOS, ISLESSONM. THE DISTANCE FROM NXP TO TCHEPONE IS 95 NM. THE DISTANCE FROM UDORN TO TCHEPONE IS 200 NM. TCHEPONE WAS SELECTED SINCE IT IS AT THE SOUTHERN END OF AREA ONE AND BEST ILLUSTRATES THE DIFFERENCES IN RELATIONSHIP TO A PRIME TARGET AREA. (FRAG POINT 501 B).
- (2) THE DISTANCE TO SAM NEUA IN NORTHERN LAOS IS
 218 NM FROM NKP AND 188 NM FROM UDORN. THOUGH THIS AREA
 IS NOT OF GENERAL CONCERN TO MACV IT IS INTERESTING TO
 NOTE THAT THE DISTANCES ARE NOT AS DRASTICALLY DIFFERENT.
 TO ALLOW THIS FACTOR TO COME INTO PLAY.
- C. THE LAST ACT OF THIS PARTICULAR TRILOGY, ASIDE
 FROM THE SIGINT SUPPORT TO TFA, IS THAT THE SELECTION OF
 3 AIRCRAFT WAS BASED ON SOME RATHER NEBULOUS FACTORS.
 COL HARDEN HAD DETAILS OF HOW 3 BECAME THE MAGIC FIGURE.
 AS I HAVE STATED PREVIOUSLY, THREE AIRCRAFT COULD GENERALLY
 SUPPORT TFA WITH APPROXIMATELY 12-13 DHOC. THIS IS AROUTE.

WAT IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR LEFECTIVE ARDY SUPPORT DORING THE COMMANDO HUNT SEASON, WHICH WILL THE SHORTLY SUPPORTING CAS WOULD ONLY DILUTE THIS IF SUPPORT TO CAS IS AN OBJECTIVE OF CF THEN AN INCREASE IN THE WUNDER OF AIRCRAFT IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY. THIS, THEN BRINGS US TO TWO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CF OPERATION FROM HERE. 2. THOUGH WE ARE NOT FULLY AWARE OF ALL OT THE DETAILS CONCERNING THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENLARGED TECHNICAL PROCESSING CENTER USAFSS WISHES TO ESTABLISH AT MICE. IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE 54, 60, OR 61 PERSONNET WILL NOT SUFFICE TO PERFORM ALL THE TASKS REQUIRED. THOUGH THIS SHOULD NOT AFFECT THE CF PLAN, AS STATED, IT DOES OPEN THE DOOR TO MANY OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. THE SSLO HAS INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PROPOSED EXPANDED GORS PROCESSING CENTER, AND IT IS ONLY BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION SINCE IT SHOULD BE CLARIFIED AT THE WING AND PSR, PRIOR TO ANY DIS-CUSSION AT PACAF. ATTACHING A FOLLOW ON PACKAGE TO CF MAY NOT BE PROPITIOUS AT THIS TIME-BUT SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED.

A. THE LOGISTICS ASPECTS OF ANY MOVE TO NOT SMALL OR LARGE MUST BE RESOLVED AS THE FIRST STEP TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE HAVE HEARD LITTLE OF WHAT POSITIVE SOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN TENDERED TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. IF LOGISTICS ASPECTS ARE NOT THE MAJOR TOPIC OF THE DISCUSSION, THE MEETING WILL RESOLVE NOTHING.

B. THE ADDED ASPECT OF SENDING TACREPS AND FROM COMINT AIRBORNE PLATFORMS WAY RESOLVE ANOTHER PROBLEM. THIS CAN COME TO FRUITION THE MEED OF PLACING CCZ AIRCRAFT AT NKP MAY BE NEGATED. KY-S TIP-OFF, A/A WITH COMMANDO LANCE/ COMBAT APPLE/CONFY EARS AND CO COULD BE VERY LUCRATIVE. IT IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME PROCESS THAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH CHAZDSM AND CC AIRCRAFT: NEEDLESS TO SAY IT IS WOEFULLY LACKING IN SVN. WE COULD PERFECT THIS PROCEDURE IN THIS LOCALE. THE DRAWBACK IS LACK OF WHE IF. AS WE HAVE CONCLUDED MINI-MOD WILL BE PRIMARILY DIRECTED AT THE LACTIAN DMZ AREA, YET, WE ARE AVARE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF TOT AND ALSO THE FACT THAT HACV WILL NOT NECESSARILY USE THE MINI-MOD IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS OF MISSIONS TO SUPPORT THA AS IT SHOULD BE SUPPORTED. THE STATIONING OF CC TO NKP IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THE CCZ TULD BE A BETTER SOLUTION IF KY-B'S ON ACRP'S AND AN

CORRECT SOLUTION IS TO PLACE SE/MINI-MOD AT NKP. THE LACK OF PROPER PROVISIONING OF AGE FOR SE HAS MADE A WITHERED OLD MAN OF CF. THE WHF PROPOSAL BY 7AF (LT COL FISHER) IS SOUND AND WILL HAVE TO BO AS A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. IF POSSIBLE, YOU SHOULD TAKE A LOOK AT IT BEFORE YOU GO TO THE MEETING.

TO THE MEETING. C. I WOULD LIKE TO SUM UP THE LOGISTICS ASPECTS AS . THE LAST PORTION OF CF. WE SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE THREE AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT TO NEP IS FEASIBLE IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE COST OF SUCH A LIMITED FORCE. A POSSIBLE EXPANSION D. A-6-18 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MIGHT NOT IMPACT MUCH MORE HAVILY THAN THREE AIRCRAFT HOTATING TO PLEIKU FOR MAJOR MINIENANCE. IF WE BET HUNG UP ON MAKING THIS WHOLE PROJECT RY AT AN EARLY DATE, WE NIGHT WISH TO RE-GROUP AND LOOK AT THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF ARDFIDSIVEDRS. THE FRAGMENTED TEVELOPMENT OF THIS EFFORT LEADS HE TO BELIEVE THAT OUR STAFFING PROVESS IS NEGLIGIBLE, LET ALONE LACK OF HAVING DENTIFIED SPECIFIC COMMAND BOALS, AND THEN MEETING THEM HEAD OR IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER I AM CERTAIN PSR AND WING ME BETTER INFORMED ON THIS BUT IT SHOULD NOT GO UNNOTICED FROM OUR POSITION: LASTLY, WE DID NOT DETERMINT THE NUMBER OF ACET MOR DID WE ESTABLISH THE MANNING, YET WE WILL BE CHANGED WITH CARRYING OUT THIS ILL-CONCEIVED PLAN THAT IS LOGISTICALLY, OPERATIONALLY, AND ORGANIZATIONALLY UNSOUND: COOOD LUCK WITH ALL THE HELP I'VE GIVEN YOU 3. HY GENIOUS IS NOT DEPLETED, BOTH WING AND PSR SHOULD ONE UP WITH SPECIFIC QUIDELINES FOR MANNING SE PRIOR TO WEADROOM RESOLUTION. OUR POSITION AT THE OPS OFFICER CONFERENCE WAS CLEAR, BUT NOT VALIDATED BY EITHER WING OR REGION WHILE AT WING REGION THIS POSITION, AND REASONS FOR BACKING TAF POSITION SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR. ALSO, "BO" HAS FIGURES ON SATH MANNING THAT SHOW WE ARE NOT MANNED TO CONSIDER CORNUAN Q'S AS Z'S. IT WOULD ALSO BE WISE TO HAVE R. YING HOUR FIGURES WITH YOU IF YOU CAN GET THEM. OPS-2 WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE THEN BY THIS DATE. I ALSO WONDER MAT WE HAVE DONE TO PREPARE BILLETING SPACE, ETC., AT ALL LOCATIONS IF HEADROOM IS MADE AVAILABLE FOR ADD-ON VICE MPLACEMENT: PEARFOLLY, NOTHING 3. THE TEN PROJECT IS MILL MOVING ALONG SATISFACTORILY.

LT ENGL VALIDITY TO THE COMPANY CONCERNING THE PARALLE

EVOLVEMENT OF THE 7AF SSG AND THE DSU AT THE THE MEN
FEEL AS THOUGH THEY HAVE LOST THEIR IDENTITY AND THIS IS
A GOOD SIGN OF SSG PROCESS HAPPENING ONCE AGAIN TO THE
CONSIDERED IMPORTANT THAT TWO THINGS HAPPEN FIRST, THAT
EITHER AN NOO OR OFFICER BE SOLE CONTACT WITH DIT!
AND PROVIDE SECURITY SERVICE INPUT THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO
THE CONSUMER-AND ALSO THAT SEPARATED FACILITIES BECOME
AVAILABLE ASAP IF WE ARE TO CONTINUE WITH THE 5-6 MAN
EFFORT. ONE VAN WOULD DO IT. KY-8 RESOLUTION IS STILL IN
DOUBT, SS MAY HAVE TO PROVIDE IT. I HAVE NOT BE EFFORT.

